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Dear Ed,

Many thanks for your kind comments on my review of Robert Beisner's Acheson biography. It was nice to hear from you.

Nancy and I missed you at our screening of "Goya's Ghost" on November 1st but understand that you were going to its Madrid premiere on the 7th. It's a powerful film, certainly one of Milos's best.

With all good wishes from Nancy and hoping to see you soon,

Warm regards,
Henry

Mr. Edward Epstein
New York
Via e-mail: eje@nyc.rr.com
November 9, 2006

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Hi Henry

Your review of the Acheson book was truly enlightening. Not only did it provide a lucid conceptual framework for understanding the transition of US foreign policy in the 1940s, but it spelled out the job of the Secretary of State in managing it. Such reviews, alas, are rarities in the gossip-driven New York Times these days. Thanks for writing it Regards Ed Epstein www.edwardjayepstein.com
DEAN ACHESON was perhaps the most vilified secretary of state in modern American history. Robert L. Beisner, in "Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War," his sweeping and thoughtful account of Acheson's tenure, cites a scholar who, with meticulous pedantry, discovered that during the four years — 1949-53 — that Acheson served as secretary of state, Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements about him on the Senate floor and only seven favorable ones (one wonders for what).

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DEAN ACHESON
A Life in the Cold War.
Oxford University Press. $35.
Cold Warrior

Continued from Page 1

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Though Acheson served during the transition when America emerged as a world power and enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, the scale of government was as yet relatively small, and Washington was still a comparatively provincial city. Its political conflicts were not shaped by public relations advisers or tested on focus groups; hence they were somewhat personal. That senior officials must remain blandly obliging while their veracity or honor is being systematically challenged was never part of the Acheson code. This explains the scene, unimaginable today, when Acheson, in the author's words, at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee, admonished Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska not to shake his dirty finger in his face. When Wherry persisted, Acheson rose and launched a round-house swing at the senatorial gadfly, which was stopped at the last moment because Adrian Fisher, the legal adviser of the State Department, wrapped his arms around Acheson and pulled him down into his seat.

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Acheson served as under secretary of state and then as secretary during the period when a large number of people who had known no direct continuing threat to its security since the early days of the Republic had to be brought to recognize that its permanent participation in the world was indispensable for peace and security. Inevitably this realization was painful and slow in coming; if indeed it has been fully achieved to this day. This is why Acheson was assailed from both political sides, by those insisting on an end to involvement through total victory over the threat and, on the other side, by those who thought there was no threat to begin with, or at least not that required Acheson's militant response.

In this maelstrom, Acheson dealt with the five principal tasks of any secretary of state: the identification of the challenge; the development of a strategy to deal with it; organizing and motivating the bureaucracy in the State Department and in other agencies; persuading the American public; and conducting American diplomacy toward other countries. These tasks require the closest collaboration between the president and the secretary of state; secretaries of state who seek to base their influence on the prerogatives of the office invariably become marginalized. Presidents cannot be constrained by administrative flowcharts; for a secretary of state to be effective, he or she has to get into the president's head, so to speak. This is why Acheson made it a point to see Truman almost every day they were in town together and why their friendship was so crucial to the achievements of the Truman years.

No secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill—though Acheson came closer than any other of the modern period. His overriding challenge was to define a conceptual framework on which to base America's involvement in global affairs. Beiser, a former president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, describes this process in detail and with special emphasis on Acheson's growing debate with George Kennan. Acheson turned Kennan's seminal article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," into the operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to mean that the task of foreign policy was to create situations of strength around the Soviet periphery to deter any temptation for aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be deferred until these situations of strength had come into being; any attempt to begin diplomacy prematurely would undermine the primary task.

Acheson's overriding priority, in the years immediately following World War II, was to reestablish transatlantic relations and create an Atlantic community to resist what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. He built the structure that sustained democracy during the cold war, with the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO and the return of Germany and Japan to the community of nations. But Acheson was less precise about the role of diplomacy in this process once the architectural phase was completed.

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considered the militarization of his own views, inaugurating a debate that has not ended to this day. Acheson implicitly believed that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, and he played down the importance of diplomatic engagement with the adversary. Kennan raised the question of how to gain Soviet acquiescence in the process and urged negotiation, even while the ultimate structure was being built. Acheson treated diplomacy as the more or less automatic consequence of a strategic deployment; Kennan saw it as an autonomous enterprise depending largely on diplomatic skill. The danger of the Acheson approach has been stagnation and gradual public disenchantment with stalemate. The danger of the Kennan approach has been that diplomacy might become a technical exercise in splitting differences and thus shade into appeasement. How to merge the two strands so that military force and diplomacy are mutually supportive and so that national strategy becomes a seamless web is the essence of a continuing national controversy.

Beiner shows how the failure to do so with respect to the Korean War was the cause of the single greatest error of Acheson’s tenure: initially, the placing of Korea publicly outside the American defense perimeter (though this was conventional wisdom at the time) and, later, the inability, after the United States crossed the 38th parallel, to correlate military operations with some achievable diplomatic objectives. For someone like myself, who knew Acheson, Beiner’s portrait does not always capture the vividness of his personality, which emerges too much as a list of eccentricities. Acheson’s relationship with the Nixon White House, and to President Nixon himself, is too cavalierly dismissed as the result of ego and an old man’s vanity. As a participant in all these meetings, I considered that relationship an example of Acheson’s generosity of spirit.

Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his 1952 campaign for vice president. But when he reached out to Acheson, it was received with the consideration Acheson felt he owed to the office, as a form of duty to the country. Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at fatuity, in pursuit of his conception of national service and, unlike some other outside advisors, without offering advice that had not been solicited.

ACHESON emerges from the Beiner book as the greatest secretary of state of the postwar period in the sweep of his design, his ability to implement it, the extraordinary associates with whom he surrounded himself and the nobility of his personal conduct. He was impatient with relativists who sought succor from the complexity of decisions by postulating the moral equivalence of the United States and the Soviet Union. His values were absolute, but he knew also that statesmen are judged by history beyond contemporary debates, and this requires a willingness to achieve great goals in stages, each of which is probably imperfect by absolute standards. This was the theme of an Acheson speech at the War College in August 1951: “There was not ‘one more river to cross’ but ‘countless problems stretching into the future.’ … Americans must reconcile themselves to ‘limited objectives’ and succeed in concert with others, for an essential part of American power was the ‘ability to evoke support from others’ — an ability quite as important as the capacity to compel.”

The importance of that perception has not changed with the passage of time.

they conduct their affairs as adroitly as any military strategist.” How? By growing toward light; concocting chemical deterrents to pests from raw materials they take from the air, water and soil; thickening their trunks in response to stress; and attracting their animal collaborators when it’s time to reproduce.

Tudge, the author of “Global Ecology” and other books, writes simply and with unapologetic enthusiasm. He also has a sense of humor. Pandas were once carnivorous, he says, but they now limit themselves to bamboo. “Though if you want to catch a panda, lure it into a (bamboo) cage with roast pork. It’s the same with all vegetarians.”

There are dozens of “wow” and “who knew?” moments throughout, until the book in its final section takes a sudden and uncompromising political turn. Thanks to all of us, the earth’s climate is rapidly warming, and trees can’t evolve fast enough to cope with the changes. What to do? Turn away from current development models, which focus on industrialization and will continue to pump out carbon dioxide, Tudge says, and support grass-roots arbo-centric economies.

Tudge calls for a new type of governance, one that takes account of the “realities of soil, water and climate” and the needs of humanity at large. If this sounds unrealistic (because it’s anti-business), try redefining the word. “Realistic,” he argues, should apply to people’s lives — “whether they have enough to eat, and water and shelter; whether they have control over their own lives and worthwhile jobs and can live in dignity.” Despite sometimes slipping into vagueness, Tudge is courageous to take this stand and risk alienating readers who’ve stuck with him throughout solely for the love of trees and his enchanting way of writing about them.
“Theodore Roosevelt’s harrowing journey through the Amazon rain forest has never before been told with such intimate depth and nail-biting urgency.**

“An eye-popping mix of presidential history, whitewater epic, and jungle-wild thriller.”—Men’s Journal

“Excellent... Candice Millard writes with precision and perfect pacing.”—San Francisco Chronicle

“Vibrant... Exhilarating... Millard combines high adventure with dazzling passages of nature writing.”—The New York Times Book Review

“The River of Doubt reminds one of the man himself—thorough, robust, extremely knowledgeable, and triumphant.”—The Washington Post Book World

“A bully good adventure tale about a great man.”—Deirdre Donahue, USA Today

HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER left his position as secretary of state in 1977, but he has remained in the public eye through his writing, particularly his three volumes of memoirs, and his place on the Defense Policy Board and a number of other government advisory panels. And, as Bob Woodward writes in his latest book, Kissinger has been “a powerful, largely invisible influence on the foreign policy of the Bush administration,” meeting privately with the president every few months. Kissinger’s admiration for another former secretary of state who was brought to the White House long after he left office—in his case to provide advice to Kissinger’s boss, Richard Nixon—is clear in his front-page review of Robert L. Beisner’s “Dean Acheson.” And in an e-mail message to us, he said that “Acheson was more an inspiration to me than a model because conditions were so different.” But, he added, “leadership is a composite of courage and character: courage to take one’s society from where it is to where it has never been; and character to withstand the assaults with which the familiar defends itself. Acheson met these criteria to a special degree and did so with zest.”

The Editors

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Continued on Page 10
Cold Warrior
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Colin Tudge has written a tribute to the world's trees.

THE TREE
A Natural History of What Trees Are, How They Live, and Why They Matter
By Colin Tudge
Illustrated. 656 pp. Crown Publishers. $27.95
By ELIZABETH ROYTE

In the early 1900's, fruit and walnut growers were growing on as much land as they needed to, and living it'llignity. Despite sometimes slipping into vagueness, Tudge is courageous to take the stand that makes me want to catch a panda, lure it into a (bamboo) cage, and roast pork. It's the same with all vegetation.

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Elizabeth Royte,whose most recent book,"Garbage Land: On the Secret Trail of Trash," has just been published in paperback, is a frequent contributor to the Book Review.
Cold Warrior

By HENRY A. KISSINGER

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Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War - By Robert L. Beisner - Books - Review - New York Ti...

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It was appropriate that Acheson entitled his memoirs "Present at the Creation." The position of secretary of state is potentially the most fulfilling in the government short of the presidency. Its scope is global; ultimately it rests on almost philosophical assumptions as to the nature of world order and the relationship of order to progress and national interest.

Lacking such a conceptual framework, incoherence looms in the face of the daily task of redefining America's relationship to the world via the thousands of messages from nearly 200 diplomatic posts and the constant flow of communication from the Executive Department - all this against the backdrop of Congressional liaison and press inquiry.

Acheson served as under secretary of state and then as secretary during the period when a people that had known no direct continuing threat to its security since the early days of the Republic had to be brought to recognize that its permanent participation in the world was indispensable for peace and security. Inevitably this realization was painful and slow in coming, if indeed it has been fully achieved to this day. This is why Acheson was assailed from both political sides, by those insisting on an end to involvement through total victory over the threat and, on the other side, by those who thought there was no threat to begin with, or at least none that required Acheson's militant response.

In this maelstrom, Acheson dealt with the five principal tasks of any secretary of state: the identification of the challenge; the development of a strategy to deal with it; organizing and motivating the bureaucracy in the State Department and in other agencies; persuading the American public; and conducting American diplomacy toward other countries. These tasks require the closest collaboration between the president and the secretary of state; secretaries of state who seek to base their influence on the prerogatives of the office invariably become marginalized. Presidents cannot be constrained by administrative flowcharts; for a secretary of state to be effective, he or she has to get into the president's head, so to speak. This is why Acheson made it a point to see Truman almost every day they were in town together and why their friendship was so crucial to the achievements of the Truman years.

No secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill - though Acheson came closer than any other of the modern period. His overriding challenge was to
define a conceptual framework on which to base America's involvement in global affairs. Beisner, a former president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, describes this process in detail and with special emphasis on Acheson's growing debate with George Kennan. Acheson turned Kennan's seminal article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," into the operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to mean that the task of foreign policy was to create situations of strength around the Soviet periphery to deter any temptation for aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be deferred until these situations of strength had come into being; any attempt to begin diplomacy prematurely would undermine the primary task.

Acheson's overriding priority, in the years immediately following World War II, was to restore Western Europe and create an Atlantic community to resist what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. He built the structure that sustained democracy during the cold war, with the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO and the return of Germany and Japan to the community of nations. But Acheson was less precise about the role of diplomacy in this process once the architectural phase was completed.

Kennan represented the other strand of American thinking. He rejected what he considered the militarization of his own views, inaugurating a debate that has not ended to this day. Acheson implicitly believed that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, and he played down the importance of diplomatic engagement with the adversary. Kennan raised the question of how to gain Soviet acquiescence in the process and urged negotiation, even while the ultimate structure was being built. Acheson treated diplomacy as the more or less automatic consequence of a strategic deployment; Kennan saw it as an autonomous enterprise depending largely on diplomatic skill.

The danger of the Acheson approach has been stagnation and gradual public disenchantment with stalemate. The danger of the Kennan approach has been that diplomacy might become a technical exercise in splitting differences and thus shade into appeasement. How to merge the two strands so that military force and diplomacy are mutually supportive and so that national strategy becomes a seamless web is the essence of a continuing national controversy.

Beisner shows how the failure to do so with respect to the Korean War was the cause of the single greatest error of Acheson's tenure: initially, the placing of Korea publicly outside the American defense perimeter (though this was conventional wisdom at the time) and, later, the inability, after the United States crossed the 38th parallel, to correlate military operations with some achievable diplomatic objectives. For someone like myself, who knew Acheson, Beisner's portrait does not always capture the vividness of his personality, which emerges too much as a list of eccentricities. Acheson's relationship with the Nixon White House, and to President Nixon himself, is too cavalierly dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's vanity. As a participant in all these meetings, I considered
that relationship an example of Acheson's generosity of spirit. Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his 1952 campaign for vice president. But when he reached out to Acheson, it was received with the consideration Acheson felt he owed to the office, as a form of duty to the country.

Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at flattery, in pursuit of his conception of national service and, unlike some other outside advisers, without offering advice that had not been solicited.

Acheson emerges from the Beisner book as the greatest secretary of state of the postwar period in the sweep of his design, his ability to implement it, the extraordinary associates with whom he surrounded himself and the nobility of his personal conduct. He was impatient with relativists who sought surcease from the complexity of decisions by postulating the moral equivalence of the United States and the Soviet Union. His values were absolute, but he knew also that statesmen are judged by history beyond contemporary debates, and this requires a willingness to achieve great goals in stages, each of which is probably imperfect by absolute standards.

This was the theme of an Acheson speech at the War College in August 1951: "There was not 'one more river to cross' but 'countless problems stretching into the future.' Americans must reconcile themselves to 'limited objectives' and work in congress with others, for an essential part of American power was the 'ability to evoke support from others - an ability quite as important as the capacity to compel.' The importance of that perception has not changed with the passage of time.

*Henry A. Kissinger served as secretary of state from Sept. 22, 1973, to Jan. 20, 1977. He is chairman of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm*
TO: Dr. Kissinger
FROM: Theresa
RE: Payment for book review

This is to let you know that the New York Times sent you a check for $2,000 as payment for your review on Robert Beisner’s book on Dean Acheson.

[Signature with checkmark]

Noted [Signature]
From: Jessee LePorin [jleporin@kmaglobal.com]  
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 1:03 PM  
To: 'Theresa Cimino'  
Subject: RE: Dr. Kissinger's review

It's OK.  
-JL

-----Original Message-----
From: Theresa Cimino [mailto:tcimino@kmaglobal.com]  
Sent: Tuesday, September 19, 2006 5:45 PM  
To: jleporin@kmaglobal.com  
Subject: Fwd: Dr. Kissinger's review

JL:
I was going to respond to the email below with our office address &
HAK's SSN, but then I thought I'd better check if that's okay with him,
it being the NYT. I don't want to make any missteps, in case he wants
them to send his payment to a charity of some sort. When you talk to
him again, if you have time, could you ask if it's okay if I give them
the info so they can send him a check? (They don't mention an amount.)
Thanks, T.

--------
From: Nancy Martinez <martinez@nytimes.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2006 09:28:05 -0400
To: tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Dr. Kissinger's review

Dear Theresa,

Barry Gewen passed along your email address. I'd like to process
payment to Dr. Kissinger for his review of DEAN ACHESON. Please
advise how we should pay him. I'll need a federal ID number or his
social security number as well as the address. Many thanks.

All best,
Nancy
--

Nancy Martinez
Assistant to Sam Tanenhaus
The New York Times Book Review
229 West 43 Street, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10036
tel (212) 556-1466
fax (212) 556-1320
I spoke to you before I went on vacation last week about the scheduling of Dr. Kissinger's review, and at the time we thought it would run in our Oct. 8 issue. It has now been scheduled for our Oct. 15 issue, and is the cover review that week, which is the reason for the delay. We will begin working on that issue next week, which means I should be ready to send you an edited version by Thursday, Sept. 28.

Barry
Dear Theresa,

Barry Gewen passed along your email address. I’d like to process payment to Dr. Kissinger for his review of DEAN ACHESON. Please advise how we should pay him. I'll need a federal ID number or his social security number as well as the address. Many thanks.

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New York, NY 10036
tel (212) 556-1466
fax (212) 556-1320
martinez@nytimes.com
Our emails must have crossed. I acknowledged receipt of the email you sent earlier, but this can serve as a second acknowledgment.

Barry
Theresa Cimino

From: Barry Gewen [gewen@nytimes.com]
Sent: Monday, October 02, 2006 2:04 PM
To: tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Subject: kissinger i.d., etc

Theresa--

Will I be seeing Dr. Kissinger's i.d., his resume and his answers to our questions before the end of the day?

Barry
TO:          Dr. Kissinger
FROM:       Theresa
RE:          Acheson review

I spoke with Barry Gewen of the NYT regarding publication of your review. “First of all,” he said, “everyone is absolutely delighted with the piece. It’s excellent, and we think it’s going to attract a lot of attention.”

The piece is currently scheduled to run in the October 8 issue. They plan to have an edited version to you for your approval on Thursday, Sept. 18 (at which time you are scheduled to be in London and then that evening to Berlin). Gewen, who has been our contact, will be out next week but provided a contact number if you have any questions while he is gone.
October 4, 2006

BOOKS OF THE TIMES

Facing a Global Threat With Nonpartisan Clarity

By WALTER ISAACSON

In 1946, just after fascism had been defeated, America’s leaders found themselves confronted by a whole new global threat, the spread of Soviet-backed Communism. They reacted creatively and boldly by devising an imaginative array of institutions, like NATO and the Marshall Plan, and by formulating a clear and nonpartisan sense of mission, expressed in the Truman Doctrine and the strategies of containment.

Today America is once again confronted by a new global threat, that of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. But so far no new NATO or Marshall Plan has been birthed, and the Bush Doctrine is not yet as clear nor as nonpartisan as some might hope. That is one reason that it is worth welcoming another biography of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was more responsible for the Marshall Plan than Gen. George Marshall and as responsible for the Truman Doctrine as President Harry S. Truman.

Acheson has been blessed with good and generally sympathetic biographers: Gaddis Smith, David McLellan, James Chace and, for his later years, Douglas Brinkley. The man himself conveyed his own flair in what may be the most luminous memoir by any American statesman, “Present at the Creation,” published in 1969, as polished and elegant as its author.

Robert L. Beisner, a diplomatic historian whose previous works have focused on the 19th century, has now produced a welcome addition to this shelf, a solidly researched and balanced tome that focuses mainly on Acheson’s years as the undersecretary and then secretary of state. It serves as the perfect companion to “Present at the Creation.” It is not as rollicking and witty, but Mr. Beisner’s prodigious mining of archives and oral histories makes it actually far more reliable and accurate than Acheson’s martini-lubricated memories.

Mr. Beisner meticulously traces the evolution of Acheson’s attitude toward the Soviet Union in 1946. Acheson began the year pushing a plan to bring Moscow into an international system for controlling atomic weapons. But by September, in what Mr. Beisner calls a “sharp and decisive turn,” he joined the growing bipartisan consensus that Stalin had to be resisted rather than accommodated. He concluded, as he later wrote, that the Soviet threat was “singularly like that which Islam had posed centuries before, with its combination of

ideological zeal and fighting power.”

With Marshall as secretary and Acheson as undersecretary, the State Department embarked on meeting this challenge. Their first step was laying a solid, carefully conceived and clearly articulated foundation, which became known as the Truman Doctrine.

The process began in early 1947 when the British informed Washington that they could no longer keep their commitment to support the Greek government in its struggle against Communist forces. Acheson realized that the United States must step into the breach, and that this presaged a whole new international role. He worked throughout the weekend with his advisers to produce an official request for aid to Greece and Turkey, and then “drank a martini or two toward the confusion of our enemies.”

Recognizing the need for bipartisanship in embarking on a mission that might take decades, Acheson consulted Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At a meeting with Truman and Vandenberg in the White House, Acheson put the aid request in the context of the larger struggle by using a metaphor about how one or two rotten apples could spoil a barrel.

Acheson oversaw the process of writing the presidential speech to define the new doctrine. The challenge was cast in sweeping terms of a world split between freedom and repression. But the commitment at the core of the doctrine was carefully calibrated to be pragmatic, definable and doable. The United States would, Truman proclaimed, “support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

Acheson realized that it was important for the new doctrine to set limits as well as visions. The United States could not help every free nation, and it would be guided by its own security interests in deciding how to react to each case. He eventually got into trouble by seeming to exclude Korea from America’s security perimeter, which some thought contributed to Stalin’s calculations in encouraging the North Korean invasion in 1950.

Mr. Beisner is defensive on Acheson’s behalf, explaining the Korea comment as a minor “afterthought in a busy month” that did not truly alter United States policy. But the incident was significant because it showed that there were risks as well as benefits in making sure that doctrines were clearly articulated and circumscribed. On balance, Acheson felt, the benefits were greater.

When Truman later loosely declared that “whenever and wherever we are challenged by the Communists we must meet the challenge,” Acheson privately wrote him: “You cannot mean this,” adding that confronting Moscow required “lots of sense and coolness in making decisions of where and how.”

After becoming secretary of state in 1949, Acheson helped shape the NATO military alliance with Western Europe and was generally able to preserve the bipartisan consensus behind the cold war strategy. But he was not able to inoculate himself personally from the anti-Communist fervor that arose in the early 1950’s. With an intellectual brilliance only partly leavened by wit, and a veneer of aristocratic arrogance polished by mustache wax, Acheson became a natural target, especially after he defended the honor of his employee and acquaintance Alger Hiss from allegations that he was a Russian spy.

American foreign policy has historically fluctuated between idealism and realism. Acheson's career showed that it is best when these strands are woven together, as they were in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. As his current heirs at the State Department seek to temper the democracy-crusade idealism at the heart of the Bush Doctrine with a dose of practicality, pragmatism and realism, Mr. Beisner's book can offer some lessons about balancing commitments and resources, interests and ideals.

Walter Isaacson, president of the Aspen Institute, is co-author of “The Wise Men” and author of biographies of Henry A. Kissinger and Benjamin Franklin.
From: Theresa Cimino <tcimino@kmaglobal.com>
To: <gewen@nytimes.com>
Subject: Dr. Kissinger's review
Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2006 13:37:33 -0400 (EDT)

Dear Mr. Gewen:

Dr. Kissinger has one additional change that he would like made to the review. He would like the very last sentence of the piece to read: "The importance [changed from 'relevance'] of that perception has not changed with the passage of time."

Also, attached are two files. The first is a page with the identification line you asked for (to run with the review) and answers to the questions you posed to Dr. Kissinger last week (for your "Upfront" feature). The second is the current resume you requested.

I am working from home today, reachable at 201/689-1622 if you have any questions.

Thank you,
Theresa

<<Acheson review questions-FINAL.doc (application/msword)>>
<<Bio-Kissinger.doc (application/msword)>>
Responses to Questions for
Dr. Kissinger’s review of Robert L. Beisner’s Dean Acheson

Responses to questions for “Upfront” feature:

Was Acheson a model for you, and if so, in what ways?

Acheson was more an inspiration to me than a model because conditions were so different. I did attempt to emulate, within the limits of the possible, the quality of his staff, which contained the extraordinary and unique team of George Kennan, Paul Nitze, Charles Bohlen and Foy Kohler.

What do you think of "Present at the Creation" and of Acheson as a writer?

*Present at the Creation* is a splendid example of the memoir genre that seeks to capture a series of decisive high points and to explain how they were mastered, through vivid portraits of the personalities involved. It is written with passion and elegance.

Has the role of Secretary of State changed from Acheson’s time to your own time in the office to the present?

The bureaucratic aspect of policymaking has been transformed. Acheson had to compete for dominance in foreign policymaking with a few individuals. The contemporary Secretary of State has to master a process. The importance of close ties with the President has remained the key to effectiveness.

Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about Acheson that you weren’t able to fit into the review?

Leadership is a composite of courage and character: courage to take one’s society from where it is to where it has never been; and character to withstand the assaults with which the familiar defends itself. Acheson met these criteria to a special degree and did so with zest.
HENRY A. KISSINGER

Henry Alfred Kissinger was sworn in on September 22, 1973, as the 56th Secretary of State, a position he held until January 20, 1977. He also served as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1969, until November 3, 1975. In July 1983 he was appointed by President Reagan to chair the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America until it ceased operation in January 1985, and from 1984-1990 he served as a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. From 1986-1988 he was a member of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy of the National Security Council and Defense Department. He is currently a member of the Defense Policy Board.

At present, Dr. Kissinger is Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm. He is also a member of the International Council of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; Chairman of the International Advisory Board of American International Group, Inc.; a Counselor to and Trustee of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; an Honorary Governor of the Foreign Policy Association; and an Honor Member of the International Olympic Committee. Among his other activities, Dr. Kissinger is a member of the Board of Directors of ContiGroup Companies, Inc. and a Public Sector member of the United States Olympic Committee. He is also an Advisor to the Board of Directors of American Express Company; a member of the Advisory Board of Forstmann Little and Co.; a Trustee Emeritus of the Metropolitan Museum of Art; a Director Emeritus of Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc.; and a Director of the International Rescue Committee.

Among the awards Dr. Kissinger has received have been the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973; the Presidential Medal of Freedom (the nation’s highest civilian award) in 1977; and the Medal of Liberty (given one time to ten foreign-born American leaders) in 1986.

Dr. Kissinger was born in Fuerth, Germany, came to the United States in 1938 and was naturalized a United States citizen in 1943. He served in the Army from 1943 to 1946. He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard College in 1950 and received M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University in 1952 and 1954.

From 1954 until 1969 he was a member of the faculty of Harvard University, in both the Department of Government and the Center for International Affairs. He was Director of the Harvard International Seminar from 1952 to 1969.
Dr. Kissinger is the author of:

* A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration of Peace, 1812-1822 (1957);
* Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957);
* The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (1961);
* The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (1965);
* Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readings (ed.) (1965);
* American Foreign Policy, Three Essays (1969);
* White House Years (1979);
* For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980 (1981);
* Years of Upheaval (1982);
* Observations: Selected Speeches and Essays, 1982-1984 (1985);
* Diplomacy (1994);
* Years of Renewal (1999);
* Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (2001);
* Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (2003); and
* Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (2003).

He has also published numerous articles on United States foreign policy, international affairs and diplomatic history. His column, syndicated by Tribune Media Services International, appears in leading U.S. newspapers and in over 40 foreign countries.

Dr. Kissinger is married to the former Nancy Maginnes and is the father of two children by a previous marriage.
Responses to Questions from *NYT Sunday Review of Books*

**Brief identification line:**

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4) Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about Acheson that you weren’t able to fit into the review?

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Responses to questions for "Upfront" feature:

1) **Was Acheson a model for you, and if so, in what ways?**

Acheson was more an inspiration to me than a model. If anything, I attempted to surround myself with outstanding experts as Acheson did when he had the extraordinary team of [George] Kennan, [Paul] Nitze, [Charles] Bohlen and [Foy] Kohler in his entourage.

2) **What do you think of "Present at the Creation" and of Acheson as a writer?**

*Present at the Creation* is a splendid example of [the memoir genre] that seeks to capture a series of decisive high points and to explain how they
were mastered, through vivid portraits of the personalities involved. It is written with passion and elegance.

3) Has the role of Secretary of State changed from Acheson's time to your own time in the office to the present?

The bureaucratic aspect of policymaking has been transformed with so many new agencies clamoring for attention. Acheson had to compete for dominance in foreign policymaking with a few individuals. The contemporary Secretary of State has to master a process. The importance of close ties with the President has remained the key to effectiveness.

4) Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about Acheson that you weren't able to fit into the review?

Leadership is a composite of courage and character: courage to take one's society from where it is to where it has never been; and character to withstand the assaults with which the familiar defends itself. [DID YOU WANT TO TIE THIS BACK TO ACHESON SOMEHOW?]

[Note: Bio. will be emailed as it stands, as you indicated.]
TO: Dr. Kissinger  
FROM: Theresa  
RE: Items needed by Mon. - for NYT Sunday Review of Books

1) They need a brief identification line of you to run with your review. Would something like this be okay?:

   "Dr. Kissinger served as Secretary of State from September 22, 1973 to January 20, 1977. He is chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., a geopolitical consulting firm."

2) You are asked for brief one- or two-sentence answers to the following questions for the "Upfront" feature that will highlight you:

   1. Was Acheson a model for you, and if so, in what ways?

   2. What do you think of "Present at the Creation" and of Acheson as a writer?

   3. Has the role of Secretary of State changed from Acheson's time to your own time in the office to the present?

   4. Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about Acheson that you weren't able to fit into the review?

3) And finally, they ask for a current bio. Please indicate whether it is okay to email them the attached:

   Okay to email attached ✓ Edit as indicated
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RE: Items needed by Mon. - for NYT Sunday Review of Books  

9/29/06

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1. Hillel was more an innovator than a model. If anything, I attempted to surround myself with his teachings, as an example. He was a mystic when he led the extraordinary team of Menahem, Zigor, Batkin and Kolbe in his entourage.

2.出让ir round these members. These are not accidental. Each of the individuals is a splendid example of genius of memoirs that seeks to capture a series of decisive life points and explain how they were mastered through mind contact to relate the. The memoirs of them. The personalities involved. It is written with passion and elegance.

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4. Leadership is a composite of courage and character: courage to take one’s society from where it is to where it will have never been; and character to withstand the assault it will inevitably.

The familiar defends itself.
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DEAN ACHESON was perhaps the most vilified secretary of state of modern American history. Robert L. Beisner, in "Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War," his sweeping and thoughtful account of Acheson's tenure, cites a scholar who, with meticulous pedantry, discovered that during the four years - 1949-53 - that Acheson served as secretary of state, Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements about him on the Senate floor and only seven favorable ones (one wonders for what). History has treated Acheson more kindly. Accolades for him have become bipartisan. Secretaries of state appointed by the party of his erstwhile tormentors have described him as a role model; Condoleezza Rice is the most recent example. Thirty-five years after his death, Acheson has achieved iconic status. This is all the more remarkable in view of his out-of-scale personality, so at odds with the present period, in which eminence seems to be tolerable only in the garb of the commonplace.

The debonair conduct, the bristling mustache, the Bond Street tailoring, the biting wit, the extraordinary analytical skill coupled with a defiant refusal to turn the other cheek bespoke an affirmation of the idiosyncratic over the conventional. Acheson was a man of high principle, whose hero was Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., an iconoclastic Boston Brahmin shaped by the 19th century, and whose best friend was Felix Frankfurter, the brilliant son of Jewish immigrants. Though Acheson served during the transition when America emerged as a world power and enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, the scale of government was as yet relatively small, and Washington was still a comparatively provincial city. Its political conflicts were not shaped by public relations advisers or tested on focus groups; hence they were somewhat personal. That senior officials must remain blandly obliging while their veracity or honor is being systematically challenged was never part of the Acheson code. This explains the scene, unimaginable today, when Acheson, in the author's words, at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee, admonished Sen. Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska not to shake his dirty finger in his face. When Wherry persisted, Acheson rose and launched a roundhouse swing at the senatorial gadfly, which was stopped at the last moment because Adrian Fisher, the legal adviser of the State Department, wrapped his arms around Acheson and pulled him down into his seat.

When Acheson became secretary of state, America had only just started its journey toward global involvement. Africa was still colonial; Britain was predominant in much of the Middle East; Indian democracy was only two years old; Germany and Japan were still occupied countries. The debate was not over aspirations to hegemony but over whether the nation should engage itself internationally at all, never mind permanently. It was appropriate that Acheson entitled his memoirs "Present at the Creation."

The position of secretary of state is potentially the most fulfilling in the government short of the presidency. Its scope is global; ultimately it rests on almost philosophical assumptions as to the nature of world order and the relationship of order to progress and national interest. Lacking such a conceptual framework, incoherence looms in face of the daily task of redefining America's relationship to the world via the thousands of messages from nearly 200 diplomatic posts and the constant flow of communication from the Executive Department - all this against the backdrop of Congressional liaison and press inquiry.

Acheson served as undersecretary of state and then as secretary during the period when a people that had known no direct continuing threat to its security since the beginning of the Republic had to be brought to recognize that its permanent participation in the world was indispensable for peace and security. Inevitably this realization was painful and slow in coming, if indeed it has been fully achieved to this day. This is why Acheson was assailed from both political sides, by those insisting on an end to involvement through total victory over the threat and, on the other side, by those who thought there was no threat to begin with, or at least none that required Acheson's militant response.

In this maelstrom, Acheson dealt with the five principal tasks of any secretary of state: the identification of the challenge; the development of a strategy to deal with it; organizing and motivating the bureaucracy in the State Department and in other agencies; persuading the American public; and conducting American diplomacy toward other countries. These tasks require the closest collaboration between the president and the secretary of state; secretaries of state who seek to base their influence on the prerogatives of the office invariably become marginalized. Presidents cannot be constrained by administrative flowcharts; for a secretary of state to be effective, he or she has to get into the president's head, so to speak. This is why Acheson made it a point to see Truman almost every day they were in town together and why their friendship was so crucial to the achievements of the Truman years.

No secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill - though Acheson came closer than any other of the modern period. His overriding challenge was to define a conceptual framework on which to base America's involvement in global affairs.
Beisner, a former president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, describes this process in detail and with special emphasis on Acheson's growing debate with George Kennan. Acheson turned Kennan's seminal article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," into the operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to mean that the task of foreign policy was to create situations of strength around the Soviet periphery to deter any temptation for aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be deferred until these situations of strength had come into being; any attempt to begin diplomacy prematurely would undermine the primary task.

Acheson's overriding priority, in the years immediately following World War II, was to restore Western Europe and create an Atlantic community to resist what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. He built the structure that sustained democracy during the cold war, with the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO and the return of Germany and Japan to the community of nations. But Acheson was less precise about the role of diplomacy in this process once the architectural phase was completed. Kennan represented the other strand of American thinking. He rejected what he considered the militarization of his own views, inaugurating a debate that has not ended to this day. Acheson implicitly believed that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, and he played down the importance of diplomatic engagement with the adversary. Kennan raised the question of how to gain Soviet acquiescence in the process and urged negotiation, even while the ultimate structure was being built.

Acheson treated diplomacy as the more or less automatic consequence of a strategic deployment; Kennan saw it as an autonomous enterprise depending largely on diplomatic skill. The danger of the Acheson approach has been stagnation and gradual public disenchantment with stalemate. The danger of the Kennan approach has been that diplomacy might become a technical exercise in splitting differences and thus shade into appeasement. How to merge the two strands so that military force and diplomacy are mutually supportive and so that national strategy becomes a seamless web is the essence of a continuing national controversy.

Beisner shows how the failure to do so with respect to the Korean War was the cause of the single greatest error of Acheson's tenure: initially, the placing of Korea publicly outside the American defense perimeter (though this was conventional wisdom at the time) and, later, the inability, after the United States crossed the 38th parallel, to correlate military operations with some achievable diplomatic objectives.

For someone like myself, who knew Acheson, Beisner's portrait does not always capture the vividness of his personality, which emerges too much as a list of eccentricities. Acheson's relationship with the Nixon White House, and to President Nixon himself, is too cavalierly dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's vanity. As a participant in all these meetings, I considered that relationship an example of Acheson's generosity of spirit. Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his 1952 campaign for vice president. But when he reached out to Acheson, it was received with the consideration Acheson felt he owed to the office, as a form of duty to the country. Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at flattery, in pursuit of his conception of national service and, unlike some other outside advisers, without offering advice that had not been solicited.

Acheson emerges from the Beisner book as the greatest secretary of state of the postwar period in the sweep of his design, his ability to implement it, the extraordinary associates with whom he surrounded himself and the nobility of his personal conduct. He was impatient with relativists who sought surcease from the complexity of decisions by postulating the moral equivalence of the United States and the Soviet Union. His values were absolute, but he knew also that statesmen are judged by history beyond contemporary debates, and this requires a willingness to achieve great goals in stages, each of which is probably imperfect by absolute standards.

This was the theme of an Acheson speech at the War College in August 1951: "There was not 'one more river to cross' but 'countless problems stretching into the future.' § Americans must reconcile themselves to 'limited objectives' and work in congress with others, for an essential part of American power was the 'ability to evoke support from others - an ability quite as important as the capacity to compel.'"

The relevance of that perception has not changed with the passage of time.

9/29/2006
Dear Mr. Gewen:

As discussed, following are Dr. Kissinger's slight changes to your edited version of his review (in bold, caps and larger font in order to facilitate spotting them in the text).

Thank you,
Theresa

DEAN ACHESON was perhaps the most vilified secretary of state of modern American history.

Robert L. Beisner, in "Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War," his sweeping and thoughtful account of Acheson's tenure, cites a scholar who, with meticulous pedantry, discovered that during the four years - 1949-53 - that Acheson served as secretary of state, Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements about him on the Senate floor and only seven favorable ones (one wonders for what).

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Though Acheson served during the transition when America emerged as a world power and enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, the scale of government was as yet relatively small, and Washington was still a comparatively provincial city. Its political conflicts were not shaped by public relations advisers or tested on focus groups; hence they were somewhat personal. That senior officials must remain blandly obliging while their veracity or honor is being systematically challenged was
never part of the Acheson code. This explains the scene, unimaginable today, when Acheson, in the author's words, at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee, admonished Sen. Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska not to shake his dirty finger in his face. When Wherry persisted, Acheson rose and launched a roundhouse swing at the senatorial gadfly, which was stopped at the last moment because Adrian Fisher, the legal adviser of the State Department, wrapped his arms around Acheson and pulled him down into his seat.

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Lacking such a conceptual framework, incoherence looms in face of the daily task of redefining America's relationship to the world via the thousands of messages from nearly 200 diplomatic posts and the constant flow of communication from the Executive Department - all this against the backdrop of Congressional liaison and press inquiry.

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would be self-enforcing, and he played down the
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respect to the Korean War was the cause of the
single greatest error of Acheson’s tenure:

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9/29/2006
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considered that relationship an example of

Acheson's generosity of spirit. Nixon had made

essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson
during his 1952 campaign for vice

President.[PLEASE NOTE: YOU ORIGINALLY HAD "HIS

1952 CAMPAIGN FOR SENATE." NIXON RAN FOR SENATE

IN 1950 AND FOR VICE PRESIDENT IN 1952, AND WE

WEREN'T SURE WHICH RACE YOU MEANT, BUT THE FAMOUS

COMMENT ABOUT ACHESON'S "COWARDLY COLLEGE OF

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From: Barry Gewen <gewen@nytimes.com>
To: <tcimino@kmaglobal.com>
Subject: acheson review
Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2006 11:16:18 -0400

Dr. Kissinger--

Your review will be running as the cover review of the Oct. 15 Book Review. We are delighted with it and expect it will generate wide discussion. Here is the edited version for you to look over. You should know that we close the issue next Wednesday, so Tuesday is the latest I can hear from you, though Monday would be preferable. I've included a few comments about some of the editing in CAPS in the body of the review. We also need a brief i.d. from you to run with the review.

But here is something else for you to attend to. In every issue of the Book Review we run a small, 200-300 word introductory section called "Upfront," highlighting some aspect of the week's issue. For Oct. 15 we would like to write the Upfront on you. For this we will need a current resume. It would also help us out if you could provide brief, one- or two-sentence answers to some or all of the following questions--but whereas we can take your response to the editing on Tuesday, we will need your answers to these questions by Monday.

- Was Acheson a model for you, and if so, in what ways?
- What do you think of "Present at the Creation" and of Acheson as a writer?
- Has the role of Secretary of State changed from Acheson's time to your own time in the office to the present?
- Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about Acheson that you weren't able to fit into the review?

Many thanks for your cooperation on all this.

Here is the edited version of your review:

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thoughtful account of Acheson's tenure, cites a scholar who, with meticulous pedantry, discovered that during the four years (1949-53) that Acheson served as secretary of state, Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements about him on the Senate floor and only seven favorable ones (one wonders for what). History has treated Acheson more kindly. Accolades for him have become bipartisan. Secretaries of state appointed by the party of his erstwhile tormentors have described him as a role model; Condoleezza Rice is the most recent example. Thirty-five years after his death, Acheson has achieved iconic status. This is all the more remarkable in view of his out-of-scale personality, so at odds with the present period, in which eminence seems to be tolerable only in the garb of the commonplace. It is not the manner of The debonair conduct, the bristling mustache, the Bond Street tailoring, the biting wit, the extraordinary analytical skill coupled with a defiant refusal to turn the other cheek bespoke an affirmation of the idiosyncratic over the conventional. Acheson was a man of high principle, whose hero was Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., an iconoclastic Boston Brahmin shaped by the 19th century, and whose best friend was Felix Frankfurter, the brilliant son of Jewish immigrants.

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Inbox: acheson review

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Sir:

Welcome home. Following are two copies of the email we received today from the NYT with your edited Acheson review, one clean copy and the other a comparison. I am also including a copy of what was submitted. A few things to note:

- Tuesday is the latest they can make changes; Monday is preferable (the issue closes Wednesday).

- They want to feature you in a small introductory section of the October 15 issue called "Upfront," which highlights some aspect of the week's issue. For this they need: (a) a current bio (which we can email with your approval); and (b) brief, one- or two-sentence answers to the questions on the first page of the email.

- I will be in the office tomorrow, in transit from about 7:15am, and plan to arrive by 9:00am.

Theresa
From: Barry Gewen <gewen@nytimes.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2006 11:16:18 -0400
To: tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Subject: acheson review

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War College in August 1951: "There was not 'one more river to cross' but countless problems stretching into the future. Americans must reconcile themselves to limited objectives and work in congress with others, for an essential part of American power was the 'ability to evoke support from others - an ability quite as important as the capacity to compel.'"

The relevance of that perception has not changed with the passage of time.
We'll put on mail summary, and I'll raise when he returns. I'm not really having a lot of time to be raising things with him via telephone these days. If you could let him know HK is abroad, that should suffice for now.

-----Original Message-----
From: Theresa Cimino [mailto:tcimino@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 11:47 AM
To: jleporin@kmaglobal.com
Cc: mhalley@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Fwd: from the editor of The New York Times Book Review

JL:
Tanenhaus is the editor of the NYT Book Review. So you might want to let HAK know the request below has come in. I am also forwarding to MH for the mail. In the meantime, I will let Tanenhaus know that HAK is traveling and that we will pass his message along to HAK. Thanks, T.

MH - You might want to remove my message before putting this email through the mail. Thanks, T.

-------------
From: Sam Tanenhaus <tanenhaus@nytimes.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2006 10:55:33 -0400
To: tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Subject: from the editor of The New York Times Book Review

Dear Ms. Cimino,

Is there any chance of my briefly interviewing Dr. Kissinger by phone in early October to discuss his splendid essay for the Times Book Review on Dean Acheson? The interview would be featured in our weekly podcast, which is featured in the on-line edition of the Times. I won't need more than 10 minutes of his time.

Best regards,

--
Sam Tanenhaus
Editor
The New York Times Book Review
229 West 43rd Street
New York, N.Y. 10036
212-556-8301 (or 1466)
It's OK.
-JL

-----Original Message-----
From: Theresa Cimino [mailto:tcimino@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 19, 2006 5:45 PM
To: jleporin@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Fwd: Dr. Kissinger's review

JL:
I was going to respond to the email below with our office address &
HAK's SSN, but then I thought I'd better check if that's okay with him,
it being the NYT. I don't want to make any missteps, in case he wants
them to send his payment to a charity of some sort. When you talk to
him again, if you have time, could you ask if it's okay if I give them
the info so they can send him a check? (They don't mention an amount.)
Thanks, T.

----------
From: Nancy Martinez <martinez@nytimes.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2006 09:28:05 -0400
To: tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Dr. Kissinger's review

Dear Theresa,

Barry Gewen passed along your email address. I'd like to process
payment to Dr. Kissinger for his review of DEAN ACHESON. Please
advise how we should pay him. I'll need a federal ID number or his
social security number as well as the address. Many thanks.

All best,
Nancy
--

Nancy Martinez
Assistant to Sam Tanenhaus
The New York Times Book Review
229 West 43 Street, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10036
tel (212) 556-1466
fax (212) 556-1320
I spoke to you before I went on vacation last week about the scheduling of Dr. Kissinger's review, and at the time we thought it would run in our Oct. 8 issue. It has now been scheduled for our Oct. 15 issue, and is the cover review that week, which is the reason for the delay. We will begin working on that issue next week, which means I should be ready to send you an edited version by Thursday, Sept. 28.

Barry
TO: Dr. Kissinger  
FROM: Theresa  
RE: Acheson review

I spoke with Barry Gewen of the NYT regarding publication of your review. "First of all," he said, "everyone is absolutely delighted with the piece. It's excellent, and we think it's going to attract a lot of attention."

The piece is currently scheduled to run in the October 8 issue. They plan to have an edited version to you for your approval on Thursday, Sept. 21 (at which time you are scheduled to be in London and then that evening to Berlin). Gewen, who has been our contact, will be out next week but provided a contact number if you have any questions while he is gone. Nancy Martinez 212/556-1466

✓ HAK said okay
Theresa Cimino

From: Barry Gewen [gewen@nytimes.com]
Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2006 2:53 PM
To: Theresa Cimino
Subject: RE: Dr. Kissinger's review

got it. thanks.
Dear Mr. Gewen:

Thank you for your message. In the meantime, Dr. Kissinger has made some slight edits to the piece and asked me to send you the attached revised final.

Sincerely,
Theresa

-----Original Message-----
From: Barry Gewen [mailto:gewen@nytimes.com]
Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2006 12:19 PM
To: Theresa Cimino
Subject: Re: Dr. Kissinger's review

Many thanks. I can't tell you at this point when the piece will be scheduled to run, but I will be sending you an edited version once that's available.

Barry
Review of Robert L. Beisner's
Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War
for The New York Times Sunday Book Review
By Henry A. Kissinger

Dean Acheson was perhaps the most vilified Secretary of State of modern American history. Robert Beisner, in his sweeping and thoughtful account of Acheson's tenure, cites a scholar who, with meticulous pedantry, discovered that during the four years that Acheson served as Secretary of State, Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements about him on the Senate floor and only seven favorable ones (one wonders for what).

History has treated Acheson more kindly. Accolades for him have become bipartisan. Secretaries of State appointed by the party of his erstwhile tormentors have described him as a role model; Condoleezza Rice is the most recent example. Thirty years after his death, Acheson has achieved icon status.

This is all the more remarkable in view of Acheson's out of scale personality, so at odds with a period in which eminence seems to be tolerable only in the garb of the commonplace, if not the banal. The debonair conduct, the bristling mustache, the Bond Street tailoring, the biting wit, the extraordinary analytical skill coupled with a defiant refusal to turn the other cheek bespoke an affirmation of the idiosyncratic over the conventional. Acheson was a man of high principle, whose hero was Oliver Wendell Homes, an iconoclastic Boston Brahmin shaped by the nineteenth century, and whose best friend was Felix Frankfurter, the brilliant son of Jewish immigrants. Though Acheson served during the transition when America emerged as a world power and enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, the scale of government was as yet relatively small, and Washington was still a comparatively provincial city. Its political conflicts were not shaped by public relations advisors or tested on focus groups; hence they were somewhat personal. That senior officials must remain blandly obliging while their veracity or honor is being systematically challenged was never part of the Acheson code. This explains the scene, unimaginable today, when Acheson, in the author's words, at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee, admonished Senator Kenneth Wherry not to shake his dirty finger in his face. When Wherry
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who seek to base their influence on the prerogatives of the office invariably become marginalized. Presidents cannot be constrained by administrative flowcharts; for a Secretary of State to be effective, he or she has to get into the President’s head, so to speak. This is why Acheson made it a point to see Truman almost every day they were in town together and why their friendship was so crucial to the achievements of the Truman years.

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Barry
Dear Mr. Gewen:

Attached is Dr. Kissinger's review of Robert Beisner's *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War*. Could you let me know what the process will be going forward and if there is anything further you need from us?

Thank you,
Theresa Amantea
212/759-7919
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and that had grown up with the conviction that such challenges as those could be overcome rapidly by the mobilization of America's strength, had to be brought to recognize that its participation was indispensable for peace and security and that it would have to do so on a permanent basis. Inevitably this realization was painful and slow in coming, if indeed it has been fully achieved to this day. This is why Acheson was assailed from both political wings by those convinced by a desire for an end to involvement as soon as an immediate threat had been overcome, [from those who sought a final victory over the threat followed by withdrawal] and, on the other wing, by those who thought there was no threat to begin with, or at least none that required Acheson's militant response.

In this maelstrom, Acheson dealt with the five principal tasks of any Secretary of State: the identification of the challenge; the development of a strategy to deal with it; organizing and motivating
the bureaucracy, both in the State Department and in other agencies;
persuading the American public; and conducting American diplomacy
towards other countries. These tasks require the closest collaboration
between the Secretary of State
with the President. Secretaries of State who seek to base their
influence on the prerogatives of the office invariably become
marginalized. Presidents cannot be constrained by administrative flow
charts; for a Secretary of State to be effective, he or she has to get
into the President’s head, so to speak. This is why Acheson made it a
d point to see Truman almost every day they were in town together and
meticulously kept him informed

No Secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill – though
Acheson came closer than any other of the modern period. He was
the first to face the need to define a conceptual framework on which to
base America’s involvement in global affairs. He turned George
Kennan’s seminal article on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” into an
operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to mean that the task of American foreign policy was to create situations of strength around the Soviet periphery to deter any temptation for Soviet aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be deferred until these situations of strength had come into being; any attempt to launch diplomacy prematurely would undermine the primary task. Kennan was later to reject this approach, which he considered the militarization of his policy, launching a debate that has not ended to this day.

Acheson's overriding priority, in the years immediately following World War II, was to restore Western Europe and create a political community to resist what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. Acheson created the structure that sustained the free countries during the Cold War via the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, the return of Germany and Japan to the community of nations; without it, the
The ultimate outcome of the Cold War would never have been reached unless something was done to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union as its ultimate transformation into a normal state. But Acheson was less clear about the diplomacy needed to follow the culmination of his architectural phase.

Kennan represented the other strand of American thinking. He explicitly believed that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, thus recognizing the importance of diplomatic engagement with the adversary. Kennan raised the question of how to gain Soviet acquiescence in the situations of strength and what a negotiation based on it would involve. The danger of the Acheson approach has been conflict through miscalculation. The danger of the Kennan approach was that diplomacy might shade into appeasement.

The tension between the two schools of thought - the one that treats diplomacy as a strategic end in itself and those who see it as an instrument of conflict.
authoritative experts depend largely on diplomacy and in itself - has yet to be resolved. How to merge the two strands so that military force and diplomacy are mutually supportive and so that national strategy becomes a seamless web is the essence of a continuing national controversy.

Beisner shows how the failure to do so with respect to the Korean war was the cause of the single greatest mistake of Acheson’s tenure: the inability, after the crossing of the 38th parallel, to correlate military operations with some achievable diplomatic objectives. That error aside, Acheson stands as the greatest Secretary of State of the postwar period in the sweep of his design, his ability to implement it, the extraordinary associates with whom he surrounded himself, and the sense of honor of his personal conduct. Mr. Beisner emphasizes these qualities and provides detailed examples of both design and execution.
For someone who knew Acheson, the portrait does not always fully capture the vividness of his personality, which emerges too much as a list of eccentricities. Especially his relationship with the Nixon White House, and to President Nixon himself, is too cavalierly dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's vanity. As a participant in all these meetings, I considered it an example of Acheson's generosity of spirit. Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his 1952 campaign for Senate. But when he reached out to Acheson, it was received with the consideration Acheson felt he owed to the office, as a form of duty to the country. Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at flattery, in pursuit of his conception of national service.

The basic theme of the book is contained in a speech by Acheson at the War College in August 1951, quoted as follows: "There was not..."
'one more river to cross' but countless problems stretching into the future: Americans must reconcile themselves to limited objectives and work in congress with others for an essential part of American power was the 'ability to evoke support from others — an ability quite as important as the capacity to compel.'"

The relevance of that lesson has not changed with the passage of time.
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No. of Pages (including cover sheet): 12  Date: 8/22/06

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Sir,

Mr. Rogers' comments follow.

-Theresa