Dear Mr. Rosen:

As discussed, following please find a copy of Dr. Kissinger's article, "Intervention with a Vision," from the April 11, 2004 Washington Post. As I mentioned in my email, it is a very slightly edited version of the Baltimore Sun version (in addition to having a different headline), so this is the one we would prefer you to use. I am also faxing the permission form as requested.

Would you mind sending a copy of the finished publication once it is out?

Sincerely,

Theresa L. Cimino
Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
March 10, 2005

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
By e-mail

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As you know, I am editing a volume for Cambridge University Press (CUP) under the title, *The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq*. It will be published in June 2005, with an initial print run of approximately 3,000 copies and an estimated retail price of $24.95. CUP is a non-profit publisher of academic works for the use of libraries, scholars, and their students.

I request your permission to include the following work:

**Article:** “Selling Democracy”
**Publication:** *The Baltimore Sun*
**Issue date:** April 11, 2004

Unless otherwise informed, permission will be assumed to grant the nonexclusive right to use the material in print and electronic editions of the work in all languages throughout the world, in all subsequent reprints and revised editions of the work and as part of a digitized extract from the work made available online for promotional purposes only. The source of the material will be fully acknowledged in the usual way.

Please indicate your agreement to this request by signing and returning one copy of this letter to me at the fax number or address below. Please keep a duplicate for your own records. By your signature, you warrant that you control these rights and are authorized to grant this permission. If this is not the case, I would be grateful if you could let me know to whom I should apply.

Sincerely,
Gary Rosen
Commentary
165 East 56th Street
New York, NY 10022
phone: (212) 891-6738
fax: (212) 891-6700

I hereby grant the permission detailed above.

Signed: [Signature]

Date: 3-21-05

Henry A. Kissinger
Intervention With a Vision

What marks this century as one of unprecedented upheaval is not primarily the emergence of new centers of power such as China or India; that has happened before, though not on this global scale. Nor is it the fact that significant states are losing control over all or part of their territory. The unique aspect is that when state power weakens, non-state terrorist groups fill the vacuum for the purpose of threatening the state system itself. The challenge is not simply to reestablish an international system but to prevent vacuums that suck into themselves the nihilistic elements trying to destroy order altogether.

At least since Woodrow Wilson, the United States has had its own definition of international order: the idea that wars are caused less by clashing interests than by unrepresentative domestic institutions. In the Wilsonian view, foreign policy based on national interest and state power prevails when democratic institutions have failed. Since democracies settle their disputes by reason, not by war, the spreading of democracy is, to this school of thought, America's ultimate mission, and regime change its ultimate sanction.

The belief that compatible domestic structures are the ultimate foundations of international peace is not new. It was the basis of the Holy Alliance after the Napoleonic wars. The opposite of democratic, it asserted that monarchial systems were the best guarantee of international stability because they were impervious to the fickleness of public opinion. And dynastic leaders were said to be more peaceful because they did not require conquests to remain in office. Though these propositions would not have been sustained by an objective examination of the record of 18th-century diplomacy, they led to interventions to produce regime change in Naples in 1821 and in Spain in 1823. The effort to universalize autocratic governance ultimately failed because the national interests of two members of the Holy Alliance—Austria and Russia—clashed in the Balkans and because Great Britain rejected the claimed right of universal intervention.

The current doctrine of global democratic interventionism faces comparable obstacles. It postulates without much evidence—because there have never been enough democracies to test it—the essential harmony of democracies. Europe's current pacifism is in part the result of exhaustion from wars of the 20th century. It deals with how to achieve order between states, but not with the prevention of challenges born from chaos.

Yet for America, the belief in the moral significance of democracy has been a fundamental theme of a society settled by immigrants. America must stand for democratic values if its foreign policy is to have any long-term support among its people. The issue is how to apply them.

But having said this, what does support for democracy mean for the practical conduct of foreign policy? How does the United States promote such a diplomacy in the face of widespread international criticism that charges us at the same time with hegemonic power and missionary crusading spirit?

America is engaged in a wide range of activities in the name of democracy and human rights. It publishes annual reports on the human rights record of every country in the world; it expresses public opinions on the democratic and human rights shortcomings of even permanent U.N. Security Council members; it applies congressionally mandated sanctions; it has gone to war in Bosnia and Kosovo over essentially human rights issues; it invaded Iraq in part to bring about regime change.

No other country has treated human rights and the support of democracy so centrally or has permitted so direct a role to so many elements of its public opinion in the implementation of a specific aspect of its foreign policy. All these initiatives promote the checks-and-balances system of the American constitutional experience, without modification on the basis of history or circumstance.

Does the United States have the capacity to achieve its lofty goals, and if so, how quickly? Democracy in the Western world evolved over centuries. The Catholic Church, though hardly democratic in its internal practices, contributed to the eventual emergence of democracy by insisting on the separation of authority between, God and Caesar. This represented a first tentative, but essential, step toward a pluralistic perception of government. Centuries later, the Reformation institutionalized religious, and hence eventually political, pluralism by emphasizing the importance of the individual conscience. The Enlightenment took the next step in its insistence on analysis based on reason. The Age of Discovery stretched horizons. Capitalism made individual initiative the engine of successful economies. The concepts of representative institutions, separation of power and checks and balances evolved over centuries from a rich tradition.

No other culture has produced a comparable evolution. Islamic societies have rarely separated church and state and never have acknowledged pluralistic interpretations of justice. In most Confucian societies, neither religions nor nongovernmental organizations have had the autonomy or the legitimacy to challenge governmental authority except by outright rebellion.
To say that democracy has cultural prerequisites does not deny it ultimate applicability to other societies but only takes note of the fact that

compressing the evolution of centuries into an inappropriate time frame risks huge unintended consequences. Where societies are divided by faith or ethnicity, our practices run the risk of ratifying a permanent distribution of power based precisely on those ethnic divisions. Where the majority has no prospect of becoming a majority, elections may often result in civil war or chaos — the very breeding ground for militant terrorist organizations.

Because democracy must be rooted in domestic factors, it will thrive only where it reflects cultural, historical and institutional backgrounds. This is why the attempt to impose Western institutions elsewhere rarely succeeds without protracted Western tutelage. In the Balkans, it has produced three protectorates—in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia—entirely dependent on outside forces and showing little tendency toward self-sustaining internal evolution would likely run counter to American values and interests in the region. And in its essence, the reconstruction of Iraq involves an extended period of an American protectorate. These operations were necessary, but they define their own limits. Regime change is a special case; it cannot be the primary exercise of American military power. Priorities must be established, at least with respect to the availability of military force for the process of democratization. A foreign policy to promote democracy needs to be adapted to local or regional realities, or it will fail. In the pursuit of democracy, policy, as in other realms—is the art of the possible. Diplomacy on behalf of democracy needs to reflect a political and strategic design rather than ad hoc bows to bureaucratic or public constituencies. This proposition is often strenuously resisted by those who want to treat democratization as an end in itself. But slogans do not create a foreign policy. When the United States plays a major role in the destruction of existing institutions, as in the transition in Iran in 1979 and in Indonesia in 1998 and, even more, when it goes to war to bring about regime change, it must do so in the name of some operational definition of democracy and its evolution. It is important to remember that the most successful building of democracy in the last half-century occurred when non-democratic regimes in places such as Korea, Taiwan and Turkey fostered an economic growth that produced middle classes, which in turn, and with some American help, insisted on representative institutions and checks and balances. When democratization is pushed in a conceptual and political vacuum, the outcome is likely to be chaos or regimes inimical to our values and perhaps our security. America needs urgently to develop a concept of political evolution that combines the authority required for economic progress with the human rights required for a democratic evolution. Though it is often argued that, for example, the hostility of the Iranian ayatollahs toward the United States was caused by America’s previous support of nondemocratic regimes, reality is far more complex. Critics who urge the United States to help bring them into power will not necessarily follow policies compatible with either our security or our values.

Iraq is turning into the test case. Regime change was impelled by strategic imperatives together with moral convictions. But the reconstruction of Iraq was in no way comparable to the occupations of Germany and Japan. In those countries, the populations were supportive; there was no alternative to democratic reform—indeed, reform and cooperation with the occupations were the sole means of regaining legitimacy and control over the national destiny. In Iraq these conditions are nearly reversed. The ethnic and religious divisions are so deep that in its early stages, democratization threatens to become a form of communalism. The creation of a governing authority on July 1 is the first small step on a long road toward a stability from which a secular middle class can emerge strong enough to insist on full representative government. An extended period of American involvement is required and some degree of internationalization. But whatever the process, its prerequisite is America’s willingness to see it through. Success is the only exit strategy. And as in Iraq, we must navigate in the rest of the Middle East between the imperative of reform and the danger of generating more chaos.

As the United States enters its national debate and—one hopes—a period of reconciliation afterward, no challenge is more important than to define a direction of foreign policy integrating our values and our interests. We paralyze ourselves when we treat these categories as absolutes and opposites. The advocates of “interest” must recognize that support for democracy is a fundamental goal that has to be built into American policy. The proponents of a value-based foreign policy need to understand that their challenge is no longer to establish their principle but to implement it, and that down their road beckons not only democracy but ungovernable vacuums. The advocates of the important role of a commitment to democracy in American foreign policy have won their intellectual battle. But institution-building requires not only doctrine but a vision recognizing cultural and historical circumstance. Such humility is not an abdication of American values; it is the only way to implement these values effectively.
Theresa Cimino

From: Gary Rosen [grosen@commentarymagazine.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 11:10 AM
To: Theresa Cimino
Subject: Re: Kissinger op-ed

It's not too long, so we can just type it in (or modify the Baltimore Sun version to make it conform to the one in the Washington Post). Thanks again.

GR

----- Original Message -----  
From: Theresa Cimino  
To: 'Gary Rosen'  
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 11:01 AM  
Subject: RE: Kissinger op-ed  

Dear Mr. Rosen:

For some reason, the WP doesn't always post Dr. Kissinger's columns online. And, unfortunately, I do not have an electronic version of this particular one. I know this makes things more difficult. What do you recommend?

Thank you,
Theresa

-----Original Message-----  
From: Gary Rosen [mailto:grosen@commentarymagazine.com]  
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 10:37 AM  
To: Theresa Cimino  
Subject: Re: Kissinger op-ed

Dear Theresa,

I got the WP version of the op-ed and the signed agreement—thanks very much. For some reason, though, I'm having trouble finding the op-ed in the WP's electronic archive; it doesn't come up in Lexis-Nexis either. Would you have an electronic version we can use?

Thanks,
GR

----- Original Message -----  
From: Theresa Cimino  
To: roseng@ajc.org  
Sent: Saturday, March 19, 2005 9:40 AM  
Subject: Re: Kissinger op-ed  

Great. I will fax the op-ed and agreement to you on Monday. (Besides the headline being different, the Washington Post version is just a slightly edited version of the distributed piece which Dr. Kissinger prefers to use.)

Thank you,
Excellent news, Theresa—many thanks. I didn't realize it had appeared in the Washington Post too, but of course we'll be happy to use that title. A fax version of the piece will be fine if you want to pass it along with a signed copy of the CUP permission agreement. I'm very pleased this worked out!

Best, GR

--- "Theresa Cimino" <tcimino@kmaglobal.com> wrote:

Dear Mr. Rosen:

Good news! Dr. Kissinger has approved use of his article for your book, and there is no TMS paperwork required. The only thing is that Dr. Kissinger would prefer you to use the version of that piece that the Washington Post ran (its headline was "Intervention with a Vision"). I am checking to see if I have an electronic version for you. If not, will a fax copy do?

Thank you for your patience.

Sincerely,

Theresa

212/759-7919

-----Original Message-----
From: Gary Rosen [mailto:grosen@commentarymagazine.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2005 5:11 PM
To: Tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Subject: A reprieve

Theresa,

I talked to my editor at Cambridge UP, and he said we can go ahead and plug in the Kissinger piece pending his and Tribune Media Service's approval/permission. If there is some hitch, we will still be able to pull the piece from the volume.

I'll be away from the office from tomorrow until next Tuesday, but I'll be checking e-mail. Please let me know if there's TMS paperwork to take care of. Thanks again for all your help!

Best,

GR

______________________________________________
Gary Rosen
Managing Editor
Commentary
Hi, Theresa. I'm afraid that I'll need to hear from Dr. Kissinger by end of business today if we're going to include his piece in the Cambridge volume. Sorry to impose such a short deadline for his response, but as I said, I only just now discovered the piece. Thanks again for your patience with this.

Best,
Gary Rosen
RE: Request to reprint an article

Gary Rosen, Managing Editor of Commentary, is compiling an edited volume for Cambridge University Press entitled The Right War?: The Conservative Debate on Iraq. Attached is the current table of contents, which includes articles by authors such as Robert Kagan & William Kristol, George Will, Fouad Ajami, Fareed Zakaria, Charles Krauthammer, Pat Buchanan and Eliot Cohen.

Rosen would like to include your Tribune Media Services article from April 11, 2004. He refers to the Baltimore Sun version, “Selling Democracy,” but the Washington Post version (copy attached) was entitled, “Intervention with a Vision.”

Would you like to have your article included in the volume?

First I want to see the editor’s introduction of the volume

Okay with me: [Signature]

But let them use the Washington Post version

Check with Tribune Media

Prefer they not use my article in the volume [Signature]
Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I am putting together an edited volume for Cambridge University Press titled *The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq*, to be published this June (I have attached the current table of contents).

I have just come across your Baltimore Sun op-ed of April 11, 2004 ("Selling Democracy") and would very much like to include it in the volume. Unfortunately, Cambridge needs to finalize the contents in the next few days, so I will need your permission in short order, especially if I also need to seek permission from the Baltimore Sun.

I have attached a permission agreement for your convenience. It can be faxed back to me at the number below. Thanks for your attention--and my apologies for the urgency of the request.

Sincerely,
Gary Rosen

Gary Rosen
Managing Editor
Commentary
165 East 56th Street
New York, NY 10022
phone: (212) 891-6738
fax: (212) 891-6700
e-mail: grosen@commentarymagazine.com
The Right War?
The Conservative Debate on Iraq
Cambridge University Press, June 2005
Edited by
Gary Rosen

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