DATE: 6/26/03
TO: HK
FROM: Jody
RE: WC 2006 brochure article - aftermath

I called Wolfgang Niersbach this morning to confirm receipt of your article faxed yesterday. He was delighted to get it, advised that they will be translating it into German, and that the brochure will be published in time for the Fri. Sept. 12th official “opening” of World Cup 2006, marking 1000 days until the first match. This will be a big celebration in Berlin, with the Chancellor and all Ministerpräsidenten expected to attend.
In 1944, I came back to Germany with the 84th Infantry Division of the U.S. Army near Geilenkirchen. As an ordinary soldier, I witnessed the collapse of the Third Reich as my unit moved across northern Germany, and I stayed for two years with the army of occupation.

I mention these events because they frame Germany’s achievement over the past fifty years. When the war ended, the country was in ruins. Cities were destroyed to an extent unimaginable to today’s generation; in many quarters of the major cities, literally not a house was standing. There was a critical food shortage. Postal and telephone service had broken down. Central authority had collapsed. In the eyes of the world,
Germany was not only an economic shambles; it was morally isolated in a world still traumatized by the wartime experience.

For me, this is the base line against which the current German achievement must be measured. It required exceptional moral courage even to start reconstruction. But with extraordinary tenacity, dedication, and moral commitment, Germany launched itself on the road to rebuilding and reform. Without central institutions for four years and no immediate access to world markets, it reinvented itself politically and economically. In 1947, currency reform unleashed market economics.

By 1949, the three Western zones of occupation had merged into a single unit headed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. To achieve this, Germany had to brave the Soviet blockade of Berlin in strong alliance with the
United States and other Western powers. It had to traverse the domestic and international debate regarding the creation of the Atlantic Alliance.

In the early 1950s, the Adenauer government made a heroic decision. Faced with an ambiguous offer from Stalin to neutralize the country in return for unification, Adenauer and his colleagues rejected the temptations of returning to Germany’s historic national policy. They affirmed the priority of reliability and ties to the West. As the Cold War division of Germany stretched into decades, the Federal Republic emphasized both its Atlantic and European vocations. It sought security from Soviet military pressures by supporting American leadership in the Atlantic Alliance, and it strove for legitimacy vis-à-vis the East German Soviet satellite by close ties with France on European integration. A few decades after the end of the war, the Federal Republic emerged as the
strongest military and economic power in Europe and as a key building block of Atlantic solidarity. These relationships were forged ever deeper through two Berlin crises and the common experience in helping bring about the unification of Germany after the collapse of Communism in 1989.

Three basic trends are emerging as a unified Germany becomes less dependent on the United States for security and on France for legitimacy:

- A more significant role for Germany is becoming evident within both the Atlantic Alliance and European institutions.

- Germany will always value its links to the United States. In that sense, it provides a balance between European institutions and Atlantic partnership.
• As Germany’s relative role grows, and as Russia recovers, there will emerge opportunities for closer Russo-German ties.

These tendencies will be supported across a broad spectrum. Not only did the younger generation of Germans not experience the postwar trauma but the former Communist third of Germany did not participate in the democratic experience until the last decade of the twentieth century. Thus a new kind of national identity is developing, not based on military power but resistant to discrimination and striving for a political influence for Germany commensurate with its economic and strategic potential.

These trends are a healthy culmination of German recovery. And they define the significant role played by Germany in a unifying Europe and as a member of the Atlantic partnership.
Visitors to the World Cup in 2006, which—unlike the last time Germany hosted in 1974—will be held in a unified country, will thus encounter a dynamic Germany. Having observed the country’s evolution my entire life and especially closely since the end of the war, I am aware of the important role football has played. As a passionately pursued sport, it has an inevitably unifying impact on the national consciousness (in national-level play, though not at Bundesliga games). Even in that first postwar winter of food shortages, the traditional clubs began to activate their established competitions and thereby provided a sense that society still existed even as political structures had collapsed. Over the years, I have visited my hometown of Fürth several times and witnessed the reemergence of my home team, Spvg Fürth, to which, by the inscrutable workings of fandom, I had remained attached through all
vicissitudes of history. German football immediately after the war was backward by modern professional standards, being largely based on prewar amateur technique; that nevertheless did not diminish my enthusiasm—especially as it produced more goals than today's style.

By 1954, football had made a great contribution to German pride when the national team won the world championship against Hungary, which had heretofore been considered unbeatable. In 1974, Germany hosted, and won, the World Cup in a marvelously efficient manner in a still divided country.

German teams have been at the forefront of the international competitions, both on club and national levels, having won three World Cups and placing second three times. In 2006, the national team of a unified Germany will be playing in a World Cup for the first time on native
soil before a committed public. It will be an extraordinary symbol of a
country that has rebuilt itself in all dimensions and can proudly
demonstrate its achievements to the world.
June 26, 2003

TO: Mr. Wolfgang Niersbach  
FIFA Fussball – Weltmeisterschaft 2006

FROM: Jody Williams

Following is Dr. Kissinger’s article for your World Cup brochure (8 pages). I am happy to e-mail you a copy as well, if you can provide an e-mail address.

Dr. Kissinger would be delighted to receive a copy of the brochure on its publication and, in the meantime, sends all good wishes.

Jody Williams
I came back to Germany in 1944 with the 84th Infantry Division of the U.S. Army near Geilenkirchen. I then witnessed the collapse of the Third Reich from the vantage point of an ordinary soldier as my unit moved across northern Germany, It occupied Hannover and Salzwedel and met the Soviet armies on the Elbe. I finally wound up for two years with the army of occupation in southern Germany, first in Bensheim, then in Oberammergau.

I mention these events because they frame Germany’s achievement over the past fifty years. When the war ended, the country was in ruins. Cities were destroyed to an extent unimaginable to today’s generation; in
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There was a critical food shortage. Postal and telephone service had broken down. Central authority had collapsed. In the eyes of the world, Germany was not only an economic shambles; it was morally isolated in a world still traumatized by the wartime experience.

For me, this is the base line against which the current German achievement must be measured. It required exceptional moral courage even to start reconstruction. But with extraordinary tenacity, dedication, and moral commitment, Germany launched itself on the road to reform.

Without central institutions for four years and no immediate access to world markets, it reinvented itself politically and economically. In 1947, currency reform unleashed market economics. By 1949, the three Western zones of occupation had merged into a single unit headed by
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. To achieve this, Germany had to brave the Soviet blockade of Berlin in strong alliance with the United States and other Western powers. It had to traverse the domestic and international debate regarding the creation of the Atlantic Alliance.

In the early 1950s, the Adenauer government made a heroic decision. Faced with an ambiguous offer from Stalin to unify the country in return for unification, Adenauer and his colleagues rejected the temptations of returning to Germany's historic national policy. They affirmed the priority of reliability and ties to the West. As the Cold War division of Germany stretched into decades, the Federal Republic emphasized both its Atlantic and European vocations. It sought security from Soviet military pressures by supporting American leadership in the Atlantic Alliance, and it strove for legitimacy vis-à-vis the East German
The Soviet satellite by accepting French political leadership on European integration. Closely associated with the United States within NATO and to France within Europe, the Federal Republic emerged (a few decades after the end of the war) its unconditional surrender as the strongest military and economic power in Europe and as a key building block of Atlantic solidarity. These relationships were forged ever deeper through two Berlin crises and the common experience in helping bring about the unification of Germany after the collapse of Communism in 1989.

Three basic trends are emerging as a unified Germany becomes less dependent on the United States for security and on France for legitimacy:

- A more significant role for Germany is becoming evident within
both the Atlantic Alliance and European institutions. Gradually Germany may well seek for itself the role within Europe that France insists Europe should play within the Atlantic Alliance.

- Germany will always value its links to the United States. In that sense, it provides a balance between European institutions and Atlantic partnership.

- As Germany's relative role grows, and as Russia recovers, there will emerge opportunities for closer Russo-German ties.

These tendencies will be supported across a broad spectrum. Not only did the younger generation of Germans not experience the postwar trauma—not to speak of the Nazi one—but the former Communist third of Germany did not participate in the democratic experience until the last decade of the twentieth century. Thus a new kind of national identity is
likely to develop, not militarily aggressive but resistant to discrimination based on a past which the vast majority of Germans never knew and striving for insist on political influence for Germany commensurate with its economic and strategic potential. These trends are a healthy culmination of German recovery. And they define the significant role played by Germany in a unifying Europe and as a member of the Atlantic partnership.

Visitors to the World Cup in 2006, which—unlike the last time Germany hosted in 1974—will be held in a unified country, will thus encounter a dynamic Germany. Having observed the country’s evolution my entire life and especially closely since the end of the war, I am aware of the important role football has played. As a passionately pursued sport, it has an inevitably unifying impact on the national consciousness
(in national-level play, though not at *Bundesliga* games). Even in that first postwar winter of food shortages, the traditional clubs began to activate their established competitions and thereby provided a sense that society still existed even as political structures had collapsed. Over the years, I have visited my hometown of Fürth several times and witnessed the reemergence of my home team, Spvg Fürth, to which, by the inscrutable workings of fandom, I had remained attached through all vicissitudes of history. German football immediately after the war was backward by modern professional standards, being largely based on prewar amateur technique; that nevertheless did not diminish my enthusiasm—especially as it produced more goals than today’s style.

By 1954, football had made a great contribution to German pride when the national team won the world championship against Hungary,
which had heretofore been considered unbeatable. In 1974, Germany hosted, and won, the World Cup in a marvelously efficient manner in a still divided country.

German teams have been at the forefront of the international competitions, both on club and national levels, having won three World Cups and placing second three times. In 2006, the national team of a unified Germany will be playing in a World Cup for the first time on native soil before a committed public. It will be an extraordinary symbol of a country that has rebuilt itself in all dimensions and can proudly demonstrate its achievements to the world.
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For me, this is the base line against which the current German achievement must be measured. It required exceptional moral courage even to start reconstruction. But with extraordinary tenacity, dedication, and moral commitment, Germany launched itself on the road to reform. Without central institutions for four years and no immediate access to world markets, it reinvented itself politically and economically. In 1947, currency reform unleashed market economics. By 1949, the three
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In the early 1950s, the Adenauer government made a heroic decision. Faced with an ambiguous offer [from] Stalin to unify the country in return for unity, Adenauer and his colleagues rejected the temptations of returning to Germany's historic national policy. They affirmed the priority of reliability and ties to the West. As the Cold War division of Germany stretched into decades, the Federal Republic emphasized both its Atlantic and European vocations. It sought security from Soviet military pressures by supporting American leadership
in the Atlantic Alliance, and it strove for legitimacy vis-à-vis the East German Soviet satellite by accepting French political leadership on European integration. Playing second fiddle to the United States within NATO and to France within Europe, the Federal Republic emerged a few decades after its unconditional surrender as the strongest military and economic power in Europe and as a key building block of Atlantic solidarity. These relationships were forged ever deeper through two Berlin crises and the common experience in helping bring about the unification of Germany after the collapse of Communism in 1989. Unification has brought about an alteration in the Cold War pattern. The political balance within Europe and NATO basically changed. Germany’s willingness to accept a subordinate status in NATO as well as in Europe has diminished. As Russian recovery gains momentum, the
traditional temptation of special German relations with Russia has reappeared.

Three basic trends are likely to emerge as Germany becomes less dependent on the United States for security and on France for legitimacy:

- A greater assertiveness will become evident within both the Atlantic Alliance and European institutions. Gradually Germany may well seek for itself the role within Europe that France insists Europe should play within the Atlantic Alliance.

- Germany will always be far less prepared to put at risk its links to the United States, that is provided for by French prescriptions for Atlantic relations. In that sense, it provides a limit to the implementation of the European institutions + Atlantic partnership between European institutions + Atlantic partners + French rhetoric.

- As Germany’s relative role and power grows and as Russia recovers,
there will emerge temptations for a special Russo-German rapprochement based on the Bismarckian tradition that the two countries prospered when they were close and suffered when they were in conflict. These tendencies will not be confined to the governing parties. Not only did the younger generation of Germans not experience the postwar trauma—not to speak of the Nazi one—but the former Communist third of Germany did not participate in the democratic experience until the last decade of the twentieth century. Thus a new kind of nationalism is likely to develop, not militarily aggressive but resistant to discrimination based on a past which the vast majority of Germans never knew and insistent on political influence for Germany commensurate with its economic and potential. These trends are a healthy affirmation of Germany's recovery and they define its essential role played by Germany in a unifying Europe and as a member of the Atlantic Partnership.
But it has also evoked a dedicated and extraordinary effort to turn Berlin into a [vital] capital for a united Germany and, in many ways, of a unit Germany (?).

Visitors to the World Cup in 2006, which unlike the last time Germany hosted in 1974 will be held in a unified country, will thus encounter a dynamic Germany. Having observed the country’s evolution my entire life and especially closely since the end of the war, I am aware of the important role football has played. As a passionately pursued sport, it has an inevitably unifying impact on the national consciousness (at national[-level play], not at league games). Even in that first winter of food shortages, the traditional clubs began to activate their established competitions and thereby provided a sense that society still existed even as political structures had collapsed. [While
Over the years, I visited my hometown of Fürth several times and witnessed the reemergence of my home team, Spvg Fürth, to which, by the inscrutable workings of fandom, I had remained attached through all vicissitudes of history.

Football of those early years was backward by modern professional standards, being largely based on prewar amateur technique; that, nevertheless, did not diminish my enthusiasm—especially as it produced more goals than today’s style.

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I came back to Germany in 1944 with the 642nd Infantry Division of the US Army near Heidelberg. I then witnessed the collapse of the Third Reich from the vantage point of an ordinary soldier as my unit moved across northern Germany. It surprised, however, to finally cross the line of front lines on the Elbe. I finally moved up for two years with the army of liberation in Brittany, Germany just in time in Europe.

I mention these events because they frame the achievement of Germany in the past fifty years. When the war ended Germany was in ruins. The cities were destroyed in an instant under the weight of the Allied bombing. In many quarters, literally no house was standing. There was a famine and food shortages. Postal and telephone service had broken down. Central authority had collapsed. In the eyes of the world Germany was not.
not only an isolated case, it was morally isolated in a world still traumatized by the Western experience with Nazi Germany.

That is why this is the line against which the current German achievement must be measured. It required extraordinary moral courage even to start reconstruction. But with extraordinary tenacity, dedication, and moral commitment, Germany launched itself on its road to reform. Without even initial institutions in four years and no access to world markets, Germany reinvented itself politically and economically. By 1947, currency reform included a full-blown market economy. By 1949, the Western German order had emerged as a single unit led by Chancellor Adenauer. To achieve this Germany, Adenauer knew that he must break the Soviet blockade of Berlin in strong alignment with the United States and other Western powers. It led to relative domestic and international debate regarding the anchor.
to the other extreme, seeking to ensure security against all its neighbors simultaneously. But if Germany was strong enough to defeat all its neighbors if they were allied, it was clearly strong enough to overwhelm them individually. Thus Germany’s effort to escape its strategic predicament produced its worst nightmare: a coalition of all the neighboring states against it. Germany has been for centuries either too weak or too strong for the peace of Europe.

In the end, this problem has been solved only twice in German history: by Otto von Bismarck in the first decades of a unified Germany in the nineteenth century, and after World War II by Konrad Adenauer and his successor chancellors of the Federal Republic. Bismarck opted for security via diplomatic dexterity. He sought to arrange the relations of European states toward each other in such a manner that Germany would always have more options than any possible rival, thereby preventing the formation of hostile coalitions. This tour de force proved too subtle and complex for his successors who substituted an arms race for diplomatic skill and slid into the First World War by the excessive flexing of muscles.

Adenauer and his successors inherited a defeated, partitioned, and devastated Germany, whose taste for solitary adventures had been exhausted by two wars. They had learned that Germany’s past conduct had generated too much distrust to allow for the Bismarck style of subtle combinations, and that the German romantic tendency would overwhelm the sense of proportion on which the Bismarckian diplomacy was based. In any event, a national diplomacy was precluded by the realities of allied occupation.

As the Cold War division of Germany stretched into decades, the Federal Republic emphasized both its Atlantic and European vocations. It sought security from Soviet military pressures by supporting American leadership in the Atlantic Alliance, and it strove for legitimacy vis-à-vis the East German Soviet satellite by accepting French political leadership on European integration. Playing second fiddle to the United States within NATO and to France within Europe, the Federal Republic emerged a few decades after its unconditional surrender as the strongest military and economic power in Europe and as a key building block of Atlantic solidarity.

In the early stage, the Christian Democratic Party included among its German politics. In terms with Germany’s past conduct had generated too much distrust to allow for the Bismarck style of subtle combinations, and that the German romantic tendency would overwhelm the sense of proportion on which the Bismarckian diplomacy was based. In any event, a national diplomacy was precluded by the realities of allied occupation.

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In the early stages of the Cold War, there was considerable opposition to the Adenauer course. It was expressed mostly in the Social Democratic Party, which had heroically resisted the Nazis and included among its members some of the most admirable figures in German politics. In the early days of the Federal Republic, its leaders advocated what amounted to a national policy in neutralist garb—in concrete terms, what they proposed was to give up Western military ties in return for unification.

By the 1970s, the SPD (in its German acronym) had come to terms with Germany’s integration into the West. Two distinguished Social Democratic chancellors, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, reinforced Germany’s Atlantic and European ties, albeit with a greater willingness to explore diplomatic options with the Communist East, and supported by the United States, at first hesitantly, later with conviction. Brandt’s “opening to the East” in negotiations with Moscow led to the formal acceptance of Germany’s division and laid the basis for a four-power agreement on Berlin which, in 1971, ended the threat to that city. The lingering interest in Germany’s eastern option as a road to unification and a different approach to military strategy on the part of the SPD’s rank and file brought down Chancellor Schmidt when, in 1982, he was preparing to implement the NATO decision to deploy American intermediate-range missiles on German soil.

In 1998—after being out of office for sixteen years—the SPD took over the direction of Germany in coalition with the so-called Green (Environmental) Party, whose platform had been historically hostile to the Atlantic Alliance. In office, neither of these parties has stressed the issues that characterized them in opposition—due in part to the fact that the post–Cold War world has overtaken many of the debates of the 1980s.

Inevitably, and independent of the party in office, the new international alignment has brought about greater emphasis on the German national interest. When the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced (and, for a time, eliminated) the fear of military attack from the East and when, in 1990, unification destroyed the East German Soviet satellite, the political balance within Europe and NATO ba-
sically changed. Germany’s willingness to accept a subordinate status in NATO as well as in Europe has diminished. As Russian recovery gains momentum, the traditional temptation of special German relations with Russia has reappeared.

Three basic trends are likely to emerge as Germany becomes less dependent on the United States for security and on France for legitimacy:

- A greater assertiveness will become evident within both the Atlantic Alliance and European institutions. Gradually Germany may well seek for itself the role within Europe that France insists Europe should play within the Atlantic Alliance.

- Germany will always be far less prepared to put at risk its links to the United States than is provided for by French prescriptions for Atlantic relations. In that sense, it provides a limit to the implementation of French rhetoric.

- As Germany’s relative role and power grow, and as Russia recovers, there will emerge temptations for a special Russo-German rapprochement based on the Bismarckian tradition that the two countries prospered when they were close and suffered when they were in conflict.

These tendencies will not be confined to the governing parties. Not only did the younger generation of Germans not experience the postwar trauma—not to speak of the Nazi one—but the former Communist third of Germany did not participate in the democratic experience until the last decade of the twentieth century. Thus a new kind of nationalism is likely to develop, not militarily aggressive but resistant to discrimination based on a past which the vast majority of Germans never knew and insistent on political influence for Germany commensurate with its economic and military potential.

These trends will tempt other European nations to court Russia, in part as a reaction to American dominance, in part as a counter-weight to Germany—though, in such a contest, Germany’s bar-
In the early 1950's, the German government made a heroic decision. Faced with communists
offering to unify the country, the government, led by Adenauer, his colleagues rejected the temptation of
returning to Germany's historic national policy. They affirmed the priority of stability and less to
work with the Cold War division. D & N, p. 38. These attempts
solidarity. These relationships were forged as the
through the Berlin crisis and the common experience
in helping bring about the reunification of Germany
after the collapse of communism in 1989.

The reunification of Germany has
strengthened an alternative in the Cold War pattern.
The political post balance within Europe. p. 39. D & N.
Our minister painted p. 42.

2. The world map
Visiting Germany in 2006 will
This encounter a significant bond which
But it has also evolved a dedicated + extraordinary effort to turn Berlin into a dynamic capital for a united Germany + in many ways, a united Germany.
comparably to the 1979 model was still in embryo and was in a young and potentially appealing combination. However, as a country - especially since the end of the war - football played an important role.

It was a potentially powerful sport. It had an undeniable unifying impact on the national consensus (as a national effort, not just a league game).

Even in the first minutes of first half, the traditional skills began to reassert their established expectations and clearly provided a sense that much still existed even as political structures had changed.

I took the occasion to visit many locations of freshly several times - saw the consequences of many long years.

Spray, which to what height, air stability, momentum of the season. I had remained attached through all circumstances of history. The football of the early years was backward by modern professional standards, being largely based on prime emotion.
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normal style.

By 1954, football made a great contribution
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the World Championship against Brazil, Hungary, and
had been a source of national pride and national
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German teams have
been at the forefront of the international competitions
in the world competitions. In the national
leagues, more than 200 times, they will be playing before a
committed public for the first time in a World Cup.
to lost their national team. It will be an extraordinary
symbol of a country which has rebuilt itself.
proudly
all strains and can demonstrate its
achievements to the world.
HK: Wolfgang Niersbach of the WC 2006 Organizing Comm. fleshes out his ideas for your article for their first brochure, suggests length of 360 lines (I’ll find out how that translates into pages), and deadline of Thurs. May 1st.

Will work on during India trip; remember to pack this folder.

Remind me on my return from India.

Prefer ________________________________

Jody
27th February 2003

Dear Miss Williams,

We are very pleased, that Professor Kissinger is willing to write an article for our World Cup brochure.

As mentioned in my first letter, we would like Professor Kissinger to make a statement in regards to the German image worldwide.

How do other countries regard Germany? What effect does football have? What statement can a World Cup make in a reunified country. How do people observe Germany worldwide also in regards to football? Is football an ambassador of our country?

As you can see, the article touches on many different subjects and should not only consider the sporting side. We would like to approach the Football World Cup 2006 in Germany from a different angle. Football is more than a game on green turf, but also part of our society, politics and part of our daily life.

That is the reason why the World Cup 2006 is such a great chance for Germany to present itself to the world. Which chance is this exactly? What does Germany have to do to use it? What does the world expect from Germany? All these questions can be answered by Professor Kissinger due to his experience and cosmopolitan attitude far better than by an author who was born and raised in Germany and has spent his life in this country.
The article should be approximately 360 lines of 48 characters. We are, of course, flexible in this matter, yet we would ask you not to excessively exceed the limit. The proposed deadline of the 1st of May 2003 would be fine.

Thank you in advance and best regards

Wolfgang Niersbach
Vice President
February 28, 2003

TO: Mr. Wolfgang Niersbach
FIFA Fussball - Weltmeisterschaft 2006

FROM: Jody Williams

Dr. Kissinger appreciated your writing and would be happy to write an article for your first World Cup 2006 brochure. Your letter touched on some broad areas he might address, but do you have any more specific suggestions for the content? And how long should the article be?

Lastly, you asked in your letter if he could do this "during the next two months." Would a deadline of May 1st be accurate?

I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Jody Williams
Dear Professor Kissinger,

First of all, we and especially our President Franz Beckenbauer hope that you are well and still have the tireless vigour and motivation to keep track with your new and impressive activities.

We would like to approach you today with a very special request. This year we would like to publish the first official World Cup 2006 brochure. It will be addressed to international decision makers worldwide, the media and should invoke a pleasant anticipation for this great event, which we were awarded by FIFA in July 2000.

We would like to include one of your essays in this brochure, in which you describe the possibilities for Germany in addition to the football-related issues. We feel, that if the political events of the last century still arouse a certain suspicion worldwide, then this can be described better by someone who looks onto Germany from the outside.

Isn’t this a grand opportunity for a country to present itself as a peace-loving epicentre in the heart of Europe? Is it yet another platform to honour the non-violent revolution of the German reunification? Which contribution can football make in these troubled times? To these and other questions, we would love to receive an answer from you. It would be wonderful, if you could fit it into your busy schedule to write an article during the next two months and we would be most grateful to receive your kind confirmation.
27. Februar 2003, Seite 2

I should convey Franz Beckenbauer's warmest regards, who is still reminded of the time when you fought together for the U.S. World Cup 1986 in Stockholm. He hopes to meet you again very soon and also Egidius Braun and the whole DFB are looking forward to an encounter with you.

We hope that you will treat our request favourably and remain

with best regards

[Signature]

Wolfgang Niersbach
Vice President