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These objectives were importantly achieved for the next decade. But the road to them was complicated. Ever since, an intense debate has been raging about the adequacy of America’s initial reaction, the degree to which various parts of the American diplomacy were related to each other in devising policy and the role different policymakers played in this effort.
Israel was inevitably focused on the problem of resupply. Washington was not aware of that need on a substantial scale until the fourth day of the war. Washington, moreover, had to manage relations with allies panicked as oil prices exploded. Over it all loomed the Soviet Union, in possession of a vast nuclear arsenal, still allied with Egypt, supplier of all military equipment to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. It considered its interests sufficiently large to undertake an airlift of its own to its clients. The dangers of escalation could therefore never be far from our minds. And all this occurred while America was undergoing its perhaps worst domestic crisis since the Civil War. During the first week of the war, Vice President Agnew resigned; during the third weekend of the crisis, the so-called “Saturday night massacre” occurred, which led to President Nixon’s impeachment, the early proceedings of which began while America went on a modified nuclear alert to counter threatening messages from Moscow.

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Theresa Cimino

From: Theresa Cimino [tcimino@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 2004 4:19 PM
To: 'hertogrz@bernstein.com'
Cc: 'restivocm@bernstein.com'
Subject: Dr. Kissinger's foreword for Shalem Press edition of CRISIS

Dear Mr. Hertog:

As you requested, attached please find Dr. Kissinger's foreword for the Shalem Press Hebrew translation of his book, CRISIS.

Please do not hesitate to call our office if I may assist further.

Thank you,
Sincerely,
Theresa L. Cimino
Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
212/759-7919
DATE 6/29/04

ACTION: Alan Stape Dennis

SUBJ. FILE

CROSS REF.

STAFF MEMO

COMMENTS:

DC OFFICE: Christie / Jody / Tiffany

INFO COPY TO:

ROUTE CC COPY TO:

TO BE FILED

Talk to S+S?

stivocme " "

hertogrz@bernstein.com

Received per Allison + passed on to publisher.
June 28, 2004

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Chairman
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10022

Dear Henry:

It was good to see you again at the Regency. I know you take great pride, as do I, in seeing Walt Wriston and Norman Podhoretz receive the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

As I mentioned last Wednesday, the Shalem Center — the Jerusalem-based research institute of which I’m currently chairman — is going to publish a Hebrew translation of your book, *Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises*. Our plans call for the book to be out in the early fall, in ample time for the 31st anniversary of the Yom Kippur War. Publication of a Hebrew edition of your book at this time could do much to lay to rest the claim that you and President Nixon had pressured Israel to make major concessions during the war and to back off militarily. In my view, the book would be immeasurably strengthened if you could provide a short preface (3-4 pages) on your reflections on the War and the U.S.-Israeli alliance over the last three decades. We’re sure that a preface from you would make a book destined to be relevant and popular in Israel even more so.

Here’s our problem: To meet our Yom Kippur publication deadline, we’d need to have your preface in hand by July 15. I much regret the short notice, but the schedule is very demanding; I hope you can help us.

On a separate matter, we wonder if you would be interested in coming to Israel and delivering the keynote speech at the book’s official launch. The event is planned for the fall, and if you honored us by speaking, we’d set the date based on your convenience. Tremendous interest in the Hebrew translation has already been sparked. *Yediot Aharonot*, the daily newspaper with by far the widest readership in Israel, has asked to publish an excerpt in its Yom Kippur edition. Further, plans are afoot for interviews on many major national news programs leading up to Yom
Kippur, and Israel’s most senior government and military officials are committed to participate in other promotional events.

I hate to impose on you for any reason, but I feel that this is a case that merits my importunity.

I hope to hear from you in this regard.

Sincerely,

RH:pm
For some unknown reason, this was chitted to SSM. I have handled the request for the foreword (I typed it this am and emailed it to Jody for HAK’s arrival). But the invitation to Israel (I) for the book launch appears to be your dept.

Thanks,

Theresa
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administering the dominant geostategic issues, military strategy was the Soviet presence in Egypt + in a lesser extent, Syria. Twenty thousand Soviet advisers helped run the Egyptian air defense system along the Israeli land. As all of the military hardware in both Egypt + Syria, was Soviet, this posed two problems for the American administration: to make concessions in the face of this huge army, might invite Soviet military intervention throughout the region. Hence, they needed to adjust to strategy. 

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3. if possible, eliminate the foreign military presence in the Middle East
4. to start a diplomatic venture concerning a settlement
5. to move towards peace
6. to improve relations with the Arab world, especially with moderate elements.

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jump p. 6.