Limited War
Strategic doctrine

Wt. necessarily depends whether change in power relations is so great as to make risk of all-out war seem invincible.

We may judge limitations of war not in relation to the arms, but in relation to the aims. To A's statement there is no substitute as only partial concern. Complementing of defeat of France may be instituted by shift in weight. Conclusions: armistice tends to increase both absolutely and relatively population.

16. Indirect limitations of former periods both of manpower and resources no longer apply.

17. It is possible that "high" backing in the long run, but can only rational approach may not find at all.

18. Antecedents determine limitability of war. Korean attack was a challenge to S. Korea. U.S. counterattack would in all likelihood be counter Chinese challenge to U.S.

19. Treaties or means of arms limitation: Unlikely for nations that can negotiate such a treaty probably would come to war.

20. War limitation depends in part on claims of issues. They are wise to make strong appeal to issues outside territory of opponent.
state. i.e., issues located on unstable within small states, i.e., stability
those concerning large powers.
27. Importance of building golden bridges: in diplomacy it
is easy to be a campaign by insisting on winning a battle.
31. Situation of France in 19th century may not be repeated.
For many cities, wars in every.

32. Role aspects of war limitation, groups schools of thought in
strategic bombing, preventive war, stalemate, etc.
35. Reason, tactical nuclear war may expand: to overcome
defense enemy may attack with nuclear forces and thus expand
supply depots, etc.

36. Arguments vs. distinction tactical - strategic: cities behind lines,

37. Tactical Atomic weapons: any device, role, between role of architects
men - their put and trained manpower. True land forces if
ill-trained troops would be useless vs. small A - trained enemy.

38. Jones' argument that good by man will beat foul little
men - their put and trained manpower. True land forces if
ill-trained troops would be useless vs. small A - trained enemy.

40. Professional armies are now, if small men war, rather than war
keep war small. True. But there are far inherent times, culturally

40. Danger of large war limited with conventional weapons. Yes, but one
probably calculated if exposed to FOG raids.
Collective security is the only answer to peace in world - unless
warlike acts 5, 6, 7. (Need for bases - one is opposed to collectivistic
policy toward peace of world as other methods. Current principle contd)
procedure is possible. 7. Struggling for real basis of collective
security. Bradley - 9. Korea strategically unproductive, plus Europe is key-
12. Calling on superpower of allies to support in expansion
of Korean war with refusal to support us in all and war.

15. Sherman: Must not get so much of one man's potential at
any time that we lose ability to fight Europe which is essential
to the Still don't have this ability.
16. Solomons: Best way to protect security of our country in age
of collective security. Therefore interest Korean war?2000
viability of principle.
17. Collective system detects anything which means it either
suffer. Therefore can it support war? Basis of our security in alliance
to armed forces in collective security.

Note: See my marginalia (By Bradley).
8. Person: Allies must make fundamental peace in secrecy of U.S.

In all parts of world there may be danger we should mark absolutely land in land with Allies.

14. Russell: Within 2 build up Europe after 1 of providing Soviet attack and not a defeat China.

Assumption

27. Objective rejected by G. Allies therefore not pressed.

28. Vehemence hope for negotiated peace without using A Indian

Negotiated peace: stalemate. In cancere Cam and war they

29. Peace whilst taking some situation in one form.

30. Note range of objectives after Korean intervention from

Chinese

31. Fitch attack many objectives limited into, if free choice should have

32. Rich attack objectives, hundreds it was plotted down in Asia, US

Bradley - 32

33. Bradley - of time we made a UN command & should strongly

prevent its breaking up.
ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Might be combined with peaceful uses
Selected Histories of Warfare

Collection of Hart's reflections on war over a 20-year period and grouped in sections: "Elements of WAR: Object, military aim, physical and psychological background;" Conduct of War: Grand strategy, instruments, principles; Conduct of Military Operations: Strategy, tactics, attack and defence.

XXX some very profound observations are made. Period covers 1920-40 roughly. Has not considered the use of modern weapons, but many of his ideas form a necessary background to the development of modern strategy.
1949, 114 pp.

chapter on the abortive "the penalty of expediting" does not think that had helped for achieving victory a unity at great cost of future policy. "U.S. had been morally."

History of warfare from the Greeks to the present. Relationship of military operations to the total social, economic and technological environment. Last chapter on Cold War, rather summary. Most important problem of our times: be prepared to fight both limited and general war.

Book of selected readings illustrating the main developments in the art of war from the 18th century on. Consideration given to the type of warfare, to the evolution of strategy, tactics, weapons etc. Especially selections are given which present the relationship between scientific and technological developments on one hand and strategic and tactical concepts on the other.

Selections of interest:


"Influence of Air Power upon History" by Edward Mead Earle (Yale R. Summer 1946) pp. 601-607

An account of militarism and civil supremacy in the United States from the days of the American colonies down to present days. Believes antimilitarist tradition to be a conspicuous part of our history, but due to the technological advances of our weapons system we may well become a militarist nation. (outcome of World War II). Military men moved into top civilian positions. Continuing of military conscription. Post-war rearmament. Good historical account of the forces in the U.S. fighting for civil supremacy against the agents of militarism. Opposed to rise of militarism which he believed occurred after second world war.

Quite erudite. However attacks problem of militarism vs. pacifism as if it were purely a domestic question, does not consider world situation.

Psychological approach to politics, war and international relations. Seeks the psych. truths which pushed men into war: incentives, deterrents, traditions, mass motivation.

Concludes that so far man has had a psychological training for war, this however must be changed in the atomic age if he wants to survive. His solution: mass education in peace and training of political leaders in schools where they become experts in the social sciences, philosophy, etc.

Fairly obvious conclusions and statements. No deep insights.
Allen James S. 


Important if the state controls the private

and the

with power

George A. Finch, Joseph P. Chamberlain, Percy E. Corbett, Malcolm W. Davis, Clyde Eagleton, Manley O. Hudson, Herbert L. May, James T. Shotwell, and Edgar Turlington were on the legal sub-committee which drew up this draft convention under auspices of U.N.

For terms see notes Unofficial Proposals.

A very general treatment which advises possible courses of action for the future and the implications for peaceful uses.

Laws and regulations for the peaceful use of atomic energy.

Detailed report to the U. S. AEC examining from a scientific and economic point of view the practical possible uses for the by-products of nuclear reactors.

A commentary on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Background of the Law (McMahon Act); control of facilities and materials; control of information; patents; power policy; Gov't aid; international activities; functions of the Joint Committee System of licensing and regulation.

Examines the role of law and executive policy on atomic power and how it has affected technology.
Masters, Dexter and Katherine Way (eds.) *One World or None*. New York: Whittle-
say House, 1946. 79 pp.

Eighteen articles about the development and use of atomic energy. Contributors are mostly scientists.

Analysis and evaluation of the McMahon-Douglas Atomic Energy Act (July 30, 1946). The authors helped draft the bill. Shows how the act creates gov't monopoly to satisfy the requirements of security. Discusses civilian vs. military control controversy, the relation of the act to control of information.

Chapters: Org. and Structure of Commission; Defining the control problem; Fissionalbe material: production and ownership; source material; radio-active by-products; industrial and commercial uses; patents and inventions; research; control of information; military applications of atomic energy; international arrangements.

Discuss "social, economic and political implications" of AE Act.

Appendix: Text of AE act, also British Atomic energy Act of 1946, Bibliog.

Most complete study of the act, not much of a critical analysis though.

Looseleaf compendium on the legal status of atomic energy in the U.S., foreign countries and the international field.

Proposal to reorganize the administration of the atomic energy program

Book put out as result of letter sent to all nations accredited diplomatically in U. S. to inquire about their government's activities in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Data on 32 nations given. Brazil, Argentian and the U.S.S.R. did not respond to survey, but some information is included based on unofficial sources.

Supplement gives U.S. bilateral agreements (June 22, 1955) to call for cooperation in development of atomic energy for peaceful use and the titles of papers submitted at the General conf. on the Peaceful uses of AE (Aug, 1955)

Chapter on "The Means of War - analysis of weapon development at end of WW II especially U.S. and its relationship to nuclear power."

Chapter on "Some of Atomic Energy contains description of power plants as well as scientific discussion of nuclear and isotopes, etc."

Possibilities of economic development.

The Need for Control.

Appendix - Truman, King, Athens Declaration - (November 16, 1955)

View of an English scientist of the problems the atom bomb has brought.

Tries to look into man's future, especially from an economic and sociological angle. Chapter on energy discusses the future utilization of atomic energy as an important source of power.

Not very useful for our purposes.
Careful, though by necessity interim, study of the prospects and limitations of applying atomic energy to industrial and other economic activity. Authors quite cautious in general in their expectation.
Considers the industrial and economic aspects of atomic energy and its repercussions on the world economy. Based on the Geneva atomic energy conference. Thesis: atomic energy could serve as link between the capitalist and the socialist system of economy because of the need to nationalize the primary means of production. If properly used atomic energy could greatly increase the living standard of the peoples of the world.

Good study of economic repercussions of atomic energy. Rather weak section on political influences. (summary of other people's books). Believes in nuclear stalemate.

Believes that coexistence in the atomic age is not only possible, but absolutely essential. As soon as the underdeveloped countries develop their economies the Western countries will no longer be able to produce as much and will have to sell to the Eastern countries to maintain some kind of stable economy, especially if a policy of reduction of armaments were adopted. This is essential to avoid economic pressures which might well lead to an economic war.

Wants abolition of nuclear weapons tests, pooling of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only (no bombs to be made) but does not provide for controls.

The exploitation of atomic energy should lead to understandings between all nations on the economic level, from there on the polit. level and finally world federation.
Aspects of the United Nations, Scientific and Technical Control of Atomic Energy

by the Scientific and Technical Committee of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, U.N. Department of Public Information


...underlying scientific and technical facts on which any effective system of control must be based... indicates various danger points at which safeguards must be erected. Does not determine the question of what type of safeguards or where responsibility for control should lie.


A historical survey of the U.S. and disarmament. The last chapter p. 219 - 246 deals with the problems of the control of atomic energy.

See introduction for problems connected with disarmament of Germany and Japan after W.W.II.
Shotwell, James T. and Marina Salvin, Lessons on Security and Disarmament


Study of past (early 20th cent.) agreements and

recent events pledging peace. Addenda to see how they

study of security disputes before and after

of Manchurian intervention in Ethiopian war.
Analysis of communique from "Washington meeting" which was published that morning. (Never says what meeting it was - Truman, King, Attlee, maybe). Then analyses the provision of the U. N. charter which might have any bearing upon the international control of the A-bomb.

Review of the proposals to limit bomb tests and of the hazards of radiation made by the U.N. Also lists U.N. agencies who are concerned with establishing some sort of safety codes for workers and control of food which might be subject to radiation.
Coale, Ansley J. *The Problem of Reducing Vulnerability to Atomic Bombs.*

How to Survive a War-Fare. Prepared for the Committee on Social Aspects of A Energy of the Social Service Research Council.
Chapter I - Possible Defenses from Atomic Attack (very cursory).
Chapter II - Description of damages done to the person if exposed to atomic attack.
Chapter III* Description of air burst atomic bomb (Fall-out)
Chapter IV- Bikini Test
Chapter V- Nuclear Radiation - physical and psychological effect.
Chapter VI - "The Bombing of Germany" effectiveness of bombing in World War II
and comparison with both possible strategic and tactical use of nuclear weapons
in the future. (Useful for utilization of nuclear weapons)
Chapter IX - Problem of delivery with a discussion of the different planes in use
at the moment. Believes that rockets are too far in the future to be discussed.
Chapter X - Military Defense for Atomic Attack, problems of interception
Chapter XI and XII deal with planning for disaster and the problem of dispersion
which might be useful for civil defense.
Chapter XIV - Of the Future; importance of psych war. Limited war possible
"Realistic, not hysterical look at the atom bomb" could be the theme of the book.
Written for the layman. Believes that we must maintain pre-eminence in the field
of atomic weapons to avoid disaster. (dated). Somewhat dated also when it comes
to strategy. (only large A-bombs then thought possible).
DEFENSE
MANPOWER PROBLEM

Should we leave this as a category?

A lot of this is out of date because it is based on the hypothesis of an American monopoly. The rest is rather general speculation on the political consequences of Soviet-U.S. atomic war.

Presents Tugwell's reflections written on each of the ten anniversaries following the dropping of the first A bomb. "We must act swiftly or else we will not survive" is his comment. Critical of our foreign policy. Feels that only co-existence is possible in the world today.

Attacks the "blunderings" of our statesmen who have been completely overwhelmed by the new weapons. Bemoans decrease of democratic participation in decision making because of lack of information.

Helpful in matters of strategy.

"..."

Implications for international institutions and analysis of implementation of A. E. C. (U. N.) plans. Discusses the problems of the use of nuclear power as a sanction. 

Check bibliography.
Conclusions based on hypothetical struggle between two nations owning the A-bomb. Probably somewhat out of date, but is an article referred to by other authors. Concludes that there is no conceivable way that the world can be organised at present so that peace can be assured. But this does not mean that there is nothing one can do - and goes on to outline steps. Discusses broken-back war.

Element of surprise attack may be less than generally assumed, because of possibility of immediate retaliation. No effective defense possible.

Rules out world government as a solution (Russia and U. S. too strong).

Believes that atomic weapons, especially if smaller countries possess them, would restore a balance of power. Does not think that limited wars will be possible with atomic weapons. Peace depends more than ever on good diplomats and good diplomacy.

Brief history of the discovery of radioactivity and the theory behind nuclear fission.

Balanced account of the issues involved in maintaining the constitutional requirement of civilian supremacy, showing that "the chief threat from the military is not the possibility of usurpation of power but the inappropriate application of military values, information and interpretations at key points in the decision making process, and the phenomenon of 'creeping militarism' among civilians." (p.76)

Emphasize present interdependence of military and foreign policy.

Russell can see only one way out - world wide hegemony of a single Power, - One state as leader in an alliance strong enough to compel the other to forgo serious armament. Since this the only way out, we have to "modify our adherence to certain of the values upheld by 19th cy. liberalism."
Rougeron, Camille. *Les Applications de l'Explosion Thermonucleaire.*

Gives history of the making of the bomb, especially the technical improvements made (smaller bombs, new materials used, less costly facilities needed, etc.) Effects of a nuclear explosion (cites official American sources) detailed. Very summary treatment of missiles. Stresses potential importance of application of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes (likes to cite the more spectacular examples such as raising the winter temperature of whole areas or irrigation of large desert areas). Fairly technical discussion of how to eliminate the dangers of radiation. Discusses military uses of atomic energy by the military, air force and navy. Tactical use of atomic weapons, their effect, destructiveness. Limited war possible. Nuclear weapons to the advantage of the defensive. Believes that distinction between offensive and defensive weapons made clear. pp. 235-242

pp. 265-299 Aerial warfare (read)

Good on the technical side, written in popular style, up-to-date.

An excellent summary of some of the far-reaching, general problems involved in the advent of atomic weapons. One paragraph in this article which is constantly quoted elsewhere - middle of first column, page 9, "The pattern of the use of atomic weapons..." "They are weapons of aggression, of surprise..." Asks for community responsibility among the *human* peoples of the world. Stresses interim character of any arrangement that might be made to control atomic energy because of continuing inventions.

Affirms the feasibility of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes in the near future, but warns that this may be used in most cases to make weapons.
Six British teachers and writers consider some of the consequences of the bomb.

The scientific achievement, by M. L. Oliphant;
Military consequences of atomic energy, by P. M. S. Blackett
The economic consequences of atomic energy, by R. F. Harrod
Values in the atomic age, by B. Russell
The political repercussions of atomic power by L. Curtis
America as Atlas, by D. W. Brogan.

Early attempt to gauge the influence on, and the importance of atomic weapons on strategy. Paper dated in some respects (technological developments since 1948 have been great), but on the whole still a valid discussion of the problem. Especially well thought out program for defense: early warning system; guides missile with homing properties; better identification system of enemy's missiles; immediate readiness of SAC (strategic use of air power); dispersal of cities as far as possible.

Foresees that in atomic war no nation would be victorious, but believes that even in an atomic war there would be survival. Modification in organization and design of conventional weapons, ships and armies.

"Imperialism, the last stage of capitalism by
V. I. Lenin"

Studies the possible causes, strategy and results of a third world war. Has some useful chapters on tactics and military strategy, but is somewhat idealistic when it comes to international politics and diplomacy. Tends to put too much stress on economic causes as the start of all present day struggles.

Names areas where friction likely to develop: Central & Western Europe, Mediterr. area and extensions into Asia Minor and Central Asia, Far East.

Outlines approx. absolute and relative strength of East and West.

Is still uncertain about the role of the atom in a future war. Cites early views on strategy in an atomic war (war over in 45 min. - Gen. Lemay; war over in 36 hours - Gen. Arnold).

No fully developed new strategy for war in the atomic age. Does mention tactical nuclear weapons, however.

How to prevent future war: Plans for a united Europe. Laws of moderation should be followed by statesmen.

More intimate relationship between military and political leadership than before in war. But so far, in spite of all the technological advances, fallible human beings still make the decisions in a war. Primarily a book about British problems. Britain's military power considered marginal. Britain should maintain the scientific lead over both the Sov. Union and her allies. Necessary to improve the R & D program.

Seems very good book on topic.
Diplomacy


General critical view of our present-day diplomacy. Condemns “planning only” diplomacy (traveling salesmen) and wants real old-fashioned diplomacy. Suggests methods, rather than solutions — very perceptive and not too flippant.

The first part of this article involves a discussion of Blackett's book Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy with which he disagrees. Apparently Blackett wants to see England as an "armed neutral," and Harrod feels that England is irretrievably bound to the fate of Western Europe and that she ought to play a part as leader of Western Europe.

Then goes on to a general discussion of peaceful uses of atomic energy. (rambling)

Concludes by advising that atomic power be prohibited completely both for war and peace purposes (not economical).
Dennett, Raymond and J. E. Johnson (eds) Negotiating With the Russians

Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1951.

pp. 209-36 - "Negotiating on atomic energy, 1946-47.
A review of the negotiations in the U.N. by the former U.S. representative

On the need for international control. Long discussion on sovereignty. Effective control and inspection of atomic energy not possible unless it be owned by an international agency. Favors world gov't.
Expansion of an editorial which first appeared in the Saturday Review. A short discussion of man's social and ethical shortcomings; the obsolescence of current political arrangements, and the author's view of the inevitability of some form of international government.
Effect of the atomic bomb on the San Francisco Charter and on the concept of national sovereignty. History of the formation of the U.N.A.E.C.. Detailed analysis of articles in the charter dealing with national security and national participation in the maintenance of world order. (Art. 43-47, Charter). Places great hope in the working of the U.N., but at the same time realizes that the most essential condition of peace is 'underlying acceptance of common values.'

Responsibility of America as a world leader. Not important. Article not important.

See that the world is stable and prosperous.
Information about the uses of bomb and its influence on military tactics.

References also to early speeches of military leaders and others on the subject.

Points covered in article: A bomb does not rule out war. Destructive power of the bomb (approx.) No adequate defense likely to be found. (historical discussion to show that there have been weapons against which man has found no counterweapon). Emphasis on range and types of carriers. Estimation of raw material available to produce bomb and length of time needed for other nations to catch up with U.S. (various opinions cited).

The pros and cons of UMT in general, and in the atomic age specifically when much faster mobilization is required, is debated. In general, pro UMT, although larger professional army believed necessary.

Speech given at Harris Institute of U. of Chicago. Exposition of the problems raised by the A bomb rather than an attempt to offer solutions. Stresses importance of retaliation through deterrence and of retaliation. Importance of fast and long-range means of delivery. Sea power on the decline. Believes that A bomb brought about "the collapse of the threat of war as an instrument of policy."

Despite the fact that it was written in 1946, seems to be still applicable, Dated in that he fails to consider the possibility of the development of small A weapons or limited A wars. Minimized risk of a surprise attack occurring. Outlines a defense program for the U.S. Doubts feasibility or worth of dispersion of cities.

Brief summary of the effect of bombing in the second World War. Analysis of American military strategy in 1948 as described in an article by General Kenney in Newsweek (May 17, 1948) and Spaatz in Life. Advocates building up defensive military policy to be followed by negotiation with Russia. (U.S. monopoly of A bomb days).

Does not believe that strategic bombing is all-effective or air force all-important. A-Bomb alone cannot result in a quick and decisive victory.
PERSONAL ACCOUNTS and REFLECTIONS

(this should have a better title. We'll think about it.)
Written by two newspaper reporters in a journalistic style giving the impression that they have the "inside dope" on the people and policies connected with the development of atomic energy and the Atomic Energy Commission. Undocumented and very fast reading.

It is actually a history of the events leading to the decision to manufacture the Hydrogen bomb. Chapter One deals somewhat with the effect of the Russian possession of the bomb on U.S. defense policy and its relation to the beginning of production of the hydrogen bomb. Part III has sections on Project East River, Lincoln, SAC and SUSAC, etc.

Put the blame for delaying the development of thermonuclear weapons on Oppenheimer and a host of other American scientists. Hero of the book is Dr. Edward Teller who is supposed to have produced the H-bomb.
Stimson, Henry L. and McGeorge Bundy. *On Active Service in Peace and War*


History of the discovery, growth and development of the A-bomb. Chapter on Battlefield A-weapons might be useful for utilisation of tactical weapons but looks very general. Forecasts uses for peace.

Discusses some of the set-up of Soviet scientific research. Believes them to be well up-to-date and capable of keeping up or topping U. S. research efforts. Completely unrealistic attitude about U.S.S.R.: thinks that the fundamental interests of the U. S. and Russia are nearly identical and therefore the two can live in peace.

131 pp.

New Frames of reference for the study of foreign policy.

Story of the making of the atomic bomb in non-technical terms.
Other References

U.S. GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS
Military assistance - Countries

Threshold of nuclear plenty

Internat'l Status quo can no longer be maintained by

Communist

Can't give anything except help

Because: of 1) Y everything else.

Take look at milit. camps

Not likely joins when other countries first arrive

Nuclear bomb. - Must carry in case of delivery

What answer to the above? "Mil. Assistance Requested." Have: don't start with clean piece of paper.

Limited Nuclear War (Jaffey)

Internal Security

Can't meddle.
Galley

All delivery means application for other countries.

No country can maintain over-all capability. Over-all capability should support total strategy.

But we must be able to cancel on us as well. Originality necessary for delivery means have to find formulae which keep us out of war while furnishing assistance.

But sources between us & Soviets must be complementary.

Slow determination by recasting forces.

Need a delivery means distinguishable from the attack.
Russian + Chinese reaction
6 - Chinese meet official of A-bomb
6. A-bomb used on Japan & affect Soviet intervention in war
Russia + China believe I would continue nuclear proliferation if only countries able to wield A-bombs
7 - A-bomb devised by man cannot be uninstalled by man. Human beings
7 - China has maximum mines, destruction as in world. Should consider
8 - Synchronized of China in war. Would take 1-2 years to produce
peaceful use. Exposed pressure to bomb
9 - Calculation of China's immunity. Would like immunity bombs. Would
take us 1970 years to produce this many
10 - 2 Russia: 0 not afraid. Special focus
11 - Resolution upholding world peace movement
12 - Statement 7 - China ignorant of A-1 energy in deliberate propaganda
He claims we cannot make more powerful than A-bomb
13 - Statement 8 speed before Vienna conference. While country discussed
with????? China have learned to tell foreign from enemies. U.S. emphasized
military - USSR peaceful use
13 - 1954 - Korea low proved bankruptcy of policy of right
14 - Empathy on St. Thomas (1950) US bombing mission. US reports 150,000
4 - Read & discuss peaceful use proposal by advocating banning of A-bombs (China).

15 - Analyzes why he made peaceful use proposal. Fear of more A-retribution?

16 - A. blackmail vs. Br. - Br. won't accept threat of unbreakable energy

17 - History of A (China & brothels than) & peaceful use, followed by

Russian attitudes

1. Germany: 3 basic themes: 1. Loss of weapons 2. Deterrence
4. Treaty of Dec '74 Vienna signed. East un-involving A. more would be end
   of its people etc.
5. Attack on NATO strategy. Links dead - injured. Arbeit
6. Need of statements of famous figures vs. A. bomb
8. - A. weapons vs. internat. law.
11. Reverse side: Play up A. might of USSR.
12. Try behind events. 1955 Articles: A. weapons can. 9 decide more
13. - Due to form article in Soviet retaliatory force.
14. Beneficial uses. We single weapon can harm us. Little country,
   weak big country. 15 - CE USSR pictures in peaceful uses
18. Attacks on USSR by pro-Soviet ideas. 19. Germany
19. A. and the W. Germany eventually to be equipped with A - weapons
   paper calls on German people risk Afghan destruction of their cities.

24. Dresden made it known. Uses Dresden as example of means of nuclear war.

25. Danger of fall of East and West Germany. Some hands would fall.


27. Appeal to Germans to keep A-weapon. Use force-prone confluence.

28. A-weapon suicide. For other defense initiative will take it.

29. Volksbund with appeal to Bundestag and A-weapon.


4. See quota from books on peaceful use.

Excited Western reaction to Russia's break of war doctrine joined success of communist propaganda.

Analysis of Soviet reaction to World War
1. 19-50. Soviet need to maintain foreign menace as reason for policy totalitarianism.
2. Attacks on weakening away of state.
3. Communist article - FAD, hauj둔s can't be pacified with small concessions.
4. Role, weakened by world war.
5. Attack on basis for advocacy of peaceful resistance.
6. lettuce, nothing that would work will not prevent.
7. Why should Margaret change course.
8. Real meaning Russia can't win in imperialism.
9. Stalin in '45 needs of resistance not because of danger of non-trad destruction, but for sake of universal peace.
10. Analysis of Hitlerian need of peaceful resistance as means to economic development.
Russian Reactors
p 3. Initial reaction to A-bomb. Projected down
1. Be must insert quotes from encyclopedia
2. Second argument that this side will win three things
mural into actually improves their legal position.
But may also be much, maybe really show
understand strategy based on your idea.
33. More will analyze current primitive A-bomb.
36. Note massive retaliation in reverse.
37. P 8 emphasis on success.
42. Problem of nuclear control in A. war.
43. Playing down tactical use of nuclear weapons. Weapon
so ignorance?
45. preach: massive retaliation applies
47. principle maintained that no statements. Nikogan, relations.
see also Bulgarian after in this


20. Reaction to NATO decision on atomic weapons. Threat against Italy was. May mean one more of AT weapons will lead to advantage.

21. Task of Soviet policy is to keep contradictions in Western government.

Effects etc.

3. 1955 command: destruction of Western civil argument in Western desire to impose ultimatum.

25 January 1955


4. Careful resistance not advanced as change in doctrine or less militancy.

5. Claim China did not press the upward process of strategic nuclear.

6. Very profound observations re effect in Soviets of giving up military

Nuclear. Inner Spear of China's/China's future. But effect after many
Russian Attitudes

9. Russia: We must eliminate blockade, return uplift to W. We for Peace Talk.
1. Consider approach to these 3-weapon idea of massive retaliation, disarmament, & destruction.
2. Korea as desire for peace & lack of intimidation by U.S. & 10,000 SIC.

11. Malenkov disagreement: our way of propaganda opposed.
12. Lines of arrangement no A-Brand: U.S. cannot hold course of history.
13. Talk of destruction of civilization designed to encourage possibility.
14. Shouldn't negotiate lesser. But we'll face communists more careful & show conclusion that Third World can make main end of history.
15. Got to begin argument in destruction of unstable communist regimes.
16. Was against limited nuclear war. 2. Deliberate offense, at least.
17. 14. Smallest threat & discourage attitude so nothing can be done.
19. Man cannot be paralyzed. 13. 0.8 years. 2. Red.
20. Peaceful assistance quite as having been forced by U.S.S.R. 5. War.
21. Peaceful assistance quite as having been forced by U.S.S.R. 5. War.
Frustration over 1958 nuclear non-test. 

Giau. Vulnerability

Giau weakness. Can be engineered for modern.

1. French decision to produce H-bomb. French statement re. communiqué with no urging of problem.

2. After 1958 - France will have sufficient plutonium to produce nuclear weapon will soon produce, starting in '59. 15-20 years.

3. Do not exclude for use in high consequence.


5. France's limitation of 24 warhead: France before France can't remain in 24 years on being non-nuclear. Ours back with explanatory statements.

6. Under France. France's role as peace maker.

7. French schizophrenia. want to be fr. peace and remain A-weapon. Canadian schizophrenia: local defense.

8. Much defense we deem nuclear weapons impossible.

9. Real thinks A-weapon will be destructive. 12. Should or should not.

10. A desire enough to remove some - nuclear threat.

11. Some French A-weapon would undoubtedly be used in war and
30. Decisions must be made. Hit must be placed in context of interest. States need to maintain balance of interest. Detente (France - U.S. - Still applicable?)

31. France would lose prestige. E. Germany would find itself placed from North/South.

32. French publicity. Decisions driven by standards thus useful for U.S.

33. Radical socialism. If France and NATO fall primarily, belief should lead peaceful means. Let take lesson, gain attention. F.D.R. First communism.


35. French Stalinist. If France and NATO fall primarily, belief should lead peaceful means. Let take lesson, gain attention. F.D.R. First communism.


42. Stalinist resolution. Peaceful means. N.E.A.-I.
64. Original impetus for linear A. energy program.
No change of tactical use.

67. Andrew: I agree. France will be important. Europe an important player without pressure. I will become common.
68. Andrew: The bomb in a condition of independence + security.
69. Le Rende: Argument for ending tests.

1 Real problem is that France shows I understand. Difference between strategic & tactical uses of A. weapons. (See below one quote). Can we ask our allies for strategic weapons?

53. Peaceful uses: Feasible fuel deficiency. 56. France imports 13% of energy. This like 1$ & energy may pay before other power advantages.
55. France to use per capita consumption of energy. Government looks at nuclear power explaining this.
57. Small French technically trained staff.
58. Summary: Nuclear strike while morality + practical considerations may lead in hand.

62. Organization of French A. energy program.
65. 1967 power development will be state-funded.
66. French will have reactor in 1948.
67. 1946-51 France devoted only about 500 man-years to nuclear research.
French Реашин
68-82 по 43.9 %, June 46-54; now propose to spend 100, 76, 54-58.
71-Various planned reactors of MAURICE project. France will
produce 1000 kg of plutonium a year
86- Europeans donate for $4.5 billion
89- Belgian entrepreneur of EURATOM 750,000
81- Anand (OECC advocate) thinks the cost is not realistic with 85-
more obstacles to EURATOM: 0.9 cent
89- Requirement for EURATOM. Difficult capital procurement for any
single European country to compete with USSR.
89 - RPI senator: only beneficiary of EURATOM will be Germany.
But this may be fact of life in Europe.
British Reactions

1. Great point: Russia - British strategic doctrine developed not from
   interrelated military. In R.I. E.W. conflict
   2. Attack on credibility. All not men as serving no purpose.

Hofreiter Report: 26 - Basic inconsistency: must hold line until last
   stimulation is broken by nuclear war. But why is it necessary to
   hold for this.

2. Land vs. Water - Land all for restraining the fact that we may be
   screened from the little interested for me. Trouble is one and belongs
   about impelling our need for: me,

2. Conventional armament vs. graduated deterrence that it makes me,
   more likely (Parliamentary secrecy & secrecy of defense).

HPC debate: Commons. 2. Measures. 4 priorities: 1. Armed war. 2. Cold War
   etc. same general time as US arguments. Arguments on graduated
   deterrence if have the law for they argue for...
2. Bellingham: All plans should be directed to full-scale war.
3. Elizabeth: Against H-bomb. Will deter mainly except in cases of economic war.
4. Franklin: Argument that A-weapons can be applied anywhere. Alternate methods of Asia. What good is mind if body is cost?
British position

Debate between Martin + Ruggard on Graduated Detention. Does it make war more or less likely.


6. Conjecture.

7. Dennis Healy on Act. retribution + importance of conventional defence.

8. Dennis Healy in Encounter. South said 9th for off.

9. With us we may 9th maintain mine. Labour wins built up as much as possible for full war.

10. Economist editorial 11-7-55: If effectiveness of detention results in uncertainty + haze over any attempts to reduce risks will reduce its power to do. How theproblem: As your remedies lower your reduce certainty + invalids.


12. Good reply by Ruggard.

13. 56 Statement of defence. An example made more less likely. National
Possession along 200 mile north of deterrent for retaliatory forces and
roles of defense planning.

14 - Conclusion: Must deploy forces for altered threat. US time expires
on limited new force.

14 - Times editorial. Need for forces to defend Europe. Reinforce of Europe's
security. West European need for deterring & prevent spread
forces of Soviet aggressors.

15 - Conclusion. Deterrents. Conventional forces decreasing value as
deterrent.

16 - Blackett. More emphasis on civil defense.

16 - Observer. 2-10-56 - Must make clear distinction between in deliberation
begins debate between trivial & vital issues. US employment of combat in
battleship would not necessarily lead to blow up US industry as Delivery Order
4-35a-62, so much reason to fear all nations as USS

17 - Daily Tel. - Intercommunicability between weapons needed to defend
Europe & destruction they will inflict on nations which don't possess them.
Need explicit statement of US position & distinction between
NATO's targets. NATO makes no notice that one will be willing to accept condemnation.
British Reactions Jan '56

Lynes Falls - Some damage needed to cannibalize statement & make sacrifices necessary for maintaining NATO.

Observed 23 Jan '56 Advocates development of indiscriminate retaliation. 12" 15 Jan '56

Puddle Hawk 25/1/56 - Present division unsuitable for second fire.

Penny's lecture, January 17, 1956 - No effective steps have yet been taken either in principle or in practice to make distinction between tactical & strategic use.

Feb 2, 1956 - Again insists that if we make distinction between tactical & strategic should rely entirely on nuclear.

Feb 9, 1956 - Defense statement advances 1955 by recognizing limited war. But less effort made to recognize distinction between tactical & strategic weapons. Consider justified because U.S. may not agree on target's essential value.

Guardian Feb 27. - Priorities have been many. Two main emphasis: 1) letters & planes should have unequivocal missiles coverage speed & 2) graduated deterrence: 1) may make sense 2) country, whatever it is called, would still be in background. Could be defined in advance in middle of combat if in priority.

Internal Affairs - 159 - Stress - Total war abolished by Hbomb. Graduated deterrence would make possible limited war.

Int. Ltd Affairs 159 Stress on graduated deterrence would give us Russia + make Germany a battleground state. Identified already - no choice between nuclear & nonnuclear. Would rather capture this intetly if need to consumer goods.

Graduated deterrence might make war a paying proposition again.
British Reactions

1. A sudden and massiveretaliation continues to grow rapidly. They will make huge losses.
2. After initial attack period of broken-back warfare must follow.
3. Ground forces hold enemy until mobilization is completed.
4. Nuclear retaliation becomes effective just like U.S.

London Times April 10

2. Liddel Hart remarks on U.S. refusal to cease between deeps.


4. Blesson is among those to see concept of F.A. examination.

5. Blesson has strong strategic revolution. Always only half-way, delay, it is Mr. and still relies on old concepts of F. retaliation.

6. Liddel Hart remarks conventionally behind line, because might be taken as disrupt of W. members.

Liddel Hart - now - mistake of planning in to look at N.A. as a supplementary not as major alternative.
British, Reactions. Key to graduated deterrent is that goals must be limited.

Hansard March 1955. Churchill speech. A-bomb did not carry us beyond the scope of human control, defense through deterrence. To make our contribution must have nuclear weapons.

1901 - require 1-bombs to hit airfields from which planes might be launched. - can be more than target would be primary priority. The closest airfield. (with its immediate, such as warm)

1903 - 1-bomb made U.S.S.R. equally vulnerable as U.K. because we can longer offer protection. 1908 - surprise attack unlikely. 1906 - the deterrent will continually grow in value. Aggressor will be fully certain that we'll suffer attack & continue retaliation.

1907 - Need conventional, smart, present, short-range rocket & his attacks only.

1910 - Would not carry nuclear weapon with U.S. if dom. 9 person deliver

1911 - Amber, going to use nuclear bombs in retaliation for conventional
attack? 1975: Lance missile attack from E. Germany 450 miles away 
1974: speech denouncing interwoven rivalry, now missiles 
1993: read old line in W Europe while A-bomb taken off

If Japan had been capable of retaliating would we have been so prepared & indeed attack?

Churchill speech June 23, '48—bring matters to a head
British Attitude

26 March 1955: Britain insists on use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Value in clear NATO statement of intention.

26 March 1955: Agrees with defence debate. Wants declaration of possibility of tactical use.

Daily Telegraph 5 March '55: Best defence lies in winning + installing nuclear deterrent.

Today Observer: Air is towards some form of world government.

Daily Telegraph 27 March: Nicaraguan Martin - constitutional am. That graduated restriction no means deterrent.


Will sooner come hard decision between peaceful and military.

16 March: Interesting letter - communions will not work in peace.

17 & 6 April '55: Lesseur in attempting to define limitation of weapons & combat zone, or to airfields. Former on letter on policy.

Still in previous chapter.
11 May 1955 - 12 & again urged making distinctions explicit but firm.

25 May - Debate between King and Hardstone. Remaining threat of all and<br>man would increase likelihood of aggression (Hardstone).

[Page obscured - June 19, Healy - Atomic detail. He stresses only on aggression against<br>atomic power. Excellent statement in Germany.

splendid, Eddle - and arguments are graduated distance. Difficult to totally

obviate June 26, '55 - Editorial on Germany. Believes nuclear state<br>

makes defense unlikely.

London Times 3 July '55 - Should spend minimum amount required

for defense and not into cold war.

4 July -呼吁 no simplification of serious armaments. Also less

need for reserve forces.

18 & 11 July - Scientists' appeal for limitation of heavy as they say.

19 and manufacture realistic.

Labour Party report 11.7.55 - thinks that some measures should be

will be almost impossible - limited targets on types of weapons.

10.9.55 - Don't merely be bombs alone. Protect in that manner.
British reaction

by start of 1957,land forces still don't distinguish between
all, multi-limited nuclear war

Observer 0216:55 - asks for clear decision on weapons.

PM 9 Oct 31 - generally favorable to graduated deterrence.

Alternative disarmament conventional forces only an H-bomb disarm.

Economist article on Graduated Deterrence. Admits it if we can be so defended.

Economist 10 Dec.:57 - sees superpowerful H-bombs to have
the weight of the "great deterrent", plus nuclear arms, peace.

Times 13 Dec. 57 - almost expects little nuclear war theory
falls off. Because threat to minor conventional attack seems far
and relatively is fully a deterrent.
11 re, y 4/04 or.:1 4476144, 490

1. 41.1.6 3/(4,01.

5. Forces have task to support civil authorities. No longer talk of holding line until that air becomes effective.

7. Note again RA F will make contribution to nuclear deterrent,

8. Attack of H bomb has greatly tightened power of deterrent

23. Under heavy defense measuresAvg in reducing deterrent.

January '56 - Conventional forces needed because we change...

5. 5A C as lead to the producing new weapons. Should be made available to...
British Reaction 2-27-56

(1) Need for war-mongering less necessary.
(2) Need for more missiles less necessary.
(3) No need for more war. Need of limited nuclear war.

2-17-56

17. Times editorial: No making contribution to Allied deterrence with standing as world power. This means not just for prestige. Can be of.

18. Times editorial: No making contribution to Allied deterrence with standing as world power. This means not just for prestige. Can be of.

19. Times editorial on the wart of having a little of everything or to keep up.

56. As W. nuclear superiority diminishes, may nuclear power become as important as banks. Up to certain pH line.

20. Senator: Hard to differentiate between total war and partial war. Latter war, many people not familiar with weapons. Identifies all sorts of misery over.
The subject is the fate of war in Europe. The subject is to establish NATO.

Arms would be Soviet supply centers. Even with 2,000,000 men.

For victory, 1945. But J.D. is surely whether the Soviet would employ 175 tons

in an A-bom.

April 1956 - Letter 2 Times: If ever unarmed civilians centers best targets are

supply centers, the allies more vulnerable than Soviet because of sea.

22-1. G.Calls for disarming NA to forces, relying openly on

massive retaliation. Also 6-9-56.

Liddel Hart: Letter 2 Times: 1-3-55 - To earn troops with conventional

is the best use for having them.

4. All military knowledge is now useless. Liddel Hart: No alternative to

relence on the bomb, defense. War is now either antiguarian in tensity.

Liddel Hart: If limited nuclear war leads to unlimited war, some

could be no worse than if men started as all-out war. A-bomb must always

graduated deterrence reflect. Presently have costs of second policy of first.
German reactions.

3. "Reiter" to write in motion fictitiously literally.

5. 3 events: making Germans indolent; technical 1-throw for defense.

8. Europe: carte blanche; 2-County conference.

2. German reactions.

9. Rationale for German reaction: avoid need everywhere of 5:1 attack.

11. Of course we no longer want tosatellite Europe.

12. Weinstein: neither does he want German invasion.


14. Weinstein opposes "unconditional" absolute defense, Germans must absorb

15. Benning plan.

17. Distinction of Benning between blocking threats + offensive threats.

19. Rogge's objection: Benning blocking formation, Germans no support.

21. Decision 2 use A-bombs in defense of Europe -- left feet. --

to commander. 2 problems -- nature of defense, nature of war.

22. F & E interprets A-intercepts to apply below the broad freeing

23. National, nuclear reality which makes it unnecessary to

close nuclear weapons confined to strategic targets. Reality that

24. Not change basic principles of strategy

[Alternates also narrow nature of war in 1st case: Germany -- land


25. Effect on mobility: maintaining enough for static defense: sorta

Blindside. Traditional notion of target

26. War, Blank NATO's concentrate, defend in conventional array. Develop

27. Yugo: conventional array not required vs. a enemy that

28. Blank alignment: need to defend alliances, same as U.S.

29. Civil Defense reaction.

30. French reaction -- some argue as if no hands would drop if overrun by

31. Dropping 350 bombs in 18 hours unrealistic: Applies made of all-nix

A limited man.

32. Very good distinction with primangers. Not necessary with fission

gas to detonate buildable service around its employment.
France

S. Dispatch: Analysis of U.S. presence in Western Europe.

36. Note: Kissinger. Quote: This was a war = civil war. This inconsistency between US reliance on nuclear weapons and Germany reliance on conventional forces.

37. Kissinger: We need to insist on UN agreement to use of A-bombs in Germany.

38. Series of arguments: U.S. will not use A-bombs in Germany if kept limited.

39. Dr. Brezhnev: To use A-bombs will be excluded.

40. Question: If war is civil war, why use conventional forces?

41. Answer: Argument for conventional forces.

42. Hitler's view: To defend. Changing taken seriously in Berlin.

43. Sum: Agreement + on conventional forces.

44. Aim: Maintain agreement. + on conventional forces of NATO advocated in Germany.

45. Sum: Agreement on conventional forces. + on Austrian forces outside the NATO.

46. CIA: Some advantage to pressure Russians. Not possible. +

47. Realization of US + Soviet forces in Germany appeal (UBC), to defend that East Germans against would disappear if Russians withdrawn. Should be

48. Argument: To get US forces withdraw. Would threaten Germany to

49. Civil war. US would lose. British would favor increase of conventional attack if US troops remained stationed there.
50. Problem that withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany would mean
51. withdrawal from Europe.

52. Importance of Germany as a base from which even its importance for
53. airfields is diminishing

54. Viet-Off article: German airfields attainable only through military
55. bases in Europe. A 500 km neutral zone meaningless in jet age

56. Germany must be offered a家乡 secure politically. Different
57. states which are defensive hold militarily separate. They might attach
58. Germany for that reason can & must be Germany for own being pol. separate

New paper. To write

1. 2 problems: 1) Use of conventional 2) Use of nuclear weapons
2. Arguments for conventional: Atomic stalemate has made conventional

3. arguments more important. (21) CDV, DEF

This same problem is in U.S.: 1) Stalemate across the board? What does
it do to traditional doctrine
6. Second + third plan of N + P + W + Russia & Japan in Germany
6. Stalemate for conventional arguments + Russia. China
7. Stalemate will make trade easier parting aside of A measured Communist
8. in response to potential
9. China identifies local war with conventional war?
German Reactions

8-9. Recommandation: Disarming Agreement.
10. Arg: W. German troops necessary only to balance E. German troops.
11. Selig: Agreement by deputy for disarmament but without disarming or disarmament with verification.
12. Neville: Only 50,000 German troops matter, if 1.8 million do not.
13. Re: As disarmament agreed Germany could only disarm.
15. E. European collective security plan. FDR is OK
17. Arg: End of Cold War makes conscription unnecessary.
18. Conscription instruction in W. Germany.threw as one argument. Work by increasing consensus on nuclear war. 204 paragraph whole page 7 AL.
27. Debates on weather. Grounds argument, if really in weather a little extra may
might not underline weather
27. Volting: logical basis is "same direction"
29. Digression: start on long half-life of radioactivity in Germany. In Germany
31. Arguments for: Topping p-tests, motion would end if tests are
stopped / right / tests / first written. May period of continued.
32. SPD + RPP vs. continued tests. Also Kingsbridge to
33. Prof. Wenzel. - Charg
36. Danger that Germany becomes underdeveloped country in scientific talent.
Germany has only 100 million scientists
42. Germanyהחלטה about Einstein: some fear big business
5. United as rather than small nation.
Random Notes

Fear of city planning

1892 - Laidon Gray question: Would he opposed to using land on

premises Tungter what might include cities in the,

limits had been used up

1285 - Major concern: 1) It is a simpler way budgeting, and

certainly bigger than ever in absence of budgeting economic

affluence simulating would be done only at something expense

forced budget.

See also Minor to 1st transport is costly with urban offering

One of virtue of limited men is to determine the possible range

of transformation: depends on some made from what it develops.

Relation between deterrence and war strategy. One may see to sacrifice

a certain amount of deterrence to be able to minimize risks of war.

The ones are two reasons: 

1) Destructive potential is primitive - easy to make

materiatic industrially may have advantage of using power as distributary

2) Destructiveness is very & if the weapons is complex and power to disbursement

advantage because additional incurrence will be strategically put an

Restoring the 1st to operate is area which requires much simpler. Large

sized munitional destructiveness.
Collective Security - Europe

1936-1947 - Importance of defending W. Europe need local
operators - nearness, defense of forward air-bases (offshore)

Nunninin: best way to keep allies is to play down AS issues

1950s - 52 appropriation hearing Collins. If we lose W. Europe
we will lose industrial base - advantage

R & E. W. European relations - nuclear strategy

OVER -> RAWLINGS, W
Rural General

(210) Anglo-Irish: illusions create illusions for economy

(197) - with deputation in struggle for permanent peace

(210) - Headline: action mass. The enemy

(233) - Richard: engagement which takes nothing of nation

(259) - Importance of study & theory (also in recent speech)

(263) - Labor always be considered part of new policy

(272) - Per. power grows out of broad of peace. Would be examined by

RN(21) - 2 aspects of planning: (1) With other side of 3/3 below rational

(2) - Problem of getting personnel that permanently take overall view. Hence

RN. staff. Head. (5) Department. Admin. implement, not by

6. Nature of surprise attack. Also

7. - Nature of planning in minds - Burke, etc.

8. Problem of leadership - substance, army, etc.

9. US nature of unanimous appeal

(11) Power of ally to command & attack by France in any way

(14) - Nature. An. might have done this in weeks. If
In most places which limited nuclear war... UN. I disagree. I am 99% sure. What can happen to many at will and advantage of recovery is status quo ante.

Einstein's insistence on legality - those are easy cases.

Kinsley: a no. of parties required to defend one's nation (70)

Earl: planners are planning for 100% probability - duration of skill! - significance exposed at similar period that it means to solve all problems - and difficulty arises in relation of the... and the

A capability which paralyses the will: genes unrelated by selection... What are social institutions? All these are intangibles.

Monterellis or aliens. Use quickly. Nato. How hard to understand will also bring
carry undulations... special... the important: have not so well.

1989 - state who areshmiered and new error unless. It is too late to correct it. System wide only or something rather than this rather.

1962 - nothing is so easy to offset as relative economic interests you'll make all...
Command for record - I believe it is perfectly safe and wise.

Better question of technical possibility. Because then it will reduce your problem.

Allies even more needed as all and with them now.

No line between all and war will come. Little more only of the strategy.

Gas warfare as you can see it.

Scholars in nuclear war. They

Things for rationality and principles.

Dear [Name],

Action Laboratory Policy

Get World Politics from 1955 re ASEAN and ASEAN. Korean war.

RN 16 M - Soot to altitude

I am aware of diplomacy.
Deterrence as Incantation
Korean War as time in which evaluation began
Intending was militar

Nuclear strategy appeals to 2 aspects of human nature:
DISTASTE OF WAR & DESTRUCTION = economic, emotional

Policy as commitment to山sacrifice as safety
Other nations are parties to the commitment and failure to be
massacred.

Commonly power 1st to strike balance between gaining up keep
of safety, power was one chose minimal diet and defense
for good will of the superjice state. But as power changes
power now threaten survival of other.

2 aspects of doctrine: capability = interpretation

In similar power can take chance on evaluation of the forces at
this moment one danger exists

Int. taking his place on basis of intention - need for high capability. One says: capabilities reassess that they are working under of adroit design. We have seen the capabilities which are in existence. This is only designing of wisdom. One capability which is important.

one is protected vs. recognize attack is one protected against everything. / Can identify attack here? - Not likely because it would attack.

Elite forces: insubstantial. Because homosexuals are efficient elements, enemy has always 1 choice: to go after industrial potential e.g. go after airfields. In determinacy if airfields are disposed more than cities may be wise. Go after latter.

Hand this needed: what can be achieved by complete air superiority. Once this position was e.g. vis-as-vid uncommitted. Greater preponderance can be before.

Victory almost unquestionable in all mid-1945. Unconditional surrender.

Victory: this is indivisible. Technology
Soviet capabilities restrictions

Statistical p. 1 - Data is rapid from 1950 Italian AF 1950 - 1954

- Fighters seen: 1953 - Large jet fighters comparable to B-47, 1953 - 2 jet
  - Early development of Soviet AF - Tupolev. Cooperation with Germany.
  - ASA - Academy for Soviet aircraft design.
  - 10-11 - Concentration on very few types of planes, by 1958 predominated
  - 4.4 the plane a year. 1.9 jet fighters.

- World War II debates in USSR of strategic vs. tactical air settled in favor of Tactical Air. 14 Stalin quote: "We can't be run by air power alone.
  - After 1940, German AF generally used for defense and logistics.
  - 25 - Losses suffered by Soviets in early days of war meant both by inferior design and lower pilot skill.

- 26 end of WWII - 3 priorities: defensive air force to a modern
  - Bombing force of planes

- 37 - Soviet take one of German jet techniques. Memran of skin
  - in economy + efficiency.

- 39 - Experiments of Prof. von Bock. Soviets obtained all research secrets
  - Landman. In slave labor camps

- 42 - Note Italian range of November to speed up plane design (Calenda)
49. 1914 moved from drawing board directly into skies.

50. US lack of concern with Soviet jet development despite fact that in 1949 Soviet man observed 406 jet aircraft (125,157)

51. Early AF victories in Korea due to superior pilot skills and "airplane plane." 171/65 rate was 1.5:8 vs. 1:100 m: p.

52. AF high altitude 07/16/15: superior even 2:8:86. 1716 can think away from tables.

53. USAF might flyers in Korea often failed to make contacts with planes indicating either lack of experience or inadequate radar. Also Soviet flyers refused to team with tactics.

54. Doctrine unified warfare.

55. Note again six sections of general staff: Org. + Mat.; Opns.; Targerd.; Communications + History.

56. Six forces: Air, AF. long-range AF; AA defense force; Navy; Air; Airborne troops; rail aviation.

57. AF AF has 50% of available aircraft. Mission, support of ground.

58. Starting in 1953 helicopters used as integral part of maneuver.

Soviet capabilities and intentions.

72 - Dep. into air defense, squadron eq, air def. in Korean war, 80-85 aircraft.

74 - Soviet long-range flying force, 3000 aircraft of various types. Between 1945-56 studied what all air defense was improved.

78 - Russian types: Badger (medium), Bison (long-range jet).

Bear (interceptor), started appearing in 1954. 79 - Lists types of missiles available.

79 - Long-range flying range of these large big & increasing than recent air-planes. It's impossible to imagine this as a normal way of life and simply an experience.

80 - 82 - Air defense forces + rings of defense forces. Jet and is composed of many small areas of air defense districts which are defended both by fighters & by anti-aircraft.

83 - 84 guerrillas, 15-20 fighters, 500 miles (depending on present condition)

16 of 24 missiles built since the war.

17-4 to mine dies of airborne maps.

60 - Soviet defense budget: 1955 light and was in post-war period.

68 - Description of German aviation.

90 - Soviets find that they are in many of technical info, spend almost
20000 a year on books, including in US
91 - Soviet education: 1/3 of primary school curriculum is science
math; 1/2 of secondary curriculum.
93 - Central design office (I - K 13) determines whether prototype is to
build after looking at design (how do they keep secretified in
facilities?
95 - Fantail (La-17) all-metal interceptor + second plane.
96 - Soviet imitation of B-17 + B-29.
97 - Dependence of Soviet jets on British Vena engine. Copied after
1947
98 - Rear engine with auxiliary jets.
114 - Russian ind. engines probably larger than B-52. But probably
less total thrust of all engines are considered.
115 - Heavy emphasis placed on rockets both for missile + aircraft
in Russia.
116 - Soviet missile development. Lead by captured German
Fermi of them released tank airplane project. They indicate still
not complete in 1948 as in engine design
120 - Raketan developed Soviet marine-time rockets

122 - We listed Soviet and only one major factory at Posen had several V-2 factories on Thuringia. 123. Schmidt 1st central institute like in Thuringia; canmonds to Russia under Dr. Neumayer - one Allied central institute later released.

124 - Soviet reaction to serious plan. Stalin will make 9 Carson to talk to gentlemen skeptics. Russian key line through dam mass on March 1.

125 - Soviet 16 missile launch under artillery expert Kalakov. 126 - Soviet, have same basic type of missile as US had in April (US has since commenced use).

128 - 2 types of SA - 2 missiles, having concern of Soviet with air defense. 129 - Kleist talk, probably missile defense of Roswell. Seems to have landing device. Original idea was fancy.

(like Vike)

130 - Soviets lose underwater to surface missile which can be launched 140 miles from target.

130 - Adaptation of V-2, now have range of 530 miles. 700 miles range for other type missile.
1 32-33 - Map of Soviet missile launching sites - installation.
134 - I think someone has been as successful with missiles as with aircraft development. Evidence: German missile experts still in Russia. Still live control underground parking.
135 - Many launching sites along Baltic, Suez, and Baltic is.
136 - Soviet working on earth satellite. Talking of manned platforms + interplanetary flight.
139 - similitude of design. Soviet aircraft compared to US models.
140 - Simplicity, Simplicity. As for designs as possible and interplanetary plans, supposed to be followed with great enthusiasm. 192. 192.
143 - Soviet machine tool and steel produced from 50k x 800k kg.
144 - Soviet machine tool and steel purchased from 50k x 800k kg.
145 - Soviet machine tool and steel purchased from 50k x 800k kg. 1940-51 + types from 500 to 1750.
146 - Russian planned production for 1956 is 1860. Total 1860. 900 900, 500 300, 1956, 500 300.
152 - Many aircraft centers removed C. in 1941 remained closely
153 - Soviet industry located close to new materials because of transport.
Soviet Capabilities and Intentions

189-20 - Statistics of missiles in Soviet production. Because proportion devoted to war purposes Soviet will have capability
5 headed and armed with long range, even before they achieve quantity. This
outweighs 150,000 missiles increased from 220k - 500k by 1951.

(13 of us)

156 - Satellite armies strong in land power, weak in air power.

167 - Function of satellite air forces: protect border. Coarse screen
an air line of defense for USSR. Combats with fighter planes.

170 - Satellite air forces had 1916-15's and asked German companies.

172 - Soviets have 750-1000 jets stationed in E. Germany

174 - Instructions of Chinese airbase: Training, equipment, and
equipments. RAF - air communications

198 - Soviet air communications facilities are not allowed
on N. route - only route used of 4 channels. Mainly to supply
airbases in Kille. All for 47 airlines reported Ministry. Telephones
180 - Air traffic far more expensive in USSR than trains

181 - Figures for Soviet airlift Czar. Always ahead of US even before
In 1953 it took 1000 miles from near N. of U.S. to travel 1000 miles from near N. of U.S.

1. Most Soviet airfields during day. Before noon landing lights at Soviet airfields.

2. Civil aircraft take mail and carry away privileged status.

3. Soviet antiaircraft & N. of Atlantic circle must be staggering for mid-

bases are unacquainted by air except 1 months if yeet.

201. Soviet pay scales in AF 3 x Infantry.


207. Soviet solders 1st to 11/6/15 in 10 post war year. By '58 will have several hundred Bism. & therefore powerful deterritory on weapon.


claim that Soviet mult. clergy authentic because it is based on Marxism.

Bourgeois mult. science incapable of discovering reality.

5. Bourgeois mult. science related to a mult. doctrine mult. science it is scientific formulation. It did not create a helmed change of men.

5. Stalin's letter in Bolshevik attacking "anti-scientific Western

attacks on Classemry because of historical indetermination
Soviet Capabilities

6. Emphasis on purely Russian sources.

7. Stalin’s division of basic principles into primary and secondary.

8. Agreement that constant factors were essentially those which had to be reckoned in Soviet planning since 1942 onwards. Until Stalin’s death, Soviet military doctrine remained essentially unchanged.

9. Change in official article which aimed for general independence of social formations (eg., 1953).

10. Subsequently, surprise factors to primary factors. Surprise is now admitted that backgrounder had broken constant factors and gives them a different name. Again, it is not clear how these should be treated.

11. 6 new principles (1) Soviet military doctrine; (2) Rejection of surprise factor; (3) Stress on science; (4) Realization that most will be almost impossible; (5) Use of distance for dispersion and defense; (6) Rep. for war not only by striking
and simultaneous + repeated tactical atomic blasts
Symington Hearings: p. 13 Smith viewed that Soviet troops...
promises most nearly as great as in Roosevelt...
Strategic Doctrine

Wilson Statement on Defense Policy: 10 aspects: 1. Preserve military
offensive capabilities 2. Evaluate our development 3. Establish proportion between def-+
ence and economic goals 4. Reserve programs 5. Retention + Utilization + Training + Reserve + Protection + Stressed growth + air power not only numerically but
in terms of weapons per plane.

SA is primary statement backed by world air + sea navy

Sustrors try to draw from Raffard admission that he felt it is infl-
fluenced by Humphrey's view on budget ceiling. This is itself a moral
2. C. had cult of respect again.

p. 9 Wilson's X + 1. Purpose of our country is to differ war. Seems to
simply that good thing will happen to thee because armaments
will be destroyed. Never to talk in liberalizing Soviet regime.

Stockwell 205 +. Huge force doctrine is supremacy of air nuclear
power. Importance of surprise attack.
210. If enemy strike in RVFA will no enforceable U. S. interest and demand retaliation if SAC is well prepared! Ascend pt. USSR side striking
2 can get air defense ready
213 - if we can increase target area Soviets must hit to avoid retaliating, we may decrease chance of Soviet attack.
217 Plus for simplicity in aircraft construction, holding 1000 lbs. in weight equivalent to doubling effective weight because body régime
susceptible combinations etc.
218 also for full interchangeability of parts.

1. quote - hand: cannot and concentrate or maintain on 20 - 2 kinds of limitations: P. Y. balancing war plans as for limited state, attacked, or involved in war? disposed to a situation. RC need not be limited
2. They feel policy of aggression may find himself in a situation. RC not want.
3. In Korea both sides taken chances, because zero sum game?
4. After situation changed in progress. Needed. Whether change in
pursuit will be acceptable. Without any prospective plan.
Who Cares...

if all you get are the crumbs?
Who cares about you, City Dweller?

Not the farmer from Tioga County or the townsmen of Canandaigua. Even though there aren't as many of them as there are of us, they control the State Legislature. As a result, our city gets a raw deal.

We pay more taxes but we don't get our share back in State aid. Some things we don't get back at all, such as our portion of automobile registration fees and gasoline taxes. Upstate counties get State aid for highways but our city which is five counties gets nothing for its streets.

Our present Assemblyman won't fight for us. He votes with his fellow-Republicans—they vote for Tioga County and Canandaigua.

This year vote for one who cares about your city. Vote for Mary deGroat Reed on the Democratic or Liberal line.
and who cares
where and
how you live?

All of us worry about the ceiling over our heads. For most of us it’s a rent ceiling—controls are due to expire next June. As long as rentals tend to the absurd, controls must be continued.

For many others the problem is a real ceiling. Joe Smith’s family, for example, has been split up. The building on 71st Street, in which he was born, is coming down. His children are farmed out in Jersey. He and his wife are staying with friends until they can “find something.” His parents have gone to the Bronx, far from family, friends and church.

Joe’s income is a little too high for public housing, much too low for the 19-story luxury apartment replacing his old home. The Joe Smiths are our “displaced persons”—there is no middle-income housing for the uprooted of our district.

Our Republican-controlled Legislature only half-cares. The Democrats asked for $200 million to help house our middle-income families—the Republicans allowed us $100 million. It’s only half a loaf but it’s better than none. Vote “yes” in November for the Proposition.

And then vote to keep the family together, a fair “ceiling” over your head and our neighborhood a real neighborhood. Vote Row B or C. Vote for Mary deGroat Reed.
Who cares about your family?

The city has lots of unusual problems which aren't important in rural areas like Oneida or Oswego.

Ellen Moynihan, who lives in the Sixties, is a widow with two small children. She is on relief. She could support her family if someone could take care of her children in working hours. Her only solution is a Day-Care Center. But the nearest one is many blocks away and filled to capacity.

Self-support is wiser, healthier and cheaper than relief rolls. The State helps pay Mrs. Moynihan's relief but your Assemblyman and 87 other Republicans voted against State aid for Day-Care Centers which would have made Mrs. Moynihan and thousands like her self-supporting. Problems like these aren't important to upstate communities and 88 Republican Assemblymen.

Vote for one who knows these problems are important—vote for Mary deGroat Reed.
...or your security?

Mary Kennedy has no unemployment insurance, no workmen’s compensation, no off-the-job sickness benefits. She is the only employee in a small business firm.

Martha Kranick has none of these rights either. She works for a large non-profit organization.

Joe Novelli and Tom Rogers, who work side by side in a machine shop, have all these rights. Tom manages to get along if he is sick or hurt or out of a job—he’s a bachelor. Joe suffers badly—he gets the same amount as Tom but he has a wife and three children.

These are examples of unfair discrimination in our labor laws. Our lawmakers must recognize that all workers need basic security and families need protection. Your Assemblyman and 87 other Republicans voted against these improvements. All Democrats voted for them. Who do you think cares?
...and who cares if your bones creak?

Mr. and Mrs. Wilson are not happy. After a lifetime of work Mr. Wilson was retired at 65. It is nice not to have to go to work but he has nothing to do. Mrs. Wilson isn’t in good health. The four flights of stairs make her ache and puff—so she seldom goes out. With illness and idleness, the Wilsons’ savings get smaller and smaller. Life has lost its spark.

If they could get a small apartment without steps—if Mr. Wilson could find a light job or learn a quiet skill—if there were a clinic for the complaints of age as there are for those of childhood—if there were a club or center where the Wilsons could “get out of themselves”—any of these would make life bearable.

All of these are Democratic hopes and aims for our elderly citizens—a useful, fruitful, happy life until the end.

For this the Republican-controlled Legislature of 1956 voted a pittance instead of a portion. Vote for a full portion.

Vote for Mary deGroat Reed.
Choice of the Democratic and Liberal Parties for New York State Assembly from the 8th Assembly District. . . . Mary Reed received A.B. and M.A. degrees from Wells College and had three years of graduate work at the Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland. She is married and the mother of two daughters—Noni, 9, Julia, 7—and, as such, is acutely conscious of the weaknesses and needs of our schools, their plants and administration. She worked in labor, health and social welfare with the State Department, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the International Labor Organization, where she learned that national and international problems have their counterparts, and often their roots, in the community and that the local neighborhood is the place to start solving them. She put the lesson into practice in 1952 and helped organize the New Democratic Club in the 8th A.D. South. She is now the elected Democratic "Leader Female" of that District and a spirited advocate of reforms in our system of registration and voting which will give you a truer voice in your government. . . . When Mary Reed ran for the Assembly in 1954, the Citizens Union said: "Few candidacies have so much to offer to the intelligent voter."