First of all let me thank the Hindustan Times for inviting me to address you. It is always an exciting experience for me to visit India. It gives me an opportunity to renew friendships that have developed now over decades. This is a particularly important moment when, I believe in both countries, it is recognised that the interests of India and of the United States are parallel and we have been able to develop a partnership that will be of great significance to the rest of the world.

Before I go into this, however, I need to point out -- since the US Ambassador, my friend David Mulford is sitting in the front row looking at me intently -- that I speak here as a private citizen, a close friend of the administration and of its leading personalities, but I give my interpretation, which I believe is compatible with their general direction.

I speak to you as somebody who has thought a great deal about American foreign policy and history for quite a bit. But what I say is bound to be in the context of existing states...
and existing American relationships. We attach great importance to our relationship with India. But it is only fair to point out that we also have other relationships and that these must be understood in the context of their own history and their importance. In our view, they need not detract from the relationship we have with India.

We have just had an election in the United States. If you had been in New York during that election, you would have thought that Senator John Kerry would carry 49 states. What the election has proved is that there is a substantial national support for the fundamental philosophy that President George W. Bush represents -- and that philosophy will be increasingly bipartisan as time goes on.

Foreign policy should not be considered the policy of one party. Foreign policy affects the fundamental interest of our society and has to be conducted over several administrations over an extended period of time. This is true of the relationship to India.

We in the world face four major problems. The first is one which we called terrorism.
The second is proliferation. The third is the movement of the centre of gravity from the Atlantic region to Asia. And the fourth is the impact of a globalised economy on the world economic system. This change brings about a dramatic transformation of international relations as we have noted. I will conclude with expressing my conviction, and the conviction of the overwhelming majority of those who are concerned with foreign policy in the United States, that the United States and India can walk a parallel path. Indeed, we are two great nations that have no conflicting national interests that could bring us into confrontation -- and that should be a fundamental theme for our foreign policies.

First, the issue that is terrorism. In order to understand its impact on the United States, you have to recognise the peculiarities of American history. America is the only major country in the world that has never had powerful neighbours. It is the only major country that believes that it could withdraw or participate in foreign policy at its own choice. It is the only major country that for most of its history has believed that every problem had a solution and that, therefore, once you faced a problem you could overcome it and set a
deadline for it. If you look at American initiatives in the period after World War II, you will see that almost every one of them had a terminal line attached. Now, we are in a world in which there is no endgame, a world of huge revolutions going on in many parts simultaneously.

The fact that the United States could be attacked on its own soil was a traumatic event for Americans, something that in India would not be in itself unusual in terms of Indian history. Secondly, this attack took place by private groups, not states. The whole of American history has been concentrated on international relations as the relationship of states to each other. This is true also of the European approach to foreign policy. That private groups could undertake efforts that in the past would be possible only by states -- and that security was endangered by groups that had no attribute of sovereignty but were operating from the territory of sovereign states without identical motives was a novel departure. It forced the United States to consider policies that were unprecedented and for which there is no preparation in our experience.
We had been familiar with diplomacy and deterrence in the Cold War. But deterrence does not operate against groups that have nothing to defend, and diplomacy does not operate with respect to groups that have no stated objectives and that are not willing to limit their objectives.

What we confronted, and what the whole world confronts, is not terrorism as such. Terrorism is a method. It is not a strategy. We are facing radical, fundamentalist Islam that is trying to undermine secular Islam, moderate Islam, secular states everywhere, and all other institutions that are incompatible with their radical vision of some sort of Islamic Caliphate. That is what the United States had tried to oppose and that is what makes the policies that we had to pursue not just policies for the United States, but also policies that affect the whole world.

I will not go into the details of the diplomacy that led to Iraq. Nor do I accept the statements that I have heard. In the view of the United States' leaders, this was not an issue of unilateralism against multilateralism.
Let me make clear what I believe to be the issue on unilateralism versus multilateralism.

We are at the beginning of a new international order. A new international order can last only if most of the significant nations believe in it. No nation, not even a nation as powerful as the United States, can impose a world order on everybody else. Hegemony cannot be the permanent policy of a country. No empire has ever lasted because when running an empire is beyond the capacity of any society, it exhausts society in acts of repression.

So, the ultimate goal of America is to achieve some degree of consensus. And if I had to predict what the Bush Administration will do in its second term, it will be precisely to try to bring about a big step towards an international order that most relevant societies feel they can embrace -- which is one reason why the co-operation of another great democracy like India is essential.
The issue of unilateralism against multilateralism arises, or should arise, basically only in emergency situations -- when a country feels that its vital national interests are threatened and it cannot achieve consensus. Then it has to decide whether to act alone or whether to give other nations a veto over something it considers essential for its security and survival.

That was the issue as it presented itself on Iraq: A country that had the largest armed forces in the region, that had used its armed forces to attack two of its neighbours, that had larger resources which it could deploy in that situation and that was believed to be in possession of and working on weapons of mass destruction could not be allowed to join the terrorists, especially as it had committed seventeen violations of the UN certified ceasefire that ended the Gulf War.

I don't want to repeat the debates, but these were not trivial decisions, nor are they a necessary guide for the future. The guide for the future should be to see what we could learn from this experience and how, before there is an emergency, we can achieve cooperation among the key countries relevant and international order.
Let me illustrate this with the current situation in Iraq. Whatever you think of how the situation arose and, as I made clear, I supported the policy of our administration, I would be amazed if many thoughtful Indians would not agree with me when I say that if a Taliban-type or fundamentalist radical government emerges in Baghdad it would radicalise the entire Islamic world and create fundamental challenges to moderate and secular regimes in the Islamic world and to any country that has large Islamic minorities.

From that point of view, the outcome in Iraq is of great consequence to many nations. We have seen terrorism from Bali to Indonesia to Singapore to Turkey to Riyadh to Morocco to Madrid to Moscow. This is a world problem and when we ask ourselves how we should proceed in Iraq, my view -- which is not yet and may never be the US government view – is, we had to act unilaterally in the military field but we should seek multilateral support for the political institutions.

Once elections are held in Iraq, the evolution of Iraq would benefit from the co-operation
and wisdom of other countries that have much at stake. It would be helpful, and I have said so publicly, if some kind of contact groups were created in which I have taken the liberty of mentioning India, and also Russia, Turkey and whatever European and Arab nations choose to co-operate, particularly those who have had experience with radical Islam. Political and economic reconstruction done co-operatively would separate the issue of military participation from the issue of political evolution. Such a co-operative effort which should also be a significant effort to bring about progress towards the Palestinian issue -- and I will be glad to comment on this in the question period.

The second issue I mentioned is proliferation. This again is one that affects everybody. Indeed it is the sort of issue with respect to which, the United States in a better technical position against specific dangers like long-range missiles. The danger of the spread of nuclear weapons technology to other countries and into terrorist hands can best be analysed if we ask ourselves this question: what should be the reaction if there were a nuclear attack in any capital of the world from New Delhi to any European or American city. What would we do if that happened? At what point would we decide, and by 'we' I
mean the international community, that it cannot go any further and we must insist on a
solution, even an imperfect solution?

How much time do we really have and what countries are we most concerned about? At
what point will the diplomacy of non-proliferation run out of control? This is a technical
question and our scientists should be able to give precise answers. It is not helpful to
come up with little measures and to have analyst discussions of whether pressure or
diplomacy is better when the key issues remain unresolved.

The second question we have to answer is what precisely must one be to prevent real
catastrophe from happening. What would one propose if there were a reasonable
diplomacy that is in the decent interval including the proliferating countries? Finally
what do we do if diplomacy fails? I am not here to give you the answer to this, but I think
these are key questions and I would not be surprised if the United States raises them.

In building an international order it is not enough to insist on a diplomatic multilateral
process but it is also not enough to insist on your own conclusions on every problem. I am convinced that in the first term President Bush had to deal with an emergency and this became the focal point of many frustrations. In the second term he will want to leave a historic legacy and I think he is in a position, comparable to one which the United States was at the end of World War II, that is to say the period between 1945 and 1955 which witnessed some of the most constructive American diplomatic initiatives.

The United States contributed through the Marshall plan and through many other measures to create and support an international system that managed to get us through the Cold War without catastrophe and managed to bring democracy to many countries. This is our challenge now. It is a particular challenge because as the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pointed out on the first day here, the centre of the gravity of the world

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1 On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall spoke at Harvard University and outlined what would become known as the Marshall Plan. Europe, still devastated by the war, had just survived one of the worst winters on record. The nations of Europe had nothing to sell for hard currency, and the democratic socialist governments in most countries were unwilling to adopt the draconian proposals for recovery advocated by old-line classical economists. Something had to be done, both for humanitarian reasons and also to stop the potential spread of communism westward. The United States offered up to $20 billion for relief, but only if the European nations could get together and draw up a rational plan on how they would use the aid. For the first time, they would have to act as a single economic unit; they would have to cooperate with each other. Marshall also offered aid to the Soviet Union and its allies in eastern Europe, but Stalin denounced the program as a trick and refused to participate.
is moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific to Asia.

The major productive capacities are gradually moving to Asia. The rate of growth in Asia is extraordinary and therefore a new international system will emerge. When you read European history you will find that it is generally argued that the emergence of Germany unbalanced the European system because it was too powerful a state for the environment and that it inevitably led to World War I. In fact, the British Prime Minister Disraeli in 1871 when Germany was unified said, "This is a greater event than the French Revolution."

Now we see the emergence of China; a little bit behind it is the emergence of India. This represents a greater transfer of power than any we have seen in a previous period and the relations of these countries to each other and to their neighbours will shape many of the significant events -- indeed in a historical perspective it may be more significant than even our immediate concern with terrorism.
When I come to India, I am asked this question: Are you going to try to play China against India or India against China and are you going to do sort of balance of power policy in Asia? My answer to that is here we are dealing with two great nations with a long history. They are not toys with which the United States can do what it wants. We cannot go to nations and say, “Will you kindly conduct an anti-India policy because that is convenient for us,” or, vice versa, go to India and say, “Will you help us balance China?” Both countries will act in their own perceptions of their interests. For America, the key goal will be – or should be- to develop policies compatible with both.

In the period before World War I, that was a reasonable way to think, largely in terms of the balance of power though the catastrophic casualties of that war showed the danger of exclusive reliance on equilibrium. In the period of nuclear weapons and global growth, a war between major countries is a catastrophe; every leading state knows it will destroy the societies that engage in it. Which European statesman on August 1, 1914 -- when the First World War broke out -- would not have recoiled had we known what the world would look like in 1918 when the war ended?
We know today what the world will look like after a great power conflict. So the issue is not what balance of power game the United States or India is going to play or China is going to play. I think the objectives of diplomacy must be much more profound.

I said globalisation is the key issue and it is the key issue in at least four ways. First, amongst industrialising nations, as one looks at the future, the access to energy and raw materials will become an increasing challenge and we may find the ironic result that some 19th century problems repeat themselves in a different way. A book called The Great Game\(^2\) described the impact of Russia and Great Britain and, to a lesser degree, China on each other in Central Asia during the 19\(^{th}\) century. It was about territory and Russia approaching the borders of India and of England wanting to protect its access to India.

When I speak to American audiences about Indian foreign policy and enterprise, the

\(^2\) The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia by Peter Hopkirk
foreign policy of Britain, East of Suez was not made in London but in Calcutta, so that it reflected the Indian perception of fundamental Indian interests. It would be ironic if ‘the great game’ repeated itself about which way pipelines are going, whether east or west or south. It does not take any great imagination to know that if you leave it entirely to market forces without some strategic understanding, huge consequences could follow.

Then we have within and between nations, the challenges of globalisation, and the impact of globalisation. The American elections witnessed a debate about outsourcing and the danger of competition from China and India. The reason for that is obvious. Free markets help everybody in the long run. But in the short run, competition creates disparities and there is always a great temptation to use the political process to protect yourself against its economic consequences. Leaders have to understand this and, therefore, the G7 and G8 processes have to be used in a more profound and systematic way. When the G7 process was created in 1975, only three leaders sat at the table: The Prime Minster (or Chief Executive), the Finance Minster and the Foreign Minister. Therefore the meetings were very small. Now they have become performances in which subordinates prepare the
communiqués and the meetings themselves become simply symbolic representations.

Now there is the challenge of globalisation between nations. Prime Minister John Major pointed out the inequalities that exist in the world and that you cannot have an international system in which most nations do not feel a sense of participation.

I have sketched for you some of the challenges the world faces. Now where do India and the United States fit in this? For one thing, we are both democracies and this creates a certain proclivity in feeling more comfortable with regimes and governments that we know reflect the popular world and therefore assure greater continuity.

Secondly, we have no conflicting interests in the traditional sense. That does not mean we cannot occasionally get on each other's nerves -- we have proved a great capacity for that and I have made my own contribution to it -- but when we look at our fundamental interests; at what we really want and what are we trying to achieve in the world, our disputes should be more than tactical disagreements. In the fundamental drift, our two
countries can work closely and increasingly together.

The national purpose is no longer to create a balance of power because with modern weapons you don't have to add countries to achieve great power. The purpose is to deal with the intangible and economically tangible consequences of a globalising world which is simultaneously in turmoil on many political issues. I expect that in the second Bush term, the relation between our two countries will even grow closer and that we can both learn from each other.

I expect that our countries will have a closer relationship without detriment to other relationships that we may have. That is our challenge. Over 200 years ago, the German philosopher Kant\(^3\) wrote: "Someday there will be perpetual peace and it will come about either by human insight and human foresight or it will come about by a series of catastrophes of such nature that mankind has no choice."

\(^3\) Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
Our challenge in the world today is to make perpetual peace come about through human foresight and I expect that America and India will be partners in that effort.

Q&A

Moderated by Lalit Mansingh

Former Indian ambassador to the US

Lalit Mansingh: Thank you Dr. Kissinger for that profound analysis and for the words of wisdom that we already expected from you -- and I particularly appreciate the optimistic note on Indo-US relations.

Question (unidentified): Dr. Kissinger, 25 years ago you wrote in the White House Years that America finds it easy to deal with dictatorships and finds it difficult to deal with democracies because the decision-making takes that much longer. It is nice to know that
you see a great friendship growing between India and the United States, but at the same
time the United States is also friendly with Pakistan where a dictatorship exists. Do you
see any contradiction in your observation?

**Henry Kissinger:** Well, _White House Years_ has about 1,400 pages and while my students
are required to memorise every word, I don't believe I said this because that is not my
view. What I certainly believed in 1971 given the circumstances that then existed -- in
which India had made an agreement with the Soviet Union and we had opened to China
but before Nixon's visit-- there was a war that threatened the existence of Pakistan and
so, for strategic reasons, we tried to bring this to an end.

The issue had nothing to with the emergence of Bangladesh. I think the real issue was
India did not want Bangladesh to emerge as an American project. I can understand very
well being the neighbour, but that was a purely strategic decision for a limited period of
time. Institutionally, we always felt more comfortable with the Indian system than with
the Pakistani system which then existed and which was a military dictatorship.
It can happen that in the evolution of a policy, you encounter relationships that you believe are essential for your security in which you modify some of your other preferences. I am sure there are Indian officials here who remember very well what I said to them privately -- that is, I always believed even then that the strategic interest of the United States and India were largely parallel.

But in the Cold War, when Russia was 400 miles away for you and thousands of miles away for us there were different perspectives. That is not the case today and also the significance of domestic institutions is better understood today than it may have been at the height of the Cold War.

**Chinmoy Gharekhan (former Indian ambassador to the UN):** Two brief questions.

Since you are so close to the Bush administration it would be of interest for us to know your views on permanent membership for India at the Security Council. Second, what is your assessment of the post Arafat situation in the Middle East?
Henry Kissinger: To answer your second question first. I believe we are at a point where significant progress can be made. I know this sound ludicrous in the light of the circumstances that exist but the challenge of the Palestinian issue was that there was one point of view that said, 'Go back to the 1967 border, give up all the settlements and there will be some sort of guarantee'.

But there is no guarantee that can really work in that situation. Now that the security fence is being built, if it can be brought into some relationship to the 1967 border and if in return Israel does what emerged as a possibility in Camp David -- that is, give up some of its current territory even if largely symbolic -- we could see an agreement that brings together the concerns of Arab dignity and Israeli security.

It requires, however, that Europe and the United States and other friendly countries come up with a common position to avoid the impression that America is the spokesman for one side. If this unity could be achieved, I could imagine that even some moderate Arab
countries could assume some responsibility for the difficult decisions that Palestine leaders have to make. Now, this is a sketch but I am hopeful that America will try to take a lead towards this.

The death of Arafat makes it perhaps somewhat easier from some points of view and a little more difficult from other points of view because there is no central dominant authority left. What is important is that those who really want peace stop competing with each other about who could appeal best to which of the two sides and achieve a common position that they will then sustain. If that is achieved, then I believe significant progress could be made within the next year to 18 months.

Regarding India's membership to the Security Council. The present Security Council does not reflect the actual distribution of power in the world. It makes no sense to have India, Japan, Germany and, potentially, Brazil excluded from the Security Council. So, a discussion of the subject is extremely important. The problem, however, will arise with how you distribute that power. If you have, say, nine permanent members the veto would
make no sense. Or if, say, Europe gets one vote rather than several, you get into transformations that affect the domestic politics of many countries. Realistically the United States will not give up the veto. It is impossible in the American political situation to imagine that any President could even propose it, and inconceivable that any Senate would ever give it two-thirds majority.

What one could imagine, for example, is that we have new members who are permanent but don't have a veto. But, it does not make any sense to have India and Japan outside the Security Council and China in it and so this is a discussion that must be started in which I am favourable to having a Security Council that reflects the actual distribution of economic and political power. But I don't know exactly how to do it.

**L.M. Singhvi (former Indian High Commissioner to UK):** We expect a prescription for the second Bush administration, a prescription for the government headed by Dr. Manmohan Singh and a prescription, which is meant for the people of both the countries. We would also like to know whether you think that America would continue to be
constrained and conditioned by their other relationship, in this case their relationship with Pakistan, in respect to dealing with India.

Henry Kissinger: With respect to the first question, I say and I believe that will happen over the next years. An intense consultation with India in many fields on the government level, not so much with dealing with actual problems in our relationships -- all though that too should happen -- but an intense discussion of how we visualise a potentially common future. How do we look at what I described about the energy problem, for example? How do we view the scientific evolution that will affect human life and the problem of development, and I think we should do that with an at least five year perspective, side by side with whatever current issue.

How does it affect our relationship with Pakistan? We have friendly relations with Pakistan -- and I know that is an extremely sensitive point for India. We have no conceivable interest in promoting conflict between Pakistan and India. We would welcome greatly a reconciliation between India and Pakistan. Pakistan is a significant
regional country. India is a global country; so those relationships have to be seen in that perspective and if we elaborate our relationships on that basis, it will automatically solve a lot of these questions.

We have absolutely no interest in building on the Indian subcontinent a kind of European balance of power situation. Of course we believe in the territorial integrity of every country but our fundamental concerns are different and that is the basis for a relationship in which the distinction will emerge quite clearly provided we really go to work, as I know our administration wants to. It is my impression from what the Prime Minister said here yesterday and what I got from my conversation with him.

Vinod Mehta (Editor, Outlook): My question to you is that since American society domestically is so vertically and visibly divided about the Iraq war and Senator Kerry's entire campaign was based on this, how will President Bush pursue a different policy in the face of this opposition?
Henry Kissinger: Well, if democratic elections mean anything, Senator Kerry lost the election. But I don't want to press on this because President Bush has pointed out that he wants to govern with the approval of at least a large segment of the Kerry voters. Now, as I told you, I supported President Bush's Iraq decision for strategic reasons because I thought it was too dangerous to leave this situation as it is and at the same time move forward on the war against terrorism. It is pointless to discuss and repeat the debates of two years ago, but if a Taliban type regime emerges in Baghdad or if Iraq becomes a centre of civil wars in the Arab world, this would be a disaster for every country.

So, the important question now: do I think the United States will act unilaterally in every situation? In my view, the United States will make every effort to achieve consensus but the best way to do that is before a crises arises. The second question is where do we go from here? The best outcome for America and for everybody else is the emergence of a government in Iraq that can govern with the support of its people and the support of an overwhelming majority of the world.
Having said this, that is huge task and you can't just snap a finger and bring it about nor do I think can we do it alone and this is why I am now speaking strictly alone. This is not an official position. Some sort of contact group should be created of countries that have an interest -- without asking them to participate in a military effort but to participate in a political and the economic effort.

It is irrelevant whether the war was unnecessary as Senator Kerry claimed. I disagreed with him but we don't have insist on that point today and you may have noticed that Senator Kerry in his very generous and far sighted concession statement specifically mentioned the importance of bringing Iraq to a successful conclusion. On this Americans should unite and I hope that we can have discussions with India and other nations to work on a co-operative solution.
Dr. Henry Kissinger

*Former Secretary of State, United States of America*

One of the few statesmen who could genuinely combine celebrity status with realpolitik, Henry Kissinger has held almost every conceivable foreign policy position in the United States government. He is America's first name in geopolitical opinion and, arguably, one of the most brilliant minds ever placed at the service of American foreign policy, as well as one of the shrewdest, best-informed, and most articulate figures ever to occupy a position of power in Washington.

Kissinger has been both National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, a Harvard academic and US army captain, a Nobel Peace Prize-winner and chairman of a private consulting firm Kissinger Associates. Among his more recent accomplishments was to chair an investigation into the September 11 attacks at the behest of the White House.
During his years at the helm of US foreign policy, Kissinger steered his country through a complex international situation with a remarkable mix of a high public profile — often seen squiring actresses like Shirley Maclaine and Jill St John — and brilliant secret diplomacy.

Two of his major geopolitical accomplishments were to engineer the US withdrawal from the Vietnam War, for which he shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973, and to completely turn around the US relationship with Maoist China. Kissinger has also received the Presidential Medal of Freedom (the nation's highest civilian award) and The Medal of Liberty. He was also a tireless shuttle diplomat for peace in West Asia and nuclear arms control between the US and the Soviet Union.

The German-born Kissinger has written lengthily about the difficulties of a representative of a liberal democracy practicing foreign policy in a world of hard nosed power politics. Foreign policy, he famously said, ‘is not missionary work’. His career was not with controversy, notably over his role in the 1973 Chilean military coup, Richard Nixon's
policy of tilt against India and Indonesia's capture of East Timor.

However, there has been little doubt that the ultimate aim of Kissinger's foreign policy has always been world stability and peace. And, as revealed in the voluminous memoirs of his years as the world's statesman among statesmen, there can be almost no foreign policy practitioner in recent times who had the ability to apply, for example, 19th European great power strategy to the needs and requirements of the 20th century world and succeed.

Drawing on his past experiences with some of the most important foreign policy leaders of our time, as well as his current experience as an international corporate consultant, Kissinger advances our understanding of international relations and the resulting impact on our domestic economy and security.

end.