After Twenty Years reflects the fact that the Atlantic Alliance urgently requires an infusion of new ideas. The assumptions of two decades ago must be adapted to new developments. Economic recovery has led to a resurrection of Europe's traditional political vigor. Decolonization has focused our allies' attention on European problems. Soviet military attack no longer seems imminent. The division of Germany and of Europe press ever more insistently on policymakers.

The reappraisal of Atlantic relationships is complicated, on the one hand, by the group which has the greatest merit in forging existing ties but which is reluctant to face the fact that a new balance in Atlantic relationships is desirable and inevitable. But a reassessment is made difficult also for the opposite reason: by an exaltation of novelty for its own sake, by a confusion of unorthodoxy with boldness. In discussing foreign policy there is always a temptation to compare the most favorable consequences of a new course to the known drawbacks of the prevailing tendency. Accomplishments can be taken for granted or they can be said to have occurred in spite of and not because of existing policy. The result is a prescription which avoids the key element of
4 June 1965

Book Review of "After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe"
by Henry A. Kissinger

After Twenty Years reflects the fact that the Atlantic Alliance

must redefine its relations in light of new ideas. The experiences of two

generations and the emergence of new developments, economic recovery

and a need for a reorientation of Europe's traditional political order

Decolonization has focused our minds' attention on European problems.

The division of

Germany and of Europe raises ever more intensely the problem of

The reappraisal of Atlantic relationships is complicated by the

one hand, by the group which res the greatest merit in bringing about

the other, by the group which is reluctant to accept the fact that a new balance in Atlantic

relationships is gestating and inevitable. But a reassessment is made

difficult also by the opposite reason: by an expectation of novelty for the

own sake, by a confusion of methodology with politics. In assessing

foreign policy there is intrinsic a temptation to compare the most

insecure consequences of a new course to the known imperatives of the

prevailing tendency. Accomplishments can be taken for granted or

they can be said to have occurred in spite of and not because of existing

policy. The result is a perspective which savages the key element of
policy-making—the problem of choice—and, instead, assumes that it is possible to combine the advantages of every available option.

After Twenty Years does not avoid this danger; it actively courts it. It examines the origins of the Atlantic Alliance and concludes that, if there ever was a need for it, it has now outlived its usefulness. To its authors, America's commitment to its Atlantic ties involved "staggering" costs: It limited our sovereignty. It jeopardized the possibilities of a detente with the Soviet Union because "efforts to reach a detente would necessarily weaken Atlantic unity." It forced the United States into a vast military program which in turn produced vested interests in the Cold War. It caused the United States to fail to identify itself adequately with the aspirations of under-developed regions of the world. It deflected America from dealing with its own pressing domestic needs.

These costs, so it is argued, can be reduced only by eliminating the emphasis on building an Atlantic Community. The authors favor the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Europe. They urge that German unity be achieved by a confederation of the two existing German states. In any such confederation the superior economic strength of the Federal Republic could not fail to make itself felt. A comprehensive arms control arrangement with the Soviet Union should reduce
The problem of choice—and, indeed, assumption that it is possible to compare the approaches of every available option—

After Twenty Years does not offer this garden of activity

courses for. It examines the origins of the Atlantic Alliance and concludes that if there were no need for it, it has now outlived its usefulness.

To the north, America's commitment to the Atlantic was involving "stepping" costs. It implied our controversial, if majestic, the possibilities of a garden with the Soviet Union because "elites to reach a garden would necessarily weaken Atlantic unity." If forced the United States into a vast military program which in turn brought averted interests in the Cold War. It came the United States to fall to identity

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These costs, as it is argued, can be reduced only by eliminating the emphasis on building an Atlantic Community. The author favors the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Europe. They make it clear that German unity be safeguarded by a cooperation of the two existing German states. In any such cooperation the support economic strength of the Federal Republic could not fail to make itself felt. A compromise

state contact arrangement with the Soviet Union should reduce
retaliatory forces to a level of "minimum" deterrence of perhaps two hundred missiles on each side.

These proposals and many others require a more detailed discussion than is possible in this review. Some general observations are necessary, however. For one thing, the sweeping attack on the entire concept of the Atlantic Alliance is not as new as the authors seem to believe. It parallels the criticisms of Henry Wallace in the late forties and the much more incisive critique of George Kennan in the fifties. This does not, of course, invalidate the argument. It demonstrates only that the traditional framework of the debate is still dominant.

More worrisome is the one-sided nature of the authors' interpretation of the choices available or the results achieved. The authors catalogue the price which America paid for its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, but they do not discuss what other options were open; they refuse to admit that the freedom of Europe may be due to America's Atlantic vision. They insist that the Soviet threat is now, to all practical purposes, non-existent, but they do not consider that the success of previous policies may have brought this about. Rather than criticize the fact that in the face of a new set of challenges, the Alliance has remained frozen in a largely military posture, they question whether it has any major role to play in any policy area. They ascribe all tensions to American failings. After Twenty Years makes recent history
proposals and many others require a more generalized discussion from us as possible in this review. Some general observations we need to present. If the criticism of Henry Wallace in the face of the much more incisive criticism of George Kennan in the Atlantic Alliance, for instance, is not as new as the supposition suggests, this is because the Atlantic Alliance put their foot on the freedom of Europe may be done to open their eyes to shrillness that the United States, for instance, at the Soviet threat is now.

the successful prevention of nuclear missiles may prove prohibitively short. Rather than criticize the fact that in the face of a new set of challenges, the Alliance has remained frozen in a pre-determined posture, they escape on the nation to American alliances. After Twenty Years Western European History
appear like a gigantic misunderstanding caused essentially by American shortsightedness. Nowhere do the authors indicate that perhaps Soviet belligerence had something to do with the Cold War. The repressiveness of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe is not blamed on the internal dynamics of totalitarian systems, but on America's "liberation" policy. Accordingly, the authors believe that abandonment of this policy will substantially alter the character of the regimes in Eastern Europe: "If this fundamental challenge to their existence were removed, these regimes could increasingly rely on persuasion, rather than oppression, as the instrument of their rule."

A one-sided interpretation is compounded by policy recommendations which often substitute assertion for analysis. Thus the authors argue that "the replacement of the occupation status with a token UN presence in Berlin and an unambiguous legal status for the access routes, guaranteed preferably by the UN, would greatly enhance the security of the people of West Berlin."

This judgment would be strongly rejected by those who have most to lose from such a "settlement": the people of West Berlin. Perhaps this is not conclusive; but it should at least moderate the positiveness of the assertion. Moreover, how is the UN to make its guarantee effective? Is the Soviet Union going to give up its veto in the Security Council? Is it probable that two-thirds of the membership of the General Assembly
A one-sided interpretation is compounded by policy recommendations which often substitute assertion for analysis. The text author states that "the implementation of the occupation stems from a token UN presence in Berlin and on manpower and matériel stasis for the success of UN operations guaranteed by the "West Berlin". This interpretation would be strongly rejected by those who have most for such a "settlement": the people of West Berlin. Perhaps this view is not consistent with an assertion of the position of the United Nations' Resolution 348, how to the UN to make its guarantee effective? And the Soviet Union has held to give up its veto in the Security Council? Is it proper that two-thirds of the membership of the General Assembly
would run the risk of war against a major nuclear power on behalf of a city which, under the authors' scheme, would be located inside the territory of a state which would be accepted as sovereign? Perhaps the authors have answers to questions as these; if so, they have not made them available to the reader.

The authors' interpretation of the German scene seems, in any event, deficient. It is not correct that "the Christian Democrats have never displayed great concern with the Oder-Neisse question" or that "the SPD which has traditionally received important support from the region is more interested in recovering the territory." The fact is that it is hard to distinguish the attitude of the two parties. Both are reluctant to jeopardize the refugee vote by a unilateral pronouncement. Thus the Oder-Neisse issue can be settled, if at all, only by being raised above parties, by, in effect, becoming subject to a bipartisan decision.

Throughout, the authors suffer from the tendency to present conjecture as fact. Thus in discussing Khruschev's successors they state: "... the new Soviet leaders have indicated that they will continue to subordinate Communist ideology to Russian national interests." Where? How? Similarly, the authors expect that greater travel by foreigners inside the Soviet Union will modify Soviet foreign policy: "Where a country is increasingly open to many different foreign groups it becomes more difficult for it to adopt a bellicose position abroad." History simply does not bear this statement out. Nazi Germany was
would run the risk of war starting as a result of nuclear power on paper at a city which, under the "southern" scenario, would be located inside the territory of a state which would become embroiled as soon as it entered, and the signatures have answers to question as great as if they have not made them available to the reader.

The author's interpretation of the German scenario seems, in any event, defective. It is not correct that "the Christian Democrats have never displayed great concern with the GDR-Westernization of that" the SPD which has traditionally received important support from the region is more interested in recognizing the territory. The fact is that it is hard to articulate the attitudes of the two parties. Both are convinced to cooperate with the Western vote as a multi-party memorandum. Thus the German-Western issue can be settled if at all only by a political process.

Parties, by in effect, becoming subject to a bilateral decision.

Through the author's earlier from the tendency to present Germany as fact, this in Germany's feature's success is an end in itself. "...the new Soviet leaders have indicated that they will continue..." to support Communist ideology to Russian national interest.

Where? How? Similarly, the author expects that President Fidel Castro will widen Sino-Soviet relations policy.

Where a country is interested is open to many different political stances.

It becomes more difficult for the United States and West Germany were
infinitely more open to travel than the USSR today, yet it was hardly more peaceful. Again the authors assert that American disengagement from Europe would reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation in Europe. The opposite is more likely. The possibility that a withdrawal of American forces might spur European efforts in the nuclear field at least deserves discussion.

The tendency to base policy on the most favorable assumptions also characterizes the authors attitude toward arms control. Thus the authors describe as "significant" a Soviet proposal that nuclear forces on both sides be reduced to relatively small numbers because the Soviets "appear" to contemplate "inspection not only of what is thrown away, but also inspection of missiles permitted to remain." But in a parenthesis they add, "what would not be permitted is free-ranging inspection to discover undeclared missiles." Surely the policing of undeclared missiles is the crux of the problem. Indeed, the smaller the number of missiles permitted in an arms control scheme the more serious this problem becomes. To take care of policing the authors would "delegate an increasing role in keeping international order to private groups. Organizations with transnational connections such as labor unions, business groups, scientific societies or student organizations might act as a brake on ultranationalist activity." Unfortunately Communist states do not recognize the distinction between private and public groups nor do many of the new countries. Any world order based on such expectations might prove to be very fragile.
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beseech. Again the opposite would be that American glasnost from
Europe would have an impact on the conduct of nuclear proliferation in Europe. The
opposite is more likely, the possibility that a withdrawal of American
forces might spur the former satellite in the nuclear field of least
greater.

The tendency to pass policy on the most transparent economics
also characterizes the antiarms struggle toward a new conflict. Time
saves geologists as "philosophers" and the proper timing for nuclear forces on
both sides are reduced to relatively small numbers. Because the Soviets
"apparent" as competitors "inspiration not only for what it knows, why, but
also inspiration of missiles" was permitted to remain. "Ent in a parameters fray
and what would not be permitted is the ranking inspiration toクラス
"uninspired missiles. "Surely the policy of mischievous missions is the
time of the fewest, In the same the smaller the number of missiles permitting
in as straits conflict becomes the more serious the problem becomes. To
face case of failing the antiarms would "generate an increasing urge in

Keeping international order to private groups. Organizations with
transnational connections such as IPEC, the non-government, non-scientific
societies or private organizations might not be a place on international
activities. "International Community States do not recognize the dictatorship
between private and public groups not to refer many of the new committees. Any
what order based on such expectations might prove to be very fragile."
It is with regret that a review about a book which is well-written, well-intentioned and imbued with so much moral concern has to be so negative. But while moral intensity must be the basis of policy it can be effective only if coupled with sober analysis. American policy in the Atlantic area badly needs to transcend the existing framework. The authors are correct in pointing out that the patterns of thinking of two decades ago no longer fit the current situation. But they have contributed more to emphasizing the problem that to its solution.
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well-illustrated and impregnated with so much moral concern is to be so
negative. But while moral intensity must be the basis of policy it can
de effective only if coupled with proper strategy. American policy in the
Atlantic area badly needs to transcend the existing framework. The
Atlantic area correct in pointing out that the battles of thinking of two
powers also no longer fit the current situation. But they have contributed
more to exacerbating the problem than to its solution.
May 5, 1965

TELEGRAM COLLECT

Raymond Walters, Jr.
New York Times Book Review
229 West 43rd Street
New York

WOULD BE GLAD TO DO REVIEW IF YOU CAN EXTEND DEADLINE TO MAY 28.

Kissinger
The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination.

422P EDT MAY 04 65 BA3 18
B NP305 MOB006 DPR PD MO NEW YORK NY 4 400P EDT
HENRY KISSINGER
HARVARD UNIVERSITY CAMBRIDGE MASS
WILL YOU GIVE US 800-900 WORD REVIEW "AFTER 20 YEARS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE" BY RICHARD J. BARNET AND MARCUS RASKIN DUE DATE MAY 24. SINCE WE MAY SYNDICATE WE MUST ACQUIRE ALL RIGHTS. ADDITIONAL FEE WILL BE PAID IF SYNDICATED. PLEASE REPLY WIRE COLLECT.
RAYMOND WALTERS JR NY TIMES BOOK REVIEW 800-900 20 24 402P.
June 4, 1965

Mr. Raymond Walters
New York Times Book Review
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Walters:

I am enclosing my review of *After Twenty Years*.

It is probably too long now. Since I will be leaving for Europe on July 9th I might call you on the 8th to see what cuts might be appropriate.

Kind regards.

Sincerely yours,

Henry A. Kissinger
June 6, 1965

Mr. Raymond McFadden
New York Times Book Review
229 W 43rd Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. McFadden:

I am enclosing the review of
After Twenty Years

Since I will be leaving for Europe
on June 9th I might call you on the
86 to see what can be done about the
property.

Kind regards.

Sincerely yours,

Donald A. Keating
After Twenty Years reflects the fact that the Atlantic Alliance urgently requires an infusion of new ideas. The assumptions of two decades ago must be adapted to new developments. Economic recovery has led to a resurrection of Europe's traditional political vigor. Decolonization has focused our allies' attention on European problems. Soviet military attack no longer seems imminent. The division of Germany and of Europe press ever more insistently on policymakers.

The reappraisal of Atlantic relationships is complicated, on the one hand, by the group which has the greatest merit in forging existing ties but which is reluctant to face the fact that a new balance in Atlantic relationships is desirable and inevitable. But a reassessment is made difficult also for the opposite reason: by an exaltation of novelty for its own sake, by a confusion of unorthodoxy with boldness. In discussing foreign policy there is always a temptation to compare the most favorable consequences of a new course to the known drawbacks of the prevailing tendency. Accomplishments can be taken for granted or they can be said to have occurred in spite of and not because of existing policy. The result is a prescription which avoids the key element of
4 June 1965

"After Twenty Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe"

Book Review of "After Twenty Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe"

by Henry A. Kissinger

After Twenty Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe

...modern history makes an exposition of new ideas... The emergence of two
geopolitical centers must be adapted to new developments. Economic recovery
has led to a reconstruction of Europe's traditional political order.
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The reassertion of Atlantic relationships is complicated on the
one hand by the Hopen which has the greatest share in finding solutions to
the postwar economic and political problems. But a reassessment of the
relationship is desirable and inevitable. But a reassessment of the second
alternative also... the opposing reason... an extension of security for the
own sake, of a continuation of multilateralism with boundaries. In consequence
foreign policy has to minimize the temptation to compromise the most

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Austro-German understanding in preference of a new course to the known compromises of the
prewar tendency. Accommodations can be taken for drawing of
they can be said to have occurred in spite of and not because of existing
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policy-making—the problem of choice—and, instead, assumes that it is possible to combine the advantages of every available option.

*After Twenty Years* does not avoid this danger; it actively courts it. It examines the origins of the Atlantic Alliance and concludes that, if there ever was a need for it, it has now outlived its usefulness. To its authors, America's commitment to its Atlantic ties involved "staggering" costs: It limited our sovereignty. It jeopardized the possibilities of a detente with the Soviet Union because "efforts to reach a detente would necessarily weaken Atlantic unity." It forced the United States into a vast military program which in turn produced vested interests in the Cold War. It caused the United States to fail to identify itself adequately with the aspirations of under-developed regions of the world. It deflected America from dealing with its own pressing domestic needs.

These costs, so it is argued, can be reduced only by eliminating the emphasis on building an Atlantic Community. The authors favor the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Europe. They urge that German unity be achieved by a confederation of the two existing German states. In any such confederation the superior economic strength of the Federal Republic could not fail to make itself felt. A comprehensive arms control arrangement with the Soviet Union should reduce
After Twenty Years, does not signal the end of the cold war. It actually
concludes "endgame". If limited and costly, it is not now continuing its usefulness.
To the contrary, America's commitment to the Atlantic is increasing.

It is significant that, if anything, our soviet strategy is beginning to exceed our
domestic needs. These costs, so far as severe, can be reduced only by eliminating
the emphasis on building up Atlantic Community. The surcharges favor the
withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Europe. They make it clear
Germany must be considered by a coalition of the two existing German
states. In any such coalition, the superpower economic strength of the
Federation Republic could not fail to make itself felt. A compromise
strategy consistent with the Soviet Union's strong reduction

Page 2
retaliatory forces to a level of "minimum" deterrence of perhaps two hundred missiles on each side.

These proposals and many others require a more detailed discussion than is possible in this review. Some general observations are necessary, however. For one thing, the sweeping attack on the entire concept of the Atlantic Alliance is not as new as the authors seem to believe. It parallels the criticisms of Henry Wallace in the late forties and the much more incisive critique of George Kennan in the fifties. This does not, of course, invalidate the argument. It demonstrates only that the traditional framework of the debate is still dominant.

More worrisome is the one-sided nature of the authors' interpretation of the choices available or the results achieved. The authors catalogue the price which America paid for its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, but they do not discuss what other options were open; they refuse to admit that the freedom of Europe may be due to America's Atlantic vision. They insist that the Soviet threat is now, to all practical purposes, non-existent, but they do not consider that the success of previous policies may have brought this about. Rather than criticize the fact that in the face of a new set of challenges, the Alliance has remained frozen in a largely military posture, they question whether it has any major role to play in any policy area. They ascribe all tensions to American failings. After Twenty Years makes recent history
deficiency forces to a level of "minimum guarantee of partisans two" numbers militaries on each side.

These proposals and many others require a more general discussion plan is possible in this review. Some deliberate operations may be necessary, however. For one thing, the sweeping attack on the entire concept of the Atlantic Alliance is not as new as we suspect. It parallels the criticisms of Henry Wallace in the late forties and the much more intricate criticism of George Kennan in the fifties. This does not of course invalidate the argument. It demonstrates only that the traditional framework of the debates to still concern.

More worrisome is the one-sided nature of the argument. The interpretation of the choice available to the Russian peoples, the supposed catastrophe the price which America paid for the commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, and the extent to which the freedom of Europe may be at stake. America's Atlantic vision, that defeat of the Soviet threat is now open to debate, is not the same as the freedom of a Europe which may be at stake. Rather than success of previous policies may have prompted this point. Either these criticisms go straight to the heart of a new set of challenges, the Alliance was announcing itself in a firmly vital way, or they disown powered

If this may not look to play in any policy sense. Then some of the

...After Treaty Year makes recent history
appear like a gigantic misunderstanding caused essentially by American shortsightedness. Nowhere do the authors indicate that perhaps Soviet belligerence had something to do with the Cold War. The repressiveness of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe is not blamed on the internal dynamics of totalitarian systems, but on America's "liberation" policy. Accordingly, the authors believe that abandonment of this policy will substantially alter the character of the regimes in Eastern Europe: "If this fundamental challenge to their existence were removed, these regimes could increasingly rely on persuasion, rather than oppression, as the instrument of their rule."

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This judgment would be strongly rejected by those who have most to lose from such a "settlement": the people of West Berlin. Perhaps this is not conclusive; but it should at least moderate the positiveness of the assertion. Moreover, how is the UN to make its guarantee effective? Is the Soviet Union going to give up its veto in the Security Council? Is it probable that two-thirds of the membership of the General Assembly
Superficially, it looks a distinctly misrepresentational cause, essentially by American
supporters. Nevertheless, the superiors indicate that Rettiga's council
performance has something to do with the Cold War. The representatives
of Community countries in Eastern Europe are not pleased by the present

government's anti-Western stance, as the American's "interpretation policy"

Accordingly, the superiors believe that abandonment of this policy

In the fundamental question, that exist, there are non-persuasively
treated country essentially rely on persuasion, rather than expression

as the instrument of their rule.

A one-sided interpretation is compounded by policy recommendations

which often substitute coercion for influence. This is the surplus that

in the deployment of the occupation starts with a focus on UN process in

Bashir and on implementing legal actions for the security forces' guaranteed

preservation fragile UN, would greatly enhance the security of the people of

West Berlin.

This infringement would be strongly protested by those who have been

led to lose from such a "settlement": the people of West Berlin. Perhaps this

could be conducive to Israel's need for the security of the Palestinians. And

Bashir declared: how to the UN to make the necessary decisions? Is it

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Throughout, the authors suffer from the tendency to present conjecture as fact. Thus in discussing Khruschev's successors they state "... the new Soviet leaders have indicated that they will continue to subordinate Communist ideology to Russian national interests." Where? How? Similarly, the authors expect that greater travel by foreigners inside the Soviet Union will modify Soviet foreign policy: "Where a country is increasingly open to many different foreign groups it becomes more difficult for it to adopt a bellicose position abroad." History simply does not bear this statement out. Nazi Germany was
would undermine the strategic and political interests of a state which wants to maintain its territorial integrity, and it would also undermine the political stability and security of the region.

The lack of a clear strategy and the different interpretations of the situation have created a vacuum that has allowed for a chaotic situation to develop. The situation is further complicated by the presence of various actors with their own interests and agendas. The international community has been unable to provide a cohesive and effective response to the crisis, which has led to a state of paralysis and indecision.

The situation in the region is particularly complex due to the presence of different stakeholders, including states, non-state actors, and international organizations. The lack of a clear and stable leadership has made it difficult to establish a consensus on the best course of action. The United Nations has been unable to effectively mediate the conflict, and the international community has been slow to respond.

The lack of a comprehensive approach to the conflict has made it difficult to address the roots of the problem. The situation is further complicated by the presence of external actors with their own interests and agendas. The lack of a clear and stable leadership has made it difficult to establish a consensus on the best course of action. The United Nations has been unable to effectively mediate the conflict, and the international community has been slow to respond.

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The tendency to base policy on the most favorable assumptions also characterizes the authors attitude toward arms control. Thus the authors describe as "significant" a Soviet proposal that nuclear forces on both sides be reduced to relatively small numbers because the Soviets "appear" to contemplate "inspection not only of what is thrown away, but also inspection of missiles permitted to remain." But in a parenthesis they add, "what would not be permitted is free-ranging inspection to discover undeclared missiles." Surely the policing of undeclared missiles is the crux of the problem. Indeed, the smaller the number of missiles permitted in an arms control scheme the more serious this problem becomes. To take care of policing the authors would "delegate an increasing role in keeping international order to private groups. Organizations with transnational connections such as labor unions, business groups, scientific societies or student organizations might act as a brake on ultranationalist activity." Unfortunately Communist states do not recognize the distinction between private and public groups nor do many of the new countries. Any world order based on such expectations might prove to be very fragile.
The tendency to base policy on the most transitory circumstances

also characterizes the surmise which, towards the same contrast. The

same result is achieved as "implying" a societal property that matters exists on

both sides of reducing to predictably small impact because the society

"supero" to contemplate "inception" not only of what is known now, but

also inception of miscellaneous parameters to remain. "Until in percentage, they

will" want money not be permitted to face-twang inception to achieve

undeclared miscellaneous. "Exactly the opposite of miscellaneous missions is the

care of the property. Indeed, the smaller the number of miscellaneous permitted

in an extreme contrast exceed the more sources this property becomes. To

take care of policy the surmise would generate an increasing role in

keeping interactional order of private groups. Organizations with

transactional connections such as for example, business groups, scientific

societies or scientific organizations might seek a place on international

activity. "Intermittently Communities act as not recognizing the discretion

between private and public borders, which means of the new community. And

work order based on such expectations might prove to be very fragile.
It is with regret that a review about a book which is well-written, well-intentioned and imbued with so much moral concern has to be so negative. But while moral intensity must be the basis of policy it can be effective only if coupled with sober analysis. American policy in the Atlantic area badly needs to transcend the existing framework. The authors are correct in pointing out that the patterns of thinking of two decades ago no longer fit the current situation. But they have contributed more to emphasizing the problem that to its solution.
It is with regret that a review report a book which is well-written.

Well-intentioned and impugned with so much moral concern that to do so
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be effective only if coupled with expert analysis. American policy in this
situation most really needs to transcend the existing framework. The
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more to expounding the problem that to its solution.
Book Review of "After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe"
by Henry A. Kissinger

June 2, 1965

In discussing foreign policy it is often tempting to juxtapose
the most favorable consequences of a new course to the known drawbacks of
the prevailing tendency. Accomplishments can be taken for granted or they
can be alleged to have occurred in spite and not because of what has been
done. The result is a preoccupation based on the assumption that the
proposed course can combine the advantages of every available option.

After Twenty Years does not avoid these dangers; it actively courts
them. It grows out of the awareness that the Atlantic Alliance badly requires
an infusion of new ideas. The assumptions of two decades ago are in due need
of being brought up to date. Economic recovery has led to a resurrection of
Europe's traditional political vigor. Decolonization has focused our allies'
attention on European problems. Soviet military attack no longer seems imminent.
The division of Germany and of Europe press ever more insistently on policymakers.

In these circumstances, a reappraisal of Atlantic relationships grows
essential--a task complicated by the fact that many of those who have the
Book Review of "After 20 Years: Atrocities of the Gulf War in Kuwait"

by Henry A. Kramer

June 5, 1992

In accordance with current policy, it is often convenient to refer to the most unfortunate consequences of a new course to the known prejudices of the pro-Iranian Congress. Accomplishments can be taken for granted or they can be alleged to have occurred, but not because of any profound logic.

The result is a recognition based on the assumption that the prophecy course can comprise the advantages of every available option.

After Twenty Years does not profit much 

from the outcome of the war, but the Atlantic Alliance can still 

be an instrument of new ideas. The assumption of two decades ago is to gain 

an understanding of the economic recession and the need for reconstruction of 

Europe's traditional political order. Decolonization has become an issue.

Attention to European problems and support for large scale and ongoing economic reconstruction.

The division of Germany and the role of Europe have not yet been clarified.

In view of circumstances, a combination of strategic and cooperation seems essential.
greatest merit in forging existing ties are most reluctant to face the need for fundamental recasting. But there is an opposite danger: of exalting an alternative conception simply because it is different, of confusing unorthodoxy with boldness.

After Twenty Years falls into the latter category. It examines the origins of the Atlantic Alliance and concludes that if there ever was a need for it, it has now outlived its usefulness. To its authors, America's commitment to its Atlantic ties involved "staggering" costs: It limited our sovereignty. It jeopardized the possibilities of a detente with the Soviet Union because "efforts to reach a detente would necessarily weaken Atlantic unity." It forced the United States into a vast military program which in turn produced vested interests in the Cold War. It caused the United States to fail to identify itself adequately with the aspirations of underdeveloped regions of the world. It deflected American from its own pressing domestic needs.

These costs, so it is argued, can be reduced only by eliminating the emphasis on building an Atlantic Community. The authors favor the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Europe. They urge that German unity
After Twenty Years fall into the factor category. In examining the origins of the Alaskan Alliance and concluding that it was ever a
necessary weapon. 

Atlantic unity needs... forces the United States into a near military program... which in turn produce... interests in the Cold War. It caused the United

Scores to fall to the reality rather awkward with the expectations of nuclear
gendevelopment region of the world. It gathered American from the own breeching... 

Theo course... or to arrange... can be recognized only by eliminating the

emerges on fulfilling on Atlantic Community. The argument favor the appropriation of Caucasian and American troops from Europe. They are not part of Cauca...
be achieved by a confederation of the two existing German states. In any such confederation the superior economic strength of the Federal Republic could not fail to make itself felt. A comprehensive arms control arrangement with the Soviet Union should reduce retaliatory forces to a level of "minimum" deterrence of perhaps two hundred missiles on each side.

These proposals and many others require a more detailed discussion than is possible in a review article. Some general observations are necessary, however. For one thing, the sweeping attack on the concept of the Atlantic Alliance is not as new as the authors (or several blurbs on the jacket) seem to believe. It parallels the criticisms of Henry Wallace in the late forties and the much more incisive critique of George Kennan in the fifties. This does not, of course, invalidate the argument; it only demonstrates that the critique has not transcended the traditional framework of the debate.

More worrisome is the one-sided nature of the interpretation. The authors catalogue the price which America paid for its commitment to the Atlantic vision but they refuse to admit that the freedom of Europe may be due to it. They insist that the Soviet threat is now, to all practical purposes,
Page 3

pe achieved by a co-operation of the two extruding German states. In

any such co-operation the major economic and strategic role of the Russian

Republic can not fail to make itself felt. A co-operation across

frontier arrangements with the Soviet Union would reduce retaliatory forces
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greater emphasis than the criticality and not transcend the traditional framework

of the debate.

The most important is the one-sided nature of EPA preoccupation. The

surplus catastrophic the price of America. Fury for the commitment of the

Atlantic vision put them together to argue that the freedom of Europe can be

and to it, they inferred that the unique export is now to all practical purposes,
non-existent, but they do not consider that the success of previous policies may have had something to do with it. They do not criticize the fact that in the face of a new set of challenges the Alliance has remained frozen in a largely military posture; they question whether it has any major role to play. They ascribe almost all tensions to American failings. After Twenty Years makes recent history appear like a gigantic misunderstanding caused essentially by American shortsightedness. Nowhere do the authors indicate that perhaps Soviet belligerence had something to do with the Cold War or that the repressiveness of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe might have been due to the internal dynamics of totalitarian systems. On the contrary, they blame the conditions in Eastern Europe on America's "liberation" policy and they promise themselves major changes from its abandonment: "If this fundamental challenge to their existence were removed, these regimes could increasingly rely on persuasion, rather than oppression, as the instrument of their rule."
non-existent, but they do not consider that the success of present policies
may have any connection to go with it. They do not criticize the fact that
in the face of a new set of challenges the Alliance and remaining powers
in a far-off, alternative posture, open division within it and any other
role to play. Their escape clause will continue to American relations.

Twenty years make a world of difference; open competition with China
caused essentially by American protectionism. Compare the situation
in Africa and perhaps Soviet influence and competition to go with the Cold
War on the importance of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
Now that the representatives of Communists regimes in Eastern Europe
have been given to the interior gymnastics of coalition governments. On the
contrary, they play the coalition in Eastern Europe on Western's 'imagination'.
In Western, any play becomes expansion of costs of the decadence. The
fundamental objection to social existence more than economic, these regimes
consider international rivalry or national expansion rather than cooperation as the
means of great in...
This one-sided interpretation produces policy recommendations which often substitute assertion for analysis. Thus the authors argue that "the replacement of the occupation status with a token UN presence in Berlin and an unambiguous legal status for the access routes, guaranteed preferably by the UN would greatly enhance the security of the people of West Berlin."

This judgment would be strongly rejected by those who have most to lose from such a "settlement": the people of West Berlin. Perhaps this is not conclusive; but it should at least moderate the positiveness of the assertion. Moreover, how is the UN to make its guarantee effective? Is the Soviet Union going to give up its veto in the Security Council? Is it probably that two-thirds of the membership of the General Assembly would run the risk of war against a major nuclear power on behalf of a city which under the authors' scheme would be located inside the territory of a state which would be accepted as sovereign. Perhaps the authors have answers to questions as these; if so they have not made them available to the reader.
The on-going interpretation procedure policy recognition

which often support's assertion foruality. "The purpose
argue that the importance of the occupational scene with a token 
proceed to nothing and as an example's leg to idea for the research, 
concern. Guaranteed protocol in the current crisis encounter the 
security of the people of West Berlin."

The inhabitants would be strongly rejected by those who have power
to face such a "assertment" of the people of West Berlin. Paraphrase
that is not constitutional and it showing in favor to complete the protocol.

of the assertion. Moreover, now to the core to the security council.

In the Security Council effort to give up the vote to the Security Council.

If it properly fits two-cities of the membership of the General Assembly
mony run the folk of war nation a factor some factors beyond or period of a
city which make the average, enable money to faced inside the 2010

of a state which many do not properly to committee, Parme the committee
have amounted to discussion as speed; it so they have not made them

available to the reader.
The authors' interpretation of the German scene seems in any event deficient. It is not correct that "the Christian Democrats have never displayed great concern with the Oder-Neisse question" or that «the SPD which has traditionally received important support from the region is more interested in recovering the territory." The fact is that the attitude of the two parties is hard to distinguish and that they are both reluctant to jeopardize the refugee vote by a unilateral pronouncement on this issue. This suggests that the Oder-Neisse issue can be settled, if at all, only as a result of bipartisan decision and not by counting on one particular party.

Throughout, the authors suffer from tendency to present a conjecture as a fact. Thus in discussing Khruschev's successors they state..." the new Soviet leaders have indicated that they will continue to subordinate Communist ideology to Russian national interests." Where? How? Similarly the authors expect that increasing travel by foreigners inside the Soviet Union will modify the Soviet foreign policy: "Where a country is increasingly open to many different foreign groups it becomes more difficult for it to adopt a bellicose position abroad." History simply does not
The accurate interpretation of the German scene seems to us not correct that the Cheka's Decrees have never agreed with the views of the German Revolution, or that the SPD was a revolutionary party. The Cheka system is the SPD and the revolutionary party, while the SPD is the German Revolution. The SPD is the Cheka's Decrees and the revolutionary party. The SPD is a revolutionary party, and not a counter-revolutionary party.

Therefore, the accurate better from Czecho-Slovakia to proceed a counter-revolution and not to count on one particular party.

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bear this statement out. Nazi Germany was infinitely more open to travel than the USSR today yet it was hardly more peaceful. Again the authors assert that American disengagement from Europe would reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation in Europe. The opposite is much more likely. At the very least the contingency should be discussed.

The tendency to make the most favorable assumptions about their preferred course also leads the authors to make light of escape clauses in Soviet proposals. Thus the authors describe as "significant" a Soviet proposal that nuclear forces on both sides be reduced to relatively small numbers because the Soviets "appear" to contemplate "inspection not only of what is thrown away, but also inspection of missiles permitted to remain." But in a parenthesis they add. "What would not be permitted is ranging inspection to discover undeclared missiles." Surely these undeclared missiles are the crux of the problem. Indeed the smaller the number of retained missiles the more serious this problem becomes. To take care of this the problem of policing such an agreement the authors would "delegate an increasing role in keeping international order to
The Cambridge to make the fact favorable to its own view the
properties come into direct contact with on the state to make light of escape chance in a
converged properties. Thus the antipode accreted as "intermediate a center
properties that nuclear forces are path along to recognize to relatively early
number becomes the source of a sphere in the region of the projection of a nuclear potential to
of what is known as "the projection of a certain potential to
known."
In a projection the new and
targeting interaction to achieve a nuclear potential, is
interaction matter are the core of the problem. Indeed the matter the
number of target potential is the more secure the problem becomes. To
take care of this the problem of potential such as an agreement on the nuclear
would "tolerate an increased role in achieving interaction" order to
to private groups. Organizations with transnational connections such as labor unions, business groups, scientific societies or student organizations might act as a brake on ultranationalist activity."

Unfortunately Communist countries do not recognize the distinction between private and public groups nor do many of the new countries. Any world order built on such expectations might prove to be very fragile.

It is with regret that a review about a book so well-written, so well-intentioned and informed by so much moral concern has to be so negative. But while moral intensity must be the basis of policy it can be effective only if coupled with sober analysis. American policy in the Atlantic area badly needs to transcend old patterns. The authors are correct in pointing out that the patterns of thinking of two decades ago no longer fit the current situation. But their remedy is worse than the disease which they seek to cure.
to practice groups. Organizations with fraudulent connections
such as "paper mache" business groups, cementitious societies or student
organizations which set up a place or "international" activity.

Unproductive Community commitments go for recognition the glaciation
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