MEMO

MAY 1, 1967

Dear Professor Kissinger,

I understand that you and Max have talked about some changes in your review of the Katz book. Here are the galleys, which incorporate his editing. He has asked me to ask you if you can provide an alternative to "accommodation" in the second paragraph.

We are scheduling this for our current issue, so could you please call me as soon as you have read through the piece?

Best wishes,

Derek Morgan
If history teaches anything, it is that all political structures have hitherto proved ephemeral. Philosophers and political scientists have found many causes for this state of affairs. None is more important or persistent than the gap that almost inevitably arises between the requirements for reaching "high office and the qualities needed to exercise it. When the gap is narrow, the political structure flourishes; when it widens, decay is inevitable.

Professor Katz, in his wise little book, addresses himself to this strangely neglected problem. He traces, through a number of historical examples, the relationship between winning power and governing: Sulla and Caesar; the French Revolution and Napoleon; the Congo; the Prussian-German experience; and finally, he shows us how governmental change is exposed to the danger of being arrested and how its political structures can be revitalized.

It would be idle to underestimate the magnitude of the task, and Professor Katz would be the last to do so. Reaching power has always required single-mindedness, ruthlessness, and a certain amount of élan. The more bitter the struggle to reach eminence, the more energy it tends to absorb, leaving less time to develop the qualities required for the exercise of high office. During periods of ideological conflict, such as the twentieth and nineteenth century in Europe, this problem was somewhat reduced. An aristocracy, if it lives up to its values, will reject the arbitrariness of absolutist rule; it will base itself on a notion of quality that discourages the temptations of demagoguery inherent in plebiscitarian political structures. When position is related to birth, generosity is possible (though by no means certain). Flexibility is not inhibited by a commitment to constant success. When a leader's estimate of himself is not dependent on his keeping unfailing masterrot an-administrative structure, then the measures he takes can be attributed to long-range concepts rather than to a compulsive need to avoid an even temporary setback.

Obviously, aristocratic periods had problems of their own; certain forms of self-sufficiency stand in the way of the success of modern bureaucratic leaders. Our challenge is to produce in a mass society some of the values heretofore restricted to a minority. The prospects are not bright. Where competence must be reached by ruthless struggle, leaders may collapse at the top, instead of establishing, but they may be inclined to use in high office the methods by which they reached it. Where political tradition is lacking, as in many of the new societies, leaders may be tempted to rule by sustaining the mood of exaltation of the revolutionary struggle—as Professor Katz shows in his thoughtful chapter on the experience of the Congo. In ideologically oriented societies the gap between reality and expectation can become ominously large.

Professor Katz thinks that this danger can be reduced if men who reach political leadership take into consideration the advice of professional administrators. To a considerable extent this notion is correct. But it may be too optimistic on two grounds. When political leaders are characterized primarily by their quest for power, when they decide to seek office first and search for issues later, then their technique to maintain power is necessarily short-range and manipulative. When men reach leadership before learning what to do with it, nothing more is likely to come from professional advice than tactical considerations. But at the same time, as the bureaucracy becomes more complex, the temptation to identify with the bureaucratic structure will dominate policymaking, or—more insidiously—grow to be identified with it. When the gap between political leadership and bureaucracy is unbridgeable, Professor Katz does not quarrel with that fact. But he would like to see the link be more firmly established—only that the magnitude of the challenge is no excuse for trying new solutions.
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Center for International Affairs  
Harvard University  
6 Divinity Avenue

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for your note transmitting a copy of Max Ascoli's letter. I'll look forward to seeing the review.

Yours,

Milt

Milton Katz
March 14, 1967

Mr. Max Ascoli
THE REPORTER
660 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10021

Dear Max:

Some weeks ago you asked me to do a brief review of the Katz book. Here it is. I will fully understand if you do not want to use it.

How have you been?

Warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

Henry A. Kissinger
Dear Max,

I hope this finds you well. I wanted to follow up on our previous conversation about the book. I have uploaded a digital version of the book to our shared drive, and I think you might find it useful. It's titled "The Art of the Possible" and was published by XYZ Publishing.

Please let me know if you have any questions or if there's anything else I can assist you with.

Best regards,

Henry A. Kestner
If history teaches anything, it is that all political structures have hitherto proved ephemeral. Philosophers and political scientists have found many causes for this state of affairs. None is more important or persistent than the gap which almost inevitably arises between the requirements for reaching high office and the qualities needed to exercise it. When the gap is narrow, the political structure flourishes; when it widens, decay is inevitable.

Professor Milton Katz, in his wise little book, addresses himself to this—strangely neglected—problem. He traces the relationship between winning power and governing through a number of historical examples: Sulla and Caesar; the French Revolution and Napoleon; the Congo; the British accommodation; the Prussian-German accommodation; and, finally, the American governmental elan and shows how it can be arrested and how political structures can be revitalized.

It would be idle to underestimate the magnitude of the task and Professor Katz would be the last to do so. Reaching power has always required single-mindedness, ruthlessness, a certain amount of egotism. The more bitter the struggle to reach eminence the more energy it tends to absorb leaving less time to develop the qualities required for the exercise of high office. During
Review of Milton G. Katz "The Tactics That Are Caused"

By Henry A. Kissinger

If history teaches anything, it is that politics and rhetoric have always been two sides of the same coin. Political scientists have long sought answers for the question of why politics is so important or present in certain situations and how they differ. The relationship between political situations and the exercise of power is a mystery of history that has been explored by many, including the British author, the American Revolution and Napoleon, the French Revolution and Napoleon, and the American government. And, as the examples of the American Revolution and Napoleon, the French Revolution and Napoleon, and the British author, the American government show, it can be assessed in new ways and new situations can be tested and analyzed.

Political scientists can be described in a variety of ways, and Professor Katz would be the last to go so. Rescinding power and its effects on the political landscape is something that he strives to understand. The more he studies the process, the more convinced he becomes of the necessity of education for the exercise of high office. During
aristocratic periods such as the eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe this problem is somewhat reduced. An aristocracy—if it lives up to its values—will reject the arbitrariness of absolutist rule; it will base itself on a notion of quality which discourages the temptations of demagoguery inherent in mass pleiscitarian political structures. When position is felt to be a birthright, generosity is possible (though not guaranteed); flexibility is not inhibited by a commitment to perpetual success. When a leader's estimate of himself is not completely dependent on his standing in an administrative structure, measures can be judged in terms of long-range concepts rather than by an almost compulsive desire to avoid an even temporary set-back.

Obviously aristocratic periods had problems of their own; a certain frivolousness, a self-confidence unrelated to knowledge. In any event, ours is the age of the expert of the charismatic leader. Our challenge is to produce in a mass society some of the values heretofore confined to a minority.

The prospects are not bright. Where eminence must be reached by endless struggle, leaders will collapse at the top drained of creativity. Even more dangerous is the tendency to use in high office the methods by which they reached it. Where political tradition is lacking as in many of the new societies, leaders may be tempted to rule by sustaining the mood of exaltation of the
Extra-European peripheries such as the archipelagos and island groups of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean, have played a significant role in shaping the European and global history. These regions have been crucial in the development of overseas empires and the spread of European languages and cultures. The economic and political relationships between these regions and the European centers have been characterized by unequal power dynamics, with the peripheries often serving as sources of raw materials and labor. The histories of these regions provide valuable insights into the processes of globalization and the ways in which power and wealth have been distributed across the world. The experiences of these peripheries offer a counterpoint to the dominant narratives of European history, highlighting the diversity of experiences and the resilience of local cultures in the face of external pressures.
revolutionary struggle—as Professor Katz shows in his thoughtful chapter on the experience of the Congo. In ideologically oriented societies the problem of the gap between reality and expectation becomes pervasive.

Professor Katz seeks a remedy by supporting the political leaders with greater reliance on professional administrators. To a considerable extent this prescription is correct. But it may be too optimistic on two grounds. When political leaders become distinguished primarily by a quest for power; when they decide to seek office first and search for issues later, their state of mind tends to grow inherently manipulative and short-range. When leaders want to be rather than to do, professional advice may exhaust itself in tactical considerations. At the same time, as the bureaucracy becomes more complex, its internal problems may come to overshadow the purposes for which it was designed. Management will come to dominate policy-making, or--more--insidiously--grow to be identified with it. The gap, in short, may be structural.

This does not mean of course that the problem is insoluble. Professor Katz does not maintain that the task is easy--only that the failure of the response cannot be excused by the magnitude of the challenge. His book should give courage to anyone concerned with the vitality of our society.
Expository attribute as Professor Katz shows in his Counterpoint chapter on the experience of the Condo. In this sociological arena, society is the problem of the gap between reality and expectation.