The Academy also encourages diplomatic study and writing at the collegiate level. In 2000, the Academy began, in collaboration with the School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, an essay contest on American diplomatic practice for college seniors planning graduate studies in that field at SAIS, the prize being a tuition grant funded by Philip Merrill, publisher of Washingtonian magazine.

In 2002, the Academy began the Leonard Marks Foundation Essay Contest Award for Creative Writing on American Foreign Policy. The award is limited to International Affairs degree candidates in the fall semester at member schools of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA).

In 2004, the Academy began a two-year program whose aim is to enhance public understanding of US foreign policy objectives, focusing on the opportunities provided by diplomacy as well as its limitations. The program includes lectures, seminars, panels, town hall discussions and papers focused on specific issues as well as commentaries to assist the American public to better understand the difficult road it is likely to have to traverse in the years ahead. The program is funded by the Honorable Hushang Ansary, a former Iranian diplomat and now an active philanthropist of Houston, Texas.

AWARDS

The Academy hosts an annual awards luncheon to recognize exemplary contributions in the field of Diplomacy. The 2004 recipient of the "Leonore and Walter Annenberg Excellence in Diplomacy Award" was former Undersecretary of State Joseph J. Sisco. Previous award recipients have included: Senator John C. Danforth (FRMR) Secretary of State Colin L. Powell UN Secretary General Kofi Annan Senators Richard Lugar & Sam Nunn Ambassador Stuart E. Eisenstat Senator George Mitchell Ambassador George F. Kennan Ambassador Dennis Ross Ambassador Richard Holbrooke

Since 1995, the Academy has awarded an annual prize for a book of distinction on the practice of American diplomacy. The Academy sees this prize as a way to stimulate further academic research on the way American diplomacy is conducted and will also deepen public understanding of the critical need for excellence in our diplomacy. The 2004 prize went to Richard P. Parker for his work entitled Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History, published by the University Press of Florida, Gainesville.

In 2004, the Academy presented its third Arthur Ross Award for Distinguished Reporting and Analysis on Foreign Affairs to Robin Wright, diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Post.

FUNDING

The activities of the Academy have been supported by grants from the Leonore and Walter Annenberg Foundation, the Una Chapman Cox Foundation, the Delavan Foundation, the Arthur Ross Foundation, the Dillon Fund, the Starr Foundation, the Marks Foundation, the Marshall B. Coyne Foundation, Diplomatic & Consular Officers Retired (DACOR), Friends of the Academy and corporate contributions. For its operating expenses it benefits from dues and other contributions from a strong and committed membership.

The Academy is a 501(c)(3), tax-exempt organization and donations to its work are tax deductible.
INTRODUCTION

The American Academy of Diplomacy is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, elected organization, whose active membership is limited to men and women who have held positions of major responsibility in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy. They believe that diplomacy, bulwarked by America's military and economic strength, plays an indispensable role in the promotion of U.S. interests abroad and that it is therefore critically important that the highest possible standards distinguish our diplomacy in practice.

ORIGINS

The Academy was founded in 1983 by Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker and U. Alexis Johnson who, together with Elliot Richardson and John J. McCloy, met to explore ways in which persons who in their careers served the United States as chiefs of mission in major foreign policy positions in Washington. Its members include all living former Secretaries of State, several former Secretaries of Defense, Directors of CIA, National Security Advisors and Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees.

Elections are held annually among current members to fill vacancies in the membership.

OBJECTIVES

The over-riding concern underlying each and every activity of the Academy is its belief that the quality of American diplomacy is vital to its effectiveness, whether the practitioner comes from the career service or the political domain. That concern is evident in its original articles of incorporation:

- To foster high standards of qualification for, and performance in, the conduct of diplomacy and the foreign service of the United States
- To increase public understanding and appreciation of the contributions of diplomacy to the national interests of the United States
- To study and, as appropriate, to disseminate findings and recommendations with regard to the conduct and content of American foreign policy, and
- To encourage the strengthening and improvement of American diplomatic representation abroad.

The Academy also has an interest in pressing for adequate financial and other support for the foreign affairs activities of the United States Government and in preserving and enhancing the professional qualifications and career attractiveness of the American Foreign Service.

The Academy maintains a close relationship with the Department of State and with other organizations with similar goals and objectives. These include, among others, the Una Chapman Cox Foundation, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired, the American Foreign Service Association and the Council of American Ambassadors. They coordinate their activities through an informal group called the Foreign Affairs Council.

MEMBERSHIP

The Academy’s members are chosen from among persons who in their careers served the United States as chiefs of mission in major embassies abroad or in equivalent high-level foreign policy positions in Washington. Its members to provide the Committee a commentary on the qualifications of those nominated by the Committee. The Academy no longer, however, provides the Committee with commentary on the qualifications of those nominated by the President as ambassadors, both career and non-career.

Today the Academy continues to maintain contact with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Academy no longer, however, provides the Committee with commentary on ambassadorial nominees, except in those instances where its Board of Directors concludes that the nominee clearly lacks any demonstrable qualifications for the responsibilities he or she will be required to undertake as ambassador.

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PROGRAMS

The Academy’s Board of Directors, meeting three times annually, and by means of a number of committees, oversees programs that focus primarily on the practice of diplomacy. The Academy regards its programs as a contribution to continuing public discussion and understanding in the fields of foreign affairs and diplomacy.

The Academy holds an annual meeting of its members, usually on Capitol Hill, with a member of Congress as guest and speaker. Its members also meet monthly in informal luncheon seminars with invited guests to discuss issues of topical interest in American foreign policy and practice.

Over the years, the Academy has conducted panels and seminars on the tasks confronting diplomacy. Recently it worked with the Business Council for International Understanding (BCIU) to conduct a conference on "Commercial Diplomacy" at the Boeing Company. Its end product was a book published in 2004 titled Commercial Diplomacy and the National Interest, written by Harry Kopp.

The Academy in 2002 worked with the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University to complete a study on building and maintaining international coalitions. The Academy also has a tradition of co-sponsoring programs exploring different international and diplomatic issues with the World Affairs Councils of America and other Washington, DC cultural and educational entities.

In April of 2000, the Academy published its first book, First Line of Defense: Ambassadors, Embassies and American Interests Abroad, with wide distribution throughout the foreign affairs community. It also distributes a quarterly newsletter.

The Academy on occasion issues brief statements to highlight its interest and concern about the practice of diplomacy. Topics have included America’s role in the world, directed at public uncertainty on that role in a changed, post-Cold War world; the American Foreign Service, to convey the Academy’s belief that a well trained cadre of professionals is critical for the practice of American diplomacy; and another on resources for the conduct of American diplomacy.
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JOSEPH J. SISCO
Dr. Sisco was Board chairman of the American Academy of Diplomacy. He was a senior partner with Sisco Associates, an international consulting firm specializing in political and economic risk analysis and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1976 to 1981 he was president of The American University. Earlier, Dr. Sisco held senior foreign policy positions in the Ford, Nixon, Johnson and Kennedy Administrations, including Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs and Director of UN Political Affairs. Dr. Sisco began his career with the CIA in 1950 and transferred to the Department of State in 1951. He received the Department’s Superior Service Award, a National Civil Service League Service Award, the Rockefeller Public Service Award and the AMVETS Peace Award for Middle East Negotiations. Dr. Sisco held a BA, magna cum laude from Knox College and a MA and Ph.D from the University of Chicago with a specialization in Soviet Affairs.

ROBIN WRIGHT
Robin Wright has covered the waterfront, in a career that has seen her reporting from more than 120 countries on six continents. Her foreign tours have included five years in the Middle East, two years in Europe, seven years in Africa and several years as a roving correspondent. She is currently the diplomatic correspondent with the Washington Post and has just returned from a trip to Tehran and travel with Secretary Powell in Latin America. She holds the Overseas Press Club Award for Angolan reporting, the National Magazine Award for Iran reporting in the New Yorker and has received a MacArthur Foundation grant. She is the author of several books on militant Islam.

RICHARD B. PARKER
Ambassador Parker entered the Foreign Service in 1949 and during his career served as ambassador to Algeria, Lebanon and Morocco. Since retirement in 1980 he has been active in writing, teaching, editing, and lecturing in the field of foreign affairs. Among 6 other books he has written or edited is The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, 1993. He has taught at the University of Virginia, Lawrence University, and SAIS Johns Hopkins, and was editor of the Middle East Journal from 1981-87. He was the founding president of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, and was the John Adams Fulbright Fellow in London in 1990. He is currently a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute.

DENNIS ROSS
Ambassador Ross is Ziegler distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. For more than twelve years, Ambassador Ross played a leading role in shaping U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process and in dealing directly with the parties in negotiations. He was the country's point man on the peace process in both the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. He was instrumental in assisting Israelis and Palestinians in reaching the 1995 Interim Agreement; he also successfully brokered the Hebron Accord in 1997, facilitated the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty, and has intensively worked to bring Israel and Syria together. A graduate of UCLA, Ross served as director of the State Department’s Policy Planning office in the first Bush administration. He was awarded the Presidential Medal for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service by President Clinton. He has honorary doctorates from the Jewish Theological Seminary and Syracuse University.

HOWARD B. SCHAFFER
Ambassador Schaffer is Director of Studies and Deputy Director at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. He spent much of his 36-year career in the Foreign Service dealing with U.S. relations with South Asia. He served as ambassador to Bangladesh (1984-87), political counselor in India (1977-79) and Pakistan (1974-77), and was twice deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for South Asian affairs. Amb. Schaffer is also the author of Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War, published in 1993 and is now working on a book about the Kashmir dispute. Schaffer has a BA from Harvard College and has done graduate work at Columbia and Princeton.
Welcome

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Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs

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Diplomatic Correspondent, Washington Post
Presented by the Honorable R. Marcus Palmer

Presentation of
THE DOUGLAS DILLON AWARD
FOR A BOOK OF DISTINCTION ON THE PRACTICE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
To
RICHARD B. PARKER
For
Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History
University Press of Florida, Gainesville,
Presented by the Honorable Samuel W. Lewis

Special Recognition to
DENNIS ROSS
For
The Missing Peace:
The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace
And
HOWARD B. SCHAFFER
For
Ellsworth Bunker: Global Troubleshooter, Vietnam Hawk
University of North Carolina Press

Presentation of
THE WALTER AND LEONORE ANNENBERG AWARD
FOR EXCELLENCE IN DIPLOMACY
To
The late JOSEPH J. SISCO
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Accepted by Ms. Jane Sisco

Closing
ARTHUR HARTMAN
Acknowledgements

The Academy acknowledges with deep appreciation support from the following:

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AMERICAN DIPLOMACY FOR A CHANGING WORLD

A Report of a Special Task Force of the American Academy of Diplomacy

November 29, 2004
Washington, DC

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Task Force Co-Chairs
Kenneth W. Dam
James R. Jones

Project Coordinator
Anthony C. E. Quainton

November 29, 2004
Washington, DC

Promoting American Diplomacy since 1983
www.academyofdiplomacy.org
About the American Academy of Diplomacy

The American Academy of Diplomacy is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, elected society of men and women who have held positions of major responsibility in the formulation and implementation of American diplomacy. They believe that diplomacy plays an indispensable role in the promotion of American interests abroad and that it is therefore critically important that the highest possible standards of excellence distinguish our diplomacy in practice. The Academy’s activities focus on programs designed to help enhance the quality of American diplomacy and to build greater public understanding of the critical role played by diplomacy in America’s foreign policy process.

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FORWARD

In May of this year the American Academy of Diplomacy created a task force to look at the challenges facing American diplomacy in the 21st Century. We did not set out to analyze the many specific regional and functional issues which the next administration would face. Rather we looked at ways in which American diplomacy could be revitalized and strengthened to meet the very complex foreign policy agenda with which America must deal in the years ahead.

We are firmly convinced that for the United States to confront these new issues successfully and to project its message to a skeptical world with clarity and vigor, we will need professionals of the highest quality, familiar with the worlds of science, business and public affairs. Success will also require a reordering of priorities in the foreign affairs agencies, greater efforts to build constituencies at home and abroad for American policies and values, and a willingness to engage multinational institutions and rising powers with energy and imagination. Diplomacy and force, of course, go hand in hand. Diplomacy will be more effective when backed by quality intelligence and a military force structure that can credibly support our foreign policy objectives.

We have been supported throughout this effort by the Chairman of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Joseph J. Sisco, its Vice Chairman Arthur A. Hartman and its President L. Bruce Laingen, and many other distinguished Academy members whose names are listed in the annex to the report. We are enormously grateful for the time they have spent attending meetings, reviewing drafts and encouraging our efforts. We should also mention with gratitude the work of the task force’s rapporteur, Anthony Quainton, whose patient reworking of the drafts over these months has given us a product which is both elegant and thoughtful.

The recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Academy of Diplomacy but are the consensus conclusions of those consulted in the drafting process.

It is our hope that the Administration and the Congress will take steps to implement our recommendations which are designed to make our diplomacy an indispensable tool for advancing American interests around the world.

Kenneth W. Dam
Co-Chair

James R. Jones
Co-Chair

November 29, 2004
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new war against terrorism the dynamics of American foreign policy have changed dramatically. Although the United States has unparalleled power, it also finds itself in a position of paradoxical vulnerability. Against this background of change and uncertainty the exercise of American leadership will be critical. Diplomacy, as America’s first line of defense, will have a central role to play both with respect to the style as well as the substance of our foreign policy. American society is largely unprepared to support an active and engaged foreign policy or to deal with the emerging issues which confront the United States. This report analyzes seven critical challenges which our diplomacy must address if America is to be effective in promoting its national interests.

1. **Addressing the Threat of WMDs and Catastrophic Terrorism.** Preventing WMD proliferation must be the first priority of our foreign policy, as no issue poses a greater threat to our national security. Creating a robust capacity to deal with the potential consequences of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism is essential. The White House, as a matter of urgency, should convene a task force of military, foreign policy, scientific and business experts to develop appropriate recommendations for action.

2. **Reaffirming American Leadership.** Our policies should confirm America’s commitment to a viable international system. We must invest significant resources in public diplomacy and build the kind of bipartisan consensus that will give added credibility to our foreign policy.

3. **Refocusing America’s Message.** Although the United States throughout its history has made a unique commitment to the promotion of liberty and freedom, we have not always promoted just societies. As a result our image in much of the developing world, where institutionalized injustice is prevalent, has been impaired. A conscious effort should be made to develop and publicize activities which support social, political and economic justice.

4. **Building Support at Home and Abroad.** American foreign policy requires broad domestic support as well as publics around the world that better understand America, its institutions and values. America is falling short on both counts. Yet, exchange programs are in decline as is the study of international relations, foreign languages, and geography. To remedy this situation Congress should create a multi-billion dollar “Endowment for America” to fund exchange programs and to make selective grants to educational institutions in the United States to enhance the teaching of international relations and foreign languages.

5. **Promoting Equitable Economic Development.** The gap between rich and poor countries is of growing significance in a world where inequalities fuel hopelessness and terror. Failed states represent a grave threat to American national interests. Greater and more rapid economic growth throughout the world, driven by open markets and free trading systems, is essential. Growth and poverty reduction should become twin priorities for America’s economic engagement with the developing world. For that to
happen, the foreign affairs agencies must more actively recruit a cadre of professionals with appropriate skills. In addition, the United States should take the lead in insisting that poverty be reduced through more effective targeting of international aid to reach intended recipients at the grass roots.

6. **Addressing Evolving Global Scientific Issues.** In the last two decades the world has confronted a new generation of science-related problems. International scientific cooperation will be essential in addressing such 21st century subjects as terrorism and non-proliferation, global warming, space, ocean and atmospheric issues, biotechnology, natural disasters, desertification and the ominous threat of pandemics. Coordination of scientific issues within the government is inadequate and the cadre of scientifically knowledgeable diplomats in foreign affairs agencies is woefully lacking. The President's Science Advisor should be given explicit authority to coordinate international science policy. The State Department should have a formal mandate to manage international science negotiations and should make an aggressive effort to recruit officers with the ability to understand sophisticated scientific issues and methodology.

7. **Managing Relations with China, India and Other Rising Powers.** Relations between the United States and major regional powers are increasingly challenging. China and India, with almost half the world’s population, are of special concern. Rising powers such as Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa require special strategies within our overall foreign policy. The President should instruct all foreign affairs agencies to develop appropriate long-term policy options and to recruit sufficiently qualified staff with appropriate area skills to manage relations with these emerging powers.

Since the end of the Cold War it has become increasingly clear that both the style and substance of American foreign policy need to evolve. We must build support for America's core values and project those values with vigor and imagination. Both our message and our programs must be managed by diplomats of the highest integrity and skill, so that we can respond to emerging challenges with courage, clarity and decisiveness.
INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy is an indispensable tool for defending and advancing U.S. interests and values. The end of the Cold War has altered America's place in the international system and posed new and daunting challenges for its diplomats. For the first time in modern history, one country occupies a dominant position of power and influence. The shock of 9/11 has introduced a new sense of vulnerability into the calculus of American foreign policy. The boundaries between international security and homeland security have become increasingly blurred. Powerful though we are, we face a world in which envy, hatred and suspicion have mobilized significant forces against us, notably in the Islamic world. We are forced to confront the growing significance and global reach of non-state actors, most importantly the terrorist organizations which are arrayed against us. In this complex and emotionally charged international environment, American diplomacy has a critical role to play. Our diplomacy will be judged not merely on the substance of our policies but also on the extent to which we interact with the international community in the making and implementing of those policies.

American society is largely unprepared to deal with these challenges, either in terms of knowledge about the world or the complex technological, economic, cultural and political issues that face it. Since the end of the Cold War America has not crafted a message that adequately explains its purposes either to its own people or to those other countries, cultures and societies with which it interacts. While it is clear that we cannot police the world or address all of its problems alone, we must accept the fact that others look to us to lead. Effective leadership requires a network of friends, alliances and multilateral institutions to support our efforts to achieve a more just and democratic world. We have much work to do to strengthen that institutional framework.

This report analyzes seven overarching challenges for American diplomacy and suggests ways in which they can be addressed. It does not provide a comprehensive diplomatic/security strategy nor does it review the many geographic and functional issues which make up the fabric of American foreign policy. These have been addressed in numerous other reports. However, success in managing these diverse problem areas will require sustained public support and the talents of well-trained, highly motivated diplomats, who are sensitive to the ambiguities and complexities of international relations. However, diplomacy, important though it is, cannot manage the task alone. Our diplomacy must be supported by a vigorous intelligence collection and analysis capability, and by a military force structure able to respond quickly and effectively when the tools of diplomacy fail.

THE CHALLENGES

1) Addressing the Threat of WMDs and Catastrophic Terrorism
2) Reaffirming American Leadership
3) Refocusing America's Message
4) Building Support at Home and Abroad
5) Promoting Equitable Economic Development
6) Addressing Evolving Global Scientific Issues
7) Managing Relations with China, India and Other Rising Powers
1. **Addressing the Threat of WMDs and Catastrophic Terrorism**

The gravest danger facing the world today is that of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the hands of terrorists and/or failed states. The spread and use of these weapons represents the greatest immediate threat to our national security. Preventing WMD proliferation must be a central concern for American diplomacy. At present we have virtually no defense against unconventional delivery and inadequate deterrence against those who value our death more than their life. Although the G-8 countries, now joined by the European Union and half a dozen additional states, have pledged $20 billion to address this issue, much remains to be done.

There is a dangerous gap between the pace of our progress and the scope and urgency of the threat. Significant amounts of weapons-grade nuclear material and many tactical nuclear and chemical weapons are unsecured or unaccounted for. The biological weapons facilities of the former Soviet Union are not open. Former Soviet scientists working in them have not been given sufficient opportunity to use their talents in peaceful ways. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program has made very significant contributions in terms of reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and should be made the model for a parallel effort to counter the biological and chemical warfare threat.

We must strengthen infectious disease surveillance and develop the necessary healthcare infrastructure to respond to biological, radiological, nuclear or chemical attacks. We must also develop an effective and creative global action plan to address the threats posed by these agents of mass destruction. We must find ways to encourage members of the international scientific community, including the private sector, to design a system of self-policing security practices that assure that our technological advances are not turned into mechanisms for mass murder. This effort will not only require sophisticated use of scientific skills, but also energetic diplomatic efforts to develop an action plan to tackle the problem.

**Recommendation:** The White House, as a matter of urgency, should convene a commission of prominent military, foreign policy, scientific and business leaders to develop recommendations on how the United States government can address these WMD threats. While part of the commission’s mandate would inevitably have to address the homeland security aspects of this challenge, the commission should also be asked to come up with a detailed action plan to build the necessary international consensus and to identify the human and financial resources that will be needed to implement the plan.

2. **Reaffirming American Leadership**

The need for America to play a leading role in the world is widely acknowledged. If the United States wishes to be effective in securing its national security, promoting its economic well-being and extending its values, it can not do so in isolation. It must work in concert with like-minded states in support of the global common good. That judgment does not mean the abandonment of American ability to act unilaterally when circumstances require, but it does assume the need to build a network of alliances and ad-hoc coalitions and to make creative use
of existing multilateral institutions. Maintaining that network should be a priority task for our diplomacy.

Neither existing alliances nor multilateral institutions are without flaws. Both are made up of disparate groupings of countries of varying power, political orientation and economic weight. Even an expanded NATO, the most successful alliance in modern history, shares some of these flaws. It is in our interest to strengthen NATO since it, almost alone among international institutions, brings together countries with a common commitment to democracy and a more just international order. The United Nations and regional and specialized organizations in which the United States participates also have important roles to play. They are capable of mobilizing resources to meet the challenges of starvation, epidemics, and the human dislocations created by local wars. However, there is clearly a need to repair, update and promote innovation in these institutions if they are to fulfill their potential as constructive actors on the international scene.

Our leadership must be clear and unambiguous. Our policies must be based on a broad public and bipartisan consensus. For our diplomats to be effective in addressing issues as complex as the war on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their skill will be as important as the substance of the policies they promote. Although some may see us as overbearing, we must exercise our leadership in ways that counter this negative perception. The serious failure to invest significant resources in public diplomacy after the end of the Cold War has undermined our ability to change this perception.

Recommendation: The President should reaffirm America’s commitment to vigorous participation in the international system, working closely with our allies and with those who join us in the pursuit of a more just and peaceful world order. This commitment must be backed by the necessary commitment of resources to sustain America’s front line: its embassies.

3. Refocusing America’s Message

For all of its national history the United States has proclaimed a commitment to freedom. We have been a beacon to the world and a symbol to other nations of the power of liberty and democracy. Under administrations of both parties we have spoken of the need to make the world safe for democracy and have espoused the “non-negotiable” demands of human freedom. We have stood for basic rights: democracy, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, free markets and free trade. The positive resonance of these ideals has been extraordinary. We have touched the aspirations and hopes of peoples on every continent. If we have fallen short, it has been the result of our failure to live up to those ideals.

However, that message may not be fully adequate in today’s world. We have been successful over the years in using our public diplomacy to articulate this commitment to liberty. We have done less well in articulating our longstanding national commitment to “liberty and justice for all”. We have tended to assume that democratic institutions would inevitably lead to just societies. Across much of the world, particularly the so-called “developing” world, that promise remains largely unfulfilled. During the Cold War we were often seen as uncritical supporters of brutal and unjust regimes. In some cases we have been tardy in dealing with
humanitarian crises and have not always addressed cases of genocide or gross abuses of human rights on a timely basis. We have not confronted directly the injustices that have fueled internal dissatisfaction, provided recruits for terrorist organizations and created a climate of hostility within which it has become harder for the United States to achieve its strategic goals.

American diplomacy must strive to redress this imbalance both in terms of its rhetoric and the substance of its policies. We must also recognize that we are dealing with a governance and stability crisis of multi-regional proportions and that this crisis requires us to speak with clarity in defense of those who share our commitment to liberty and justice. Although there may be different views about how to give programmatic substance to this message, it is critically important that we forthrightly address international crises where issues of fundamental human rights are at stake. We must also recognize that the pursuit of freedom and justice is constantly in tension with our desire for a stable world order.

Recommendation: In articulating America’s purposes to the world, our diplomacy must be instructed to make a conscious effort to balance our strong and ongoing commitment to democracy and freedom with an equally clear commitment to social, political and economic justice. We must also develop and publicize our many activities in support of social, political and economic justice worldwide. Our national message must include both: freedom and justice. Our public diplomacy must systematically convey to the world an unshakable commitment to the rule of law and to the building of the civil society that underpins a free and just society. It must have the resources to do the job.

4. BUILDING SUPPORT AT HOME AND ABROAD

American foreign policy cannot be successful if it does not enjoy broad popular support within the United States and if there are not constituencies in foreign countries that understand America’s institutions, values, and people. One obvious problem is the lack of attention to the outside world in the American educational system. The study of history, geography and foreign languages has dramatically declined over the last two generations. Our difficulty in finding sufficient human resources to meet the challenges of American engagement in places as diverse as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans and Africa, points to the same problem. Our population at large has little experience of foreign countries. While increasing numbers of students, particularly at the college level, are studying abroad, many are still unable to do so for financial reasons or because of security concerns and often do not realize the immense excitement and challenge of living and working in foreign societies.

The other side of the coin is the world’s understanding of America. Throughout the Cold War we invested substantial resources in bringing current and potential foreign leaders and scholars to this country. The Fulbright program was the flagship of this effort, but it was by no means the only program of its kind. Funding for exchange programs has steadily eroded since the end of the Cold War. Fewer foreign students and scholars are coming to this country for long-term study. The post-9/11 environment has exacerbated this problem as visa procedures have been tightened, particularly for students, journalists and leaders from Muslim countries. While prudent security measures are essential, we must make a long-term commitment to building the communities of interest and support which America will need in the
remainder of this century.

The problem which has consistently bedeviled efforts to sustain exchange programs has been the vagaries of the budget. What is needed is a new institutional basis for these valuable exchange programs outside the annual appropriations process. We must also provide ongoing support and encouragement to school systems inside the United States that want to improve their studies of other countries and cultures.

**Recommendation:** In order to achieve a long term and sustainable commitment to both exchange programs and the improvement of international understanding in the American education system, we recommend that Congress create a multi-billion dollar “Endowment for America.” Such an endowment would be funded in the first instance by a major congressional grant. Resources, perhaps on the order of magnitude of the Millennium Challenge Account, could then be supplemented by contributions from foundations, corporations, NGOs, and private citizens. The Endowment would be managed by an independent non-partisan board. The purpose of the Endowment would be to fund youth exchange programs, to underwrite the Fulbright program and to make selective grants to educational institutions in the United States to enhance the teaching of international relations, history and foreign languages. The Endowment after its initial infusion of funds would be essentially self-sustaining, carrying out programs from the proceeds of the Endowment itself.

A great deal of America's attractive power comes not from government, but from its vibrant civil society. In addition to the Endowment, we should be exploring ways in which the government can help our civil society to engage with peoples in other countries. One way might be the creation of an independent corporation for public diplomacy, but other means should be explored as well.

5. **PROMOTING EQUITABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

The polarization between rich and poor countries and the growing income inequality within developing countries pose challenges with which the United States and international development institutions have been grappling for decades. There are no easy solutions. There is a vigorous debate in the academic community and within developmental organizations between those who believe that the focus should be on economic growth, which in turn will yield increases in per capita income, and those who argue that there must be some form of targeted strategy focused on the poor. However, there is little disagreement that priority must be given to the task of promoting development within a context of democracy, free markets and transparent governance. The track record of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies is not reassuring. Aid has often failed to reach its intended recipients at the grass roots level.

In some situations, the failure of state institutions not only makes economic development impossible, but poses a direct threat to the local population as well as to the United States. Afghanistan in the 1990s was a prime example. We, and the international community, are poorly equipped to deal with such situations. Our military is properly configured to win wars, not peace. We will need to work with other countries and international institutions to develop capabilities for constabulary, peacekeeping and reconstruction before we can hope
to see economic development in such situations.

It is clear that the United States must continue, as the world’s richest and most powerful nation, to be a leader in promoting development. Programs focused on education, health and the elimination of poverty are essential. Trade liberalization offers enormous potential for stimulating economic growth in developing societies. Successful completion of the WTO’s Doha round is a critical component of any development strategy since it will make possible a more dynamic involvement of the private sector in the creation of wealth.

We cannot remake the world alone. We need to work with other countries, international institutions and non-governmental organizations. Making growth and development central themes of American diplomacy is an essential element in the projection of American values as well as in the fight against terrorism. Failure to give these issues adequate priority over the next decade will undoubtedly lead to political, social and economic instability in many regions of the world of strategic importance to the United States. We can not afford a proliferation of failed states.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation and the allocation of substantial resources to it will significantly supplement contributions to international lending institutions and bilateral aid programs. Yet effective development assistance requires not only carefully targeted resources, but also trained and committed personnel. The cadre of development professionals working for the United States government has steadily shrunk over recent years. USAID is a shadow of its former self. State Department professionals are still largely focused on political issues. The Millennium Challenge Corporation is barely up and running.

**Recommendation:** The President should continue to articulate a compelling vision of the importance of stimulating growth and reducing poverty, emphasizing the dynamic contribution of the private sector. Congress should provide the substantial resources needed to give that vision tangible reality. The Millennium Challenge Account and the HIV/AIDS initiative are important steps in this direction and must be fully funded. At the same time, we need to ensure that aid reaches the individuals and communities for which it is intended. The foreign affairs agencies must actively recruit from business schools, economic faculties and the private sector, a cadre of professionals to manage America’s developmental programs in those hundred-plus countries that continue to chafe under the burdens of underdevelopment, corruption and poverty.

6. **ADDRESSING GLOBAL SCIENTIFIC ISSUES**

During the past two decades the agenda of America’s foreign relations has evolved. Cold War concerns have given way to new global issues. The nature of the disarmament debate has shifted from SALT and START to the issues surrounding proliferation by second and third-tier powers. Efforts to deal with terrorism, drugs and transnational crime have become priorities for our diplomacy.

The emergence of a new global scientific agenda has received less systematic attention. The efforts to limit proliferation of WMDS and the war on terrorism have important scientific dimensions. This new agenda is also reflected in growing concerns about the environment,
notably global warming, as well as in issues such as desertification, acid rain, ocean pollution and reduction of biological diversity. Epidemiological issues have become increasingly apparent. The global HIV/AIDS pandemic has received the most attention, but the outbreak of SARS, the emergence of the Ebola virus, the persistence of TB and malaria, and the evidence of antibiotic resistant diseases make clear that the potential for a catastrophic health event at some point in the next generation is high. Catastrophic weather events, whether as a result of global warming or other factors, can also be expected. None of these issues can be handled on a strictly bilateral basis. All require careful coordination among nations and through the multilateral organizations charged with monitoring these issues. They should also be addressed through the private sector's unique resources and energy to bring education, agricultural improvements and scientific research to the developing world.

More effective coordination inside the United States government is also needed. International science policy has largely been a stepchild of other policy concerns. Authority is widely diffused among different agencies. The President's Science Advisor should be a key player in the development of international science policy. The State Department's Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science (OES) should play the central role in international science negotiations. OES today, however, does not attract the best and the brightest. Recruitment into and assignments within the Foreign Service pay little attention to the scientific knowledge or background of potential candidates and serving officers. This reality needs to change.

Recommendation: The President should give explicit authority to his Science Advisor to develop and coordinate international science policy and to work directly with the State Department on the implementation of that policy overseas. Such authority may exist in theory, but effective implementation does not. The President should instruct Ambassadors to give priority to science-related issues. In addition, the State Department, given its lead role in science negotiations, should make an aggressive effort to recruit into the Foreign Service officers with a sophisticated understanding of scientific issues and methodology. The President will thereby have available a cadre of individuals able to work knowledgeably to help develop science policies in coordination with other parts of the government and to implement those policies in the field.

7. MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHINA, INDIA AND OTHER RISING POWERS

No set of relationships is more problematic for American foreign policy than relations with major powers. Russia evidently poses critical long term challenges in terms of both democracy and economic viability. Considerable attention must also be paid to our relations with China. It is already a major international power and its economy is a significant competitor of ours. It consumes dramatically increased amounts of energy. It represents environmental challenges of the first order. Its human rights posture is of constant concern. Management of our relationship with Russia and China should remain at the forefront of American diplomacy.

But America's relations with rising powers also need attention. India, with over a billion inhabitants, is a power in its own right. It is a source of domestic policy concern because of
concerns about the outsourcing of technology, and of foreign policy concern because of fears that tensions with Pakistan might trigger a nuclear conflict. Pakistan, with its rapidly growing population in a strategic region of the world, risks becoming the world’s largest failed state. Iran, on the verge of acquiring nuclear capability and with a history of support for radical terrorist organizations in the Middle East, is a constant preoccupation. Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia are emerging powers in Africa, South America and Asia. These countries are pressing for reform of the United Nations Security Council to make that body reflect the realities of the 21st Century. We should take the lead in shaping these growing pressures for reform, for the UN will only be as strong and effective as the United States, its strongest member, wants it to be.

If we are to give these new powers adequate attention, we must develop clear and coherent strategies that are backed by high level mandates and political capital. We must be sure that we are adequately represented in these countries, so that we have the ability to understand and interact with these complex and rapidly evolving societies. Language and area training for service in all of these countries remains inadequate across the United States government. Even in the State Department, which has training programs focused on these key areas, the number of qualified and readily deployable personnel is insufficient. We must have a substantial core of area-qualified professionals in every agency to ensure that we have a genuine understanding of developments and trends important to our national security.

**Recommendation:** The President should identify countries of priority interest to the United States and should require agencies to report on steps they are taking to ensure that we are appropriately represented and that, when they deploy personnel to any of these countries, such personnel have adequate preparation and training. Similarly, all foreign affairs agencies should adopt recruitment strategies which ensure that they have qualified staff to fulfill their area specialization needs, and develop training programs to bring existing personnel up to a sophisticated level of language proficiency and cultural understanding.

**CONCLUSION**

Given the challenges of the 21st Century, American diplomacy must play a dynamic role. To that end, creative and collaborative engagement of the United States with the world is essential. This engagement will require alliances, both formal and informal, sustained interaction with international organizations, and the support and cooperation of the private sector as well as of influential non-governmental and civil society institutions.

To build support for America’s core values, we must project them with vigor and imagination, making clear that freedom is not a narrow set of institutional propositions and that for democracy to survive a more just international order is needed. The implementation of this agenda will require America to deploy a cadre of diverse, experienced and professionally competent representatives. Our message and our programs must be managed by diplomats of the highest professional quality and integrity, who understand the changes that have taken place in the world since the end of the Cold War and who can respond to those changes with courage, clairt and decisiveness. Diplomacy will then indeed be our first line of defense.
ANNEX I: TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Richard E. Benedick
Chester A. Crocker
Kenneth W. Dam, Co-chair
Edward P. Djerejian
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Robert L. Gallucci
Charles A. Gillespie
Arthur Hartman
L. Craig Johnstone
James R. Jones, Co-chair
Kenton W. Keith
L. Bruce Laingen
Samuel W. Lewis
Donald F. McHenry
Sam Nunn
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Phyllis E. Oakley
R. Marcus Palmer
Anthony C. E. Quainton, Rapporteur
William D. Rogers
Dennis Ross
J. Stapleton Roy
Harold H. Saunders
Joseph J. Sisco
Richard Solomon
Strobe Talbott
Terence A. Todman
Viron P. Vaky
Edward S. Walker, Jr.
Frank G. Wisner
ANNEX II: ABOUT THE CO-CHAIRS

Kenneth W. Dam

Kenneth W. Dam served as Deputy Secretary of State from 1982 to 1985 and as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 2001 to 2003. In the latter position he focused on international matters ranging from the financial war on terrorism to international financial and economic development issues to international taxation.

He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago, where he served for many years as the Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law prior to joining the U.S. Treasury.

He has extensive private sector international experience as a corporate vice president of IBM, as an international arbitrator, and as a corporate director.

James R. Jones

James R. Jones served as U.S. Ambassador to Mexico from 1993 to 1997, demonstrating leadership during the Mexican peso crisis and the passage and implementation of NAFTA, developing new, cooperative efforts to combat drug trafficking, and assisting U.S. businesses with commercial ventures.

Ambassador Jones was President at Warnaco International and Chairman and CEO of the American Stock Exchange in New York from 1989 to 1993. As a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Oklahoma (1973-1987), he was Chairman of the House Budget Committee and ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee. He was only 28 years old when President Lyndon Johnson selected him as Appointments Secretary, the position presently titled Chief of Staff.

Ambassador Jones currently is Co-chairman and CEO of Manatt Jones Global Strategies, an international marketing firm.
Remarks at American Academy of Diplomacy
Fifteenth Annual Diplomatic Awards Luncheon
honoring the late Joseph Sisco
December 9, 2004

Joe Sisco was an original; when they made him, they threw away the mold. Indefatigable, dedicated, knowledgeable, a superb diplomat, and a skillful bureaucratic infighter, Joe was an indispensable colleague and a valued friend. We met in the early days of the Nixon administration. The Cold War has, in retrospect, acquired an almost nostalgic quality as being relatively simple because it was seemingly bipolar. But it did not look that way to those of us required to manage it. The Soviet Union had just occupied Czechoslovakia; there was no contact of any kind with China; India was aloof; hostilities were raging along the Suez Canal. And Vietnam was tearing the country apart.

A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that greeted it. The combination of a new presidency and domestic turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking apparatus beyond the State Department.

This issue is often put in terms of prerogative. In my experience, the problem is best overcome by a demonstration of indispensability.

Joe Sisco understood this and set about to implement his insight. When I was appointed National Security Adviser, Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye out for him if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He could wear down any objections by sheer persistence and outwork any aspirations to arbitrary decisions using three methods: (1) In crises, he would move himself physically as close to my office as circumstances permitted – preferably into the Situation Room, which had the added advantage of assuring his participation in all meetings. (2) From his office issued a seemingly endless array of
policy proposals. Some say he offered more solutions than there were problems. But it kept me busy and cut down the time available for interfering in his concern. (3) Finally, he knew that, in the end, strategy winds up as a cable, and he made certain that the process started with his draft. By these methods, Joe helped us through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971.

When I became Secretary in 1973, Joe had already established himself and the role of the Foreign Service. Now there was no longer a question of jurisdiction. And what a group Joe had assembled: Roy Atherton, Hal Saunders, Dean Brown, Dick Murphy, Hermann Eilts, and others. Any Secretary would look good with their help. And the country had every reason to be proud of them, and the Foreign Service that produced them.

Joe and the team he assembled were simply indispensable. They helped manage the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the diplomacy that followed. Together we navigated the war, a nuclear alert, shuttle diplomacy, two disengagement agreements and one political agreement between Israel and Syria and Egypt. And then Joe became my emissary when the Cyprus crisis erupted and contributed decisively to preventing the outbreak of war between two NATO allies.

All of this was accomplished with buoyancy, good humor, and great serenity sometimes belied by Joe’s stentorian voice. Joe was very conscious of his background as the son of Italian immigrants. He had entered the Foreign Service laterally from the Civil Service. And he was enormously proud of that distinction. First, Joe viewed the United States as embodying a special responsibility for peace and progress. He was impatient with self-pitying righteousness. The disputes of the Vietnam and Watergate period were to him challenges to America to demonstrate that it retained its sense of mission and was capable of translating it into a contribution toward a better world.

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Joe’s buoyancy made the enterprise a lot of fun. On one of our shuttles, a Xerox machine got loose from its moorings on the airplane and began rolling around, with Joe frantically trying to corral it. One of my assistants shouted, “Grab him before he falls into it; if there were a duplicate of him, we would never get any sleep.” On another occasion, Joe was with me on a shuttle in Damascus even after he had been promoted to Political Under Secretary. I explained to Assad that I had brought along such a high-ranking officer because Joe had been caught measuring the curtains in my office when I left him alone in Washington. Coups were something Assad understood, and Joe reported to me gleefully that after that remark, his protocol treatment in Damascus improved dramatically.

Joe left the Foreign Service in 1975 because the opportunity came along to head a university. It had always been his dream to follow his service to American diplomacy with a career in education. In 1974, he had been asked to head Hamilton College, but he could not yet bring himself to separate from his beloved Foreign Service. Eighteen months later, however, the opportunity to preside over American University proved irresistible.

Joe loved his country, was proud of the Foreign Service, and adored his family. His wife Jean — beautiful, charming, worldly — provided the emotional ballast and security that was the foundation of his ebullience. And he was devoted to his daughters. I invited him to my 80th birthday party and seated him next to my daughter Elizabeth so that he could talk about his family and perhaps tell mine something about the battles where we stood shoulder-to-shoulder in trying to repay our country for the opportunities it had given us.

After Joe retired from the Foreign Service, he and I remained in contact by telephone and occasional dinners. He never fully
recovered from Jean’s premature death. In his last years, he threw himself with characteristic relish into the service of this institution. I spoke to him the last time a few days after he entered the hospital on his final illness. He mentioned the infirmity of age. But he would not dwell on his disabilities. He wanted to know what I thought of Iraq. When he got better, he would devote himself to healing the rift between the administration and some of his colleagues. I could imagine the old warrior saddling his horse for another adventure.

Joe’s passing leaves a huge void, also for me personally. I admired his gallantry, his wisdom, and his humility. I shared many of his attitudes derived from his origins. Amidst the bedlam of day-to-day events, it was reassuring to know that Joe was there – a national treasure, a personal safe haven. We who loved and admired Joe will miss him for as long as we live. But we would not trade places with those who were never fortunate enough to benefit from the dedication, the love of country, the humanity, and the inspiration of our honoree today.
Joe Sisco was an original; when they made him, they threw away the mold. Indefatigable, dedicated, knowledgeable, a superb diplomat, and a skillful bureaucratic infighter, Joe was an indispensable colleague and a valued friend. We met in the early days of the Nixon administration. The Cold War has, in retrospect, acquired an almost nostalgic quality as being relatively simple because it was seemingly bipolar. But it did not look that way to those of us required to manage it. The Soviet Union had just occupied Czechoslovakia; there was no contact of any kind with China; India was aloof; hostilities were raging along the Suez Canal. And Vietnam was tearing the country apart.
A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that greeted it. The combination of a new presidency and domestic turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking apparatus beyond the State Department. The Foreign Service represents accumulated experience; it has a fine sense of the intangible and the practical. But the political leadership must – especially in times of upheaval – lead our country from where it is to where it has never been. This difference in perspective can lead to a sense of alienation – especially when relations at the NSC level are strained or aloof.
It is not a question of loyalty, it is a challenge of perspective. This mine is often put in terms of prerogative. In my experience, the problem is best overcome by a demonstration of indispensability.

Joe knew understand this and how to implement. This was Joe Sisco's strategy. When I was appointed National Security Adviser, Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye out for him if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He could wear down any objections by sheer persistence and out-think any aspirations to arbitrary decisions. In crises, he would move himself physically as close to my office as circumstances permitted. Joe helped us through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. He knew that, in the
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Threw away the model
rather than die

because it appeared to be risky

p3. not shut down - because he was not ashamed

no "The" before Black September
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After Joe retired from the Foreign Service, he and I remained in contact by telephone and occasional dinners. He never fully
recovered from Jean’s premature death. In his last years, he threw himself with characteristic relish into the service of this institution.

I spoke to him the last time a few days after he entered the hospital on his final illness. He mentioned the infirmity of age. But warrior that he was, he would not dwell on his disabilities. He wanted to know what I thought of Iraq. When he got better, he would devote himself to healing the rift between the administration and some of his colleagues. I could imagine the old warrior saddling his horse for another adventure.

Joe’s passing leaves a huge void, also for me personally. I admired his gallantry, his wisdom, and his modesty. I shared many of his attitudes derived from his origins. Amidst the bedlam of day-to-day events, it was reassuring to know that Joe was there – a national treasure, a personal safe haven. We who loved and
admired Joe will miss him as long as we live. But we would not
trade places with those who were never fortunate enough to benefit
from the dedication, the love of country, the humanity, and the
inspiration of our honoree today.
Joe Sisco

Joe Sisco was an original; when [they made him], they threw away the O. Indefatigable, dedicated, knowledgeable, a [superb] diplomat, and a skillful bureaucratic infighter, Joe was an indispensable colleague and a valued friend. We met in the early days of the Nixon administration. The Cold War has, in retrospect, acquired an almost nostalgic quality as being relatively simple because bipolar. [But] it did not look that way to those of us required to manage it. The Soviet Union had just occupied Czechoslovakia; there was no contact of any kind with China; hostilities were raging along the Suez Canal. And Vietnam was tearing the country apart.
A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that greeted it. The combination of a new presidency and domestic turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking apparatus beyond the State Department. The Foreign Service represents accumulated experience; it has a fine sense of the intangible and the psychological. But the political leadership must - especially in times of upheaval - lead our country from where it is to where it has never been. This difference in perspective can lead to a sense of alienation - especially when relations at the NSC level are strained.

It is not a question of loyalty; it is a challenge of perspective.

It is often put in terms of prerogative. In my experience, the
problem is best overcome by a demonstration of indispensability, the Foreign Service demonstrates its indispensability.

This was Joe Sisco's strategy. Before I came to Washington, Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye on him if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He could shout down any objections and outthink any aspirations to arbitrary decisions. In crises, he would move himself as close to my office as circumstances permitted. Joe helped us through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. He knew that, in the end, strategy winds up as a cable, and he made certain that we started with his draft.
When I became Secretary, Joe had already established himself and the role of the Foreign Service. Now there was no longer a question of jurisdiction. Joe and the team he assembled were simply indispensable. He and the team he assembled helped manage the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the diplomacy that followed. He began by waking me up at 6:30 in the morning to tell me that there was a crisis, and if I got on the phone quickly, we could overcome it.

Joe was a bit too optimistic [in this case]. But he and his colleagues were indispensable in dealing with the crisis and its implications. Together we navigated the war, a nuclear alert, shuttle diplomacy, two disengagement agreements and one political agreement between Israel and Syria and Egypt. And then [the Cisco team] became my emissary when the Cyprus crisis erupted and contributed decisively to preventing the outbreak of war.
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All of this was accomplished with buoyancy, good humor, and a stentorian voice, notwithstanding great serenity. Joe was very conscious of his background as the son of Italian immigrants. He had entered the Foreign Service laterally from the Civil Service.

And he was enormously proud of that distinction. Like most first- and second-generation Americans, Joe viewed the United States as embodying a special responsibility for peace and progress. He was impatient with self-pitying righteousness. The disputes of the Vietnam and Watergate period were to him challenges to America
to demonstrate that it retained its sense of mission and was capable of translating it into a contribution toward peace and progress. Amidst the wreckage of Vietnam and Watergate, Joe would express this in his bearing and his devotion, not in self-righteous assertions.

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shoulder in shoulder. It's just forward. So, I'm going to repay
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early days of transitioning to the Reagan administration. The cold
war was in retrospect acquired an almost nostalgic
quality as being relatively simple because of his own.
It did not look that way to those of us assigned to
manage it. The Soviet Union had just emerged
there was no contact of any kind with them.
Georgievski, the military man running the secret parts of
the arms control sanctuaries, were arrogant along the Fyag land.
and Vietnam took the country apart.

Joe as Assistant Secretary of State for the
Near East Bureau. Last perhaps the most complex task.
As in still the case with countries were asking us to achieve
Israel's sequence in a peace agreement to which this own
contribution would be marginal if not non-existent.
Premier Bashi intervention was real in the form of
The combination of a new administration
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of loyalty; it is a challenge of perspective. It is often put
in terms of perspective. In my experience, the problem
is best overcome by a demonstration of understanding
twenty thousand so-called '鼠标' in Egypt; intelligence support & sharing terrorist groups.]

A new American administration was ordered to deliver a sense of certainty, accountability & predictability. Unilateralism, pressures, fears & anger. Preventing its erosion; because it inevitably carried a familiar visitor to the 'embrace' of retrenchment; would rely on the vindication of foreign leaders & the entanglement between a White House viewpoint on policy needed & established institutions.

This is not the place to outline these hypotheses. But it is an occasion to stress that the commitment is secure, the dedication is; yet the discipline of the energies of the great assets of our society. If we are one of the great assets of this country, at the same time tensions between new approaches & traditional problems arise from time to time. When they do, it is a mistake to fight unresolved disagreements in the name of perpetuating. The country is best served when
This was Joe Sisco’s strategy. Before I came to Washington, Dean Kirk had urged me to keep an eye on him if I ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find him; he presented himself and I was not to be ignored. He would stand down any objections, he would antithink any aspirations, he arbitrary deciding. He would move himself as near my office as circumstances permitted. He helped us through the 1970 crises along the way, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, the Iran, a standing element in Afghanistan and the diplomacy that followed. He knew that in the end strategy winds up as a cable & he made sure that we started with his draft, not ours possible.

When I became Secretary, Joe was gone. He had established himself + the work of the Foreign Service
a question of jurisdiction. The end of the line assembled, helped merge the 1973 Yom Kippur war of 1973 with the diplomacy that followed. It started with him, making me up at 6:30 in the morning to tell me that there was crisis if I got on the plane quickly we could overcome it.

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in when the Cyprus crisis erupted and contributed


about his personality is essential. Joe was the son of
Italians immigrants, very proud of it. He had joined...
A great deal has been written about the shuttle diplomacy. Back and forward shuttling sustained unprecedented activity given to those who made the enterprise possible. What a reality!

the negotiations involve the many eyes of Joe & his team. The professionals knew this. But it was Joe & his team who sustained it. Normally had late in the night the negotiations lasted? I would come in finishing the next morning a summary of what had happened, a report to the President and an outline of necessary next steps.
All of this was accomplished with urgency and profound effort. I was very conscious of my background,

as the son of Italian immigrants. I had entered the

civil service. And I was enormously proud of that distinction.

Like most first and second generation Americans I

received this country, to express a special

responsibility for peace and progress. To adapt it to

the Vietnam and Watergate periods were to bring challenges to

American to demonstrate that it retained its sense of mission

and was capable of translating it into a contribution towards

peace and progress.

And amidst the wreckage of Vietnam and Watergate,

helped achieve the peace in the Middle East. Joe was expected

in his bearing and his devotion met in self-righteousness.

And his humility made the enterprise a

lot of fun. One of our shuttles had a fox maladie

on its airplane.

I was able to start walking around with Joe for the first time.
seeking to retrieve it. One of my assistants
advised a Great Linen Dupl to take and copy it,
and inserted a duplicate
in a sheet seat in Washington, men after he
had been promoted to Political Undertaking.
I told him that I had been asked
about this and that he had a high
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Hamilton College. He could not yet bring himself to separate himself from his beloved Foreign Service.

A year later the prospect of returning once more to university proved irresistible.

Joe loved his country, was proud of the Foreign Service, and adored his family. His wife Jean was beautiful, charming, worldly, generous, and sunny. The emotional stability which was the hallmark of his leadership. He was devoted to his daughter, Victoria. 

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colleague and a treasured friend. His death in
appointed service pleased Dean Rusk. A profound
loss for the country and leaves a void in my
personal friendship of of State urged me to say

The survival to Joe life whom is described
outstanding
as one of the best foreign service officers through cost
from a different mold than most of his colleagues
— being the son of Italian immigrants —
entirely in the present foreign service literally rather than
through a foreign service examination.

I owe Dean Rusk’s assistance for Joe

proved unnecessary. He quickly presented himself
by coming up with a plan to restart the Middle
East negotiations then.