NATO’s Place within the Global Context
Partial Text of SHAPE Lecture
(may add some comments on Palestine and China extemporaneously)
November 4, 2005 – Brussels
Henry A. Kissinger

On April 23, 1973 – 32 years ago – while serving as National
Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon – I addressed an
Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic
relations in the following words: “There have been complaints in
America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing
economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying
its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been
complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe
economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe
diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their
independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies – also in the name of Atlantic unity.”

I recall these quotes to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic relations is not as unique as it appears in the aftermath of the tensions of 2003. The circumstances that caused the debate were, however, quite different.

Then the disputes arose because of a perception of growing Soviet strength, especially in the nuclear strategic field. Today it is fostered by the collapse of Soviet military power and hence the disappearance of an agreed military threat.

Then European integration was just beginning. Today it is far advanced and, with all its recent setbacks, approaching a point of culmination.
Then European nations – whatever their differences with the United States – were anxious to sustain America’s continued commitment to their defense. Today many allies are anxious lest they are drawn into conflicts that involve American interests but not necessarily their own.

Then the center of gravity of world affairs was the Atlantic. Today the seminal fact is that the center of gravity is shifting to the Pacific basin.

Then the Atlantic nations thought they needed a nuclear strategy to resist their adversaries’ presumed superiority in conventional weapons. Today many nations seek nuclear weapons to offset America’s presumed superiority in advanced precise conventional weapons.
These changed policy perspectives reflect changes in the political evolution on both sides of the Atlantic.

The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century. European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not so much traditional diplomacy as esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European allies tend to apply their new approach to the international arena.

This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be
legitimized by the UN Security Council – in other words, an international consensus separate from the alliance structure. The proposition that the alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War and subjected its actions to a Soviet veto. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between its past based on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy and its future integrated institutions without being as yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic foreign policy. With an overall European interest yet to be defined, these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply embedded in European public opinion.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent on the sovereign right to define the ultimate threats to its security.
How to reconcile the non-state aspect of European unification with the experience of a country driven by state concepts or with the notion of alliance as traditionally conceived is the challenge of the next phase of Atlantic relations.

Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan, and India still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema; it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion. The balance of power still affects their calculations.

Therefore, in the controversy between unilateralism and multilateralism, the real issue is not procedural. No serious leader prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available. The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps
incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the requirements of security. The challenge before the alliance, therefore, is whether it is possible to reachieve a common purpose in designing a global order and how to implement it.

I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not only a strategic but a moral and psychological imperative. The conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a partnership freed of many of the calculations that had led to two world wars. Disputes – as described in my opening paragraphs – occasionally occurred, but they generally concerned disagreements about agreed goals, rarely the goals themselves.

The generations that followed us, having experienced neither the war nor the beginning of the Cold War, were more shaped by the controversies surrounding Vietnam and missile deployment. Thus a
shared interpretation of the new international environment has been more difficult and disputes more intense.

The question before the Atlantic Alliance is whether it is possible to achieve a common purpose and by what methods.

This is not the occasion to put forward a detailed blueprint for the next phase of foreign policy. Rather, let me stress, as a believer in Atlantic cooperation based on parallel histories and shared values, two tasks among many that are before us and how they need, in my opinion, to be addressed.

Iraq

I have been warned not to talk about Iraq to a predominantly European audience. Fatigue has set in, I am told, and there is a growing desire to end the conflict. I have rejected that advice because
the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of the original decision to intervene – which I supported – or the arguments of the controversies of 2003, current thinking must deal with the impact of possible outcomes, especially catastrophic ones. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, American abdication in Iraq will have global consequences.

If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul,
Madrid, London, and New Delhi demonstrate the worldwide scope of the *jihad* challenge.

Much will depend on whether the reasonably stable institutions can emerge in Iraq after the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 15. The mechanical part of success is relatively easy to define: establishment of a government considered sufficiently legitimate by the Iraqi people to permit recruitment of an army willing and able to defend its institutions.

What is such a government? And what are the obstacles that need to be overcome? Western democracy developed in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate
where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression of the weak by the powerful. In multiethnic societies, minority rights must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards.

Political progress in Iraq can be defined in terms of four objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.
I have gone into Iraq at such length despite the reservations some in this audience have expressed in the past because there is no escaping the dilemma: a catastrophic outcome in Iraq would affect directly or indirectly all the members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The belief that accommodation to the jihad agenda provides immunity confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. This is why the next phase of the Iraq conflict requires some degree of internationalization. As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about the direction of Iraq’s evolution should be attempted. Whether to do this in the NATO Council or via some more restricted contact group goes beyond the scope of this speech. Whatever the approach, the consultative process should then lead to a degree of internationalization of the political process. Security will increasingly
shift into Iraqi responsibility backed by American forces. But the political stability of emerging institutions depends ultimately on international acceptance. The United States should be prepared to share defined responsibilities in political reconstruction with its allies and the international community. Atlantic consultations could lead to an international contact group under UN auspices to advise on Iraq’s political evolution. Logical members would include countries that have experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq – such as India, Turkey, and Russia – together with key NATO countries.

[Palestine – will be done extemporaneously]

Proliferation
As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold War, the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent nightmare. In a speech here in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties incompatible with any sense of moral responsibility, but abdication from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made approximately the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled. But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation, deterrence will lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-to-state relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer be clear who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means. Second-
order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can become a shield behind which to step up terrorist challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called “private” distribution of Pakistan’s nuclear technology to other countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation from spinning out of control.

The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks in Beijing – composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US, and China – seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.
The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain, France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating parties do not by themselves have available the combination of incentives and pressures—especially as Iran is a more powerful country than North Korea with a greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a challenge that brooks no delay.

It is not a matter of devising a formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the ongoing diplomacy to UN action. The fundamental challenge to the Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions: How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation has become irreversible? What incentives and assurances are we prepared to offer? What pressures
are we prepared to undertake if incentives do not work? And how do we prevent negotiation and implementation from becoming a means to legitimize proliferation rather than avert it?

Failure to answer these questions will face the world community and the Atlantic Alliance with yet another set of questions: How does a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world community react to such an event or to a nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries?

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to elaborate a forum for negotiations with Iran that would include nations with an immediate interest in the subject, which – by analogy to the Beijing talks – could well include the United States, Russia, and perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the
Beijing talks. The next decision will have to be a precise calculus of pressures and incentives.

[China – will be done extemporaneously]

Conclusion

Will the nations bordering the Atlantic be able to develop the cohesion to address so vast an agenda? Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. The defining characteristic of the traditional international system has been fundamentally altered by contemporary ideology and technology. That system assumed that the domestic jurisdiction of states was beyond international challenge; hence the
principal threat to international stability was perceived to be the attempt to change frontiers by force of arms. Neither assumption is still valid.

Terrorist threats challenge the social cohesion, and weapons of mass destruction are now able to alter the balance of power and threaten devastation primarily through technological developments within the territory of a sovereign state. In those circumstances, the potential victims cannot wait until the threat has been implemented. A measure of preemption is inherent in the technology and ideology of the 21st-century international system. But that challenge should not be presented as if it were an American dispensation. It cannot be in America’s interest to encourage every nation to define preemption in purely national terms. It cannot be in Europe’s interest to pretend that the Westphalian system is fully operational. The solution to this
dispute is to develop together how to apply a new concept long
recognized in international law: the right of self-defense. What the
argument is about is rules for establishing the threshold of when this
principle can be applied under contemporary circumstances.

As the alliance shifts its emphasis from the military to the
political arena, from defending a geopolitical dividing line to what in
NATO parlance used to be called "out of area" conflicts, both sides of
the Atlantic need to define for themselves why NATO is still important.

Foreign policy cannot be based on hegemonic power primarily.
Many of the problems affecting world order are not susceptible to
solution by military means. The United States will not be able to
shape every international problem alone with exhausting itself
physically and psychologically. It will need allies, and the countries
that most share our values and history are the NATO countries. And
however much conventional wisdom balks at the concept of a clash of civilizations, that is what Western societies face together from the radical, crusading *jihadist* version of Islam.

The ultimate challenge for allied foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of American military preeminence. It implies the need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of threats and long-range purposes.

By the same token, Europe must resist the temptation of “distinctiveness” for its own sake. The alliance needs a clearer definition of what is intended by a “European” foreign policy and one
less geared to pacifying domestic pressure groups. Europe must be allowed scope for disagreeing with its partner. But if distinctiveness is defined by disagreement for its own sake, Western civilization is on the road to destroying its substance, as it did in the first half of the 20th century.

In this context, the debate between multilateralism and unilateralism assumes a different dimension. Abstract multilateralism is as incompatible with a vital Atlantic relationship as abstract unilateralism. The former absorbs energies in a quest for formal consensus, the latter in overemphasis on special national objectives. But the Atlantic Alliance, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character between these two extremes. It must be able to define common purposes more precise than the attainable international
consensus and more embracing than the national interest of an
individual partner.

As the alliance increases its political consultation, it will have to
decide in what manner Europe plays its role, whether as a political unit
or on a more ad hoc basis through a series of contact groups of the
willing. Importantly, this will depend on the political evolution of
Europe. In the interim, outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
suggested at this year’s Wehrkunde conference that a panel of senior
former officials or other respected nongovernmental personnel might
develop some of the options.

Is this possible? We cannot know the answer today, but the
future of our societies requires that we make the effort. In
undertaking that task, we should remember a quote from Winston
Churchill: “It is not always enough to do our best; sometimes we have to do what is required.”
On April 23, 1973 – 32 years ago – while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon – I addressed an Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: “There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies – also in the name of Atlantic unity.”

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The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century. European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not so much traditional diplomacy as esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European allies tend to apply their new approach to the international arena.

This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be legitimized by the UN Security Council – in other words, an international consensus separate from the alliance structure. The proposition that the alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America
applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War and subjected its actions to a Soviet veto. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between its past based on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy and its future integrated institutions without being as yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic foreign policy. With an overall European interest yet to be defined, these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply embedded in European public opinion.

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Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan, and India still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema; it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion. The balance of power still affects their calculations.
Therefore, in the controversy between unilateralism and multilateralism, the real issue is not procedural. No serious leader prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available. The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the requirements of security. The challenge before the alliance, therefore, is whether it is possible to re-achieve a common purpose in designing a global order and how to implement it.

**Evolution of Alliance Strategic Thought**

When NATO was founded, the assumption was that Soviet manpower and conventional forces were overwhelming and had to be balanced by nuclear weapons -- hence the doctrine of massive retaliation by American strategic power. Conventional NATO buildup was conceived as a tripwire and, in its more sophisticated versions, a threshold for resort to strategic weapons.

From the beginning, this produced a credibility problem. In its early phase, was the United States prepared to inflict the tens of millions of casualties such a strategy implied on moral grounds? And
as the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew through the 1950s, was anyone prepared to accept the casualties this strategy implied?

This credibility problem led to three decisions: (1) to increase conventional forces; (2) to develop a strategy of flexible response; and (3) to deploy nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe. Conventional forces were intended to raise the threshold for nuclear war; flexible response was supposed to provide more acceptable options; and nuclear missiles were intended to link the defense of America to that of Europe organically.

None of these goals was fully reached. Conventional forces rarely reached planned levels; flexible response was, to some extent, negated by the increased power of the weapons. The placement of missiles came closest to achieving its aim. The Soviet Union could not attack Europe without attacking the missiles, and this in turn would trigger a response by the remaining force together with the Strategic Air Command.

Still the strategy saw NATO through three Berlin crises, the Hungarian revolution, and a number of technically out-of-area crises in the Middle East and the Caribbean. Victory in the Cold War was importantly the result of allied cohesion.
This does not mean that the strategy was unchallenged. The formation of NATO encountered demonstrations accusing the allied governments of provoking, rather than easing, Soviet pressures. Massive demonstrations sought to prevent the deployment of missiles with the argument – among many – that Europe could find safety better by delinking its defense from the nuclear strategy of the United States – a forerunner of more contemporary debates.

The dominant international order was based on the notion of sovereignty that evolved after the Treat of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War. Aggression was viewed as the crossing of borders of a sovereign country. September 11 changed all this. The defining characteristic of the traditional international system has been fundamentally altered by contemporary ideology and technology. That system assumed that the domestic jurisdiction of states was beyond international challenge; hence the principal threat to international stability was perceived to be the attempt to change frontiers by force of arms. Neither assumption is still valid.

Terrorist threats challenge the social cohesion, and weapons of mass destruction are now able to alter the balance of power and threaten devastation primarily through technological developments
within the territory of a sovereign state. In those circumstances, the potential victims cannot wait until the threat has been implemented. A measure of preemption is inherent in the technology and ideology of the 21st-century international system. But that challenge should not be presented as if it were an American dispensation. It cannot be in America’s interest to encourage every nation to define preemption in purely national terms. It cannot be in Europe’s interest to pretend that the Westphalian system is fully operational. The solution to this dispute is to develop together how to apply a new concept long recognized in international law: the right of self-defense. What the argument is about is rules for establishing the threshold of when this principle can be applied under contemporary circumstances.

As the alliance shifts its emphasis from the military to the political arena, from defending a geopolitical dividing line to what in NATO parlance used to be called “out of area” conflicts, both sides of the Atlantic need to define for themselves why NATO is still important.

Some current debates very similar to preceding ones attempt to delink the safety of the Europe from the actions of the United States.

As a result, the political and military aspects of the alliance are no longer as fully synchronized as during the Cold War. The military
command is pursuing with considerable success three initiatives: the Prague Capabilities commitment; the establishment of a NATO Response Force; and the Headquarters for Allied Command Transformation.

The political side of the alliance has greatly improved its cohesion but still faces legacies of the crisis of 2003.

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The generations that followed us, having experienced neither the war nor the beginning of the Cold War, were more shaped by the controversies surrounding Vietnam and missile deployment. Thus a shared interpretation of the new international environment has been more difficult and disputes more intense.

The question before the Atlantic Alliance is whether it is possible to relink policy and strategy.
This is not the occasion to put forward a detailed blueprint for the next phase of foreign policy. Rather, let me stress, as a believer in Atlantic cooperation based on parallel histories and shared values, two tasks among many that are before us and how they need, in my opinion, to be addressed.

Iraq

I have been warned not to talk about Iraq to a predominantly European audience. Fatigue has set in, I am told, and there is a growing desire to end the conflict. I have rejected that advice because the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of the original decision to intervene – which I supported – or the arguments of the controversies of 2003, current thinking must deal with the impact of possible outcomes, especially catastrophic ones. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, American abdication in Iraq will have global consequences. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or
Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and New Delhi demonstrate the worldwide scope of the jihad challenge.

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dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression of the weak by the powerful. In multiethnic societies, minority rights must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards.

Political progress in Iraq can be defined in terms of four objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.

I have gone into Iraq at such length despite the reservations some in this audience have expressed in the past because there is no escaping the dilemma: a catastrophic outcome in Iraq would affect directly or indirectly all the members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The belief that accommodation to the jihād agenda provides immunity confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. This is why the next phase of the Iraq conflict requires some degree of internationalization.
As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about the direction of Iraq's evolution should be attempted. Whether to do this in the NATO Council or via some more restricted contact group goes beyond the scope of this speech. Whatever the approach, the consultative process should then lead to a degree of internationalization of the political process. Security will increasingly shift into Iraqi responsibility backed by American forces. But the political stability of emerging institutions depends ultimately on international acceptance. The United States should be prepared to share defined responsibilities in political reconstruction with its allies and the international community. Atlantic consultations could lead to an international contact group under UN auspices to advise on Iraq's political evolution. Logical members would include countries that have experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq – such as India, Turkey, and Russia – together with key NATO countries.

Proliferation

As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold War, the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent
nightmare. In a speech here in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties incompatible with any sense of moral responsibility, but abdication from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made approximately the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled. But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation, deterrence will lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-to-state relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer be clear who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means. Second-order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can become a shield behind which to step up terrorist challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called “private” distribution of Pakistan’s nuclear technology to other countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation from spinning out of control.
The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks in Beijing – composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US, and China – seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.

The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain, France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating parties do not by themselves have available the combination of incentives and pressures – especially as Iran is a more powerful country than North Korea with a greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a challenge that brooks no delay.

It is not a matter of devising a formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the ongoing diplomacy to UN action. The fundamental challenge to the Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions: How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation has become irreversible? What
incentives and assurances are we prepared to offer? What pressures are we prepared to undertake if incentives do not work? And how do we prevent negotiation and implementation from becoming a means to legitimize proliferation rather than avert it?

Failure to answer these questions will face the world community and the Atlantic Alliance with yet another set of questions: How does a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world community react to such an event or to a nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries?

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to elaborate a forum for negotiations with Iran that would include nations with an immediate interest in the subject, which – by analogy to the Beijing talks – could well include the United States, Russia, and perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the Beijing talks. The next decision will have to be a precise calculus of pressures and incentives.

[China – may be done extemporaneously]
Conclusion

Will the nations bordering the Atlantic be able to develop the cohesion to address so vast an agenda? Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order.

Foreign policy cannot be based on hegemonic power primarily. Many of the problems affecting world order are not susceptible to solution by military means. The United States will not be able to shape every international problem alone with exhausting itself physically and psychologically. It will need allies, and the countries that most share our values and history are the NATO countries. And however much conventional wisdom balks at the concept of a clash of civilizations, that is what Western societies face together from the radical, crusading jihadist version of Islam.

The ultimate challenge for allied foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of American military preeminence. It implies the
need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of threats and long-range purposes.

By the same token, Europe must resist the temptation of “distinctiveness” for its own sake. The alliance needs a clearer definition of what is intended by a “European” foreign policy and one less geared to pacifying domestic pressure groups. Europe must be allowed scope for disagreeing with its partner. But if distinctiveness is defined by disagreement for its own sake, Western civilization is on the road to destroying its substance, as it did in the first half of the 20th century.

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consensus and more embracing than the national interest of an individual partner.

As the alliance increases its political consultation, it will have to decide in what manner Europe plays its role, whether as a political unit or on a more ad hoc basis through a series of contact groups of the willing. Importantly, this will depend on the political evolution of Europe. In the interim, outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schröder suggested at this year’s *Wehrkunde* conference that a panel of senior former officials or other respected nongovernmental personnel might develop some of the options.

Is this possible? We cannot know the answer today, but the future of our societies requires that we make the effort. In undertaking that task, we should remember a quote from Winston Churchill: “It is not always enough to do our best; sometimes we have to do what is required.”
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November 4, 2005 – Brussels
Henry A. Kissinger

On April 23, 1973 – 32 years ago – while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon – I addressed an Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: “There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their
independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies – also in the name of Atlantic unity.”

I recall these quotes to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic relations is not as unique as it appears in the aftermath of the tensions of 2003. The circumstances that caused the debate were, however, quite different.

Then the disputes arose because of a perception of growing Soviet strength, especially in the nuclear strategic field. Today it is fostered by the collapse of Soviet military power and hence the disappearance of an agreed military threat.

Then European integration was just beginning. Today it is far advanced and, with all its recent setbacks, approaching a point of culmination.
Then European nations – whatever their differences with the United States – were anxious to sustain America’s continued commitment to their defense. Today many allies are anxious lest they are drawn into conflicts that involve American interests but not necessarily their own.

Then the center of gravity of world affairs was the Atlantic. Today the seminal fact is that the center of gravity is shifting to the Pacific basin.

Then the Atlantic nations thought they needed a nuclear strategy to resist their adversaries’ presumed superiority in conventional weapons. Today many nations seek nuclear weapons to offset America’s presumed superiority in advanced precise conventional weapons.
These changed policy perspectives reflect changes in the political evolution on both sides of the Atlantic.

The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century. European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not so much traditional diplomacy as esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European allies tend to apply their new approach to the international arena.

This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be
legitimized by the UN Security Council – in other words, an international consensus separate from the alliance structure. The proposition that the alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War and subjected its actions to a Soviet veto. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between its past based on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy and its future integrated institutions without being as yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic foreign policy. With an overall European interest yet to be defined, these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply embedded in European public opinion.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent on the sovereign right to define the ultimate threats to its security.
How to reconcile the non-state aspect of European unification with the experience of a country driven by state concepts or with the notion of alliance as traditionally conceived is the challenge of the next phase of Atlantic relations.

Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan, and India still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema; it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion. The balance of power still affects their calculations.

Therefore, in the controversy between unilateralism and multilateralism, the real issue is not procedural. No serious leader prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available. The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps
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Evaluating of Military Strategies Thought

When NATO was founded, the assumption was that Soviet manpower, conventional forces were overwhelming and had to be balanced by nuclear weapons. Hence the doctrine of massive retaliation by American strategic forces. Conventional NATO buildup was connected as a top priority in its more exploratory, versus a threshold for use of strategic weapons.

From its beginning, this produced a credibility problem. As the United States prepared to inflict billions of millions of casualties and a strategy implicit on moral grounds, and as its Soviet nuclear arsenal grew through the 1970s, was anyone prepared to accept the casualties this strategy implied?

This credibility problem led to Real Options: to increase conventional
force, (3) to develop a strategy of flexible
response and (2) to deploy nuclear missiles
in Europe. Conventional forces were intended
to raise the threshold for nuclear war; flexible
response was supposed to provide more acceptable
alternatives to nuclear missiles well intended to
bring the defense of Europe to that of Europe
organically.

Though none of these goals were
fully reached, conventional forces rarely reached
planned levels; flexible response was to some
degree negated by the increased power of
the weapons. The placement of missiles caused
considerable criticism, and a Soviet Union
would not attack Europe without attacking the
missiles, and this in turn would trigger a response
by the remaining force, together with the
Strategic Air Command.
Though three Berlin crises, the Hungarian revolution, and a number of technically minor
incidents in the Middle East, the cold war was unexpectedly
the result of allied collisions.

This does not mean that the strategy
was undamaged. The foundations of NATO
to be encountered demonstrators demanding
Western demonstrations among the
governments of promoting public opinion
behind Soviet pressures. Western demonstrations
sought to prevent the deployment of missiles
with the argument among many, that
Europe could feel safer better by
sheltering its defense from the nuclear
strategy of the United States, a feature
of more contemporary debates.
The dominant international order was based on the notion of sovereignty which evolved after the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War. Aggression was viewed as the crossing of borders by sovereign states. 9/11 changed all this. The changing international landscape is characterized by the loss of the old international order.
The cohesion of the political side of the Alliance has greatly improved, but still faces legacy of the crisis of 2003.
incompatible - definitions of the national interest and of the
requirements of security. The challenge before the alliance, therefore,
is whether it is possible to reachieve a common purpose in designing a
global order and how to implement it.

I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not
only a strategic but a moral and psychological imperative. The
conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a partnership freed of many of the calculations that had led to two world
wars. Disputes - as described in my opening paragraphs -
occasionally occurred, but they generally concerned disagreements
about agreed goals, rarely the goals themselves.

The generations that followed us, having experienced neither the
war nor the beginning of the Cold War, were more shaped by the
controversies surrounding Vietnam and missile deployment. Thus a
shared interpretation of the new international environment has been more difficult and disputes more intense.

The question before the Atlantic Alliance is whether it is possible to achieve a common purpose and by what methods.

This is not the occasion to put forward a detailed blueprint for the next phase of foreign policy. Rather, let me stress, as a believer in Atlantic cooperation based on parallel histories and shared values, two tasks among many that are before us and how they need, in my opinion, to be addressed.

Iraq

I have been warned not to talk about Iraq to a predominantly European audience. Fatigue has set in, I am told, and there is a growing desire to end the conflict. I have rejected that advice because
the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of the original decision to intervene — which I supported — or the arguments of the controversies of 2003, current thinking must deal with the impact of possible outcomes, especially catastrophic ones. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, American abdication in Iraq will have global consequences.

If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul,
Madrid, London, and New Delhi demonstrate the worldwide scope of the jihad challenge.

Much will depend on whether the reasonably stable institutions can emerge in Iraq after the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 15. The mechanical part of success is relatively easy to define: establishment of a government considered sufficiently legitimate by the Iraqi people to permit recruitment of an army willing and able to defend its institutions.

What is such a government? And what are the obstacles that need to be overcome? Western democracy developed in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate
where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression of the weak by the powerful. In multiethnic societies, minority rights must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards.

Political progress in Iraq can be defined in terms of four objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.
I have gone into Iraq at such length despite the reservations some in this audience have expressed in the past because there is no escaping the dilemma: a catastrophic outcome in Iraq would affect directly or indirectly all the members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The belief that accommodation to the jihad agenda provides immunity confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. This is why the next phase of the Iraq conflict requires some degree of internationalization. As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about the direction of Iraq’s evolution should be attempted. Whether to do this in the NATO Council or via some more restricted contact group goes beyond the scope of this speech. Whatever the approach, the consultative process should then lead to a degree of internationalization of the political process. Security will increasingly
shift into Iraqi responsibility backed by American forces. But the political stability of emerging institutions depends ultimately on international acceptance. The United States should be prepared to share defined responsibilities in political reconstruction with its allies and the international community. Atlantic consultations could lead to an international contact group under UN auspices to advise on Iraq’s political evolution. Logical members would include countries that have experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq – such as India, Turkey, and Russia – together with key NATO countries.

[Proliferation

[Palestine - will be done extemporaneously]
As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold War, the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent nightmare. In a speech here in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties incompatible with any sense of moral responsibility, but abdication from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made approximately the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled. But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation, deterrence will lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-to-state relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer be clear who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means. Second-
order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can become a shield behind which to step up terrorist challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called “private” distribution of Pakistan’s nuclear technology to other countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation from spinning out of control.

The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks in Beijing – composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US, and China – seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.
The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain, France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating parties do not by themselves have available the combination of incentives and pressures – especially as Iran is a more powerful country than North Korea with a greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a challenge that brooks no delay.

It is not a matter of devising a formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the ongoing diplomacy to UN action. The fundamental challenge to the Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions: How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation has become irreversible? What incentives and assurances are we prepared to offer? What pressures
are we prepared to undertake if incentives do not work? And how do we prevent negotiation and implementation from becoming a means to legitimize proliferation rather than avert it?

Failure to answer these questions will face the world community and the Atlantic Alliance with yet another set of questions: How does a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world community react to such an event or to a nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries?

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to elaborate a forum for negotiations with Iran that would include nations with an immediate interest in the subject, which – by analogy to the Beijing talks – could well include the United States, Russia, and perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the
Beijing talks. The next decision will have to be a precise calculus of pressures and incentives.

[China will be done extemporaneously]

Conclusion

Will the nations bordering the Atlantic be able to develop the cohesion to address so vast an agenda? Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. The defining characteristic of the traditional international system has been fundamentally altered by contemporary ideology and technology. That system assumed that the domestic jurisdiction of states was beyond international challenge; hence the
principal threat to international stability was perceived to be the attempt to change frontiers by force of arms. Neither assumption is still valid.

Terrorist threats challenge the social cohesion, and weapons of mass destruction are now able to alter the balance of power and threaten devastation primarily through technological developments within the territory of a sovereign state. In those circumstances, the potential victims cannot wait until the threat has been implemented. A measure of preemption is inherent in the technology and ideology of the 21st-century international system. But that challenge should not be presented as if it were an American dispensation. It cannot be in America’s interest to encourage every nation to define preemption in purely national terms. It cannot be in Europe’s interest to pretend that the Westphalian system is fully operational. The solution to this
dispute is to develop together how to apply a new concept long recognized in international law: the right of self-defense. What the argument is about is rules for establishing the threshold of when this principle can be applied under contemporary circumstances.

As the alliance shifts its emphasis from the military to the political arena, from defending a geopolitical dividing line to what in NATO parlance used to be called “out of area” conflicts, both sides of the Atlantic need to define for themselves why NATO is still important.

Foreign policy cannot be based on hegemonic power primarily. Many of the problems affecting world order are not susceptible to solution by military means. The United States will not be able to shape every international problem alone with exhausting itself physically and psychologically. It will need allies, and the countries that most share our values and history are the NATO countries. And
however much conventional wisdom balks at the concept of a clash of civilizations, that is what Western societies face together from the radical, crusading jihadist version of Islam.

The ultimate challenge for allied foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of American military preeminence. It implies the need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of threats and long-range purposes.

By the same token, Europe must resist the temptation of "distinctiveness" for its own sake. The alliance needs a clearer definition of what is intended by a "European" foreign policy and one
less geared to pacifying domestic pressure groups. Europe must be allowed scope for disagreeing with its partner. But if distinctiveness is defined by disagreement for its own sake, Western civilization is on the road to destroying its substance, as it did in the first half of the 20th century.

In this context, the debate between multilateralism and unilateralism assumes a different dimension. Abstract multilateralism is as incompatible with a vital Atlantic relationship as abstract unilateralism. The former absorbs energies in a quest for formal consensus, the latter in overemphasis on special national objectives. But the Atlantic Alliance, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character between these two extremes. It must be able to define common purposes more precise than the attainable international
consensus and more embracing than the national interest of an individual partner.

As the alliance increases its political consultation, it will have to decide in what manner Europe plays its role, whether as a political unit or on a more ad hoc basis through a series of contact groups of the willing. Importantly, this will depend on the political evolution of Europe. In the interim, outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schröder suggested at this year’s Wehrkunde conference that a panel of senior former officials or other respected nongovernmental personnel might develop some of the options.

Is this possible? We cannot know the answer today, but the future of our societies requires that we make the effort. In undertaking that task, we should remember a quote from Winston
Churchill: “It is not always enough to do our best; sometimes we have to do what is required.”
NATO’s Place within the Global Context

On April 23, 1973 – 32 years ago – while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon – I addressed an Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: “There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name
of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies – also in the name of Atlantic unity.”

I recall these quotes to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic relations was not as unique as it appears today. The circumstances that caused the debate were, however, quite different.

Then the disputes arose because of a perception of growing Soviet strength, especially in the nuclear strategic field. Today it is fostered by the collapse of Soviet military power and hence the disappearance of an agreed military threat.

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commitment to their defense. Today many allies are anxious lest they are drawn into conflicts that involve American interests but not necessarily their own.

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Today the seminal fact is that the center of gravity is shifting to the Pacific basin.

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These changed policy perspectives reflect changes in the political evolution on both sides of the Atlantic.
The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of
the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international
politics and the focus of political loyalties since the 17th century when
the Treaty of Westphalia created an international system based on the
notion of sovereignty. European leaders spend more time on issues of
European unification than any other. And these issues involve not as much
traditional diplomacy but esoteric constitutional arrangements.

Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a
transnational consensus, European diplomats seek to apply their new
experience to the international arena. This has changed the attitude
to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic
pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left
to an alliance decision but must be legitimized by the UN Security
Council – in other words, an international consensus separate from the
alliance structure. The proposition that the alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War and subjected its actions to a Soviet veto. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between its past based on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy and its future institutions not yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic foreign policy.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent on the sovereign right to define the ultimate threats to its security. With a European national interest yet to be defined, these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply embedded in European public opinion. How to reconcile the non-state aspect of European unification with the experience of a country driven
by state concepts or with the notion of alliance as traditionally

conceived... [INCOMPLETE THOUGHT]

Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan, and India

still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European

states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema;

it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The

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The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps

incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the

requirements of security. The issue before the alliance, therefore, is
whether it is possible to reachieve a common purpose in designing a
global order and how to implement it.

I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not
only a strategic but a moral and psychological imperative. Having
experienced dictatorship and war, we considered Atlantic cooperation
an essential building bloc for a new system of international relations.

The conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a
partnership freed of many of the pressures of traditional diplomacy.
Disputes – as described in my opening paragraphs – occasionally
occurred, but they generally concerned disagreements about agreed
goals, rarely the goals themselves.

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war nor the beginning of the Cold War, were more shaped by the
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the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of the original decision to intervene—which I supported—or the arguments of the controversies of 2003, current thinking must deal with the impact of possible outcomes, especially catastrophic ones. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have global consequences. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul,
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differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such
circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression
of the weak by the powerful. In multiethnic societies, minority rights
must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards.

Political progress in Iraq can be defined in terms of four
objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process
to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis;
(2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as
havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite
government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4)
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process.
I have gone into Iraq at such length despite the reservations some in this audience have expressed in the past because there is no escaping the dilemma: a catastrophic outcome in Iraq would affect directly or indirectly all the members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The belief that accommodation to the *jihad* agenda provides immunity confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. This is why the next phase of the Iraq conflict requires some degree of internationalization. As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about the direction of Iraq’s evolution should be attempted. Whether to do this in the NATO Council or via some more restricted contact group goes beyond the scope of this speech. The consultative process could then lead to a degree of internationalization of the political process. Security will increasingly shift into Iraqi responsibility backed by
American forces. But the political stability of emerging institutions depends ultimately on international acceptance. The United States should be prepared to share defined responsibilities in political reconstruction with its allies and the international community. Atlantic consultations could lead to an international contact group under UN auspices to advise on Iraq’s political evolution. Logical members would include countries that have experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq – [such as] India, Turkey, and Russia – together with key NATO countries.

[Palestine – will be done extemporaneously]

Proliferation
As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold War, the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent nightmare. In a speech here in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties incompatible with any sense of moral responsibility, but abdication from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made approximately the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled.

But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation, deterrence will lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-to-state relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer be clear who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means. Second-
order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can become a shield behind which to step up terrorist challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called “private” distribution of Pakistan’s nuclear technology to other countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation from spinning out of control.

The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks in Beijing – composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US, and China – seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.
The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain, France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating parties do not by themselves have available the combination of incentives and pressures—especially as Iran is a more powerful country with a greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a challenge that brooks no delay.

It is not a matter of devising a formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the ongoing diplomacy to UN action. The fundamental challenge to the Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions: How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation in Iran has become irreversible? What incentives and assurances are we prepared to offer? What
pressures are we prepared to undertake if incentives do not work?

And how do we prevent negotiation and implementation from becoming a means to legitimize proliferation rather than avert it?

Failure to answer these questions will face the world community and the Atlantic Alliance with yet another set of questions: How does a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world community react to such an event or to a nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries?

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to elaborate a forum for negotiations with Iran that would include nations with an immediate interest in the subject, which – by analogy to the Beijing talks – could well include the United States, Russia, and
perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the
Beijing talks. The next decision will have to be a
precise calculus of pressures and incentives.

Conclusion

The fundamental question remains whether the Atlantic Alliance
can develop the cohesion to address so vast an agenda. In addition to the topics discussed here are such issues as the rise of
Asia, the equitable distribution of energy, and the entry of billions of
new workers into the global economy.

Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They
have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a
generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. In that context that the debate over preemption should be redefined.

The defining characteristic of the traditional international system has
been fundamentally altered by contemporary ideology and technology.

That system assumed that the domestic jurisdiction of states was beyond international challenge; hence the principal threat to international stability was perceived to be the attempt to change frontiers by force of arms. Neither assumption is still valid.

Terrorist threats challenge the social cohesion, and weapons of mass destruction can alter the balance of power and threaten devastation primarily through technological developments within the territory of a sovereign state. In those circumstances, the potential victims cannot wait until the threat has been implemented. Preemption is inherent in the technology and ideology of the 21st-century international system. But that challenge should not be presented as if it were an American dispensation. It cannot be in America's interest to encourage every nation to define preemption in
purely national terms. The solution to this dispute is to develop
together some principles of preemption. For in the end, preemption is not so much a new concept as the application of a norm long recognized in international law: the right of self-defense. What the argument is about is rules for establishing the threshold of when this principle can be applied under contemporary circumstances.

As the alliance shifts its emphasis from the military to the political arena, from defending a geopolitical dividing line to what in NATO parlance used to be called "out of area" conflicts, both sides of the Atlantic need to define for themselves why NATO is still important.

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international problem alone with exhausting itself physically and psychologically. It will need allies, and the countries that most share our values and history are the NATO countries. And however much conventional wisdom balks at the concept of a clash of civilizations, that is what Western societies face together from the radical, crusading jihadist version of Islam.

The ultimate challenge for allied foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. It implies the need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of threats and long-range purposes.
By the same token, Europe must resist the temptation of "distinctiveness" for its own sake. The alliance needs a clearer definition of what is intended by a "European" foreign policy and one less geared to pacifying domestic pressure groups. Europe must be allowed scope for disagreeing with its partner. But if distinctiveness is defined by disagreement for its own sake, Western civilization is on the road to destroying its substance, as it did in the first half of the 20th century.

In this context, the debate between multilateralism and unilateralism assumes a different dimension. Abstract multilateralism is as incompatible with a new Atlantic relationship as abstract unilateralism. The former absorbs purpose in a quest for a general global consensus, the latter in overemphasis on a special national character. But the Atlantic Alliance, to be meaningful, needs to have a
special character between these two extremes. It must be able to
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As the alliance increases its political consultation, it will have to
decide in what manner Europe plays its role, whether as a political unit
or on a more ad hoc basis. Importantly, this will depend on the
political evolution of Europe. In the interim, outgoing Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder suggested at this year’s *Wehrkunde* conference that
a panel of senior former officials or other respected nongovernmental
personnel might develop some of the options.

Is this possible? We cannot know the answer today, but the
future of our civilization requires that we make the effort. In
undertaking that task, we should remember a quote from Winston
Churchill: "It is not always enough to do our best; sometimes we have to do what is required."
NATO's Place within the Global Context

On April 23, 1973 – 32 years ago – while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon – I addressed an Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: “There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name
of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies – also in the name of Atlantic unity.”

I recall these quotes to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic relations was not as unique as it appears today. The circumstances that caused the debate were, however, quite different.

Then the disputes arose because of a perception of growing Soviet strength, especially in the nuclear strategic field. Today it is fostered by the collapse of Soviet military power and hence the disappearance of an agreed military threat.

Then European integration was just beginning. Today it is far advanced and, with all its recent setbacks, approaching a point of culmination.

Then European nations – whatever their differences with the United States – were anxious to sustain America’s continued
commitment to their defense. Today many allies are anxious lest they
are drawn into conflicts that involve American interests but not
necessarily their own.

Then the center of gravity of world affairs was the Atlantic.

Today the seminal fact is that the center of gravity is shifting to the
Pacific basin.

Then the Atlantic nations thought they needed a nuclear strategy
to resist their adversaries’ presumed superiority in conventional
weapons. Today many nations seek nuclear weapons to offset
America’s presumed superiority in advanced precise conventional
weapons.

These changed policy perspectives reflect changes in the political
evolution on both sides of the Atlantic.
The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the 17th century when the Treaty of Westphalia created an international system based on the notion of sovereignty. European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not traditional diplomacy but esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European diplomats seek to apply their new experience to the international arena. This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be legitimized by the UN Security Council – in other words, an international consensus separate from the
alliance structure. The proposition that the alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War and subjected its actions to a Soviet veto. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between its past based on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy and its future institutions not yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic foreign policy.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent on the sovereign right to define the ultimate threats to its security. With a European national interest yet to be defined, these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply embedded in European public opinion. How to reconcile the non-state aspect of European unification with the experience of a country driven
by state concepts or with the notion of alliance as traditionally
conceived... [INCOMPLETE THOUGHT]

Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan, and India
still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European
states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema;
it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The
concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion.
The balance of power [still] affects their calculations.

At the heart of the controversy between unilateralism and
multilateralism, the real issue is not procedural. No serious leader
prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available.
The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps
incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the
requirements of security. The issue before the alliance, therefore, is
whether it is possible to reachieve a common purpose in designing a global order and how to implement it.

I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not only a strategic but a moral and psychological imperative. Having experienced dictatorship and war, we considered Atlantic cooperation an essential building block for a new system of international relations. The conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a partnership freed of many of the pressures of traditional diplomacy. Disputes – as described in my opening paragraphs – occasionally occurred, but they generally concerned disagreements about agreed goals, rarely the goals themselves.

The generations that followed us, having experienced neither the war nor the beginning of the Cold War, were more shaped by the controversies surrounding Vietnam and missile deployment. Thus a
shared interpretation of the new international environment has been more difficult and disputes more intense.

The question before the Atlantic Alliance is whether it is possible to achieve a common purpose and by what methods.

This is not the occasion to put forward a detailed blueprint for the next phase of foreign policy. Rather, let me stress, as a believer in Atlantic cooperation based on parallel histories and shared values, two tasks among many that are before us and how they need, in my opinion, to be addressed.

**Iraq**

I have been warned not to talk about Iraq to a [predominantly] European audience. Fatigue has set in, I am told, and there is a growing desire to end the conflict. I have rejected that advice because
the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of the original decision to intervene – [which] I supported – or the arguments of the controversies of 2003, current thinking must deal with the impact of possible outcomes, especially catastrophic ones. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have global consequences. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul,
Madrid, London, and New Delhi demonstrate the worldwide scope of the *jihad* challenge.

Much will depend on whether the reasonably stable institutions can emerge in Iraq after the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 15. The mechanical part of success is relatively easy to define: establishment of a government considered sufficiently legitimate by the Iraqi people to permit recruitment of an army willing and able to defend its institutions.

What is such a government? Western democracy developed in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate where minority status is permanently
established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic
differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such
circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression
of the weak by the powerful. In multiethnic societies, minority rights
must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards.

Political progress in Iraq can be defined in terms of four
objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process
to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis;
(2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as
havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite
government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4)
to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic
process.
I have gone into Iraq at such length despite the reservations some in this audience have expressed in the past because there is no escaping the dilemma: a catastrophic outcome in Iraq would affect directly or indirectly all the members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The belief that accommodation to the \textit{jihad} agenda provides immunity confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. This is why the next phase of the Iraq conflict requires some degree of internationalization. As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about the direction of Iraq's evolution should be attempted. Whether to do this in the NATO Council or via some more restricted contact group goes beyond the scope of this speech. The consultative process could then lead to a degree of internationalization of the political process.

Security will increasingly shift into Iraqi responsibility backed by
American forces. But the political stability of emerging institutions depends ultimately on international acceptance. The United States should be prepared to share defined responsibilities in political reconstruction with its allies and the international community. Atlantic consultations could lead to an international contact group under UN auspices to advise on Iraq’s political evolution. Logical members would include countries that have experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq – [such as] India, Turkey, and Russia – together with key NATO countries.

[Palestine – will be done extemporaneously]

Proliferation
As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold War, the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent nightmare. In a speech here in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties incompatible with any sense of moral responsibility, but abdication from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made approximately the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled.

But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation, deterrence will lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-to-state relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer be clear who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means.
order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can become a shield behind which to step up terrorist challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called “private” distribution of Pakistan’s nuclear technology to other countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation from spinning out of control.

The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks in Beijing – composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US, and China – seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.
The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain, France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating parties do not by themselves have available the combination of incentives and pressures – especially as Iran is a more powerful country with a greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a challenge that brooks no delay.

It is not a matter of devising a formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the ongoing diplomacy to UN action. The fundamental challenge to the Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions: How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation in Iran has become irreversible? What incentives and assurances are we prepared to offer? What
pressures are we prepared to undertake if incentives do not work?

And how do we prevent negotiation and implementation from becoming a means to legitimize proliferation rather than avert it?

Failure to answer these questions will face the world community and the Atlantic Alliance with yet another set of questions: How does a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world community react to such an event or to a nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries?

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to elaborate a forum for negotiations with [Iran] that would include nations with an immediate interest in the subject, which – by analogy to the Beijing talks – could well include the United States, Russia, and
perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the
Beijing talks.

Conclusion

The fundamental question remains whether the Atlantic Alliance
can develop the cohesion to address so vast an agenda. For in
addition to the topics discussed here are such issues as the rise of
Asia, the equitable distribution of energy, and the entry of billions of
new workers into the global economy.

Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They
have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a
generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. It is
in that context that the debate over preemption should be redefined.
The defining characteristic of the traditional international system has
been fundamentally altered by contemporary ideology and technology.

That system assumed that the domestic jurisdiction of states was beyond international challenge; hence the principal threat to international stability was perceived to be the attempt to change frontiers by force of arms. Neither assumption is still valid.

Terrorist threats challenge the social cohesion, and weapons of mass destruction can alter the balance of power and threaten devastation primarily through technological developments within the territory of a sovereign state. In those circumstances, the potential victims cannot wait until the threat has been implemented.

Preemption is inherent in the technology and ideology of the 21st-century international system. But that challenge should not be presented as if it were an American dispensation. It cannot be in America’s interest to encourage every nation to define preemption in
purely national terms. The solution to this dispute is to develop
together some principles of preemption.

For in the end, preemption is not so much a new concept as the
application of a norm long recognized in international law: the right of
self-defense. What the argument is about is rules for establishing the
threshold of when this principle can be applied under contemporary
circumstances.

As the alliance shifts its emphasis from the military to the
political arena, from defending a geopolitical dividing line to what in
NATO parlance used to be called “out of area” conflicts, both sides of
the Atlantic need to define for themselves why NATO is still important.

Foreign policy cannot be based on hegemonic power. Many of
the problems affecting world order are not susceptible to solution by
military means. The United States will not be able to shape every
international problem alone with exhausting itself physically and psychologically. It will need allies, and the countries that most share our values and history are the NATO countries. And however much conventional wisdom balks at the concept of a clash of civilizations, that is what Western societies face together from the radical, crusading *jihadist* version of Islam.

The ultimate challenge for allied foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. It implies the need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of threats and long-range purposes.
By the same token, Europe must resist the temptation of "distinctiveness" for its own sake. The alliance needs a clearer definition of what is intended by a "European" foreign policy and one less geared to pacifying domestic pressure groups. Europe must be allowed scope for disagreeing with its partner. But if distinctiveness is defined by disagreement for its own sake, Western civilization is on the road to destroying its substance, as it did in the first half of the 20th century.

In this context, the debate between multilateralism and unilateralism assumes a different dimension. Abstract multilateralism is as incompatible with a new Atlantic relationship as abstract unilateralism. The former absorbs purpose in a quest for a general global consensus, the latter in overemphasis on a special national character. But the Atlantic Alliance, to be meaningful, needs to have a
special character between these two extremes. It must be able to
define common purposes more precise than the attainable
international consensus and more embracing than the national interest
of an individual partner.

As the alliance increases its political consultation, it will have to
decide in what manner Europe plays its role, whether as a political unit
or on a more ad hoc basis. Importantly, this will depend on the
political evolution of Europe. In the interim, outgoing Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder suggested at this year's Wehrkunde conference that
a panel of senior former officials or other respected nongovernmental
personnel might develop some of the options.

Is this possible? We cannot know the answer today, but the
future of our civilization requires that we make the effort. In
undertaking that task, we should remember a quote from Winston
Churchill: “It is not always enough to do our best; sometimes we have to do what is required.”
NATO's Place within the Strategic Contemporary Context

On April 23, 1973 – 32 years ago – while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon – I addressed an Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: "There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name
of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies – also in the name of Atlantic unity.”

I recall these quotes not to demonstrate my undiminished eloquence but to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic relations was not as unique as it appears today. The circumstances that caused the debate were, however, quite different.

Then the disputes arose because of a perception of growing Soviet strength, especially in the nuclear strategic field. Today it is fostered by the collapse of Soviet military power and hence the disappearance of an agreed military threat.

Then European integration was just beginning. Today it is far advanced and, with all its recent setbacks, approaching a point of culmination.
Then European nations – whatever their differences with the United States – were anxious to sustain America’s continued commitment to their defense. Today many allies are anxious lest they are drawn into conflicts that involve American interests but not necessarily their own.

Then the center of gravity of world affairs was the Atlantic. Today, the seminal fact of our time is that the center of gravity is shifting to the Pacific basin.

Then the Atlantic nations thought they could resist their adversaries’ presumed superiority in conventional weapons by a nuclear strategy. Today many nations seek nuclear weapons to offset America’s presumed superiority in advanced precise conventional weapons.
These changed policy perspectives reflect changes in the political evolution on both sides of the Atlantic, which are quite different.

The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the 17th century—when the Treaty of Westphalia created an international system based on the nation-state. European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not traditional diplomacy but esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European diplomats seek to apply their new experience to the international arena. This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be legitimized by the UN Security Council. The proposition that the...
alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between institutions not yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic foreign policy and domestic pressures based on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent on the sovereign right to define the ultimate threats to its security.

With a European national interest yet to be defined, these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply embedded in European public opinion. Confirmed Atlanticists are increasingly troubled by how to reconcile the non-state aspect of European unification with the experience of a country driven by state concepts or with the notion of alliance as traditionally conceived.
Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan and India still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema; it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion.

The balance of power [still] affects their calculations. The real issue is not procedural. No serious leader prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available.

The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the requirements of security. The issue before the alliance, therefore, is whether it is possible to reachieve a common purpose and how to implement it.
I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not only a strategic but a moral and psychological imperative. Having experienced dictatorship, we considered Atlantic cooperation an essential building bloc for a new system of international relations. The conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a partnership freed of many of the pressures of traditional diplomacy. Disputes – as described in my opening paragraphs – occasionally occurred, but they generally concerned disagreements about agreed goals, rarely the goals themselves.

The generations that followed us, having experienced neither the war nor the beginning of the Cold War, were more shaped by the controversies surrounding Vietnam and missile deployment. Thus a shared interpretation of the new international environment has been more difficult and disputes more intense.
I have been warned not to talk about Iraq to a largely European audience. Fatigue.

I am told there is a warming device to end the conflict. I have rejected that advice because the

[Signature]
The question before the Atlantic Alliance is whether it is possible to achieve a common purpose and by what methods.

This is not the occasion to put forward a detailed blueprint for the next phase of foreign policy. Rather, let me stress, as a believer in Atlantic cooperation based on parallel histories and shared values, what tasks are before us and how they need, in my opinion, to be addressed. You can draw your own conclusions about the feasibility of the enterprise.

Iraq

Iraq has increasingly become a flashpoint of the domestic debate in most allied countries. But the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of
the arguments of the controversies of 1963, what should dominate current thinking is the impact of a catastrophic outcome. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have global consequences. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and New Delhi demonstrate the scope of this challenge.

Much will depend on whether the reasonably stable institutions can emerge in Iraq after the parliamentary elections scheduled for
December 15. The mechanical part of success is relatively easy to define: establishment of a government considered sufficiently legitimate by the Iraqi people to permit recruitment of an army willing and able to defend its institutions.

What is such a government? Western democracy developed in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression
of the weak by the powerful. In multiethnic societies, minority rights must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards.

Political progress in Iraq can be defined in terms of four objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.

I have gone into Iraq at such length despite the reservations some in this audience have expressed in the past because there is no escaping the dilemma: a catastrophic outcome in Iraq would affect directly or indirectly all the members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as
countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The belief that accommodation to the jihad agenda provides immunity confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about the direction of Iraq’s evolution should be attempted. Whether to do this in the NATO Council or via some contact group goes beyond the scope of this speech. The consultative process could then lead to a degree of internationalization of the political process. Security will increasingly shift into Iraqi responsibility backed by American forces. But the stability of emerging institutions depends ultimately on international acceptance. The United States should be prepared to share some degree of internationalization should be part of the next phase. Atlantic consultations could lead to an international contact group under UN auspices to advise on Iraq’s political evolution. Logical members would include countries that have experience with
militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq – [such as] India, Turkey, and Russia – together with key NATO countries.

[Palestine – will be done extemporaneously]

Proliferation

As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold War, I believe the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent nightmare. In a speech here in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties incompatible with any sense of moral obligation, but abdication from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made
approximately the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled. But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation, deterrence will lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-to-state relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer be clear who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means.

Second-order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can become a shield behind which to step up terrorist challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called "private" distribution of Pakistan’s nuclear technology to other countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation from spinning out of control. North Korea is so short of foreign exchange that its diplomats often revert to counterfeit currency; it
might find the temptation to trade nuclear material for foreign exchange irresistible. In Iran, extremist elements have frequently demonstrated their ability to find spurious Islamic justification for unconscionable acts in support of terrorism.

The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks in Beijing – composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US, and China – seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.

The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain, France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One
problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating
parties do not alone have available the combination of incentives and
pressures – especially as Iran is a more powerful country with a
greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a
challenge that brooks no delay. It is not a matter of devising a
formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the
ongoing diplomacy to UN action. The fundamental challenge to the
Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions:
How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation
in Iran has become irreversible? What incentives and assurances are
we prepared to offer? What pressures are we prepared to undertake if
incentives do not work? And how do we prevent negotiation and
implementation from becoming a means to legitimize proliferation
rather than avert it?
Failure to answer these questions will face the world community and the Atlantic Alliance with these questions: How does a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world community react to such an event or a nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries?

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to elaborate a forum for negotiations with [Iran] that would include nations with an immediate interest in the subject, which—by analogy to the Beijing talks—could well include the United States, Russia, and perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the Beijing talks.

Conclusion
For its part, America defines its national interests in more strategic terms. Europe defers worries about the operation of such new institutions as the International Criminal Court partly because of the lower priority it gives to foreign policy altogether. The United States is concerned about the immediate impact of an institution with a vague charter, unsettled procedures and no system of checks and balances, one that can affect the many Americans engaged in global responsibilities. Hence it contests the ICC's provisions with the same intensity Europeans devote to common agricultural policy.

The difference in Europe's reaction to the Bush administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court, compared with its treatment of the policies of the Clinton administration, shows that the controversy is more about style than substance. Europeans were pacified by the multilateral process of negotiation even though they must have known that what was being negotiated would not be implemented. The Senate, by a vote of 95 to 0, had made clear its refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. And President Clinton, in signing the ICC convention three weeks before leaving office, emphasized that he had no intention of submitting it to the Senate for ratification or of recommending that his successors do so.

Similarly, the furor surrounding the notion of preemption concerns procedure probably far more than substance. The administration was defending its position on the defining characteristic of the traditional international system has been fundamentally altered by contemporary ideology and technology. That system assumed that the domestic jurisdiction of states was beyond international challenge; hence the principal threat to international stability was perceived to be the attempt to change frontiers by force of arms. Neither assumption is still valid. Terrorist threats challenge the social cohesion, and weapons of mass destruction can alter the balance of power and threaten devastation primarily some principles of preemption. •. . . , n . a

to military to the political arena, from defending a geopolitical dividing line to what in NATO parlance used to be called "out of area" conflicts, both sides of the Atlantic need to define for themselves why NATO is still important.

The United States must resist the foreign policy hegemonic power. Many of the problems affecting world order are not susceptible to solution by military means. Hence the very power or latter every powerful country calls into being counter-\-Balancing forces. And that power, and I would assert, the United States will not be able to serve every international problem alone without exhausting itself physically and psychologically. It will need allies, and the countries that most share our values and history are the NATO countries. And however much conventional wisdom balks at the concept of a clash of civilizations, that is what Western societies face together from the radical, crusading strain of Islam.

The ultimate challenge for American foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. It implies the need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of threats and long-range purposes.

By the same token, Europe must resist the temptation of "distinctiveness" for its own sake. Once center US. culture and policy has been a staple of European opponents of NATO for 50 years. What is unusual now is that European countries are making efforts to claim the title, and they occasionally even cite it up. The alliance needs a clearer understanding of what is intended by a "European" foreign policy and one less geared to pacifying domestic pressure groups. Europe must be allowed scope for disagreeing with its partner. But if distinctiveness is defined by disagreement for its own sake, Western civilization is on the road to destroying its substance, as it did in the first half of the 20th century. Europe must take pains to define how its attempt to share a world order reflects a sense of global responsibility and not the psychological orientation of particular leaders.

In this context, the debate between multilateralism and unilateralism assumes a different dimension. Abstract multilateralism is as incompatible with a new Atlantic relationship as abstract unilateralism. The former absorbs purpose in a quest for a general global consensus, the latter in overemphasize on a special national character. But NATO needs to be meaningful, needs to have a special character between these two extremes. It must be able to define common purposes more precise than the attainable international consensus and more embracing than the national interest of an individual partner, however powerful.

Is this possible? We cannot be convinced of this point. We cannot know the answer today, but the future of our civilization requires that we make the effort to find it.
Henry A. Kissinger

A Dangerous Divergence

NATO was created more than a half-century ago to protect its members against the threat of aggression, specifically a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. That threat has not been involved. The Bush administration has abandoned pressures for increasing the overall European defense effort. Instead, it has concentrated on the creation of a relatively small intervention force of 20,000 under the NATO institutional umbrella to confront threats that used to be considered "out of area."

If European distinctiveness is defined by disagreement for its own sake, Western civilization is on the road to destroying its substance, as it did in the first half of the 20th century.

But the future of NATO depends less on its military structure than on the ability of its members to develop common political purposes. And therein lies reason for profound concern. European media and some political figures continue to present the United States as the land of the death penalty, rapacious capitalism, unilateral diplomacy and a cowboy mentality. The psychological gulf was evident when, at last month's NATO summit in Prague, so staunch an advocate of Atlantic ties as Czech President Vaclav Havel asked for understanding of "the occasional insensitivity, clumsiness or self-importance that may come with this [global] responsibility." Even the consensus on Iraq at the Prague summit will face a moment of truth when there is a need to define what constitutes a material breach of U.N. resolutions and what remedies are appropriate.

At the same time, many in the United States see Europe as a region of incipient neutralism, free-riding on U.S. defense capabilities and seeking to protect its security by substituting multilateralism for alliance responsibilities. There is a growing insistence on having the United States act as the sole arbiter of the global interest. These attitudes are at the heart of the dispute that goes under the heading of multilateralism vs. unilateralism.

The slogans obscure the underlying reality, which concerns the relative importance to be given to domestic and foreign policy. Europeans are no more willing than Americans to subordinate their perception of vital national interests to multilateralism in the abstract—witness their behavior with respect to the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union. But they define their vital interests in more parochial terms and regard global issues as matters that can be used to gain the support of national constituencies. In this way, European multilateralism often merges with new forms of self-righteous, moralistic nationalism.

(over)
political consultation it will have to decide in what manner Europe plays its role whether as political unit or an annual ad hoc basis. Essentially, political this will depend on the protection of Europe in the interim
The fundamental question remains whether the Atlantic Alliance can develop the cohesion to address so vast an agenda. For in addition to the topics discussed here are such issues as the rise of Asia, the equitable distribution of energy, and the entry of billions of new workers into the global economy.

Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. The Atlantic Alliance needs to adapt its institutions to the task of shaping the emerging world order. As Europe unifies, it may play a role within the alliance in a more coherent form. Until then, various formulae suggest themselves as interim solutions. Outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schröder suggested at this year’s Wehrkunde conference that a panel of senior former officials or other nongovernmental personnel might...
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Europe will, of course, gain greater scope as a result of its strength and emerging cohesion. But while this includes occasional disagreements with its allies, a challenge to America should not be its unifying principle. As for America, it needs to continue the current process of increased consultation, enhancing it by defining consultation as something broader than implementing American designs. Room must be left for the designs of others.

Amidst the turmoil attendant on an emerging world order, we can take pride in a half-century of great achievement. In undertaking that task, we should remember a quote from Winston Churchill: “It is not always enough to do our best; sometimes we have to do what is required.”

Is this possible? We cannot know. It requires that we make the effort.
NATO’s Place within the Strategic Contemporary Context

On April 23, 1973 – 32 years ago – while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon – I addressed [an] Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: “There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name
of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies – also in the name of Atlantic unity.”

I recall these quotes not to demonstrate my undiminished eloquence but to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic relations was not as unique as it appears today. The circumstances that caused the debate were, however, quite different.

Then the disputes arose because of a perception of growing Soviet strength, especially in the nuclear strategic field. Today it is fostered by the collapse of Soviet military power and hence the disappearance of an agreed military threat.

Then European integration was just beginning. Today it is far advanced and, with all its recent setbacks, approaching a point of culmination.
Then European nations – whatever their differences with the
United States – were anxious to sustain America’s continued
commitment to their defense. Today many allies are anxious lest they
are drawn into conflicts that involve American interests but not
necessarily their own.

Then the center of gravity of world affairs was the Atlantic.

[Today] the seminal fact of our time is that the center of gravity is
shifting to the Pacific basin.

Then the Atlantic nations thought they could resist their
adversaries’ presumed superiority in conventional weapons by a
nuclear strategy. Today many nations seek nuclear weapons to offset
America’s presumed superiority in advanced precise conventional
weapons.
These changed policy perspectives reflect changes in the political evolution on both sides of the Atlantic, which are quite different.

The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the 17th century. European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not traditional diplomacy but esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European diplomats seek to apply their new experience to the international arena. This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be legitimized by the UN Security Council. The proposition that the
an alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between institutions not yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic foreign policy and domestic pressures based on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent on the sovereign right to define the ultimate threats to its security. With a European national interest yet to be defined, these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply embedded in European public opinion. Confirmed Atlanticists are increasingly troubled [over] how to reconcile the non-state aspect of European unification with the experience of a country driven by state concepts or with the notion of alliance as traditionally conceived.
Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan and India still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema; it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion. The balance of power [still] affects their calculations.

This is at the heart of the controversy between unilaterism and multilateralism. The real issue is not procedural. No serious leader prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available. The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the requirements of security. The issue before the alliance, therefore, is whether it is possible to achieve a common purpose and how to implement it.
I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not only a strategic but a moral and psychological imperative. Having experienced dictatorship, we considered Atlantic cooperation an essential building bloc for a new system of international relations. The conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a partnership freed of many of the pressures of traditional diplomacy. Disputes – as described in my opening paragraphs – occasionally occurred, but they generally concerned disagreements about agreed goals, rarely the goals themselves.

The generations that followed us, having experienced neither the war nor the beginning of the Cold War, were more shaped by the controversies surrounding Vietnam and missile deployment. Thus a shared interpretation of the new international environment has been more difficult and disputes more intense.
The question before the Atlantic Alliance is whether it is possible to achieve a common purpose and by what methods.

This is not the occasion to put forward a detailed blueprint for the next phase of foreign policy. Rather, let me stress, as a believer in Atlantic cooperation based on parallel histories and shared values, what tasks are before us and how they need, in my opinion, to be addressed. You can draw your own conclusions about the feasibility of the enterprise.

Iraq

Iraq has increasingly become a flashpoint of the domestic debate in most allied countries. But the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of
the arguments of the controversies of 1963, what should dominate current thinking is the impact of a catastrophic outcome. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have global consequences. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and New Delhi demonstrate the scope of this challenge.

Much will depend on whether the reasonably stable institutions can emerge in Iraq after the parliamentary elections scheduled for
December 15. The mechanical part of success is relatively easy to define: establishment of a government considered sufficiently legitimate by the Iraqi people to permit recruitment of an army willing and able to defend its institutions.

What is such a government? Western democracy developed in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression
of the weak by the powerful. In multiethnic societies, minority rights must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards.

Political progress in Iraq can be defined in terms of four objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.

I have gone into Iraq at such length despite the reservations some in this audience have expressed in the past because there is no escaping the dilemma: a catastrophic outcome in Iraq would affect directly or indirectly all the members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as
countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The belief that accommodation to the *jihad* agenda provides immunity confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about the direction of Iraq’s evolution should be attempted. Whether to do this in the NATO Council or via some contact group goes beyond the scope of this speech. The consultative process could then lead to a degree of internationalization of the political process. Security will increasingly shift into Iraqi responsibility backed by American forces. But the stability of emerging institutions depends ultimately on international acceptance. Some degree of internationalization should be part of the next phase. Atlantic consultations could lead to an international contact group under UN auspices to advise on Iraq’s political evolution. Logical members would include countries that have experience with
militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq – [such as] India, Turkey, and Russia – together with key NATO countries.

[Palestine – will be done extemporaneously]

Proliferation

As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold War, [I believe] the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent nightmare. In a speech [here] in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties incompatible with any sense of moral obligation, but abdication from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made
approximately the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled. But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation, deterrence will lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-to-state relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer be clear who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means.

Second-order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can become a shield behind which to step up terrorist challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called “private” distribution of Pakistan’s nuclear technology to other countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation from spinning out of control. North Korea is so short of foreign exchange that its diplomats often revert to counterfeit currency; it
might find the temptation to trade nuclear material for foreign exchange irresistible. In Iran, extremist elements have frequently demonstrated their ability to find specious Islamic justification for unconscionable acts in support of terrorism.

The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks in Beijing – composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US, and China – seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.

The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain, France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One
problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating parties do not alone have available the combination of incentives and pressures – especially as Iran is a more powerful country with a greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a challenge that brooks no delay. It is not a matter of devising a formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the ongoing diplomacy to UN action. The fundamental challenge to the Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions: How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation in Iran has become irreversible? What incentives and assurances are we prepared to offer? What pressures are we prepared to undertake if incentives do not work? And how do we prevent negotiation and implementation from becoming a means to legitimate proliferation rather than avert it?
Failure to answer these questions will face the world community and the Atlantic Alliance with these questions: How does a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world community react to such an event or a nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries?

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to elaborate a forum for negotiations with [Iran] that would include nations with an immediate interest in the subject, which – by analogy to the Beijing talks – could well include the United States, Russia, and perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the Beijing talks.

Conclusion
The fundamental question remains whether the Atlantic Alliance can develop the cohesion to address so vast an agenda. For in addition to the topics discussed here are such issues as the rise of Asia, the equitable distribution of energy, and the entry of billions of new workers into the global economy.

Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. The Atlantic Alliance needs to adapt its institutions to the task of shaping the emerging world order. As Europe unifies, it may play a role within the alliance in a more coherent form. Until then, various formulae suggest themselves as interim solutions. Outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schröder suggested at this year’s *Wehrkunde* conference that a panel of senior former officials or other nongovernmental personnel might
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