A PERSONAL DIARY

OF THE 1964 REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

Henry A. Kissinger
Explanatory Note

The following notes were written every evening at the end of each day -- except for a few entries. The notes were completed before I left San Francisco two days after the Convention ended.

This diary makes no attempt at an objective assessment. It describes the impressions of one participant at the fringes of the Convention during a period charged with emotion.

Only seven copies of this document exist. This copy is being shown to you in strictest confidence. I would be grateful if you did not show it to anyone or share its observations with anybody else.

Henry A. Kissinger
July 6

Arrived 1300 at the Sheraton Plaza. Joined a meeting of Hinman, Pfeiffer, Perkins, Deardourff and Wells. Hinman was worried and ferret-like. Perkins had his usual mimeographed forms with him. Wells was making cynical comments. The general atmosphere was one of dejection. This could have been NAR's show. As it is, everyone present had his own regrets and his own theory for the failure.

The immediate problem was to establish a mode of cooperation with the Scranton camp. This is not easy. Scranton's organization is non-existent. His strategy is completely unclear. It is not certain, for example, whether Scranton envisages the discussion about the platform as a way of clarifying issues or of improving his position for an eventual compromise. A Steering Committee has been formed. NAR's intelligence and that of Scranton do not match. The NAR staff was of the view that some people invited by Senator Scott (Scranton's chief lieutenant) are leaning towards Goldwater (i.e. McCulloch of Ohio). It was not clear whether Scranton wanted the Steering Committee to include the widest possible consensus or only those people on whom he could count. There was some desultory talk about a letter Scranton has written to the platform committee to be released the next day. Apparently Scott had not been informed of this.
At 1400 I went to see Gene Lipscomb, a Representative from California who is acting as Laird's assistant for foreign policy. (I had consistently opposed this for fear that they would later use my name on material I could not approve. Perkins insisted that I owed it to NAR to go over NAR's foreign policy planks with the Committee.) Lipscomb was at first extremely suspicious and aloof. Even after he warmed up, it was clear that NAR is not a force he reckons with. He seemed much more concerned about the reaction of the Goldwater side. He said that some Goldwater supporters wanted a plank urging the United States to withdraw from the United Nations. I told him there were three issues of principle in NAR's planks: (a) maintenance of our membership in the U.N., (b) continued recognition of the USSR, and (c) no delegation of the decision to use nuclear weapons. The rest of the conversation consisted in an explanation of the Governor's platform planks.

At 1800 there was another desultory staff meeting for the purpose of giving assignments to the research staff.

At 2000 Clare Booth Luce spoke to the platform committee -- an icy, poised presentation of the views of the Citizen's Council. It was presented with little conviction as if Clare Booth Luce did not herself much care whether these views were accepted. There was one technical question about the Panama Canal which she sharply cut off.
On the way out I exchanged a few words with her. I also saw Theodore White who said that the Convention was stacked in favor of Goldwater.
July 7

The day started with a breakfast meeting with Deardourff, Moore and Perkins. There was some desultory talk and a report by Perkins about the Steering Committee. Apparently McCulloch of Ohio had taken the position that he would mediate between Goldwater and Scranton. More effort was expended trying to find compromise language than in developing a common strategy.

We then went to the airport to greet NAR. I rode in with the NBC correspondent covering NAR. He said that NAR lost the California primary partly because of Nelson Jr.'s birth, partly because his campaign had lacked any substance.

NAR then spoke to the platform committee. It was on the whole well, if somewhat monotonously, delivered. Romney was there -- dapper and suave. He distributed a text of his own statement for the next day. It turned out to be a political science essay on federal-state relations. His assistant Van Dusen asked me what I thought of it. I said that there was nothing in it to which Goldwater would object nor did it indicate any over-all course for the GOP. It was a holding action. Privately it struck me as characteristic of the GOP moderates, not one of whom -- except NAR -- has the moral courage to draw an issue of principle and each of whom holds himself available either for the unexpected here or at least as the heir presumptive of the the Goldwater following for 1968.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
This was followed by lunch. Present were: NAR, Carlino, Pfeiffer, Wells, Ronan, Perkins, Moore, and Hinman. Carlino reported that the Platform Committee was 75% in favor of Goldwater. Even though N.Y. has the largest delegation and is the most thoroughly Republican state, none of its members are on the Drafting Committee.

Hinman reported appalling confusion in the Scranton camp. He had been appointed Vice-Chairman of the Scranton campaign without even being consulted or informed. He read about it in the newspapers. He could not name a single delegate who had switched to Scranton. Some interpreted Scranton's letter in the morning as an indication that he would settle for Vice President.

This led to a discussion about NAR's stance if Scranton pulled out of the race. I expressed the view that NAR should go ahead and let his name be placed in nomination. He should use the argument that he did not want the party of Lincoln to be turned over to Goldwater's forces by acclamation and he wanted to give the delegates a choice. The professionals (Hinman and Wells) strongly objected saying that it was an amateurish proposal: NAR would be left with perhaps fifty supporters. I said that two years from now people would remember his stand, not his defeat.

The issue was left unresolved until the week-end -- though NAR leaned towards my point of view.
The same argument was repeated about the platform. What was our stance if the Scranton forces compromised. I urged a floor fight. Hinman and Wells objected. This too was left unresolved.

During the meeting, a call came from General Schulz -- Ike's aide. He said he was "returning" NAR's call. NAR said that he had not placed a call. Schulz then suggested that as long as the connection was made why not talk to the "Old Man." Ike then came on and asked NAR how things were going. NAR said that all those who had believed in Eisenhower Republicanism were disheartened. The Convention seemed in the hands of the Goldwater forces. Everything Eisenhower Republicanism had stood for seemed doomed. Ike asked what NAR thought he should do. NAR said he should indicate his preference for Scranton -- nothing less would help now.

Ike said that he could not go back on his position of the past 18 months, that he would not dictate to the Convention. NAR said rather icily: You will have to decide, Mr. President, whether consistency is the highest value.

At this point, Representative Miller came to the suite asking for NAR's support for the Vice Presidential nomination. The conversation was in a private room off the dining room. NAR told us that he had flatly refused.

The disorganization of the Scranton forces is shown by the fact that it has proved impossible to plant questions designed to bring out
Goldwater's position in the Committee even among Scranton's supporters. Van Dusen (Romeny's man) has flatly refused. Seibal would not ask a question about extremism, arguing that he had done his duty by introducing an amendment condemning it. Moreover, it is doubtful that Laird would recognize hostile questions.
July 8

Morning meeting with Perkins to discuss strategy. I urged taking a stand on some issues of principle. The anti-Goldwater group was running for history not only for the Convention. Moreover, it was quite clear that the Goldwater forces could not possibly be conciliated. Perkins promised to take it up with the Steering Committee. We drafted some planks on the UN, nuclear weapons control, etc., which could then be submitted to the Platform Committee.

I then attended hearings listening to Romney, Meany, and Lodge. Romney's passion could not obscure his emptiness. He advocated basing economic development abroad on private enterprise but he did not explain how this was to be done. He spoke on behalf of civil rights but insisted that it was in part a local responsibility and had to take place "in the hearts of men." He advocated a trade policy based on the reduction of US tariffs on raw materials in return for the reduction of the tariffs of underdeveloped countries on consumer goods -- in other words, the classic definition of imperialism. In short, it was the characteristic straddling of the self-styled moderates desperately trying to find a position in the middle of whatever may be at hand. They are the prisoners of events which they then arrange in an arbitrary hierarchy with themselves in the middle. In this case Romney tried to distinguish himself from both Scranton and Goldwater.
Lodge was little better. His prepared text was full of generalities including a particularly intriguing one: "We must never let other nations consider us hooked." NATO? OAS? He also spoke violently against any nuclear diffusion, rating it as a danger above Soviet hostility. There was only one indirect reference to Goldwater's views. Does Lodge, too, think that lightning might strike?

Meany's presentation was the most manly.

As for the Convention itself, it has become apparent that the Platform Committee is packed with Goldwater supporters and that its chairman, Laird, is basically on Goldwater's side. The present plan is to present a platform Friday evening and then get it adopted that same evening. None of the Scranton supporters on the Committee will get a look at the platform before Friday evening. (Allegedly the Goldwater camp will not either. But since the drafters are Goldwater supporters, this distinction is meaningless.)

In order to counteract this, Senator Scott induced Representative Conte to introduce a motion asking that the Chairmen of the Subcommittees be designated as a Drafting Committee and submit planks each evening. Laird refused. Rather than press the issue to a vote, Scott then decided that it was wiser to appoint a subcommittee on procedures to report tomorrow (Thursday). To this Laird agreed. Scott's reasoning was that this avoided a defeat and enabled the issue to be kept alive. The real reason, however, seems to me the professional politician's instinctive trend towards compromise. By tomorrow it will not matter what the platform committee
decides, for even if the Conte proposal is adopted, it will be too late to do any good. The Goldwater people will have gotten through the week without having a substantive debate of the issues.

At noon, Laird started showing the brass knuckles. He told Perkins that he was sick and tired of the pressure of the Scranton and Rockefeller forces. If he needed assistance, he would ask for it. Otherwise he did not want to be bothered. This is the capstone of a year's effort by Perkins to gain the good-will of Laird -- an effort I had always doubted. Perkins had believed that he could get NAR's ideas into the platform by infiltrating the committee -- a quixotic gesture and a silly one.

Lunch with Pfeiffer, Young, Wells, Moore, Deardourff, Ronan and McManus. Most of the discussion concerned placing NAR in nomination assuming Scranton stayed in the race. I again urged that NAR stay in regardless of Scranton. I had an unexpected ally in Young who said that he wanted a vote to see which bastards in the New York delegation "he should get" during the next two years.

At the lunch Hinman reported a Scranton "victory." The Goldwater group had proposed that in 1968 the members of the National Committee be ex officio delegates to the Convention. This would have slightly strengthened the smaller states. The Rules Committee had voted against this.
In the afternoon, the confusion of the Scranton camp was evident again. Laird had offered each speaker an opportunity to select those members of the platform committee who were to ask questions ahead of time. NAR had refused. The Scranton people accepted. This guarantees that all questions to Scranton tomorrow will be friendly. However, it also guarantees that all questions to Goldwater will be friendly and known to him in advance. This means that an opportunity to pinpoint his weaknesses has been thrown away and also the chance to lure him into one of his characteristic gaffes.

In the afternoon, Laird called Perkins in a conciliatory tone saying in effect that the Committee would go far towards meeting the Scranton wishes and would balk only at personal attacks on Goldwater.

The weakness of the Scranton forces is shown by their members in the Platform Committee. Two weeks ago in Pocantico Hills a joint meeting of Romeny, NAR and Scranton advisors agreed on a common strategy. There was some talk about varying the approach in order to avoid the impression of a cabal. In fact there is almost no coordination. No one wants to expose himself at this late stage.
The secret of this Convention is that there are no secrets. The Goldwater forces are in control. The so-called moderates are impotent, incompetent and selfish. The control of the Goldwater forces extends even to minutiae. The seating arrangements have placed the N.Y. and Pennsylvania delegations into the furthest corner of the hall. The control of the Goldwater forces extends even to minutiae. The seating arrangements have placed the N.Y. and Pennsylvania delegations into the furthest corner of the hall. The seats given to Rockefeller and Scranton for spectators are similarly badly located.

The moderates behaved today in what has become characteristic vacillation. Lodge is not taking a very active part. Things which he cannot conduct personally do not seem to engage his attention. The moderates suffer from the fact that no one knows what they are trying to do. Write planks to sharpen issues. Today hours were spent on a proposed plank on the UN. What finally emerged was a demand that the Charter be revised (an old Goldwater proposal). I asked the drafter what changes he had in mind. It turned out that he had something in mind. The 黁 secret of this Convention is that there are no secrets. The

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research staff) said to me that I should be more flexible. "You have got to give these fellows something if you want their support." It is no great victory to write a plank embodying a Goldwater proposal.

The daily strategy lunch of the Rockefeller group has degenerated into a bull session since there is nothing to talk about.

The Conte resolution of the previous day has failed. The procedure now is that Sections 1 and 2 of the platform will be submitted to the Committee Friday night and will then be immediately debated. (Part I contains a statement of GOP principles; Part II, an attack on the Democratic record.) Sections 3 and 4 (containing specific proposals) will be submitted to the Committee Saturday morning and will then be immediately debated in Executive Session. This means that neither the Scranton nor the Rockefeller staff will see the actual text before the debate begins and there is a rumor that Committee members will not be permitted to take them out of the room.

Scranton testified today. The text of his speech was good. The delivery was tepid, as if at a PTA meeting. Now that all the "moderates" have testified it is noticeable that none--except Rockefeller--drew an issue of principle. Everyone acted as if all that was at stake was some difference of opinion about technical solutions. And even these were often presented in a way that only the initiate could understand them.
Whatever the shortcomings of the Goldwater supporters, they do have convictions. They are not public opinion poll watchers like the moderates. They mean business and the inability of the moderates to believe that they are serious has helped them. Freed from worry about reactions of the press --which they hate--they have gone their way and created their own reality.

Two weeks ago at a strategy conference in Tarrytown, attended by Scott, Van Dusen, NAR, Ronan and myself, the idea had been to rely on Laird to write a sensible platform. He was proud of his Congressional record and would seek to embody it in the platform. This, in turn, would embroil him with Goldwater's supporters, since Goldwater opposed his fellow Republican on almost every issue. This fatuous reasoning has already been exposed as empty. On every issue so far Laird has been on the side of the Goldwater supporters. And why not? Why should he fight the likely Presidential nominee when the national leaders of the party behave so ambiguously? Why should Laird pull the chestnuts of the moderates out of the fire? The fact is that he is working hand-in-glove with Goldwater and probably has all along.
July 10

The day started with Goldwater's presentation to the platform committee. The room was jammed 45 minutes before the hearing was supposed to begin. Goldwater's supporters were there in full force. In fact, the room was packed an hour before the meeting started and was closed by the fire department. I got in only by means of a press card which a friend had given me. Later it appeared that many tickets were counterfeit and many bona fide ticket holders were excluded.

As for the Goldwater supporters, it is a mistake to think of them as old ladies in tennis shoes and retired colonels. The vast majority of the enthusiasts in the room were bright, eager young men. The Goldwater supporters are middle class and "respectable." They feel threatened and insecure. They crave the safety of total commitment. Whatever Goldwater's "real" views, as a phenomenon his movement is similar to European fascism.

Goldwater's presentation, though it lacked intellectual content, had fervor and intensity magnified by the enthusiasm of his audience. Goldwater had more fire than any of the moderates -- with the possible exception of NAR. He stands for something other than an artificial middle position. In a void, this is a powerful appeal.

After the Goldwater presentation I went to Senator Scott's suite where various staffers and Perkins were sitting around in various stages of dejection. I desultorily started scribbling down some thoughts with respect to...
Goldwater's observation that control over nuclear weapons should be delegated to the NATO commander. (See Appendix A.)

Senator Scott came in prior to a press conference he had scheduled half an hour later. He proposed to tell the press that the platform committee had accepted eight of Scranton's eleven proposals before the Platform Committee. Perkins asked him whether these proposals contradicted anything Goldwater had ever said. Scott said no, but that a claim of victory was necessary because of its psychological impact on the arriving delegates. In other words, Scott was claiming as a victory that the Goldwater group accepted its own views. Perkins violently objected.

He pointed out that any comparison of the draft planks with the Goldwater record would demonstrate that the victory claim was ludicrous. Moreover, claiming victory on eight issues would make it difficult to take a stand on the planks that were essential: extremism, civil rights and nuclear control.\footnote{As these lines are being typed, Scranton has repeated the claim of "winning" on eight issues.} Scott then said that Goldwater had even been conciliatory as to the control over nuclear weapons. I said that I disagreed. On the contrary, Goldwater had reiterated his familiar views in different language. I handed Scott my notes about nuclear control. He walked out of the door with them. The next thing I knew he was attacking Goldwater on television and all hell broke loose. Thus are issues of principle born.
I then had lunch with Representative Frelinghuysen who was supposed to carry the fight for the nuclear plank in the Platform Committee. He was thoroughly intimidated because Goldwater supporters had told him that he was violating security by even raising the issue. I reassured him and explained the command structure of NATO to him. He agreed to introduce an amendment about nuclear control.

During the afternoon -- after the testimony had been completed -- the strategy of the Goldwater supporters on the Platform Committee became apparent. The first two sections of the Platform (containing a statement of principles and an indictment of the Democratic record) will be submitted to the Platform Committee tonight (Friday) in Executive Session. Parts III and IV (containing recommendations for domestic and foreign policy) will be submitted to the Platform Committee tomorrow, also in Executive Session. Each part must be voted on at the session when it is submitted. No member of the Platform Committee will be permitted to take a copy of the Platform out of the room with him.

This procedure deprives the Scranton supporters of effective staff advice. (Since the Committee is composed of 75% Goldwater supporters, his views will undoubtedly dominate the platform.) In order to obtain advice, Scranton supporters will have to report their recollection of the contents of the Platform to their staff. This makes it impossible to discuss nuances. It makes the Scranton staff dependent on what hard-pressed delegates consider significant in fields with which they are often unfamiliar. It prevents any serious analysis of omissions. It will be very difficult to articulate a clear issue in these circumstances.
July 11

The day started with a 7:30 meeting at Senator Scott's suite in the St. Francis. It was not until 8:30 that all the Scranton supporters had assembled. A major reason was that the Platform Committee had been kept in session until 3:00 a.m. in order to approve Part I and Part II of the Platform. At this point, no member of Scranton's staff -- not Scranton, Lodge, Rockefeller or any other key figure -- had seen the text of these sections. The reports from the moderate members of the Platform Committee were hardly reassuring. They described Parts I and II as intransigent and the criticism of the Democrats as excessive. The mood of the majority of the Platform Committee was shown by a refusal to incorporate any reference to Eisenhower's record in the first two sections of the Platform. During the meeting, there was still no text of Parts I and II available because the Executive Committee was redrafting and had collected all copies of the night before. The Scranton supporters were further handicapped by the fact that their amendments had to be improvised while they were being exposed to enormous, almost abusive, pressure from the Goldwater supporters to approve the Platform.

In order to avoid this particular problem, Senator Scott sought to work out a procedure to deal with the substantive planks which would come up during the day. Since no one had seen the text of Parts III and IV, the group tried to prepare amendments for every major policy area -- a time-consuming and not very efficient process.
The discussion was slowed even further because Romney's assistant Van Dusen came up with a typical piece of Romney pretentiousness. He wanted to offer two amendments taken from Romney's speech before the Platform Committee: (1) that the GOP was dedicated to putting the consumer in the driver's seat and (2) a plank calling for a reduction in U.S. raw material tariffs in return for a reduction by raw material exporters of tariffs against manufactured goods.

No one else was enthusiastic about these proposals but an hour was spent discussing them. In the event, Van Dusen -- who himself is a good man -- reserved Romney's position.

It was finally decided to make an issue of four planks: extremism, civil rights, right to work, and control of nuclear weapons. At this point, Van Dusen announced that Romney would not go along with a condemnation of the John Birch Society or any other specific group. He would go no further than a general censure of extremism.

From this meeting I had to run over to the Sharaton-Palace to talk to Keating who, I was told by Perkins, had developed reservations about an amendment with respect to the control of nuclear weapons. As it turned out his concerns were not substantive. He was simply afraid that Ike would pull the rug out from under Scranton. If Ike remained neutral, Keating said, he would go along.
In other words, the performance of the moderates was hardly awe-inspiring. At the same time, the behavior of the Goldwater group was becoming more and more intransigent. Increasingly, the hints of the previous week about a conciliatory attitude on the Platform turned out to be ruses designed to prevent a concerted approach by the Goldwater opponents in their testimony before the Platform Committee. This having been accomplished, the Goldwater group became belligerent. It turned the Platform discussions into an ideological forum with every request for concessions treated as a departure from the true faith. The Goldwater camp was deaf to the argument that some of the Northern moderates, in order to survive politically, required a Platform containing provisions to which they could point with pride. The Goldwater group refused to include any reference to extremism even when the names of specific organizations were omitted. It rejected a proposed pledge to "enforce" the Civil Rights Act -- substituting, instead, the phrase that it would execute the Act. As Senator Scott said, the Goldwater group offered to let the President take the oath of office. (This semantic purism is one of the curious aspects of the Goldwater supporters.)

Above all, the Goldwater group viciously fought against the clause reaffirming Presidential control over nuclear weapons. They accused Representative Frelinghuysen, who had offered it, of jeopardizing the national security. They hinted darkly that he was revealing classified information. One enraged Goldwater adherent shouted at Ted Stevens, the delegate from Alaska who was supporting Frelinghuysen: "I always suspected
you were not a Republican. Now I know that you are not even an American."
The absolute refusal of the Goldwater supporters to be conciliatory in victory is the hallmark of the true fanatic. It is clear now that the Goldwater camp is not interested in creating a broadly based consensus. They are concerned above all with the purity of their doctrine to which others then have to adhere. As human types, they are intense, efficient, humorless, curiously insecure. When confronted by opposition they become almost irrational in their anger -- since they represent the "truth," the opposition must reflect invincible stupidity or fundamental error. Above all, they act as if they were surrounded by a conspiracy of evil to be defeated by a superior moral strength and superior conspiratorial skill.

In order to get Frelinghuysen some support, I sent Baily to the airport to greet Herter who was arriving. He was to ask him to send a telegram to Frelinghuysen supporting his amendment. Herter agreed to do so. Lodge also agreed to send a telegram to Frelinghuysen. Lodge thought that the nuclear issue might prove to be the most potent one. Scott was concerned lest Ike, approaching San Francisco by train, might upset the applecart with one of his Delphic pronouncements. He therefore called Milton Eisenhower at one of the train stops and implored him that his brother at least reserve judgment until he arrived in San Francisco. Milton Eisenhower promised that Ike would say nothing until Scott and Lodge had had a chance to talk to him.
July 12

I do not know whether it is possible to recapture the confusion and frustration of this day. In the morning I went to Scott's suite to find out what had happened during the Platform Committee's deliberations over Parts III and IV the preceding night. I learned that Parts III and IV (the text of which was again not available outside the Committee room) were even more intransigent than the early portions. The Civil Rights section was weak; there were major omissions. All the amendments of the Scranton group had been defeated overwhelmingly, often brutally. The Platform Committee had been kept in session until six in the morning with no prospect of obtaining effective staff advice. The process of amendment was almost impossible when those who knew the subject did not have the document and those who had the document were under constant pressure to vote.

The accusations that Frelinghuysen was jeopardizing national security were repeated. The Chairman -- Laird -- instead of being neutral made an impassioned attack on him for getting into the most sensitive areas. In general, Laird was reported to have conducted the meetings in a way to give the maximum benefit to the Goldwater group.

As a further method of intimidation, a motion of censure against Senator Scott was introduced. He was criticized for having revealed that President Eisenhower's name had been omitted from the first two sections of the platform. Senator Scott stopped this only by threatening to keep the Committee in session for another hour on a point of personal privilege.
At 10:30 there was a strategy session of the Scranton supporters on the Platform Committee on how to organize a floor fight. The general atmosphere was dispirited. I had the impression that some of those present were looking for a graceful way to make their peace with Goldwater. In the middle of the discussion I was called to a meeting of the leaders of the New York delegation. Present were NAR, Keating, Carlino, Maloney, Young, and Javits. I briefed them on the way the nuclear amendment had developed. Javits thought the issue of peace and war might be the best way to turn the Convention around. The rest of the discussions concerned tactical questions about when NAR should be on the Convention floor and similar matters.

I returned to the Scott strategy session where Romney's assistant Van Dusen was explaining that Romney now refused to participate in any joint report and insisted on presenting amendments of his own. I had the distinct impression that if Scranton had accepted Romney's versions -- which were in any event nitpicking variations -- Romney would have found some other pretext for dissociating himself. In short, Romney was maneuvering for the middle position so beloved by the self-styled moderates. Romney was unavailable for discussion claiming that he never conducted business on the Sabbath.

While the meeting was going on I received an urgent call from Scranton's office that he wanted to see me immediately. Scranton was in the Royal Suite of the Mark Hopkins. I was ushered in to have dessert with him, NAR and Lodge who had lunched together. Scranton was sitting on a chair buddha
fashion with his legs folded under him. He began quizzing me about the nuclear issue. His manner was disturbingly similar to Kennedy's. The grilling was very acute and rapid; the face was impassive. Despite the superior intelligence of the questions, it was not clear what Scranton was really after or whether he had any views on the subject. Lodge was acting like a prima donna. He made cryptic comments designed to illustrate his competence in the field of strategy. Scranton asked whether it would be possible to get some senior people to sign a declaration reaffirming the desirability of Presidential control over nuclear weapons. He also said he would make the nuclear issue the big test at the Convention. Lodge asserted that rounding up senior people was not a job for staff and that he would call Herter, McCloy, Allen Dulles, and Thomas Gates personally. He also indicated that he wanted to sign such a declaration himself.

We went into an outer room where one of Lodge's assistants was waiting for him. He showed Lodge some statement he had drafted which contained penciled corrections. Lodge threw a tantrum and asked that a typewriter be brought in. He would type a clean copy personally.

A flustered secretary brought in a typewriter. She set it down on a table whose folding side promptly collapsed, nearly spilling the typewriter on Lodge's feet. There is no telling where Lodge's fury would have led him had not photographers arrived at this moment to take pictures of NAR, Scranton and Lodge. Lodge immediately became the Ambassador again, smiling, serene, imperturbable.
We tried to reach Herter by phone and failed. Lodge then asked me whether in view of his commitments that afternoon I would not line up the supporters of the amendment after all.

I called Tom McCabe -- a Philadelphia industrialist backer of Scranton and an acquaintance from Special Studies days -- and asked him whether it was possible for Gates to take the next plane out so that Ike's Secretary
of Defense was available to lend support. I called Herter. He was very generous and offered to introduce the amendment reaffirming Presidential control of nuclear weapons. I then called Allen Dulles and McCloy. They, too, agreed to go along. Everybody expressed shock at the refusal of the Platform Committee to reaffirm the explicit provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and of the Constitution.

I reported to Senator Scott, who felt that a great deal depended now on Ike, who had just arrived in San Francisco by special train. In order to prepare the way Scott had set up a meeting with Milton Eisenhower, Scott and myself in Scranton's suite. Eisenhower arrived accompanied by Malcolm Moos, Ike's former speech writer. Milton Eisenhower made a very good first impression. He seemed energetic and decisive. He listened to my explanation of the background and looked at some briefing memoranda which I had prepared.

He said that Ike, of course, would go along with our amendment. Ike had pledged himself not to express a personal preference for a candidate. But the nuclear issue was substantive, involving questions of war and peace on which Ike could in good conscience take a stand. He promised to see to it that his brother would say nothing prejudicial to Scranton until he and Scott had had a chance to brief Ike.

This was about 4:00 p.m. I reported to NAR that we might get Eisenhower's support. NAR replied that anyone relying on either Eisenhower was letting himself in for a certain let-down. Moreover, Milton was a weak man who would bend with the wind.
After talking to Milton Eisenhower, I saw Keisling briefly. He showed me a letter that had been drafted for delivery to Goldwater that evening and asked me what I thought of it. I told him that a challenge for a debate was probably an overworked device. Also the letter seemed to me extremely sharp. Keisling replied that during the Pennsylvania gubernatorial campaign needling had caused Dilworth (Scranton's opponent) to lose his poise completely. The same thing could happen to Goldwater in San Francisco. Since I was not really concerned with this issue, I did not pursue the conversation.

I then went to the airport to meet Secretary Gates. I gave him a brief account of what had happened and showed him the amendment as well as the statement McCloy, Herter and Dulles had agreed to sign. Gates said that the question of delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons was highly delicate. Some delegation had to be made for emergency situations when communications might break down. Moreover, Ike in his desire not to be bothered had probably gone beyond emergency procedures in his delegation of authority. This was undoubtedly known to Goldwater since most senior military commanders were on his side. Gates had the impression that Goldwater was being given top-secret material on a clandestine basis. If he was prepared to breach security, he could make his recommendation appear consistent with Ike's practice. It would be possible to refute him only by an even more gross breach of security. Gates predicted that unless he briefed Ike on the issue personally the reaction might be very explosive.
and personal. Gates added that he considered the refusal of the Platform Committee to reaffirm what were in effect provisions of the Atomic Energy Act extremely sinister. Gates and I then redrafted the amendment in order to avoid the word "delegation."

Within the hour, however, the fat was in the fire. When I returned to the hotel I found a message from James Reichley, Scranton's legislative assistant, to see him immediately at the command post in the St. Francis Hotel. There I met Reichley, Scott, and Malcolm Moos. The latter two had just returned from a meeting with Ike which had also been attended by Milton and John Eisenhower. They had shown the amendment about nuclear control to Ike. Ike had blown up saying that it was not a fit subject for the Convention. Only matters on which new legislation was necessary should be included in the Platform. If such an amendment was offered, he would denounce it publicly. He himself had delegated authority over nuclear matters. John Eisenhower had pointed out that Ike's delegation had been for extreme emergencies when all communications were out. Ike agreed that this was so, but being proved wrong only made him angrier.

The Scranton people were despondent. Having decided at noon to make the nuclear amendment the key issue, they were now ready to drop it. I urged going ahead without Ike. It seemed to me that it would be very hard for him to oppose publicly his former Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA.
Scott called up Lodge, who was staying in the same hotel, and told him what had happened. In his imperious manner Lodge said he would take care of Ike and left accompanied by Malcolm Moos.

Lodge returned forty minutes later claiming a great victory. In fact, Ike had repeated his earlier position to him. However, he had finally agreed that the following statement was accurate: "The authority over nuclear weapons belongs to the President." Lodge claimed that this platitude would enable Scranton to claim Ike's blessing for a platform fight.

While we were talking Milton Eisenhower called with a "clarification." Ike wanted it understood that while Lodge's statement represented his views, he was still opposed to including it in the Platform. At this point, Scott was ready to throw in the towel.

I urged that the matter be taken up by a strategy meeting of Scranton supporters which was due to take place at the Mark Hopkins in about 10 minutes (10:30 p.m.). Scott reported Ike's attitude which created general discouragement. Representative Frelinghuysen, who had offered the amendment to the Platform Committee, was clearly unwilling to offer it to the Convention. He said he had already lost too many old friends over an issue he did not really understand. Apparently during the afternoon some Goldwater supporters had charged him with being a Democrat in disguise since he was helping them with his attitude.

At the Republican gala that evening Ike had hinted to Freylinghuysen that he did not want the nuclear issue discussed at the Convention. The
situation was saved by the arrival of John Sherman Cooper. Apprised of the problem, he insisted that a refusal to reaffirm civilian control over the military was unthinkable. It was essential that the Republican party face up to this issue.

It was decided to reassemble around 12:30 a.m. after a meeting of key Scranton supporters which had been scheduled to take place at 11:15 p.m. in a room in the mezzanine of the Mark Hopkins. Present were all Governors and Senators supporting Scranton together with other top men such as Milton Eisenhower and Lodge. The group included NAR, Cooper, Javits, Keating, Clifford Case, and Thomas Gates. It took place outside of Scranton's headquarters partly because he did not have a room large enough to hold forty people, partly in deference to Romney. Finally, Romney did not show up, claiming his usual Sabbath excuse.

Word of the meeting had reached the Goldwater camp. When we got to the room we found the area outside jammed with Goldwater supporters who, aided by a band, made an incredible amount of noise. It was very hard to get into the room and even harder to keep the Goldwater supporters from rushing the doors.

In the bedlam the meeting finally started. Mr. and Mrs. Scranton entered escorted by Senator Scott. I had expected the meeting to be conducted by Scott or Scranton. Instead Mrs. Scranton got up and made a speech more suitable as a pep talk for an undergraduate political rally than for an assembly of senior people aware of the facts of life. She
urged everyone to keep fighting for the good cause. The tide had turned and from now on the road would be downhill. She wound up her speech by saying: "I now introduce to you the greatest man of this generation and probably of many generations -- Bill Scranton."

Scranton then spoke in his precise, slightly precious way with gestures which gave the impression that he was animated by a mechanical spring. He, too, said that the tide had turned and that in the past three weeks he had conducted the most intensive campaign in the history of America. This had taught him that the people did not want Goldwater. He was certain that the pressure of public opinion would soon bring on a massive switch of delegates.

I thought his approach was extravagant and wrong. The audience was composed of professionals, all of whom had done a lot of campaigning and all of whom knew what was going on. There was no sense pretending things were going well. It would have been much wiser to admit the heavy odds against Scranton.

There followed a discussion about how to proceed. A midwestern supporter said that the fanaticism of the Goldwater adherents in his area could not be exaggerated. They had only two hopes for success -- foreign crises and domestic violence. They could do little about hastening the former; but they were fanatic enough to trigger the latter. Racial outbursts were their great hope; they were likely to do their best to foment them.
Senator Javits said that peace and war were the crucial problems in the eyes of all the people. Nothing would dramatize this more than the issue of control of nuclear weapons. He therefore urged that the nuclear weapons problem be featured.

Lodge at this point waved a piece of paper saying that it contained Ike's agreement to a nuclear plank. The paper contained only the one sentence mentioned above -- but the participants at the meeting did not know this.

Scranton said that he was sending Gates to see Ike first thing in the morning and that Gates and I should then decide whether to proceed with the amendment. It sounded crisp and decisive -- but I have the uneasy feeling that this crispness hides a profound inward uncertainty.

Scranton then introduced NAR. Scranton said that it was unprecedented for one candidate not only to back another but to turn over his entire staff to him. It is true that whatever Scranton will achieve -- and I doubt that it is much -- he owes to NAR. All the organizational and research work of the Scranton campaign is in the hands of Rockefeller people. NAR received a standing ovation -- a much greater one, incidentally, than Scranton had received.

NAR said that the key issue was not what tactics to pursue. It concerned the soul of the Republican party. There had been too much concern with mechanics -- and he had been partly guilty, too. But now
the problem was to care, not only to seem to. The Republican moderates had
to convince the people that it mattered which wing of the party won. He did
not know whether there was still time.

There was some desultory talk of how to bring the extremism issue
before the convention. Then, without a word of warning, Scranton walked
away from the lectern to move to the rear of the room to ask me privately
about delegation of nuclear authority.

Truax, the Pennsylvania state chairman, then got up and made an earnest,
pedantic exhortation about the danger to the country represented by the
Goldwater extremist backers. He described his experience at the Convention
of the Young Republicans the year before. He talked as if he had personally
discovered the extremist nature of the Goldwater support. He did not explain
why his candidate had delayed so long to fight so insidious a danger; nor
indeed why so late as June 4 he still had seen no basic differences between
himself and Goldwater. Finally, Mrs. Scranton got up and made another
fighting speech which wound up with the phrase that she knew that Wednesday
evening she and Bill would be standing before the Convention to receive
its unanimous acclaim.

While I was talking to Scranton, Lodge came over and complained that
Gates, not he, was being sent to see Ike. He thought it was a slap at
him. Scranton replied that it seemed to him that this was the best way to
proceed. He said it a little petulantly and without mentioning the obvious
fact that Gates was, after all, Ike's last Secretary of Defense.
Throughout, bedlam caused by Goldwater supporters reigned just outside the door. Significantly, Milton Eisenhower said nothing at the meeting. And he refused to go to a strategy session for a smaller group which was to follow -- claiming a sore throat. He never attended another meeting.

After the others left, Gates, Frelinghuysen, NAR and I talked for a while about the merits of the nuclear amendment. NAR said the issue was not what Ike thought, since he would come unstuck anyway as soon as George Humphrey got to him. We should ask ourselves what was right. Gates said that an amendment was desirable if a prohibition of delegation in emergencies was avoided. We then drafted language to this effect. Frelinghuysen agreed to introduce it.

Gates, Frelinghuysen and I then went upstairs to Senator Scott's suite where another strategy meeting about the platform was in progress. (By this time it was 12:45 a.m.). As we left the room some Goldwaterite was checking off names on a list. I was not on it. But he knew me and said: "Kissinger -- don't think we'll forget your name."

Upstairs Lodge was holding forth to the effect that the sentence he had extracted from Ike met our needs and that it was foolish to go back to Ike. Javits spoke in favor of the Gates mission saying that once Ike had given his word, he (Javits) would stake his life on it. Scott said drily: "I would not cut down my life expectancy unnecessarily if I were you, Jack."
Cooper urged pressing the amendment and not going back to Ike. He said we should use Ike's sentence and perhaps dress it up with some more philosophical observations. The consensus developed that Reichley (Scranton's legislative assistant), who was the next person scheduled to see Scranton (for breakfast), should suggest to him that we should proceed without seeking Ike's endorsement.

There was some discussion of how Scranton should respond to questions concerning the nuclear issue, extremism, and civil rights at a TV taping scheduled for the next morning. At 2:45 a.m. the meeting broke up.
July 13

Having gone to bed at 3:15 a.m. I was awakened at 7:30 a.m. by a phone call from Reichley. He had just left Scranton who agreed to the proposal of the Steering Committee that we proceed without Ike. He asked me to draft an amendment which I should clear with Lodge and Gates. I drafted an amendment which read as follows:

**AMENDMENT ON PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL**

**OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

The Republican Party reaffirms the historic Constitutional precept of civilian control over the military.

The most awesome responsibility faced by the President of the United States is the control over our nuclear arsenal. The decision to employ nuclear weapons involves the life of every American and the fate of humanity.

The authority to use America's nuclear weapons belongs only to the President of the United States.

I then called Lodge and checked it with him. Lodge agreed to the wording. He suggested that he call Herter and get him to introduce the amendment. He also proposed a joint visit of Herter and himself to Ike after the amendment was filed to inform Ike of the accomplished act. This struck me as a good procedure. I tried to call Gates but could not locate him. I called Reichley to inform him of how we were planning to proceed. He told me that he was glad I had called because while I had been talking to Lodge, Scranton had changed his mind. He had decided to send Gates to see Ike after all, and Gates was even then on his way there. I called Lodge to inform him of this. He, in turn, had just gotten through
speaking with Herter who had agreed to sponsor the amendment and had accepted its wording. When Lodge heard what had happened he got rather furious.

The situation was now as follows: Herter had agreed to sponsor an amendment of whose existence Gates was unaware and which, if it appeared as had been arranged, would appear to Ike as an act of bad faith. I desperately tried to head Gates off before he reached Ike's suite. Finally I called Milton Eisenhower and asked him to delay the Gates appointment with Ike until I could get a text of the amendment into his hands. We finally succeeded. Gates and Malcolm Moos saw Ike.

Reichley, Gates and I then met with Scranton to hear a report of the result. Ike at first was furious with Scranton's letter to Goldwater. He violently objected to its tone and content and blamed Moos for having drafted it -- which was incorrect. When they finally got around to the nuclear question, Gates explained the need to allay the doubts raised by Goldwater's statement about delegation of authority to local commanders. The Scranton amendment was simply a reaffirmation of procedures followed in the Eisenhower Administration. Ike reluctantly agreed. He took out of the amendment the phrase that "the decision to use nuclear weapons involves the life of every American." He said small nuclear weapons would not hazard that. With that deletion, he agreed to voice no public objection to the amendment as drafted. On this basis Scranton told us to proceed.
I called Lodge to tell him of the changed wording. He said he would go along with it but that he would not longer participate in organizing the presentation. It was up to somebody else to inform Herter of the changed amendment. I sent Baily to call on Herter. It took him a whole day to find him.

On the way to the meeting with Scranton, I asked Reichley what he thought of the letter to Goldwater. He said that he had opposed it but that Scranton and Keisling had insisted. He hoped it would not backfire.

I then turned to drafting the minority report and spent most of the rest of the day on it. I then redrafted the telegram (which McCloy, Dulles and Gates had agreed to sign) to make it conform to the text of the amendment. They all agreed.

Scranton's office then suggested we get Norstad to sign it, too, in order to have some military backing. I told them that I was almost certain he would avoid signing it. Nevertheless, I called him. He said that he was a passionate believer in civilian control over the military. He was therefore eager to sign it. However, he did not want to leave the impression that he would oppose allied planning and suggested adding a phrase to the effect that U.S. contingents in Allied forces be subject to Presidential control.

As Norstad well knew, it was too late to alter the phrasing of the amendment because it had already been submitted to the Convention,
Norstad, in other words, used the pretext of strengthening the amendment to get out of endorsing it.

In the late afternoon there was a meeting in Scott's suite to determine the order of speakers. They were fixed as Herter, Frelinghuysen, Mrs. Mastersen, Governor Anderson, Senator Cooper and Senator Javits.

In the afternoon, Ike held a press conference. He told of his conversation with Gates and read the proposed amendment. He made clear that the meeting had been at Gates' initiative. He added that he thought it unnecessary but would not object "too strenuously" if it were pressed. At the same time, he could see no compelling reason for pursuing it.

The evening was spent preparing speeches for those selected to address the Convention and a briefing book for a strategy meeting in the morning.

During the evening, too, it was learned that Romney had decided to play his lone hand to the end. He refused to join the nuclear control amendment. And he submitted two amendments of his own on civil rights and extremism, both milder than those of Scranton. In fact, the one on extremism is ludicrous -- it simply condemns extremism without identifying any particular group. Thus the moderate forces are split. The Goldwater supporters have a choice of strategies. Since they control the convention machinery they can call up the "tough" amendment first and use Romney's votes to defeat it. Or they can reverse the process. In either case
Romney, in his egotistic quest for a middle way, has wrecked the last faint hopes of the moderates on civil rights and extremism, while Eisenhower has pulled the rug out from under them on the nuclear issue.

In the evening, the Scranton office released the Herter, Lodge, Gates, Dulles and McCloy statement so diffidently that, to my knowledge, not a single newspaper in the country even reported its existence.
July 14

I had breakfast with Bailey and went over with him the speeches that the Scranton supporters proposed to make during the platform debate.

At 8:30 there was a meeting of NAR, George Hinman, William Pfeiffer, Rod Perkins, Ronan and myself. The discussion concerned the new situation created by Romney's amendments. George Hinman said that it made a desperate situation hopeless. With the already weak opposition split, those controlling the Convention could play the moderates off against each other. It would be impossible to make clear to the television audience the moral issues involved. He had pleaded with Romney to agree on a joint phrasing. But Romney had not only refused a joint procedure; he had broken off all liaison. NAR agreed to follow the lead of Scranton.

During the meeting it was learned that Scranton had denied knowledge of the letter to Goldwater. The action seemed inexplicable. When someone pointed out that nevertheless Scranton had assumed full responsibility, NAR said: "How very noble of him."

Next there was a meeting at the Mark Hopkins chaired by Scott. Present were NAR, Hinman, Lodge, Javits, Keating, Cooper, Alessandroni, McCabe, Edward Brooke (the Attorney General of Massachusetts - a Negro), Senator Case, Frelinghuysen and a few staff members. Now six hours before the session started, there still was no strategy for the Convention floor fight. After
Ike's press conference, Scott and Scranton had developed cold feet about the nuclear issue. They would present it to the Convention but not insist on a roll-call. Settling for a voice vote, Javits pointed out, was tantamount to saying in advance that the issue was not very important and that Scranton conceded defeat.

It turned out that Scott had made an agreement with Morton that there should be only one roll call vote. He felt that if he did not make this agreement, Morton would take the time consumed by roll calls out of the time set aside for debate. It apparently never occurred to him that the refusal of debate--or of roll calls--might in itself be a good issue. But perhaps Scott had a point. Since the debate was to be conducted according to House of Representative rules, the time allocation depended on Morton and Laird as the chairmen of the Platform Committee.

The discussion then turned to whether a roll call should be sought on extremism or on civil rights. Everybody present was impressed by the applause Mark Hatfield had received the previous evening when he attacked extremists. The thought was therefore that the extremism amendment might get the largest vote on a roll call. In other words, the amendment which had received the least attention either by the staff or by the strategy group was being pushed into the forefront because of one round of applause in a Goldwater-stacked Convention.
Lodge objected. He said that civil rights seemed to him the best issue if the nuclear control amendment was not to be pressed. Louis Harris had conducted an actual poll of individual delegates and had concluded that 689 -- or more than a majority -- would support the Scranton civil rights amendment.

In considering the alternatives it became apparent that the group was in no position to make a decision on the roll call because of the uncertainty created by the Romney amendments. If the Romney amendments on either extremism or civil rights were called up first, it was futile to ask for a roll call on the Scranton amendments. The vote on the milder Romney version would decide the case. If the Romney amendment was accepted by the Convention, it was silly to offer a stronger one and it was sure to be defeated. If the Romney amendment was defeated, the Scranton version was surely doomed.

Given these uncertainties it was left to Senator Scott to decide on the issue for the roll call when he got to the Convention and the Scranton supporters were asked to hold themselves in readiness. In other words, six hours before the platform fight was supposed to begin the Scranton forces still had no strategy.

There was some discussion of what attitude to take if the Civil Rights amendment was defeated. Somebody suggested that in that case the Negro
delegates supporting Scranton should walk out of the Convention. At this point NAR spoke up. He said first of all that he did not think we were bound by an agreement between Senator Scott and Morton. We should demand a roll call (as opposed to a voice vote) on each amendment. But he would do whatever Senator Scott thought best. However, he was violently opposed to a walk-out of Negro delegates alone. He felt that civil rights was not a Negro problem but a human problem. If any Negro walked out, he would walk out with him. He offered unconditionally to leave with whatever part of the New York delegation would follow him if the civil rights plank was defeated. Scott backed off and suggested that no one walk out. Curiously enough he was supported in this decision by Brooke, the only Negro in the room.

Afterwards, there was a meeting of Herter, Anderson, Mrs. Masterson, Senator Cooper, Senator Javits, Frelinghuysen, and myself to go over speeches for the evening session. Herter wisely suggested not to get into the details of nuclear control but focus on who should have the final decision for peace and war -- the President or military commanders. His speech would be brief and deal with this point. He also proposed to answer the charge that Scranton's side was violating security by bringing up the issue at all.

Afterwards, I had a brief talk with McCabe and Alessandroni. McCabe said that he had tried for months to get Scranton to enter the race and
introduced him around the country in a series of lunches. But Scranton had been too coy and played his cards too close to his chest. Alessandroni said that if his advice and McCabe's had been followed they would all be receiving congratulations today. Nevertheless he thought they had come out all right. Scranton would now be the natural leader of the moderate faction of the GOP which would return to power in 1968.

Even this I doubt. Scranton has not shown the decisiveness which is needed to wrest the party machine from Goldwater. And the Goldwater forces will be extremely difficult to dislodge--whatever the outcome of the election. They are dedicated and skilled at organization. It will not be possible to get back the control of the party without equal devotion and faith--something which most moderates sadly lack.

I had lunch at the Pacific Union Club with Frelinghuysen whose enthusiasm for his own amendment was visibly wilting.

After lunch I started walking back to my hotel. I was accosted on the street by Rep. Hosmer--ranking Republican House member on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. He stopped me with the words: "I notice you have gone over to the enemy." (I had never met him. He had heard me talk once at the National War College.) I asked him what he meant. He said that he understood I was backing the Scranton amendment on nuclear control.
asked him why he objected to reaffirming Presidential control over the decision to go to nuclear war. This is after all required by the Atomic Energy Act. He said that if the amendment were adopted our allies would leave NATO. I said that the problems with Europe went much deeper than who pushed the button and could not be solved by delegating authority to the NATO commander. I know no European country prepared to make a similar delegation. Hosmer then said that I was trying to foist the "pause theory" on the Republican Convention. I pointed out that I had criticized the pause theory as applied to NATO in print. However, it seemed to me that the way to deal with it was not to turn over to military commanders discretion over the use of nuclear weapons. Hosmer said he was glad to note that Norstad did not agree with me and that he had refused to sign the telegram of McCloy, Dulles and Gates. Hosmer said that he had personally talked to Norstad about this—a clear case of Norstad playing both sides of the street. I asked him to explain how reaffirming the law could be a violation of security.

When I got back to my hotel, I learned that the hope of appealing to the American people by a platform fight had been shattered by the arrangers of the Convention. Originally the program had called for the platform to be presented to the Convention around 5:00 p.m. PST (about 8:00 p.m. in the East), to be followed by a speech from Ike and would have put on the debate
at prime TV time. However, this program had been changed. Ike's speech would now precede the presentation of the platform. Moreover, the platform would be read word for word to the Convention. This would take two hours and was guaranteed to induce millions to turn off their television sets. It also guaranteed that debate could not possibly start before 8:00 p.m. (Pacific Standard Time) or 11:00 p.m. in New York thus killing the television audience. Even this schedule turned out to be optimistic because Morton got "lost" in a taxi on the way to the Cow Palace delaying proceedings by another hour. Considering the number of Cow Palaces in San Francisco this was a "plausible" excuse. The debate on amendments finally started at 9:00 p.m. San Francisco time (12:00 p.m. EST).

I went to the Cow Palace around 6:00 p.m. Scranton's office had sent tickets for me for his box and also a pass to the Convention floor. Thus I had an excellent seat. It was symptomatic for the petty harassment by the Convention managers that NAR's associates had been allocated seats in the far corner of the Cow Palace and at its highest point.

At the Cow Palace I was immediately struck by the frenzy, the fervor and the intensity of most delegates and practically the entire audience. The atmosphere was more akin to a revival meeting than to a political convention. A revolution clearly was in the making. Neither spectators nor delegates had come to participate in a traditional victory. They were
there to celebrate a triumph. They wanted to crush, not to integrate, their opponents. Nine-tenths of the spectators were Goldwater partisans packed into cheering sections and directed by walkie-talkie radios.

The question then arises how this was possible? The answer is that the National Committee under Miller was firmly in the control of the Goldwater forces and handled all the arrangements. At least three quarters of the doorkeepers and ushers were Goldwater supporters and wore blatant Goldwater buttons. In addition thousands of counterfeit tickets had been issued. Thus an hour before the sessions started the Cow Palace was packed and closed by the fire department preventing bona fide ticket holders from entering. Moreover in case of disputes inside the hall ushers inevitably sided with those wearing Goldwater buttons.

Persons identified with Scranton or NAR were subjected to systematic harassment. One member of NAR's staff wearing a Rockefeller button was sent for nearly an hour all over the arena until she finally was shown her seat. Even the Scranton box was not immune from harassment. I must have been asked twenty times to show my ticket. On the last day during such an inspection the usher said: "Where did you get this counterfeit? I am letting you stay only because the real ticket holder isn't here." One member of NAR's staff was twice nearly ejected from the hall when he applauded Rockefeller for "causing a disturbance."
Perhaps the most telling symptom of the attitude of the Convention staff was during the demonstration against NAR. I saw two policemen fully armed with pistols standing in the aisle participating in the booing at the top of their voices.

Another example of the attitude of those managing the Convention was the behavior of the permanent chairman Thruston Morton. His late arrival for the platform session set the tone. His introduction of pro-Scranton speakers were brief to the point of discourtesy. He found nothing more to say about NAR than that he was Governor of New York or about Herter than that he was once Secretary of State not even identifying him with Ike. On the contrary even the most dreary Goldwater hack received a lavish introduction. Morton did very little to quiet the uproar during NAR's speech intervening only after many minutes of booing. Even then he confined himself to pointing out that the Governor had been granted five minutes which were not yet exhausted. There was no criticism of the disgraceful conduct of the Goldwater people; no reference that this was no way to treat a distinguished Republican who had still been a contestant for the Republican nomination a month previously. Morton made no attempt to quiet the general hubbub which made Herter's speech on nuclear control almost inaudible. When Goldwater was put into nomination and the demonstration would not end, Morton said: "If you want to cheer for your candidate in November you better let us finish what we are doing"—at a moment when
the other contenders had not yet even been put into nomination. During the demonstration for Romney, Morton observed: "Some of you fellows must be getting awfully tired. I have seen the same people demonstrating for the last four contenders (meaning NAR, Margaret Chase Smith, Scranton and Romney)."

It would be impossible to describe the witches cauldron that was the Cow Palace on this evening. The roars of Barry, Barry filled the hall.

Eisenhower was warmly—if not enthusiastically—received when he was introduced. But when he launched his cheap attack on the press a tremendous roar went up from delegates and spectators alike. Thousands jumped up shaking their fists at the press section and the TV cameras. The next big round of applause came when he criticized those who considered switchblade murderers a sociological and not only a judicial problem. This struck me as an unworthy comment by a former President—an unsuitable one for a national political convention. I was to learn later when I went down to the Convention floor that the phrase "lawlessness on the streets" did not mean hoodlumism to many delegates. Most took it as a euphemism for a criticism of the civil rights movement and in this spirit applauded any reference to it by subsequent speakers wildly. In fact, it is interesting to speculate how Ike's speech was orchestrated so well with the major themes of the Goldwater camp.
After Ike's speech the platform was read word for word. This consumed nearly two hours. A wild cheer went up for Senator Tower one of the most vicious Goldwater supporters. He was selected to read parts of the section on foreign policy. He read with the great emphasis the sections taking oblique cracks at the UN. He also stressed the sections promising liberation not only for the East European countries but to the Baltic States, the Ukraine, Armenia, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia (in other words breaking up Yugo-slavia). For this he was rewarded with frenzied cheers.

During the reading of the platform I went to the Convention floor to talk to some of the delegates I know. George Lodge was depressed about the by-now almost certain outcome. He, too, had been subjected to harassment including a cutting of the telephone lines of the Massachusetts delegation twice.

I had a brief chat with Rep. Taft of Ohio, who is running for the Senate. He is basically a good man, though now engulfed in the Goldwater tide. When I lunched with him last year he had told me that Goldwater would be a disastrous candidate in Ohio. He might cause the same electoral catastrophe as the right-to-work amendment in 1958 which led to the defeat of Senator Bricker. Today, he told me that he had come to share the conviction of Governor Rhodes that Goldwater might well win on the issue of general lawlessness (a more elegant euphemism for white backlash). I asked
Taft what he thought would happen during the platform debate. He said that the only issue was whether the amendments would be shouted down or voted down. I asked him for his personal views on the amendments. He replied evasively that he did not see what they would accomplish. I observed that the most striking thing to me was the lack of conciliatoriness of the Goldwater camp in its hour of triumph. What did they risk by accepting a relatively mild amendment on extremism or by reaffirming the Presidential control of nuclear weapons provided by the Atomic Energy Act. There were many moderates who needed something to which they could point as their achievement at San Francisco---men like Senator Keating for example. Taft replied that this was not the dominant strategy. The feeling was that if any concessions were made---even verbal ones---this would lead to more demands. The point of this evening was to crush the opposition, not to conciliate it. The time to be conciliatory was after victory was consolidated, not before it was achieved. This on the eve of the "platform fight" was the mood of a man as sensible and moderate as Taft---who had once been considered by the Rockefeller staff as a possible running mate for NAR.

Finally around 9:00 p.m. PST (midnight in the East) the Scranton forces had an opportunity to present their minority report (which incidentally was not read to the Convention and never covered by the press. Was it released?) The first speaker was NAR urging an extremism amendment which
Proposed Amendment on Extremism

The Republican Party fully respects the contribution of responsible criticism, and defends the right of dissent in the democratic process. But we repudiate the efforts of irresponsible, extremist groups, such as the John Birch Society, the Ku Klux Klan, the Communist party and others, to discredit our Party by their efforts to infiltrate positions of responsibility in the Party, or to attach themselves to its candidates.

The scene which followed has been captured on TV. A TV rescreening I saw seemed to me but a pale reflection of the venomous, vicious, hysterical hatred which filled the Cow Palace. Before NAR could even begin to speak—introduced without any adjectives simply as the Governor of New York—there were minutes of booing, jeering and catcalls which the chair did nothing to restrain. The statement was interrupted every few words with disgusting, cheap and vicious outbreaks in which again the chair was anything but helpful. The most vituperative outrages were directed against his attempt to have Communism, the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society specified as extremist groups. The most violent reaction was produced by the attempt to mention the John Birch Society.

The opponents of the amendment took an interesting tack. They accused the advocates of it of trying to undermine freedom of speech and of the
press—this from people who two hours previously had shaken their fists at the press and who tomorrow will be happy to lock up any person they consider a left-wing sympathizer. Senator Dominique from Colorado read a quote from the New York Times of 1763 in which allegedly Patrick Henry was called an extremist—the point being that the extremist of today is the patriot of tomorrow. Next day it became apparent that the New York Times did not exist in 1763 and that the quote was pure invention. By then, of course, it was too late to do anything about it.

One of the tactics of the Goldwater supporters is to follow outrageous conduct with attractive and calm explanations. I saw Senator Dominique on TV the next morning and it could never appear plausible that such a clean-cut and quiet man could have had a hand in the despicable proceedings of the previous night. He explained the outbreaks against NAR with the argument that NAR had accused the Republican party of being infiltrated by Communists—a charge which naturally outraged the delegates. This shows one of the problems the Democrats will have in the fall. Charges of extremism are likely to backfire in the face of this bland fanaticism.

At any rate the extremism amendment was defeated.

Next Romney took the floor to offer essentially the same amendment with the reference to Communism, the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society.
deleted. He said that he was offering his amendment with no ulterior purpose and no divisive intent (in contrast to NAR?). He called attention to the omissions in his amendment compared to that of the Scranton camp. For all his pains Senator Dominique made another insulting reply and his amendment was defeated as roundly as the previous ones.

The following debate on Civil Rights was less dramatic. The Scranton group argued for a more compassionate plank and some specific promises of further progress. The Goldwater supporters argued that there was no need for further measures until the new Civil Rights Law had been given a chance to work. On a roll call vote the Civil Rights amendment was defeated by a vote of over 800 to some 400. This broke the back of the Scranton forces. If over 800 delegates were prepared to have their names recorded against what would still have been a very moderate Civil Rights plank, the mood of the Convention was obvious.

The Convention turned to the nuclear issue about 11:00 p.m. PST (2:00 a.m. EST)--the most potent issue thus having been placed last. Secretary Herter spoke first. He said that the American people had to be reassured that the decision to go to nuclear war would remain in the hands of the President. He asserted that no change in traditional procedures was being asked. He was introduced without any enthusiasm by Morton simply as
a former Secretary of State. During his presentation there was no booing, only so much general hubbub that even in a box right next to the podium it was next to impossible to hear what Herter was saying. Morton made no effort to quiet the crowd or to turn up the microphones.

Herter was followed by Frelinguysen whose lame presentation showed the pressures he had been under from the Goldwater group the previous few days. He did read the telegram signed by Dulles, Gates and McCloy--more in the nature of an alibi for being involved in the debate than as a plea for the adoption of the amendment. Of the other speakers only Javits was noteworthy. He was booed nearly as much as NAR. Nevertheless, he made the point that those offering the amendment were not asking for a change of procedures. The amendment had been made necessary because of the repeated assertions of a leading contender that the decision to use nuclear weapons be delegated to local commanders. This, of course, also received violent boos.

The argument of the Goldwater group which included Arends, Hickenlooper and Representative Ford was as follows: (a) the amendment was unnecessary because the Atomic Energy Act already gave the President full authority; (b) the amendment endangered American security because it raised doubts about our commitment to use nuclear weapons; and (c) the amendment was a violation of classified information. This last argument was made particularly insistently
by a former Congresswoman from Illinois, Mrs. Church. She kept saying: "If you knew what I know as a former member of the House Armed Services Committee you would realize that this amendment is dangerous, a threat to U.S. security and a violation of defense secrets." Thus a former Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency found themselves accused of violating security and betraying secrets because they wanted to reaffirm the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. No one thought this absurd. After the Scranton forces had exhausted their time, Senator Scott asked for 30 seconds additional time on a point of personal privilege to correct these charges. This request had to be made privately to Morton. Morton replied: "Are you kidding?" The vote was overwhelmingly against the amendment. (The Morton-Scott exchange was told to me afterwards by Senator Scott).

Towards 12:30 a.m. the session ended.
July 15

I had breakfast with Lodge who is leaving town because he does not want to have to extend congratulations to Goldwater or attend a summit meeting of leaders.

While Lodge is personally impossible and not a good team player, he has behaved with dignity and without compromise.

The Convention choice was conducted in the same atmosphere and with the same tactics as the night before. When Milton Eisenhower put Scranton into nomination he mentioned Earl Warren and was greeted for his pains with a chorus of boos. Goldwater was put over the top appropriately enough by South Carolina. New York, under great pressure from Morton, held out and even at the very end had five abstentions.

One vignette: the desperate face of Meg Greenfield during the frenzied Goldwater demonstration which followed his being placed in nomination by Dirksen.

After Goldwater's nomination was clinched, Scranton conceded with the same inconclusiveness which he had exhibited during the campaign. He made no reference to having stood for certain principles and promised his support to Goldwater so unconditionally that it was hard to believe that a basic moral issue might have been involved in the previous controversy.
Of course, it is more than likely that he does not feel any fundamental issue. It is not possible to manufacture commitment.

Romney also moved to make the nomination unanimous calling Goldwater's nomination a great victory for Americanism in America.

A few random observations:

**Intransigence**: The most striking phenomenon of the Convention was the intransigence of the Goldwater camp. During the platform week there were many rumors that the Goldwater group would prove conciliatory on the platform because they understood what the Northern Republicans were up against. Indeed Laird explicitly spoke to Scott to this effect. These rumors--it turned out--were largely designed to prevent the moderates from launching a concerted attack during their presentations to the Platform Committee. As it turned out, the platform was the first sign that the Goldwater forces wanted not a victory but a revolution. The document which emerged was dominated by the Goldwater group. It was doctrinaire and ideological--full of trick phrases designed to appeal to the particular conservative paranoia that has developed over the past years. Thus America is not a "democracy" but a Constitutional Republic; there is no reference to social welfare; there is no compassion; no reference to relating America to the rest of the world. Civil Rights is dealt with by trick phrases.
This doctrinaire rigidity was carried over into the platform fight. A few concessions on any of the three amendments offered by the Scranton group would have avoided the fight altogether. But the Goldwater supporters were not concerned with saving the face of their opponents. They wanted to crush them. And if the Scranton group were to leave the Republican party many of Goldwater's supporters would not be sorry. They are determined to take over the Republican party and turn it into a disciplined instrument to further their philosophy.

The frenzy of the cheering at the Cow Palace was reminiscent of Nazi times. I am not even sure that the Goldwater group this year counts on an election victory nearly as much as on taking over the Republican party. A defeat is not likely to shake their control—all the more so as I doubt that their opponents even now understand the gravity of the situation. The Scranton strategy is obviously what it was before he entered the race—to establish a claim later for the Goldwater supporters by such small tricks as "proudly" casting his vote for Representative Miller.

In this he will not succeed. The Goldwater supporters are not silly old ladies in tennis shoes. They are the middle class gone rampant: the technocrats, the white collar workers impelled by an almost fanatical zeal. They are the result of a generation of liberal debunking, of the smug self-righteousness of so many intellectuals. Short of a catastrophic defeat,
the Goldwater supporters will not shift to any of the so-called moderates. They have a faith not a party. The delegates walking around with stamp out Huntley and Brinkley buttons are a new phenomenon. The delegate who said to me I am sorry the button is not big enough to include Howard K. Smith and all Eastern newspapers was a new form of delegate. This group once organized will be hard to dislodge. It will try to become the residuary legatee of all crises that are likely over the next decade.

This explains why the Goldwater group drew the lines ever more sharply at the Convention even as its ascendancy grew. It is the reason why Goldwater's acceptance speech did not contain a single generous reference to Scranton even though Scranton had been for my taste excessively conciliatory in defeat.

The Goldwater victory is a new phenomenon in American politics—the triumph of the ideological party in the European sense. No one can predict how it will end because there is no precedent for it. What may be ahead of us was symbolized at the Cow Palace. Outside there were pickets calling for neutralization of Vietnam, for the end of NATO and CORE demonstrators. Inside were the extremists of the right.

Scranton Staff and Entourage: No man can ever have made a bid for a Presidential nomination with a more woefully inadequate staff. Here was a
man who had clearly held himself in readiness to become the compromise choice of the Convention. Yet no preparatory work of any kind had been done either in research on the issues or in laying an organizational base. Whatever information Scranton required—even about his own voting record in the Congress—he had to obtain from the Rockefeller research staff. Every document submitted by the moderates to the Convention was prepared by the Rockefeller group. James Reichley, the chief Scranton research assistant, acted primarily as liaison man. The major part of the organizational work was done by George Hinman of the Rockefeller team. The key Scranton figures as I saw them were: Alessandroni—nicknamed the General. A dour, cocky, imperious little man who has a reputation for political sagacity but who was very quiet at all the meetings I attended; Reichley—another dour, silent man. I grew rather fond of this taciturn former newspaper man. He was unpretentious and a hard worker though completely dependent on the Rockefeller staff; Keisling—young, tough, self-confident and very similar to Dick Goodwin; Scott—was the only professional of the group. Imperturbable, able but vastly overworked.

The Scranton family at all times exhibited an ostentatious togetherness which I found somewhat jarring. During the Scranton demonstration after he was put in nomination the assembled Scrantons in the box made one feel guilty if one did not scream at the top of one's lungs for the entire 25 minutes.
James Linen, the President of *Time* and brother-in-law of Scranton, was much in evidence. I do not consider such an ostentatious tie-up between a candidate and a leading organ of mass communication altogether desirable.
Conclusion:

Goldwater deserved to win, or rather the moderates deserved to lose. They had been too petty and selfish for too long. Goldwater--however repellant his supporters--was the only candidate in San Francisco who genuinely stood for something. All the others were playing for position. Had NAR won the California primary Scranton would not have discovered the principles he later claimed were propelling him into contention. Instead, he would have remained in the middle trying to pick up Goldwater supporters.

When the collapse of the Rockefeller candidacy forced Scranton into the fray, Romney sought to occupy the middle position. None of the moderates--except NAR--represented a cause larger than himself. This accounts also for Scranton's curiously ambivalent concession after Goldwater was nominated. It contrasted unfavorably with Goldwater's much more manly performance in an analogous situation from years previously. As soon as the Goldwater nomination was assured, Scranton was again trying to prove that he was a regular fellow. He was not prepared to indicate in defeat that he would continue to fight for his ideas--partly because like most of the moderates he lacks fixed ideas. Indeed like most of them he considers this a condition of flexibility and a proof of wisdom.
Before the moderates can regain control of the GOP, they must take stock of their moral collapse. None of Goldwater's opponents at San Francisco represented any principles they were able to communicate though they often invoked the word. Moderation to them had become a pedantic quest for a middle way between whatever absolutes existed. Sometimes they even constructed these "extremes" artificially. Such a form of moderation is relativism run rampant. It makes its practitioners the prisoners of events. It leads to spiritual starvation.

This explains also why many of the professionals were so irrelevant at San Francisco. They knew the mechanics of power but they had lost touch with the well-springs of human motivation. One of the striking things of the moderates' campaign during the last year has been the ineptness of the so-called professionals. I do not mean such gaffes as sending emissaries to Ohio to round up delegates without having a list of delegates or sending Lodgé to St. Louis after the Missouri delegation had left. Mistakes as these are inevitable in an improvised campaign. But, in a deeper sense, every strategic assessment turned out to be wrong. Throughout, the political experts were judging each statement in terms of its political "mileage" which they measured in newspaper headlines. Insufficient attention was paid to intangibles of faith; to the fact that great leaders do not wait for their following, they create it. During the planning
for the Convention there was the hope of support now from Dirksen, then from Laird, then from Ike. After a while activity became an end in itself and a substitute for thought. The only hope to derail Goldwater was to create an enormous groundswell of support. Time was too short for that; but also the passion and conviction were lacking. The fact was that at San Francisco only one man had a devoted following—Goldwater.

Of course, Goldwater was aided as well by a highly skilled organization and extremely cynical methods. Not only were convention proceedings rigged. Many Goldwater supporters had been kept in what the intelligence community calls "deep freeze" to emerge at strategic moments. The degree of Laird's commitment to Goldwater did not become apparent until the Convention. The same was even more true of Miller.

The fact remains that there exists a moral malaise of the moderates not only in the Republican party but among the Democrats as well. It is one reason why I think Goldwater will do better in the election than now seems possible.

Every democracy must respect diversity. But it must also know what its purposes are. Tolerance does not have to be equated with moral neutrality. On the contrary, if relativism grows too rampant, pseudo-values will substitute for the real values which have been destroyed. Man cannot live by tired slogans...
and self-righteous invocations. The whole of truth was not revealed to mankind in the 1930's. The smug, patronizing condescension with which too many of my colleagues (and probably I as well) have treated those less sophisticated was bound to create an emotional vacuum.

If the Goldwater phenomenon passes both parties have an obligation to undertake some profound soul-searching. They should ask themselves why peace and prosperity proved not to be enough; why the middle class became radicalized during a period of material well-being. They must consider that democracy cannot survive unless it bases respect for diversity on a strong sense of purpose and unless its leaders realize that tragedy is inherent in human conduct. Not everything that is plausible is possible. Leaders must have a vision and not act as if history will hand them their deepest desire on a silver platter.
July 10, 1964

BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON PROPOSED PLATFORM PLANK

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In his press conference on July 9, and in his platform presentation of July 10, Senator Goldwater substantially reiterated his proposal that the President delegate the control of nuclear weapons in Europe to the NATO Commander. In the category of weapons over which authority would be delegated, Senator Goldwater in his platform presentation mentioned those weapons small enough to be carried in airplanes.

Senator Goldwater said that more control should be given to the NATO Commander under the general direction of the President. He specifically mentioned General Lemnitzer as the officer to whom authority should be delegated.

These statements exhibit once more a reckless, shoot-from-the-hip quality.

1. Small size in nuclear weapons is entirely relative. The smallest nuclear weapon in Europe has more than one hundred times the power of the largest conventional bomb of World War II. The larger nuclear weapons in Europe have — as is well known — destructive power many times in excess of those which devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

2. As for the delegation of authority to the NATO Commander, Senator Goldwater does not seem to understand the command structure in NATO. The Commander of the United States forces under NATO and the Commander of the NATO forces are two separate jobs which are today both held by one man, General Lyman Lemnitzer. As Commander of the U.S. forces, Lemnitzer is known as CINCEUR (Commander in Chief, Europe) and takes his orders from the President of the United States. As NATO Commander, Lemnitzer is known as SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) and takes his orders from the NATO Council.

The NATO Commander is not subject to the authority of the President. The position is filled by the NATO Council where we have one voice in fifteen. It is conceivable that this post will someday go to a European. Is Senator Goldwater recommending that the decision to go to nuclear war could be in the hands of a foreign military man? In other words, does Senator Goldwater mean that General Lemnitzer should have the authority, or does he mean that the NATO Commander should have the authority? Would he be willing to give the same authority to the NATO Commander if that Commander happened to be a European?
3. Tactical nuclear weapons should not be used without reference to the state of readiness to use strategic nuclear weapons. This could be disastrous. For this reason, it is important that the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons be made by the President of the United States, who has full information on our ability to follow up -- if need be -- with our strategic striking forces.

4. Conclusion. No more important decision can be made than the resort to nuclear weapons. All potential aggressors must know that the United States will not hesitate to use any weapons in its arsenal to preserve freedom. If need be, the American people will face the risks of nuclear war. Only that determination can preserve peace and freedom.

The willingness to resort to nuclear war, if necessary, however, must be accompanied by the recognition that nuclear war would be awesome. It should not be entered lightly. The decision to use our nuclear weapons should be made by only one man -- the President of the United States, who represents the American people. This awesome responsibility must not be delegated to a subordinate who cannot be aware of the entire picture. The most important decision that the voters entrust to a President -- involving the lives of every American and perhaps the survival of humanity -- cannot be delegated.