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China Takes Off
Confident Diplomacy  Booming Economy
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M. Taylor Fravel  Lyric Hughes Hale

Japan’s New Nationalism
EUGENE MATTHEWS

Hezbollah’s Threat
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Flashback: “The Present Situation in Germany”  
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U.S. troops on conquered territory, infrastructure in ruins, international squabbling over reconstruction: a window onto occupied Germany seven months after V-E Day, when progress was still unsteady and Europe's future hung in the balance.

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China has achieved stunning economic progress since the 1970s, thanks to aggressive liberalization, a commitment to exporting high-tech goods, and a massive injection of foreign investment. Although this unprecedented success is understandably unnerving to China’s neighbors and trading partners, it should not be cause for worry; China, the United States, and the rest of the world still have lots of business to do.

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The radical Lebanese Shi’ite movement Hezbollah is fomenting violence in post-war Iraq and fanning the flames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its bloody track record makes it a natural target in the war on terror. But Washington’s only option is to confront Hezbollah indirectly: by getting its backers, Syria and Iran, to help change its focus from militancy to politics.

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During the Cold War, the ever-present Soviet threat helped keep the West united. More recently, however, attempts to mend the transatlantic rift by pointing to present dangers have only deepened the cultural divide. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must accept that “the West” has now split into European and American halves. But both sides still need each other—now more than ever.

Japan’s New Nationalism  *Eugene A. Matthews*  74

Ever since World War II, the slightest sign of nationalism in Japan has been widely denounced, at home and abroad. Recently, however, discussions that were once taboo—including whether to rearm or even develop nuclear weapons—have moved into the Japanese mainstream. Yet the country’s critics need not be alarmed; a little healthy nationalism may be just what Japan, with its faltering economy, needs most.

America’s Imperial Dilemma  *Dimitri K. Simes*  91

The United States increasingly looks, walks, and talks like an empire. It should therefore heed the lessons of its predecessors, exercising strong and determined global leadership. At the same time, it must avoid the temptation to meddle when American interests are not at stake. This means, among other things, dropping the doctrine of universal democracy promotion.

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The emerging global market in natural gas has the potential to meet rising demand for electricity worldwide. The United States’ own gas supplies are dwindling, but elsewhere vast, unexploited resources are becoming ever more accessible now that gas can be liquefied, shipped, and used efficiently. New energy linkages will create new risks, but none that cannot be managed through proper diversification.

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Clinton's Strong Defense Legacy  Michael O'Hanlon  126
Conventional wisdom holds that Bill Clinton presided over a disastrous downsizing of the U.S. military. But this claim is wrong. In fact, Clinton's Pentagon maintained high levels of readiness and enacted a bold military modernization program that bore fruit in Bosnia and Kosovo—and in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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The Other 9/11  Kenneth Maxwell  147
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The Other 9/11
The United States and Chile, 1973

Kenneth Maxwell


There are two types of what Theodore Draper called "present history." The first is based on documents and testimony accessible to all historians: assertions and interpretations can be checked, verified, and contested on the basis of fact rather than speculation. Both Draper and, in his own way, I. F. Stone were brilliant practitioners of this kind of history and demonstrated that, despite the best (or worst) intentions of bureaucrats to hide or distort the record, much could be found in the public domain if diligently sought after. The second approach to writing about contemporary history is based on anonymous "sources" and self-interested "leaks." Here, much depends on the credibility of the authors; but in the right political climate, such writing can be powerful enough to bring down a president, as it did with Watergate. And over the past two decades, heavily redacted, "secret" government documents released under the Freedom of Information Act have been added to its menu.

Both approaches have their weaknesses, and neither is as new as might first appear. The Draper method—by abjuring the fragments exhumed from a government's dark places—risks underestimating the role of the clandestine actions that were often at the center of the ideological and geostrategic struggles of the Cold War. History by self-interested leaking of documents or the use of anonymous sources, however, tends to produce narratives that are self-justifying, on the one hand, or

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Kenneth Maxwell

indictments, on the other, and to exaggerate the importance of covert operations. Again, there is a long history of both genres: Winston Churchill the historian was a master over many volumes at preempting the assessment of Winston Churchill the statesman, and Henry Kissinger is doing what Churchill did for his own epoch and his own historical place within it by releasing weighty tomes on his White House years and other topics.

But, as Isaac Newton taught us, actions produce reactions. So it is entirely within the established pattern that 30 years after the Yom Kippur War and the bloody coup in Chile—at just the moment when Kissinger himself publishes a book about his unquestionable diplomatic skill in confronting grave crises in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, grand stages where issues of war and peace and nuclear confrontation were handled—Kissinger’s critics have revived the case against him over U.S. actions in Chile on his watch, doggedly seeking out forensic linkages to establish his role, as national security adviser, and that of his president, Richard Nixon, in undermining and engineering the overthrow of a democratically elected socialist president, Salvador Allende. Peter Kornbluh, in his troubling dossier, sets out to piece together this less elevated story.

THE CASE AGAINST KISSINGER

The crux of the case made against Kissinger rests on three events in particular: the assassination of Chile’s chief of staff, General René Schneider, in 1970; the extent of U.S. complicity and active involvement in the September 11, 1973, coup against Allende; and the assassination in Washington, D.C., of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean foreign minister, in 1976. The first and last cases, according to the record Kornbluh has uncovered, have odd similarities. Schneider’s elimination three years before the coup was regarded as essential by the Nixon administration, since Schneider was a strict constitutionalist and therefore an obstacle to U.S. efforts to promote a military intervention before Allende could take office. The general was killed in a kidnapping attempt that the United States knew about, approved of, and had even assisted in planning. A week before the kidnapping was to take place, however, Kissinger discouraged the plot. As he told Nixon at the time, he had “turned it off.”

The killing of Schneider, it seems fair to say, was not what the Americans wanted (although the CIA had warned of such an outcome), but was, as the saying now goes, “collateral damage.” The planned assassination of Pinochet’s critics living abroad under Operation Condor—an international state-sponsored terror network set up by the Pinochet regime (in consort with Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and, later, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador) to track and eliminate opponents—was also known to U.S. intelligence operatives and reported to the White House. Policymakers even knew that a Chilean assassination team had been planning to enter the United States. Kissinger intervened a month before the killing of Letelier, ordering that the Latin American rulers involved be informed that the “assassination of subversives, politicians and prominent figures both within the national borders of certain Southern Cone countries and abroad ... would create a most serious moral and political problem.” This démarche was apparently not delivered: the U.S. embassy
in Santiago demurred on the ground that to deliver such a strong rebuke would upset the dictator. The U.S. ambassador to Chile, David Popper, wrote to Washington, “In my judgement, given Pinochet’s sensitivity regarding pressures by the USG [U.S. government], he might well take as an insult any inference that he was connected with such assassination plots.” On September 20, 1976, the State Department instructed the ambassadors “to take no further action” with regard to the Condor scheme. Letelier and his American assistant, Ronni Moffitt, were killed the following morning.

As for the coup itself, there is no doubt that the United States did all that it could to create the conditions for the failure of Allende and his government. But, as in most such cases, it was the locals who made the coup itself. And although the United States did little to reign in Pinochet thereafter and certainly, as these documents make clear, knew much more about the atrocities committed in Chile than was admitted to at the time or later, the causes of the violence in Chilean society are to be found more in Chilean circumstances than in the intent of manipulators in Washington. What is truly remarkable is the effort—the resources committed, the risks taken, and the skullduggery employed—to bring a Latin American democracy down, and the meager efforts since to build democracy back up. Left to their own devices, the Chileans might just have found the good sense to resolve their own deep-seated problems. Allende might have fallen by his own weight, victim of his own incompetence, and not become a tragic martyr to a lost cause.

Kornbluh, who has put together several collections of declassified documents on key U.S. foreign policy crises, led the campaign...
to declassify more than 25,000 closely held records on U.S.-Chilean relations through the National Security Archives, a nonprofit nongovernmental organization that he helped establish with the support of several U.S. foundations. This effort, he says, is part of an ongoing international campaign "to hold Pinochet and his military responsible for the murder, torture and terrorism committed during his regime."

These are, of course, just matters of historical curiosity. Pinochet, after all, was held under house arrest in London in 1998 under just such charges filed by the Spanish investigating judge Baltasar Garzón. In fact, the release of the documents in this book resulted from that watershed event, a high point in the campaign by human rights activists and victims' families to hold repressive leaders responsible for their actions. Now, lawsuits are pending or threatened against Kissinger himself for complicity or foreknowledge of the plots that led to the assassination of Schneider in Santiago in 1970 and, closer to home, the shocking car bombing in 1976 that killed Letelier and Moffitt 14 blocks from the White House.

Kornbluh's bill of particulars and the supporting documents he has uncovered confirm the deep involvement of the U.S. intelligence services in Chile prior to and after the coup. In outline, this story has been known for many years and will be no surprise to Chileans. The extent of the involvement was originally hinted at during the Senate hearings conducted by the late Frank Church in the mid-1970s. The scope and nature of these clandestine activities are significantly amplified by the documents released in the extensive declassification ordered by President Bill Clinton in 1999 and 2000 and reprinted in Kornbluh's book. These documents include: transcripts of top-secret discussions among President Nixon, Kissinger, and other cabinet members on how "to bring Allende down"; minutes of secret meetings chaired by Kissinger to plan covert operations in Chile; new documentation of the notorious case of Charles Horman, an American murdered by the Chilean military and subject of the movie Missing; comprehensive documentation of the Letelier case and the extensive CIA, National Security Council, and State Department reports surrounding it; and U.S. intelligence reporting on Operation Condor. All these sources, however, are extensively redacted—that is, sensitive parts of them, especially those from the CIA, have been blacked out.

WHAT THE BOSS WANTED

Kissinger's response to Kornbluh's charges will undoubtedly be twofold. On the general level, he will argue that Chile and its problems were marginal to the larger concerns the Nixon administration was facing in the Middle East and South Vietnam, not to mention Watergate: Nixon and his would-be Metternich were fully engaged elsewhere with "big" events. On the narrow, legalistic level, the claim will be that the dots in the Schneider and Letelier cases cannot be joined because of the undelivered démarche, in the case of Letelier, and Kissinger's counterorder, in the case of Schneider. These are arguments best left to lawyers, not historians. On the question of the impact of "larger" concerns, however, there is one inconvenient detail: chronology. War broke out in the Middle East on October 6, 1973, almost a month after the overthrow of Allende on September 11. As late as October 5, as
Kissinger points out in his new book, *Crisis*, the CIA had reported to Nixon: "The military preparations that have occurred do not indicate that any party intends to initiate hostilities." So it can hardly be argued that Allende's downfall came as a surprise to policymakers in Washington because their attention at that particular moment was focused elsewhere.

On Kornbluh's side, what is lacking in the forensic approach (and it is a weakness of much writing on U.S. diplomatic history) is location in time and space. We see only the U.S. side of a story that is at least two-sided, if not multifaceted. The pursuit of declassified documents tends to exaggerate this tendency, so that intramural bureaucratic paperwork takes on a life of its own. Very little of the complex political and social history of Chile in the 1970s enters here; nor do we see the roles of many other actors beyond the Chilean military, U.S. clandestine operatives, and their political masters. Chilean society was at the time highly mobilized on the left as well as the right. All the Chilean political parties—from Communist to Christian Democrat—received and welcomed outside support, much of it clandestine. The Soviets and the Cubans had their own involvements, and the international left held Chile as a potential model. So it was not only Nixon and Kissinger who looked into the Chilean mirror and saw what they wanted to see; others did too, and from different angles.

If anything, both sides were guilty of knee-jerk reactions prompted by Cold War phobias. U.S. methodology in Chile was not that different from the tactics used to remove regimes from Guatemala City to Tehran deemed dangerous to the geopolitical status quo. Kissinger defenders may be right in asserting that this was not high on his agenda. But the outcome might have been better if he had paid greater attention to the details instead of leaving them to "old hands." In the end, what have persisted through the decades to haunt him are the "marginal" cases: Timor, Angola, and Chile; the old triumphs against the Soviet Union are barely remembered by a generation for whom the days of Cold War threats are long gone.

But what is very clear in all of this is that the coup in Chile is exactly what Kissinger's boss wanted. As Nixon put it in his ineffable style, "It's that son of a bitch Allende. We're going to smash him." As early as October of 1970, the CIA had warned of possible consequences: "you have asked us to provoke chaos in Chile. ... We provide you with a formula for chaos which is unlikely to be bloodless. To dissimulate the U.S. involvement will be clearly impossible." The Pinochet dictatorship lasted 17 long and brutal years. According to the Chilean Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, its victims numbered 3,197. Thirty years after its initiation, the coup of 1973 remains deeply etched in collective memory. It is unlikely that this book will be the end of the story.
Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal
G. John Ikenberry


The United States has Fukuyama, Huntington, and Kagan as its prophets of the coming world order. Who does Europe have? The answer is Robert Cooper, a former adviser to Tony Blair and an EU diplomat. This small book of essays offers a sweeping interpretation of today’s global predicament. Cooper argues that two revolutionary forces are transforming international relations: the breakdown of state control over violence, reflected in the growing ability of tiny private groups to wield weapons of mass destruction, and the rise of a stable, peaceful order in Europe that is not based on either the balance of power or the sovereignty of independent states. In this scheme, the Westphalian system of nation-states and power politics is being undermined on both sides—by a postmodern Europe and a premodern world of failed states and post-imperial chaos.

Cooper makes a good case that the growing threat of terrorism necessitates new forms of cooperation and a reconstructed international order that goes beyond the balance of power or hegemony. Stable order in the new age must be built on legitimate authority and more inclusive political identities. But apart from these postmodern urgings, Cooper’s vision remains sketchy.

Cooper is most interesting in his explorations of how the West should cope with the encroachment of premodern violence. The American approach to such threats is hegemonic—to control, through military force if necessary, the foreign policies of threatening states. The European community, meanwhile, aims to expand outward to absorb threatening societies on its periphery. In Cooper’s view, neither approach is sustainable, and he seeks a synthesis that would allow the United States and Europe to confront threats together over the long haul. The defensive interventionism displayed in the West’s response to Afghanistan is one model, and the U.N. protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo is another. Cooper’s provocative call for a new Western imperialism that is compatible with human rights and cosmopolitan values is fraught with unexamined peril but worthy of serious debate.
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Comments

Fixing the Mix  Lawrence J. Korb  2
The battlefield victory in Iraq obscured what the occupation has since made clear: the U.S. military's personnel system—especially the size of its active-duty Army and the number of crucial units kept in the reserves—desperately needs updating.

The Ties That Bind  Shibley Telhami  8
The war on terror has bound Israel and the United States closer together. But it has also deepened the rift between them and Arab and Muslim countries that rally behind the Palestinians. Peace in the Middle East has never seemed more elusive.

A Rose Among Thorns  Charles King  13
Georgia’s recent, peaceful revolution might allow the country to become a beacon of hope for a troubled region. For that to happen, however, its new leaders must find a way to deal with local secessionists, as well as with Moscow and Washington.

Essays

A Normal Country  Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman  20
Conventional wisdom in the West says that post–Cold War Russia has been a disastrous failure. The facts say otherwise. Aspects of Russia’s performance over the last decade may have been disappointing, but the notion that the country has gone through an economic cataclysm and political relapse is wrong—more a comment on overblown expectations than on Russia’s actual experience. Compared to other countries at a similar level of economic and political development, Russia looks more the norm than the exception.
Trouble in Taiwan  Michael D. Swaine  
George W. Bush was right to rebuke Taiwan’s president over his plans for a referendum on relations with China. Administration critics assume that democracy and independence are inseparable, that the “one China” principle is no longer useful, and that China would never go to war over Taiwan. But they are wrong on all three counts and fail to appreciate the dangers that may lie ahead.

How to Build a Fence  David Makovsky  
Israelis and Palestinians must be separated for the Middle East to achieve some semblance of peace. At this point, that will take a fence. The good news is that Israel is already building a sensible barrier. The bad news is that the Sharon government may construct it in a way that spurs future conflict rather than ends it. The United States thus needs to step in to make sure that the right kind of fence gets built, in the right place—or else both sides will face more fighting in the future.

America’s Crisis of Legitimacy  Robert Kagan  
Europeans accuse the United States of acting like a bully: aggressive, self-interested, and disrespectful of rules. That charge is hypocritical. Still, it must be taken seriously, for as a liberal democracy with a global vision, the United States needs the approval of other nations that share its ideals. The American project is in Europe’s interest, too—whether the Europeans understand that or not.

Foreign Economic Policy for the Next President  C. Fred Bergsten  
Even in a time of terrorism and war, no successful foreign policy can neglect the global economy. The next U.S. administration will therefore need to balance the country’s books, liberalize trade, and reduce its reliance on foreign energy. Above all, Washington must shore up domestic and foreign support for globalization, so that it can continue to benefit the United States and the rest of the world.

The Rise of the Shadow Warriors  Jennifer D. Kibbe  
U.S. special forces are enjoying unprecedented fame—and not just thanks to their exploits in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wants to use them for secret antiterror missions around the globe. But that could endanger all Americans in uniform and let the Pentagon run covert operations without proper oversight. Congress must ensure that someone guards the guardians.

The True Worth of Air Power  Robert A. Pape  
Precision air weapons have revolutionized modern warfare, but not by making it easier to kill enemy leaders. Decapitation alone still doesn’t work; wars are still won by pummeling troops in the field. The new weaponry makes it easier to hammer the enemy’s forces from the air—but only when they are kept in place by ground forces.

Smart Power  Suzanne Nossel  
The Bush administration has hijacked a once-proud progressive doctrine—liberal internationalism—to justify muscle-flexing militarism and arrogant unilateralism. Progressives must reclaim the legacy of Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy with a foreign policy that will both bolster U.S. power and unite the world behind it.
Reviews & Responses

Illusions of Empire  G. John Ikenberry

From Washington to Baghdad, the debate over American empire is back. Five new books weigh in, some celebrating the imperial project as the last best hope of humankind, others attacking it as cause for worry. What they all fail to understand is that U.S. power is neither as great as most claim nor as dangerous as others fear.

Recent Books on International Relations

Including Walter Russell Mead on Zbigniew Brzezinski; L. Carl Brown on Henry Kissinger; and Kenneth Maxwell on Opening Mexico.

Letters to the Editor

Peter Samson on unhelpful giving; Richard Marshall on diplomacy in East Asia; and others.

Lurie's Foreign Affairs
As Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel elucidate in the same issue of *Foreign Affairs* ("China’s New Diplomacy"), China is developing a more sophisticated foreign policy. Beijing may, in fact, recognize that Tokyo’s approach to its modern security interests makes sense, given Japan’s global stature and the growing threat to the region posed by North Korea. China may also realize that, although Japan appears to be slightly more comfortable with a greater military role, its electorate is unlikely to allow the fiercely nationalistic Japanese soldier to reappear any time soon.

**RICHARD MARSHALL**  
Honolulu, Hawaii

**ATTITUDE ADJUSTMENT**  
*To the Editor:*  
In "Clinton’s Strong Defense Legacy" (November/December 2003), Michael O'Hanlon acknowledges that U.S. military morale suffered during the Clinton presidency, but he does not fully explain why. Perhaps it was because of fundamental opposition to nation-building and peacekeeping among the Pentagon leadership. These criticisms harked back to the Vietnam War and to the “Weinberger Doctrine,” outlined in 1984, which argued against nonessential military intervention. Colin Powell, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, carried the anti-intervention argument forward in the early 1990s, even getting into a public spat with former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher over whether to intervene in the Balkans. In the late 1990s, General Wesley Clark was fired by the Pentagon leadership for arguing too passionately for U.S. involvement in Kosovo.

Such attitudes had a direct effect on military morale, because soldiers were told by their leaders that peacekeeping missions such as Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans were wrongheaded and would erode the military’s war-fighting capabilities. Given this explanation, it is no wonder that troops in the Balkans felt misused and overworked.

The Pentagon’s recent attempt to close the Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks suggests that the Army is not getting any more serious about low-intensity missions, such as counterinsurgency and peacekeeping. In Iraq, meanwhile, we are again witnessing the negative effects on morale when soldiers do not support an operation. A change of attitude is desperately needed.

**ALFRED R. BARR**  
Washington, D.C.

**CRISIS PREVENTION**  
*To the Editor:*  
Kenneth Maxwell’s bias is clear in his reply to my criticism of his review of *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* ("Fleeing the Chilean Coup," January/February 2004). He finds a “cruel coincidence” between a September 20, 1976, State Department cable and Orlando Letelier’s murder at the hands of Chilean intelligence agents the very next day. This “cruel coincidence” leads Maxwell to conclude that “this was a tragedy that might have been prevented.” By whom, one might ask? Who does he think could have “prevented” Letelier’s killing? Secretary of State Henry Kissinger? Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman? Me? The implication is outrageous, and the facts are otherwise. Maxwell misreads the cable: it was not an instruction to ambassadors in the field, but a cable from Shlaudeman, then in Costa Rica,
to the State Department in Washington. And it had no consequence. The State Department sent no instruction to the field implementing it. Even if it had passed Shlaudeman's message on to Santiago, it could not conceivably have "prevented" the murder. The bomb was already strapped to Letelier's car.

Furthermore, Shlaudeman counseled "no further action," thus suggesting—the message to which he was responding is nowhere to be found—that the embassy in Santiago had already carried out Kissinger's order to warn the Chileans about political assassinations. And finally, the notion that an assistant secretary of state—particularly one as distinguished and responsible as Shlaudeman—would have had the temerity to countermand a direct, personal instruction from Kissinger, and to do it behind his back (Kissinger and I were in Africa trying to end the role of the white regime in Rhodesia) bespeaks no sense of Kissinger's stewardship at the State Department. Such are the absurdities of this myth—but they are absurdities that strike at the heart of character and reputation.

I was assistant secretary of state from 1974 to 1976. Late 1976 was the time of the Letelier murder and Operation Condor. Kissinger brought me into the State Department aware of my background in human rights and civil liberties. So I found Maxwell's reference to the existence of Operation Condor on my watch gratuitous. I would like to assume that he did not mean to imply that I was therefore somehow responsible for Condor or that the United States was complicit in that appalling program. But the bias and distortions in Maxwell's reply to my critique of his book review do not give me great comfort in that quarter. One would hope at least that Maxwell's views are understood to be his own and not those of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he is a senior fellow.

WILLIAM D. ROGERS
Retired Senior Partner of a Washington, D.C., law firm and Vice Chair of Kissinger Associates, Inc.