ask the Attorney General if he is willing to make available the summary report to the committee in executive session. Then it is up to the committee to determine what to do with it.

Senator Percy. The Attorney General would be given an opportunity to expand on whatever concerns he may have about the civil liberties of the individuals involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator Percy. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The civil liberties, such as they are, are already compromised, if they are compromised by the publicity already given to them. There have been many articles about the 17 named, including the member of this staff. There is no secret about the people who were wiretapped, many of whom bear little relation, if any, to what is called national security. I cannot imagine that they could have been. Why they were wiretapped is a great mystery to me.

Senator Case. It seems to me a fundamental violation of a person's civil liberties is involved in his being wiretapped.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in our knowing about it. It has already been talked about. If there is any violation it took place at the time he was wiretapped. One of these gentlemen, Mr. Halperin, I was told yesterday, has already entered a suit against the nominee for $100 a day for every day he was wiretapped when he was out of the Government. I was told that yesterday.

Senator Percy. I just want to be certain we have an opportunity to ascertain the consequences of those 17 names being officially revealed as suspects. It may jeopardize the rights of those individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator is fearful the chairman will release them on his own authority, he can be assured on that.

Senator Percy. I will leave it then for the moment.

ACTIVITIES OF MR. DAVID YOUNG

I think for the record, Dr. Kissinger, it would be well to have your comments about a former employee of your own, Mr. David Young, who has been indicted for conspiracy and burglary.

Did you, when he left your employment and was transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman, have any idea at that time or any subsequent time that he was to be requested to engage in illegal activities—burglary, conspiracy to burglary, or whatever they might be.

Mr. Kissinger. Senator, I have no knowledge of any such activities that David Young may have engaged in. I did not know of the existence of the "Plumbers' Group," by that or any other name. Nor did I know that David Young was concerned with internal security matters.

Perhaps I should explain for the record my connection with David Young. I hired David Young because I had met him in New York when I was associated with Governor Rockefeller, and he was a member of the law firm that worked for the Rockefeller family. When I came to Washington, I was looking for a man of high moral standards, whom I knew personally, who could work as a personal assistant and appointments secretary. David Young worked in that capacity. He was very highly recommended. I also knew his family, and I thought extremely highly of him. And I must say that in my own experience I never had any reason to change my mind.
He worked in this capacity as my appointment secretary for a year, from roughly January 1970, to January 1971. That position is one of the more exhausting ones in the Government, for both practical and I suppose psychological reasons. David Young therefore asked to be transferred to more substantive work. We could not find any substantive work for him immediately because all of his experience had really been in domestic affairs. So David Young worked in the files; he didn't even have an office from January 1971, through June 1971. He accompanied me occasionally to meetings, but basically he was no longer working in my outer office; he was working with people located in the files.

In June 1971, David Young—on his own initiative or Mr. Ehrlichman's, I don't know which—transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff. David Young had met Mr. Ehrlichman because Mr. Ehrlichman and I sat across from each other on Air Force 1 and David Young sat next to me and Mr. Ehrlichman's assistant sat next to him. In fact, the transfer occurred while I was on my first secret trip to China.

At that time I was told that David Young would work on a project for 3 months concerned with changing the declassification procedures of the Government, a project that was publicly announced and which published a public report [Executive Order 11052, March 5, 1972]. After this project ended, I was told by Mr. Ehrlichman that David Young would stay on his staff, and I had no contact with David Young either by telephone or in my office or in any other way after he left my staff, although I continued to have high regard for him.

In short, I did not know either from him or anyone else about the existence of the "Plumbers," as I said, by this or any other name, or about his activities in connection with internal security matters. I think it was a deplorable event.

Senator Percy. Thank you for that clarification.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie.

Senator Muskie. Dr. Kissinger, I am conscious of the fact that you have been under these lights for 3 hours and we have been throwing the platoon system at you while we have gone to vote. Many subject areas have been opened up that I would like to talk with you about, but I am under a time limitation.

WITNESS' OPENING STATEMENT APPLAUSED

First, may I say with respect to your opening statement that I applaud it as a statement of philosophy to bring to this job. I cannot resist saying that if it had been reflected in the policies and actions of this administration in the last 5 years, we would not be here today discussing the problems that have been created by the lack of trust between us and the administration. So I hope your articulation of this philosophy expresses not only just your own personal attitude about the responsibilities you have been asked to assume but that it signals a change in the administration policies which have inhibited a free flow of information and free communication.

ADMINISTRATION POLICY CONCERNING PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY IN WIRETAP FIELD

On that point I would like to ask one specific question in the wiretap field. I do not know that I will ask further questions in that field
January 22, 1974
No. 28

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
JANUARY 22, 1974

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will go right to the questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, we had a number of second and third hand reports from senior American officials and Congressmen and so forth, about the question of whether you, on your trip, in concluding this [Egyptian-Israeli] Agreement or getting it concluded, made any commitments on behalf of the United States. Or beyond that, whether there are any unpublished understandings which put the United States in the position of being a diplomatic guarantor. And I thought it would be helpful if you would tell us, yourself about this.

A Let me sum up the documents that exist, and then explain our understanding of their significance:

First, there is an agreement between Egypt and Israel, signed by the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt and Israel at Kilometer 101 -- and which has been published in the newspapers.
Secondly, there exists an undertaking about the limitation of forces in the zones of limited armament, and elsewhere, between Egypt and Israel that came about as the result, technically, of a United States proposal made by the United States to both sides. The reason was that both sides found it easier to accept a United States proposal as to the limitation of their forces, than to accept limitations which seemed to be demanded by the other side about their deployment.

This proposal was transmitted in a letter by the President, to the Heads of Government of Egypt and Israel in which it was pointed out that acceptance of this identical document -- that signature of this document -- would constitute acceptance and that it would thereby become part of the basic agreement.

It, therefore, does not constitute a United States guarantee, but it was a device by which the United States made it possible to convey to the other their acceptance of certain limitations on the armaments. This, at the request of both sides, has not been published, and since it is not a United States obligation, we felt we had to acquiesce in the views of the parties.
Thirdly, in the process of negotiating the agreement, both of the parties asked us questions about the intentions of the other, that were not part of the formal agreement, but that nevertheless made it easier for them to plan their own course. And we, therefore, sometimes in writing, sometimes orally, would do one of two things:

We would either ask one of the parties what its intention was, with respect to the problem at issue, and we would then communicate that statement of intentions to the other side -- in effect, saying: "We have been informed that the Egyptian Government --" or that the Israeli Government -- "plans to do the following."

Sometimes we were asked what our interpretation was of certain clauses, and in that case we did that -- sometimes in writing, sometimes orally. In the cases that now come to my mind, it turned out that our interpretations were identical with the interpretations of both of the parties, and therefore it was essentially irrelevant.

Now, "Are we guarantors of the Agreement?"

In the sense of having a formal obligation to take specific action in case of violation of the agreement, we are not guarantors.
In the sense that we will be in some way involved if the Agreement breaks down, all of recent history in the Middle East indicates that if there is an outbreak in the Middle East, the United States is involved whether or not it has engaged in prior diplomatic activity. It is certain that if there is another conflict, one or both of the parties are going to ask us for diplomatic support — and in that sense it is, of course, true that our judgment as to who violated the Agreement will affect the course that we will pursue. But in the legal sense, there is no obligation that the United States has taken to enforce the Agreement.

Q Mr. Secretary, if you will follow up this question — having read the four or five whatever you call them, assurances — it struck me that all of them were given to Israel. Didn’t Egypt need any? Was Mr. Sadat so self-assured that he didn’t ask for any —

A No, there were some assurances given to Egypt as well.

Q Would you tell us some more? We have read in the papers, those you gave to Israel, but nothing about Egypt.

A Well, the ones you read in the papers that were
given to Israel, had previously been leaked by the Government of Israel.

The ones that were given to Egypt have not been released -- but they are of the same nature.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said at your previous, or last, news conference, that it was increasingly inappropriate for the Arab oil embargo to continue while the United States was engaged in a mediating effort.

Now that that effort has been successful in its first stage, at least, what is your feeling about the continuation of the oil embargo? And can you report any progress in that area?

A Well, we have had every reason to believe that success in the negotiations would mark a major step toward ending the oil embargo. We would therefore think that failure to end the embargo in a reasonable time would be highly inappropriate, and would raise serious questions of confidence in our minds, with respect to the Arab nations with whom we have dealt on this issue.

Q Mr. Secretary, back on the question of the documents -- doesn't this leave the public record of the
Administration, and the United States, in a rather strange position with these unpublished documents? And does this not raise a question of where the Administration is heading in its relations with Congress, where there have been very strong demands in recent years for full documentation of international accords?

A The Congressional leaders were given a detailed account of all of these assurances, as well as of the content of any unpublished document.

Secondly, it makes a great deal of difference whether we publish a document to which the United States is a party, and which therefore, spells out an American obligation -- or whether we publish a document which in effect, spells out the obligations of other parties, and in which we played a mediating role because of the confidence these other parties had in us. I would suggest that there is an enormous difference in these two situations.

Nevertheless, the Congressional leaders have been informed about these matters.
Q Mr. Secretary, going back to your answer on oil:

You mentioned that -- you used the phrase something about a "reasonable" period of time that this could be lifted.

Is it a proper assumption that when the disengagement has been completed, when this forty day cycle is over, that it is at that time you would think the oil embargo ought to be lifted?

A I think in more ambitious terms.

Q Do you mean even before that?

A Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, there is word from --

A Wait a minute --

Q Have you got some assurances from Mr. Sadat that he would use his influence in the oil producing countries in this embargo?

A I don't think it would be appropriate to go into all the details of the conversation between President Sadat and myself, but I have made clear the United States position on the oil embargo, and I believe that it is clearly understood by all of the leaders with whom I have spoken.
Q Mr. Secretary, while you were away, it was disclosed through the White House and the Pentagon that the U.S. military had been receiving certain unauthorized National Security Council documents by such devices as going through your briefcase, because they were worried about your policy on China and the Soviet Union, and further that when you heard about it, that you were furious and demanded the transfer of the guilty parties.

This becomes a matter of curiosity to me because I found myself wondering and wanting to ask you how you knew that these things were happening, when I recall your sworn testimony before the Senate was that you didn't know about the existence of the Plumbers, had no contact with David Young, and thought he was doing something else.

A I missed you on the trip, Mr. O'Leary.

[Laughter.] Let me answer the question in terms of my knowledge of this particular episode.

This incident arose out of the leakage of highly classified documents containing minutes of meetings of the Washington Special Action Group on the India-Pakistan crisis to a columnist. As a result of this leak, Mr.
Erlichman, who was in charge of all internal security investigations in the White House, started an investigation of this particular leak.

Sometime after this, Admiral Welander, who was in charge of the JCS Liaison Office at the NSC, came to General Haig and told him that the internal evidence of at least one of the documents suggested to him that the leak to the columnist had occurred from his office.

I was out of town at the time. When General Haig informed me of this, I told him to turn that matter over to Mr. Erlichman.

Sometime later, I don't have the exact dates, several weeks later, Mr. Erlichman let me see -- or rather listen -- to the interrogation of Admiral Welander with respect to this particular incident. And, in the course of this interrogation, there was developed an allegation not only with respect to the source of the leak, but also about the unauthorized transfer of documents from my office to the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Beyond this one interrogation, I was told nothing about the investigation, either preceding or following this interrogation.
I was amazed by this allegation, since the Office of the Chairman, and my office, had worked closely together. I agree with what Admiral Moorer said on television last week, that there was a full flow of information between my office and his office, and I had no reason to suppose, on the basis of my experience, that there was any conflict between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and my office. And therefore I have no reason to question the argument that has been made by Admiral Moorer that this incident of the unauthorized transfer of papers from my office to his office reflected overzealousness on the part of subordinates, and, in any case, gave him no information that he did not already possess.

I must add that I was not aware of the fact that a report was being prepared by Mr. Erlichman, and I have never seen that report. Nor have I seen the report of the investigation that was conducted by Secretary Laird's office. And therefore what I am saying is based on my personal knowledge of the incident which is confined to this one interrogation of one individual who volunteered his information first to my office. These reports must have come to conclusions similar to the ones I have outlined.
here, because no disciplinary action was taken by the addressees of this report.

After these allegations became known to me, it was decided in consultation between Admiral Moorer and myself to close the Liaison Office attached to my staff.

With respect to my statements before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made under oath, I reaffirm here every word that I have said to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I assert that they were fully consistent with the allegations of the unnamed sources that have been made while I was on my trip last week.

To be specific, I did not know that David Young was conducting an investigation into the matter of the Anderson leaks. He never talked to me about this, or any other subject, while he was conducting what I now know was his investigation. I did not instruct him, nor did I request it. I never saw the report, nor did I know that the report existed until I read it in a newspaper early last week.*

I have called both Senator Fulbright and

* General Haig has himself assured me that he had no contact with David Young on the report or related matters. [EDS: Added to the record subsequent to the press conference.]
Senator Stennis and told them that I would be prepared to meet with their committees to answer any questions that they might have on this subject.

Q One quick follow up, who interrogated Admiral Welander?

A I believe he was interrogated by David Young, but from this one could not suppose that David Young was conducting an investigation.

Q Did you know David Young had performed the interrogation?

A I knew that David Young had performed the interrogation, but I had assumed that since we had sent Admiral Welander to Mr. Erlichman's office, Mr. Erlichman had designated one of his staff members to take whatever report Admiral Welander had to give.

I repeat again, we were not told about either the investigation preceding it or the investigation following it, and I had no contact whatever with David Young during that period.

Q Mr. Secretary, to clarify, you said you participated in the interrogation.

A I did not participate in the interrogation.
Q. Could you clarify that you read or listened to a tape of the interrogation?

A. I listened to a portion of the tape of the interrogation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why didn't you find out the total results of the investigation and the interrogation of Admiral Welander?

A. Because I was told that I was not to be informed of it.

Q. By whom were you told?

A. I have said all that I will say on this subject. All internal security matters in the White House after May 1970 were handled by Mr. Erlichman's Office, and therefore it was not unusual for this to be conducted in the established framework.

Q. Mr. Secretary, perhaps your lack of precision on the oil question is deliberate, but I wonder if I could try to pin you down once more. Can you tell us what you would define to be a reasonable period of time? And you said if nothing did happen, that it would raise a question of confidence. What is the implication of that question?
A It would not be useful for me to go beyond this. But we have carried out in good faith what we have told both sides we would do.

Q Mr. Secretary, the United States has stated its opposition to any one country dominating affairs in Asia or in other parts of the world. How do you look upon (a) the Paracel Islands question; and (b), the Island question that is dividing North and South Korea. There seem to be disputes over both sets of islands?

A I don't think either of those issues raises the question of dominating the area, or dominating the world. With respect to the Paracel Islands, there has been a dispute between various countries as to the ownership of these islands.

The United States regrets the use of military force in settling this dispute, but it does not raise an issue of world domination.

With respect to the Korean Islands, those were assigned to South Korea as the result of the armistice agreement, and the United States supports that position.

Q Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects now for agreements between Israel and Syria and Israel and
Jordan? And in that connection, has your own personal diplomacy superseded the Geneva Conference?

A With respect to Syria and Israel, on the occasion of my visit to Syria, the Syrian Government put forward some ideas with respect to the disengagement of forces on the Syrian front. It's the first time that the Syrian Government put forward concrete suggestions on any phase of the negotiations.

We have transmitted those ideas to the Government of Israel, which is now studying them, and which has promised us an answer sometime after their cabinet meets next Sunday.

We hope that a process can be generated by which the disengagement of forces on the Syrian side can be negotiated with the same seriousness as on the Egyptian side, and we have indicated that we would be prepared, if the two parties request it, to offer our good offices.

I might say also that the visit to Syria led to an improvement in the bilateral relations between the United States and Syria; one example of which is the fact that an American citizen, who has been held in Syria on
the charge of espionage since July of 1972, is being released tomorrow. His name is John Bates, and Mr. Vest can give any of you who want to pursue it further particulars.

With respect to Jordan, the United States believes that all parties that have frontiers with Israel should participate in the process of negotiation, and we favor negotiations, as well, between Israel and Jordan.

The framework for the negotiations that have taken place was established by the Geneva Conference. The co-chairmanship between us and the Soviet Union is taken very seriously by us, and we are keeping, and have kept, the Soviet Union informed of all of the actions which we have taken, which we believe are consistent with the consensus resolution which ended the last meeting of the Geneva Conference, and which carried out the spirit of this.

My personal role has been produced by the fact that both parties found it easier to convey certain ideas through an intermediary, and because given the hostility in the area, it was useful to have a more impartial third party convey certain considerations and
particular assurances. It is to be hoped that as these negotiations develop, and as the parties gain confidence in each other, that the role of a mediator will become less crucial. But given the importance to the peace of the whole world, of making progress towards a settlement in the Middle East, I don't want to take a dogmatic position on that issue.
Q  Mr. Secretary.
A  Marilyn.

Q  Mr. Secretary, in mentioning the documents that do exist you said the second document is an undertaking of limited forces in zones of limited armaments and elsewhere. Can you spell that out a little bit, and does this involve limitation on weapons that could reach the other side?

A  It concerns primarily the limitation of weapons within the zones of limited armaments and some understandings with respect to offensive capabilities.

Q  Does each side then take on the responsibility not to acquire offensive capability?

A  No, it is strictly a deployment question.

Q  Mr. Secretary, President Sadat is quoted today in Algeria as saying that there has been a significant change since three months ago in U.S. policy towards the Middle East. I wonder if you could tell us what it was that you either said or did while you were in Egypt that would cause President Sadat to reach that conclusion.
A I think --of course I am not a spokesman for President Sadat--but it is obvious that the United States has played a much more active role in the Middle East in pursuing a settlement than has been the case previously, and the United States has attempted to take into account the legitimate concerns of both sides in urging a settlement. So I would think that the change to which President Sadat referred concerns the degree of our activity and our general participation in producing a settlement.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you expect now that there will be a swift resumption of diplomatie relations with Egypt?

A I think the conditions for that have been improved.

A Mr. Secretary, some of the Arab states or oil-producing states are said to be mining their oil fields in a direct response to Secretary Schlesinger's speech of January 6 in which he said that public opinion might force a show of force by the West. What is your opinion about the likelihood of such a show of force by the West if the embargo goes too far?
A Well, I don't think the embargo will go too far, so that this is essentially an academic question.

Q Mr. Secretary, following your last round of conversations with the Chinese leadership, you expressed the hope that the process of normalization could be accelerated. Could you tell us as to what precisely you mean by normalization? Is it establishment of full diplomatic relations? And if so, how would you go about it?

A Well, in our relations with the Chinese we have always stressed that the practical improvement of our relations is more important than the legal form in which it is expressed. Therefore, we have always stressed particular concrete steps. We are at the moment negotiating a number of issues with the Chinese Government on blocked assets and claims of both sides, which are progressing, and we are proceeding along the lines which we have previously outlined. But by normalization of relations we mean at this stage closer contact, improved communications, and a greater interconnection of various activities.
Q  Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ehrlichman is gone, but have you been assured since then that you never again will be denied information which properly falls within your sphere of operations?

A  I had no reason to complain about the matter because I thought it was a reasonable division of labor that I would not participate in internal security matters.

Q  Mr. Secretary, you've talked --

Q  Mr. Secretary, what's the status of the preparations for the energy conference? And have you yet dispatched the special emissary to the European countries for the preparations?

A  The question is what is the status of preparations for the energy conference, and have we dispatched the emissary?

Very active work went on in the preparations for the energy conference as a result of a task force composed of Mr. Donnelson, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, Mr. Lord, and Mr. Cooper from the National Security Council, together with representatives from other departments: Mr. Bennett from the Treasury; a representative of the Energy Office.
Now, we are having daily meetings on the subject this week, and when our preparations have progressed to a certain point, no later than the end of this week, we will be prepared to talk to our allies and to other invitees.

I will have to talk to Mr. Donaldson on what the best use of his time is, whether the best use of his time between now and the beginning of the conference is by taking a trip or whether we can brief the other participants here. And that decision will be made in the next few days.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been a debate within the Government over many years as to whether it is good or bad for the United States that the Suez Canal be open. What is your view now, since one by-product of this negotiation may be the opening of the Canal?

A I would say that obviously the United States has no overwhelming reason of its own to get the Suez Canal opened. So the arguments pro and con have to be seen within the context of the general contribution that opening of the Suez Canal would make to peace in the Middle East. In that context, the United States
would feel that it would be a positive step towards peace in the Middle East, and the greater ease by which the Soviet Union can transfer its fleet from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean can be compensated both by the greater ease with which we can transfer some of our ships into the Indian Ocean and other measures that can be taken of a different nature.

Q Mr. Secretary, last fall when Foreign Minister Jobert was here you spoke of the constructive role that France was playing in the dialogue between the United States and Europe. I was wondering if you would still use that description for French policy in view of the initial steps that France has taken with regard to the franc and the negative attitude the French have taken until now towards your projected energy conference.

A Well, of course, the steps that France has taken with respect to the franc is similar to the steps that we have taken with respect to the dollar. And we can't blame France for pursuing a fiscal policy similar to our own.
With respect to the negotiations on the various declarations, they are now in process. I am quite optimistic that the NATO declaration can be settled fairly quickly. The declaration with the European Community is in the process of being redrafted. And there will be another meeting of our representatives with those of the Nine early in February, and it will be easier to form a judgment then.

With respect to energy, our views and those of France are quite opposed. And to the extent that we, of course, believe that we are correct, I could not characterize the French attitude as constructive.
Q  To follow up, at your San Clemente press conference, the last time you talked about Europe, you mentioned only two declarations. What happened to the third one, was it dropped -- the idea?

A  With respect to Europe, we are working on two declarations: a declaration defining the relationship between the European community and the United States, and a declaration defining the basic principles on which NATO should proceed.

There is a project that we strongly support for a third declaration, including Europe, the United States and Japan -- and encompassing the basic principles of both of the declarations we are drafting with Europe, plus certain objectives we share together with Japan.

The United States position is that we strongly favor such a trilateral declaration, and we have not changed our policy.

Q  Mr. Secretary, would you go ahead with this anyway?

A  We would proceed in any event. Yes.

Q  Mr. Secretary, would you say that the removal of the oil embargo is not really enough, is not the real problem but
that the production cutbacks must be restored as well, otherwise, everybody would be competing for the same amount of scarce oil.

Do you have reason to believe that that will happen, as well as the lifting of the embargo?

A I maintain the position that I advanced at previous press conferences.

Q Mr. Secretary, one of the Senators who was at a meeting with you yesterday, said that the Russian cooperation was mainly, not objecting to what you were achieving in the Middle East. Could you give us an example of the more positive Soviet cooperation?

A The Soviet Union played a very useful role and a very crucial role, in helping to get the Geneva Conference organized. It played a very constructive role at the Geneva Conference itself.

Neither of those events could have occurred without active and constructive Soviet participation.

With respect to disengagement, it was always understood by the Soviet Union and ourselves, that we were in a tactically better position to promote progress on that
issue.

And therefore, at the Military Committee that was meeting in Geneva, it was agreed from the beginning, that the Israeli and Egyptians discussions should take place under the auspices of a United Nations representative, rather than under the auspices of the Co-Chairman.

Now in the last phase of the negotiations, the tactical details were handled primarily by the United States, but the Soviet Union was informed, and indicated its strong support for the effort -- and we consider this a constructive step.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned opening a new dialogue -- your desire to open a new dialogue with the countries in South America, and there has been some talk about a trip, perhaps to Panama, and your trip to Mexico City at the end of the month -- and possibly a larger trip to the Continent in April.

I would like to ask you if you could be more specific at this time about your plans, and whether you would rule out a meeting in Mexico with an emissary of
the Cuban Government.

A I have indicated at a previous press conference that there has been an agreement ad referendum, which means for current examination by the United States and Panamanian Governments about the basic principles on which a negotiation leading to a new treaty for the Panama Canal should be based.

These principles are now being studied in our Government, and when they are approved, it is possible that I may take a trip to Panama to mark the Agreement on these principles.

The meeting in Mexico City grew out of a speech I made to the Latin American Foreign Ministers during the United Nations General Assembly, in which I pointed out that the United States was eager to start a new dialogue with Latin America on the basis of equality and geared to the realities of the current situation.

At this lunch, the Foreign Minister of Colombia responded to my speech and invited the Foreign Ministers of all Latin American countries to a meeting in Bogota to formulate a preliminary response to this American initiative.
That meeting took place in November, and came up with what we consider a very constructive document that outlines an agenda for a proposed meeting between the other nations of the Western Hemisphere and the United States.

This meeting is now scheduled for the period of February 21st to the 23rd, in Mexico City. The Latin American Foreign Ministers will meet several days before then, to formulate their ideas even more precisely than was possible in Bogota.

I have been in close touch with various foreign ministers who are active in Latin America and who are actively engaged in this, and I am quite optimistic that we can take a significant step in Mexico City, and we are hard at work in preparing an American position in response to this Latin American initiative.

With respect to a possible meeting with a Cuban Representative, there is no such plan.

Q Mr. Secretary, I don't know if you had a chance to be fully briefed on certain changes in strategic nuclear weapons policies that Secretary Schlesinger has publicly talked about, involving retargeting of
nuclear warheads and also the improvements in the accuracy
of our nuclear warheads -- and if so, what effect do you
think these decisions might have on our relations with the
Soviets, and what effect, if any, on the SALT II
discussions?

A All decisions of this nature are taken within
the framework of the National Security Council system and,
therefore, in my capacity as Assistant to the President,
as well as in my capacity as Secretary of State, I'm
of course familiar with these various matters.

I would say that they underline the inexorable
nature of the arms race and the essential necessity of
making progress on the limitations of arms.

If the strategic arms race continues unchecked,
it is inevitable that both sides will refine the number
of their weapons, multiply their warheads, increase their
accuracies and develop strategies which will sooner or
later, create the threat of a gap between the first strike
and the second strike capability -- which was considered
to be a principle element of insecurity in the 1950s and
early 1960s -- which would put a premium on striking first
and therefore, contribute to the danger of the outbreak of
nuclear war.

Q Thank you, very much --

A This is why we believe that this is a year in which major progress should be made on the strategic arms limitation.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
LSE:

Final version of Moorner statement.

Do you want it to go in Hak's book?

Yes ______

Other ______
MEMO TO: Larry E.

Attached is final revision.

Will be in touch later this B.O.T.

Blackie
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNTIL RELEASED
BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT BY
ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER, USN
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WEDNESDAY, 6 FEBRUARY 1974

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Some two weeks ago in letters to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, I offered to provide "all of the information available to me" concerning the anonymous allegations of "military spying," the so-called unauthorized transfer of papers and the publication of documents in the media which could affect national security -- either through the Staff "or at a Formal Hearing as you deem it appropriate or desirable."

I stand ready to do so.

It is, personally, very, very distasteful and certainly out of character to find myself discussing the attacks and insinuations appearing in the media that I was "spying" on the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It is distasteful and out of character because I have served this Nation for 45 years as a member of a profession where honesty, integrity and devotion to country are the measure of the man. I have risen during this period from Midshipman to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have seen peace, and I have been a part of three wars. As a citizen and as an experienced professional, I bow to no one in or out of uniform in terms of devotion to duty, to country,
or to the Constitution of the United States.

Therefore, I hope you can understand why these insinuations and allegations sicken me as a man, concern me as a military officer and deeply disturb me as the nation's senior uniformed official.

The rationale advanced for this so-called "military spying" has been that since the Joint Chiefs of Staff were denied a free flow of National Security Council information which we were entitled to receive in order to fulfill our statutory responsibility, a "spy ring" was established to thwart or inhibit the development of policies with which they allegedly disagreed.

In the interest of setting the record absolutely straight I appeared on national TV and publicly denounced this allegation for what it is -- ludicrous and ridiculous. I stand by that statement. In the first place, there is and always has been a free and complete flow of information between Dr. Kissinger and me as required by Presidential directive. Secondly, with respect to foreign affairs and military operations, I have consistently and actively supported our national policies. I respectfully call your attention to my many appearances before this and many other Congressional Committees, my speeches and press conferences. Furthermore, I have frequently been requested by the President to brief individuals and groups from the Congressional Leadership, including the Distinguished Chairman of this Committee, the Speaker of the House and many others. I have also been the senior military spokesman charged with explaining United States national policy to our Allies.
In short, I have continuously been engaged in steadfastly supporting initiatives which it is now alleged that I opposed. Therefore, the allegation that I desired to inhibit national policy initiatives simply does not make sense.

At the outset, let me emphasize that I have never seen any of the reports of investigation supposedly submitted on the matters at hand. I have not had the privilege of listening to any tape of any interrogation relating to these subjects. I have only been briefly advised orally by Mr. Buzhardt, then General Counsel of the Department of Defense, as to the contents of an interview with Yeoman Radford and Rear Admiral Welander. Just yesterday, for the first time, I reviewed the summaries of statements of various individuals compiled by the Defense Investigative Service. As you know, this sheaf of unsigned narratives is far from a full Investigative Report.

My letter of 30 January to you, Mr. Chairman, sets out in detail my recollections of the circumstances surrounding the various allegations. No useful purpose would be served by repeating at this time all that has been said. Let me emphasize the main points.

First, I must speak about my relationship with Dr. Kissinger and the National Security Council Staff. The exchange of information, the coordination of effort, and the mutual feeling of confidence was and still is excellent. I am sure Dr. Kissinger will attest to this fact.
I have always been privy to full information on all subjects with military implications and on the multitude of subjects where coordination between the NSC Staff and the JCS is necessary. Whatever contribution I have tried to make toward the development and implementation of national security policy in the past four years has been served well by the mutual exchange and confidence which exists between Dr. Kissinger and me.

On two occasions, over two years ago, I was shown papers by one of my staff officers -- papers which, as it turned out, were acquired in an unauthorized way. As I recall, these papers were treated as I treat any paper handed to me by my staff officers. I quickly scan the paper for subject matter; if the subject matter is one with which I am already fully informed, the papers are simply handed back or set aside. These particular papers, as I explained in my letter of 30 January 1974, were on subjects with which I was already completely familiar; so they were, as is my custom, routinely returned. These papers were only momentarily scanned, and I did not focus on any irregularity.

Perhaps I should have been more alert in following up as to the precise origin and transmission of these papers; but these were busy times and I was dealing rapidly with literally thousands of papers, dispatches, and documents -- in fact, a deluge of information.
It is important that I stress to you that I gave no orders, issued no instructions, gave no encouragement — either direct or implied — to anyone to collect or retain in any irregular or unauthorized manner any information, papers or documents from the National Security Council.

Let me again emphasize, there is no substantive relationship between the leak of official documents which appeared in the media and these miscellaneous papers which were retained by Yeoman Radford in the course of his clerical duties during two trips several months before the leak to the press. By this I mean that none of the materials acquired by Radford on these trips have appeared in the media. Yet, for some reason unknown to me, it is these miscellaneous internal papers which are being spotlighted rather than the official documents covering a different time frame which were acquired by the media and boldly displayed, with their "Secret" stamp clearly visible. These are the documents which, in my opinion, did have an adverse effect on national security.

In my most recent letter of 30 January 1974 to you, I discussed the facts and circumstances concerning the leaks of highly classified material to the press and Yeoman Radford's suspected involvement. In fairness to Yeoman Radford, I want the Committee to understand that this is
circumstantial evidence and does not, under military judicial standards, establish guilt. On two occasions I recommended orally that investigative procedures under the Uniform Code of Military Justice be invoked in order to establish the guilt or innocence of Yeoman Radford. I was advised that no disciplinary proceedings would be conducted and that Yeoman Radford would be transferred from Washington.

Obedience, integrity, and loyalty to country are the standards of our military services. The people of our great country deserve nothing less than absolute adherence to these standards from all of us who serve. The allegations and insinuations of "spying" subvert these standards and grossly distort the truth -- which I am confident this Committee will establish to the satisfaction of the American people. The trust and confidence of our people in their military forces must not be weakened. It is absolutely indispensable to the safety and well being of our country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. Chairman, I am most willing to attempt to answer any questions that you or other members of the Committee might wish to pose. If you would permit me, however, I would first like to make a short statement which I hope may clarify a number of points about which you are concerned.

On December 23, 1971 I was made aware for the first time that highly sensitive papers were being taken from the National Security Council in an unauthorized manner and were being passed to the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This discovery took place as a result of an investigation undertaken at the direction of John Ehrlichman into the very serious leaks earlier that month to columnist Jack Anderson of detailed information concerning deliberations of the Washington Special Action Group on the India-Pakistan conflict.

As you may recall, beginning in mid-December 1971, Jack Anderson published a series of columns which revealed extremely sensitive WSAG deliberations on that conflict and eventually Anderson published verbatim the texts of several Top Secret Defense Department internal memoranda which recorded in detail the course of the WSAG discussions of December 3, 4, 6 and 8, 1971.
On December 12 or 13, John Ehrlichman telephoned me with the message that he was conducting an investigation into the Anderson leaks, that I was not to participate in that investigation and that I would not subsequently be informed about the investigation. He did say that he might undertake an investigation of members of the NSC staff as well as checking NSC security procedures. I informed him later through General Haig that I would not tolerate an investigation of the staff, but that a check of the security procedures was not objectionable if I were given a copy of whatever report resulted.

I was not and did not expect to be further involved in any investigation of this matter, in accordance with the agreement reached in May of 1970 that Mr. Ehrlichman was thereafter to be responsible for investigating internal security aspects of national security issues, that all such reports were to go to Mr. Haldeman's office rather than to mine, and that I was not any longer to be involved.

I did later become aware that Mr. Ehrlichman's office had assigned a Department of the Air Force official to study the security procedures employed at the NSC and that a copy of his report was given to General Haig. I did not read that report on the recommendation of General Haig that nothing in it deserved my attention.
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However, on December 14 Rear Admiral Welander, head of the JCS Liaison Office with the NSC, informed General Haig that it appeared that at least one of the documents leaked to Anderson had to have come from within the Liaison Office. I was away at the time and when General Haig relayed this disclosure to me I told him to send Admiral Welander to John Ehrlichman because Ehrlichman was in charge of all internal security investigations.

On December 24 at his request I went to John Ehrlichman's office where he played for me about 15 minutes of a tape recording of Admiral Welander being interviewed about his knowledge of the leak. Mr. Ehrlichman had informed me on the preceding day of the contents of the tape, namely the disclosure that someone on the JCS Liaison Office staff was apparently stealing NSC documents and conveying them in an unauthorized way back to the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I was appalled that anyone would do such a thing, and amazed by it because it was such a useless, pointless act. As both Admiral Moorer and I have informed you by letter and as I wish to repeat today, in my view we had a close, effective and open working relationship and that the JCS were kept
fully informed of NSC matters. I have never received any complaints from the JCS of not having adequate information. I consulted with Admiral Moorer on December 23 about the discovery of the unauthorized transfers of documents and on the same day ordered that the Liaison Office be closed. This was the only action within my discretion, as I was told that I was not to participate in any further investigation or possible disciplinary action, and I did not pursue the matter further.

Although I was quite angry at the time that the theft and transfer of documents had taken place, I did not then and I do not now believe that what took place deserved the creation of a public scandal. I do not pretend to explain to you the personal motivations which led to these foolish acts, but neither do I believe on the basis of the information available to me that there are any grounds for the American public to lose confidence in the U.S. military. I admit that I have not read or heard described the contents either of the report made at Mr. Ehrlichman's direction, or of the report prepared by the Department of Defense after its own investigation, but I repeat my own feeling that we did not face a traumatic or lasting problem here which should be of fundamental concern to the American people.
Admiral Moorer and I have had and continue to have an harmonious and fruitful working relationship. He is kept fully informed of all NSC actions, and it was well known to the Office of the JCS that I had directed the NSC staff to make available information on all matters of mutual concern to our two organizations. It simply made no sense for anyone to order the theft of NSC documents, virtually all of which would have been or were passed to the JCS through normal communications channels. I am therefore strongly inclined to believe that no such orders were given, and that the problem has been adequately dealt with by the closure of the Liaison Office and the removal of those persons immediately involved.

Thank you for this opportunity to make these remarks. I am now willing to address any questions you may have.
Honorable Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.  

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, the press and the media generally have focused in great detail on the issue known as "military spying" concerning the so-called unauthorized transmission of National Security Council documents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In an effort to make available to the Committee the maximum amount of information as quickly as possible, I would appreciate your responding with a written statement on this matter. Though not limited to the following questions, I would like to request that your statement include all you know both personally and officially concerning the following aspects of this matter.

a. Would you describe the authorized system for the transmission of information from the National Security Council staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its scope and method of operation. This includes the personal relationship and the extent of cooperation on both a personal and official basis.

b. Would you provide comments of what you know about the NSC material which appeared in the press December 1971 - 1972.

c. What was the nature and the extent of the NSC material which was transmitted from the NSC to the Joint Chiefs in an unauthorized manner? Over what period of time did this occur?

d. What was the relationship, if any, between the material cited in (b) above, to that cited in (c)?

In summary, the Committee would appreciate a complete statement indicating the entire period concerned, the salient facts and circumstances which have been connected with this entire matter -- including all relevant information of which you are aware in addition to the issues set forth above.

Sincerely,

John C. Stennis
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 30, 1974

Dear Senator Stennis:

As requested in your letter of January 28, 1974, I have prepared and submit herewith a statement concerning the so-called unauthorized transmission of National Security Council documents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This statement includes all relevant information on the subject of which I am aware. If I can be of any further assistance please let me know.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable
John C. Stennis,
United States Senate.
STATEMENT OF HENRY A. KISSINGER
IN RESPONSE TO LETTER OF JANUARY 28, 1974
FROM SENATOR JOHN C. STENNIS

(Questions as set forth in Senator Stennis’ letter and responses thereto.)

(a) Would you describe the authorized system for the transmission of information from the National Security Council staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its scope and method of operation. This includes the personal relationship and the extent of cooperation on both a personal and official basis.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military adviser to the National Security Council, which is the principal forum through which the major issues of national security policy are brought to the President for decision. He attends all meetings of the Council, and of its sub-groups at the Deputy Secretary level (which are chaired by me as the Assistant to the President). If the Chairman is unable to attend any such meetings, the Chief of Staff of the service who has been designated as Acting Chairman, or the Assistant to the Chairman, attends. On issues for which an interdepartmental negotiating team has been assembled, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, the Chairman would be accompanied to such meetings by the JCS representative on the delegation.

A JCS representative also participates in the lower level (Assistant Secretary) Interdepartmental Groups chaired by the State Department and in all ad hoc or working groups in the NSC system, at whatever level. This includes the working groups for the Verification Panel and the Defense Program Review Committee. The JCS representative also participates in the Under Secretaries Committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, which is responsible for developing operational plans for and overseeing implementation of Presidential decisions in the national security area. I am attaching for your information a listing of the number of NSC and NSC-related meetings, by year, for the period 1969-1972 at which the JCS were represented.

In addition, I meet regularly, usually biweekly, outside the institutional framework of the NSC, with the Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman of the JCS and the Director of Central Intelligence for frank and full discussion of issues of interdepartmental concern.

Copies of all National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) and related NSC documents are distributed to the Chairman of the JCS directly by the NSC Staff Secretary. JCS comments on NSC papers or on issues in the NSC system are transmitted to me as Assistant to the President through the office of the Secretary of Defense.

Among other NSC documents, the JCS regularly receives the monthly report on the status of all NSSMs prepared by the NSC Staff Secretary. This report is used by the JCS Staff to monitor JCS input into the NSC system on issues of concern to the Chairman and to the individual Chiefs of Staff.

In addition to the formal distribution system, members of the NSC staff are in close and constant communication with JCS representatives on all substantive issues of interdepartmental concern. I have instructed the NSC staff to communicate to the JCS representatives all information necessary for mutual support on national security matters. In addition, they exchange informal views both orally and in writing in the course of developing policy options for review at the sub-Cabinet level, including the Chairman of the JCS, and for onward transmission to the President.

(b) Would you provide comments of what you know about the NSC material which appeared in the press December 1971-1972.

Material which appeared in the press in December 1971 included highly classified documents, the disclosure of which constituted a serious security risk to our government. In particular, the publications adversely affected our relations with India and had other consequences of grave concern.

I do not recall the full extent of the classified material which appeared in the press nor have I endeavored to make a list of it. In the main, particularly with respect to minutes of meetings of the Washington Special Action Group -- a body on which the JCS were represented -- I believe the documents published did not come from the NSC and were not among the documents transmitted by the NSC to the Joint Chiefs. The minutes of those meetings were prepared,
I understand, in the Department of Defense and constituted their internal Department records of the meetings in question.

(c) What was the nature and the extent of the NSC material which was transmitted from the NSC to the Joint Chiefs in an unauthorized manner? Over what period of time did this occur?

I have never received any report on the nature, extent or time over which the NSC material was transmitted in an unauthorized manner to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have not seen any report of any investigation in this matter and my direct knowledge is limited to the information I learned from listening to the part of Admiral Welander's interview discussed below.

(d) What was the relationship, if any, between the material cited in (b) above, to that cited in (c)?

I do not have the necessary information to make the analysis requested. As mentioned above, insofar as I know, none of the material published by Jack Anderson in December 1971 comprised NSC papers, or came from the files of the National Security Council. Thus, the material published by Mr. Anderson could not, to the best of my knowledge, have been a part of the material reportedly taken from the NSC in an unauthorized manner.

General Comment:

As a result of the publication of the information referred to above, an investigation was started by Mr. Ehrlichman who was in charge of internal security investigations in the White House. After that publication and while I was out of the city, Admiral Welander, who was in charge of the JCS Liaison Office to the National Security Council Staff, told General Haig that it appeared that the leak of at least one of the documents published had come from his office. When General Haig informed me of the Welander conversation, I told him to turn the matter over to Mr. Ehrlichman.

Sometime later Mr. Ehrlichman let me listen to a portion of a tape recording of an interview of Admiral Welander by David Young. As I recall, this interview covered not only the possible
sources of leaks but also unauthorized transfer of papers from my office to the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As noted above, this interview came about as a result of General Haig sending Admiral Welander to Mr. Ehrlichman. Apart from this one interview I have no direct knowledge of the results of any investigation in this matter, nor have I seen any report of such results.

I was of course concerned by the allegation that there had been unauthorized transfers of documents from my office to the office of the JCS. Any attempt to transfer papers from my office to the JCS was pointless, since there was a full flow of information in authorized channels between the respective offices. Furthermore, Admiral Moorer was kept fully informed of all NSC actions; in addition, he and I have had many conversations on these questions over the years. Thus, the fact that someone would undertake an unauthorized transfer of such information to that office was incomprehensible to me. I believe Admiral Moorer when he said he did not focus on the precise origin of the papers because he already had all the information he needed on the subjects concerned, and that the unauthorized transfer represented overzealousness on the part of subordinates. The unauthorized transfers, of course, should not have taken place and should not have been tolerated. I have noted above that to my knowledge the unauthorized transfers had nothing to do with the leaks to the press, regardless of whether the person who made the unauthorized transfers was responsible for the leaks.

It seems to me that the unauthorized transfers do not justify a "public scandal" that could undermine public confidence in the military. However, I had no part in the decision to close any investigation or to reprimand or not to reprimand the participants. The only action within my area of jurisdiction was my decision, after consultation with Admiral Moorer, to close the Liaison Office attached to my staff.

From my point of view, I worked entirely harmoniously with Admiral Moorer, we had a full exchange of information on NSC matters, and I had and have complete confidence in him. I have never had any reason to consider Admiral Moorer as anything but a personal friend, and I believe he reciprocates my feelings.
## Number of NSC and Related Meetings

January 20, 1969 - December 31, 1972

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<th>Year</th>
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Dear Mr. Chairman,

Your letter of 28 January pertaining to recent press and media reports dealing with allegations of "Military Spying" and the so-called unauthorized transmission of NSC documents have been received. I am pleased to respond to your request that I set out my knowledge of the matter. I would emphasize, however, that I have never been provided or seen any investigative report pertaining to these matters, although apparently, simultaneous investigations were conducted in the Pentagon and the White House. I would, therefore, note that the following is reconstructed from memory and informal discussions with others associated with the case which arose over two years ago.

First, I wish to record a few general observations which I consider crucial to the issue. Thereafter, your specific inquiries will be addressed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and codified in 10 United States Code, Section 141, "The principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." The statutory language, of course, does not fully describe the close, harmonious relationship which has—and continues to—exist between the President, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the NSC Staff on the one hand, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as represented by the Chairman, on the other. The exchange of data, facts, opinions, and views was—and is—free, continuous, and involves all matters of mutual concern. I am privy to all matters and information in areas where close cooperation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council is required. Dr. KISSINGER issued instructions to his Staff ensuring that this information is made available to me.

Turning now to your specific inquiries:

a. Transmission of information between the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council Staff.

The means and methods of transmitting information between the two organizations are virtually unlimited. They include
secure and unsecure voice, telecommunications, LDX, courier and direct personal contact. The level of interface between the NSC and the JCS runs from clerk-to-clerk in exchange of routine scheduling information and transmittal of documents for comment or concurrence through staff officer-to-staff officer discussion of substantive issues, to personal contact between the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As early as 25 January 1969, Doctor Kissinger announced his procedures for support and cooperation which established two essential ingredients; first, that the Chairman, JCS, would be routinely furnished copies of all National Security Council documents; and, second, that there would be direct access between the President (and the NSC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to facilitate this exchange of information, a Liaison Office was established in 1950. "The Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for National Security Affairs" was the official title of the liaison officer from the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the NSC Staff. In 1962 the liaison officer established facilities in the Executive Office Building. When I became CJCS, RADM Robinson held this position. YN Radford was assigned as his clerical assistant in September, 1970. Subsequently, RADM Welander routinely replaced RADM Robinson. The essential function of the office was the exchange of information, recommendations, views, and decisions pertaining to the JCS and NSC activities. This liaison officer had direct access to Dr. Kissinger and was often tasked directly by him. The function of the office included assistance in preparation of memoranda and staff papers for consideration by the President and the NSC. The incumbent served in many respects and was designated a senior member of the NSC Staff. He regularly participated in Staff conferences and discussions in preparation for meetings. The JCS, represented by the Chairman, were—and remain on—every NSC Committee of any international significance. It was my policy—and my entire Staff was so instructed—to ensure that this Liaison Office was informed of all matters relating to the activities of the JCS knowledge of which was required by the NSC Staff.

The personal relationship between Dr. Kissinger and CJCS is of great importance in this context. Our relationship was—and is—excellent. As a matter of fact, aside from the continuous flow of staff papers and information, we frequently had—and continue to have—expanded personal discussions by telephone, or in his office, on key matters. I never had the feeling of isolation from information. Dr. Kissinger and I
continue to have almost weekly discussions at a luncheon-type arrangement. I had direct access to the President and frequently met with him, aside from the formal meetings of the NSC and budget matters, on such military activities as air operations and cross-border operations in Cambodia, the 1971 incursion into Laos and the air campaign into North Vietnam, including the Mining of Haiphong Harbor in May, 1972 and the attacks on military targets in the Hanoi Area in December, 1972. Discussions with Dr. Kissinger included arrangements and advance preparations for all his trips to the People's Republic of China, including the first one, and discussions of SALT matters, including contact from Moscow during the June 1972 Summit.

With regard to information pertaining to matters under discussion within the NSC system, in reality, my problem—if I had one—was sifting, synthesizing, and analyzing the flow of information, data, and opinion available. In the event I felt the need for any information—specific or general—I simply called Dr. Kissinger, who was immediately forthcoming. This remains the case today.


Beginning in the middle of December, 1971 and running through January, 1972 "The Washington Merry-go-Round" a syndicated column written by Mr. Jack Anderson published, with particular reference to the Indo-Pakistani conflict, a series of columns demonstrating clearly a source with access to highly classified information reflecting on the functions of the National Security Council system. These documents included memoranda for the record (MFRs) of Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) Meetings on 3, 4, 6, and 8 December, 1971, classified "Top Secret" and originating in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) or the Office of the Chairman, JCS. These MFRs were prepared by Staff officers in attendance at the WSAG meetings. In addition, there were classified cables and intelligence reports pertaining to the topics under discussions at these meetings. Subsequently, the full MFRs were published by The Washington Post and other newspapers.

The 14 December 1971 article was of particular note. It alluded to "guided missile destroyers, Parsons, Decatur, and Tartar SAM." A Memorandum from RADM Welander to GEN Haig, which was typed by YN Radford and hand-carried by RADM Welander to GEN Haig, had referred to "Parsons, Decatur, Tartar SAM Destroyers" (referring to their surface-to-air armaments and not to the name of a ship). This memorandum was available only to RADM Welander, GEN Haig and YN Radford. Upon reading this column, RADM Welander immediately recognized the relationship between his memorandum and the misconstruction of the expression,
I. MRLICHMAN's office, I immediately advised SECDEF LAIRD and recommended institution of investigative proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). I would emphasize that it was RADM WELANDER--my Liaison Officer--who discovered the probable source of the leak and immediately reported the matter to his superiors, both at the White House and here in the Pentagon.

Subsequent examination by RADM WELANDER and my administrative officer of the entire series of articles published by Mr. ANDERSON indicated the following:

(1) The series of articles published extracts from all MFRs of WSAG meetings for the period 3-8 December except the ISA MFR of the 6 December WSAG Meeting. RADM WELANDER had withdrawn this MFR from the file and returned it directly to my administrative officer. It was not available to YN RADFORD. It, alone, in the series of MFRs, was not published by Mr. ANDERSON.

(2) In the process of deciding on a course of action with regard to a Naval Contingency Force, RADM WELANDER dictated a memorandum to YN RADFORD "brainstorming" optional courses of action--which included proposed public leaks in Djakarta, Manila, and Singapore. Only one copy of this "think piece" was made. It was never used, since RADM WELANDER was unable to discuss the matter with GEN HAIG prior to a decision being made. Only RADM WELANDER and YN RADFORD had access to the paper. Subsequently, Mr. ANDERSON referred to leaks in the same three capitals which, in fact, never occurred.

(3) Subsequent to YN RADFORD's being denied access to documents, no ANDERSON column appeared dealing with these matters based upon documents dated later than 15 December 1971--the date on which YN RADFORD was denied further access.

(4) It was also reported that YN RADFORD had been stationed in India and had developed close relationships with Indian nationals and had an interest in US-Indian relations. He knew Mr. ANDERSON and, on occasion, met with him--including having dinner with him on 12 December 1971.

YN RADFORD, in the routine performance of his duties, had direct access to all the documents published by Mr. ANDERSON. These documents were distributed in the normal and regular administrative process with the
exception of the two memoranda written by RADM WELANDER.

c. The nature and extent of the so-called unauthorized transmittal of NSC materials to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On occasion, YN RADFORD accompanied senior NSC Staff personnel on various trips. For example, GEN HAIG requested that YN RADFORD be assigned to assist Dr. KISSINGER on his July, 1971 trip to Asia. RADM WELANDER resisted due to his newness in the job and YN RADFORD's pending leave request. GEN HAIG insisted and YN RADFORD was so assigned. Upon his return, YN RADFORD provided to RADM WELANDER a collection of miscellaneous staff papers, roughs, and questionnaires. After screening these papers, RADM WELANDER hand-delivered some of the working papers to my office, noting that YN RADFORD had retained them incident to his clerical duties on the trip. To the best of my memory, based upon a very brief exposure, these papers dealt primarily with the military and political situation and discussions taking place during the trip—matters with which I was already familiar. These papers did not stimulate close attention by me because they contained no new information. I had already received several messages from the various embassies involved, as well as reports from the military authorities in the field, on the progress of the trip. In addition, on 16 July, five days before the receipt of the RADFORD papers, I spent the entire day in San Clemente with the President and Dr. KISSINGER discussing the details of the trip. I did not scrutinize the papers as to their precise contents or origin but handed them back to RADM WELANDER.

Subsequently, in September 1971, at GEN HAIG's request, YN RADFORD was again assigned to accompany GEN HAIG to Southeast Asia. I had received reports pertaining to this trip from ADM MC CAIN (CINCPAC) and GEN ABRAMS (COMUSMACV). I had been informed by GEN HAIG not only about the trip, but also in detail on other matters. Subsequently, RADM WELANDER provided me with some miscellaneous papers YN RADFORD had prepared during the trip. These papers had been overtaken by events, and again, I did not scrutinize them as to their content or precise origin. I want to stress that these papers were provided me by a Staff officer in a routine manner. They were treated by me in the same manner that I would treat any other Staff officer's report on a matter upon which I was already fully informed. Such papers are only momentarily scanned for subject matter—not precise origin or method of transmission.

These are the only instances, to the best of my knowledge and belief, were information acquired in a manner which, in retrospect, might be labeled "unauthorized," was brought to my attention. No one has questioned my access to the information.
itself, and I don't believe anyone can rightfully do so. I might add that RADM ROBINSON, while assigned to the NSC Staff, briefed me on NSC activities as it was his duty. I presume that the acquisition of this information had been normal and regular in every instance.

By statute, my responsibility is limited to operational matters and the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. I have no authority in the field of discipline or military justice. Recognizing this fact, when I was advised of these matters, I consulted with the Chief of Naval Operations concerning my desire to institute proceedings under the UCMJ. Upon receipt of his concurrence, I so recommended to the SECDEF and to the DOD General Counsel. I was, however, advised that no disciplinary proceedings were to be conducted and that it had been decided by the civilian leadership that YN RADFORD was to be immediately transferred. I accepted these orders and directed my staff to implement them without delay. I repeat--I have never been provided, or read, any of the many White House and DOD investigative reports allegedly associated with this matter.

When I was advised by Mr. BUZhardt, the DOD General Counsel, that YN RADFORD testified during the Defense Investigative Service inquiry that he had not only been retaining papers in the course of his clerical duties but, also, had been actively collecting them in a clearly unauthorized manner, I directed that any such papers which might be in the Liaison Office files be returned to the NSC Staff. Acting on those instructions, all such papers were then returned.

c. The relationship between the matter published in the media and the allegations of unauthorized information.

There is no substantive relationship between the leaks of official documents which appeared in the media and the miscellaneous papers retained by YN RADFORD in the course of his clerical duties several months before the leaks to the press. None of the papers discussed, in reply to your question "C." appeared in the press. It was the leaks of official documents covering the period 3-15 December 1971 which were subsequently widely published in the news media that were detrimental to national policy.

Several additional factors seem worthy of mention at this time. In retrospect, one could argue that, perhaps, I should have been more alert in following up on the manner in which the information provided by RADM WELANDER was acquired. However, since the same information was freely flowing from
many sources, I simply did not give any thought to scrutinizing the precise origin of the material at that time. In this connection, I gave no orders, no instructions, and no encouragement, either direct or implied, to YN RADFORD or to anyone else to collect or retain any information or papers from the NSC in an irregular manner. As a matter of collateral fact, I have never, to my knowledge and belief, talked to YN RADFORD.

There have been allegations to the effect that I opposed several aspects of national policy. These allegations, made in the press media, are not only untrue but their lack of validity is easily demonstrated without exception by simple reference to the public record and members of the National Security Council. In Open and Closed sessions before Congressional Committees I have repeatedly explained and firmly supported our national policy. Doctor KISSINGER and I have discussed these matters at length, and I repeatedly advised him that these initiatives were viewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being in our best security interest.

It is not appropriate for me to discuss, in detail, my relationship with the President. However, I would simply note that my reappointment as Chairman, JCS, occurred several months after these matters had been known and thoroughly investigated. I have continued to brief Congressional leaders at his request. If he had occasion to question my dedication to the institution I represent or my performance of duty, he never indicated such to me in any way.

I have dealt with these matters which occurred during a very busy period over two years ago as forthrightly as I can. I stand willing to discuss them further, at any time and in any manner, you deem appropriate.

Sincerely,

T. H. MOORE
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable John Stennis
Chairman, Senate Armed Forces Committee
Washington, D.C. 20510
The following item(s) have been removed from the collection because they contain security classified information:

Collection:  Henry A. Kissinger papers

Box Number: 383

Folder Number: 4

Item(s) and Security Classification:

1  Briefing by the Secretary of State to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 35 Jan 1974  35pp  S
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31—The Senate Armed Services Committee announced today that it had summoned Secretary of State Kissinger and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to testify about the alleged military spying operations inside the White House in 1971.

Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, committee chairman, said in a statement that the testimony of the two Administration officials would be taken, next week if possible, before further hearings are scheduled.

At issue are a maze of public contradictions over the nature of the spying, its seriousness, who authorized it and who investigated it.

There has been no public statement from President Nixon on the issue since it arose in newspaper accounts two weeks ago. However, reliable White House sources have said since then that the spying allegations were a key facet of the "national security" concern mentioned by the President a number of times to support his efforts to limit the Watergate investigations last spring.

Young's Report

A highly classified report prepared by David R. Young Jr., one of the White House "plumbers," reportedly concluded in early 1972 that two military men attached to the National Security Council, then headed by Mr. Kissinger had relayed documents to the office of Admiral Moorer.

Mr. Young also was said to have concluded in his report that one of the military men, Yeoman 1st Cl. Charles E. Radford, was responsible for leaking White House documents on the India-Pakistan dispute to Jack Anderson, the columnist. Both Mr. Radford, who denied the charge, and the other man who figured in the report, Adm. Robert O. Welander, were quickly transferred and their White House office abolished.
Recently, however, all of the officials involved in the incident have publicly downgraded its significance. Yeoman Radford and Admiral Welander have been characterized as "overzealous" subordinates anxious to please their superiors by bootlegging the Security Council documents to Admiral Moorer. In addition, high-level White House officials have called Mr. Young's report overstated and in the words of one senior assistant—"ludicrous."

Mr. Stennis was urged to begin the hearings by Senators Harold E. Hughes, Democrat of Iowa, and Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, both of whom played a major role in the committee's inquiry into the secret Cambodian bombing last summer.

The full committee met privately to discuss the matter this morning, and agreed on the preliminary meetings with Mr. Kissinger and Admiral Moorer.

Afterwards, two conservative members of the committee, Senator Strom Thurmond, Republican of South Carolina, and Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, expressed displeasure with the decision.

"Trying to Start Something"

"Somebody up here is trying to start something," Mr. Thurmond said. Mr. Goldwater, in an obvious reference to Yeoman Radford, said, "I think it is a case of some young guy trying to pick up a buck."

One Senator said after the meeting that Mr. Symington had objected to the committee's decision not to summon Yeoman Radford and Admiral Welander to the first round of hearings next week. Both men are expected to be called if the committee authorizes a full-scale inquiry into the allegations. Neither has spoken publicly since the first reports about the spying were published.

In his statement, Senator Stennis said he had "spent much of my time" since returning earlier this month to Washington investigating the allegations. He said that he had spoken informally with Mr. Kissinger, Admirals Moorer and Welander, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., the White House chief of staff, and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger.

Admiral Moorer, after denying for a week any knowledge of the unauthorized tunneling documents, subsequently acknowledged that he had received "a file" of unauthorized material. Mr. Schlesinger later described the material as consisting of "two batches" of documents—taken from the White House when there were secret diplomatic negotiations under way with the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam.

Kissinger Denial

Mr. Kissinger maintained for months that he knew nothing of the activities of Mr. Young, his former personal assistant, on the plumbers team. Then, last week, he acknowledged that in December, 1971, he had listened to a tape recording of Mr. Young interrogating Admiral Welander about the alleged spying activity. However, the Secretary of State insisted that he did not realize at the time that Mr. Young was "conducting an investigation."

The White House refused last week to let Mr. Schlesinger hear the Young-Welander tape recording. In addition, informed sources have said that no officials outside the White House have been permitted to analyze the young report.

Officials have said that no disciplinary action was taken against Mr. Radford on the ground that he might have disclosed the classified materials during a court proceeding, thus posing unacceptable "national security" risks.
Stennis Panel to Probe Document Shift

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Armed Services Committee decided yesterday to investigate the unauthorized funneling of secret White House documents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1971.

Committee Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) said it was decided to hear testimony by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and the chairman of the joint chiefs, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, "as soon as possible on this matter."

In a statement issued after the closed-door meeting, Stennis said that after these two officials have been heard, "the committee will decide what further steps to take."

This leaves open whether 'red but never punished. It remains unclear if the yeoman was simply "overzealous" in his duties, as has been alleged, or if he was ordered by superiors to use all methods to collect data.

Similarly, Radford's boss in the joint chiefs' White House liaison office, Adm. Robert O. Welander, was not mentioned, nor was former White House aide David Young.

Young was a member of the "plumbers" group formed to investigate news leaks and later, the military document-passing operation. Young is also the author of a report that allegedly describes the liaison office operation as a military spy ring.

Schlesinger indicated that while he had not read the Young report, the Pentagon's own investigation led him to believe the episode had "been blown out of all context" and that if Young had concluded there was a "spy ring," such a conclusion was wrong.

Yet the former chief of the "plumbers," E. Clay (Bud) Krogh, said in Seattle last week that Schlesinger would not have made such remarks if the Pentagon chief had read the Young report.

Schlesinger said his own informal investigation indicated there had been some "improprieties" but not "illegalities" and no military "spy ring" operating.

Washington Post

JAN 31
HAK: Relationship with David Young

Secretary Kissinger first met David Young when the Secretary was working with Governor Rockefeller in New York. David Young was an attorney with the law firm that worked for the Rockefeller family. The Secretary also knew Mr. Young's family, and had a very high opinion of him. [HAK: Confirmation Hearings]

After he came to Washington in 1969 to serve as the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Kissinger asked David Young to work for him as his personal assistant and appointments secretary, which Mr. Young agreed to do. He worked as appointments secretary approximately from January 1970 to January 1971, when he asked to be transferred to more substantive work. Because Mr. Young's experience had been exclusively in domestic affairs, no substantive position at the NSC was immediately found for him, and between January and June 1971 he worked in the NSC files. [HAK: Confirmation Hearings]

In early July 1971,* during Mr. Kissinger's first trip to China, Mr. Young transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff, either at his own or Mr. Ehrlichman's initiative, for the announced purpose of working on a project concerned with changing the Government's declassification procedures. Mr. Kissinger was told initially that this project would last approximately three months. However, after the project was concluded, Mr. Ehrlichman told Mr. Kissinger that David Young would remain on Mr. Ehrlichman's staff. [HAK: Confirmation Hearings]

Mr. Kissinger was not informed of any of Mr. Young's responsibilities or activities after June 1971 except for the declassification project. Mr. Kissinger neither recalls nor has any record of any communication or contact with David Young between June 1971 and March 1973, except for the receipt of three memoranda in May, June and August of 1972, each of which dealt with declassification. In March 1973, David Young

*On Sept. 7 at his Confirmation Hearings, HAK said the transfer took place in June, 1971; he also said the transfer took place during his first secret trip to China, which took place July 7-9. On Sept. 10 in those hearings he agreed with Chairman Fulbright that it occurred in July 1971.
requested Mr. Kissinger's assistance in finding another job, a request made presumably because Mr. Kissinger had originally brought him to Washington. [HAK: SFRC Ex.Sess. 1/29/74; to be publ.]

In two instances during this period David Young was brought to Mr. Kissinger's attention, although there was no contact between them. The first was on December 13, 1971 when he received from General Haig a note putting through a routine promotion for David Young. Mr. Kissinger wrote on that note "Why are we carrying him when he is working for Ehrlichman?"

The second instance occurred on December 24, 1971, when Mr. Ehrlichman asked Mr. Kissinger to listen to a portion of a taped questioning of Admiral Welander in connection with security leaks leading to the Jack Anderson stories on the India-Pakistan conflict and with the unauthorized transfer of NSC documents to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Kissinger recognized the interrogator's voice as that of David Young. In this instance as well there was no contact of any kind between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Young. [HAK: Press Conference, 1/22/74; dates added in SFRC Ex.Sess. 1/29/74; to be publ.]
I. Knowledge of David Young's activities

Mr. Secretary, while you were away, it was disclosed here through the White House and the Pentagon that the U.S. military had been receiving certain unauthorized National Security Council documents by such devices as going through your briefcase, because they were worried about your policy on China and the Soviet Union, and further that when you heard about it, that you were furious and demanded the transfer of the guilty parties.

This becomes a matter of curiosity to me because I found myself wondering and wanting to ask you how you knew that these things were happening, when I recall your sworn testimony before the Senate was that you didn't know about the existence of the Plumbers, had no contact with David Young, and thought he was doing something else.

Mr. Kissinger....To be specific, I did not know that David Young was conducting an investigation into the matter of the Anderson leaks. He never talked to me about this, or any other subject, while he was conducting what I now know was his investigation. I did not instruct him, nor did I request it. I never saw the report, nor did I know that the report existed until I read it in a newspaper.

Confirmation Hearings Statement

Senator Percy....I think for the record, Dr. Kissinger, it would be well to have your comments about a former employee of your own, Mr. David Young, who has been indicted for conspiracy and burglary.

Did you, when he left your employ- ment and was transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman, have any idea at that time or any subsequent time that he was to be requested to engage in illegal activities -- burglary, conspiracy to burglary, or whatever they might be.

Mr. Kissinger. Senator, I have no know- ledge of any such activities that David Young may have engaged in. I did not know of the existence of the "Plumbers' Group," by that or any other name. Nor did I know that David Young was concerned with internal security matters.

Perhaps I should explain for the record my connection with David Young. I hired David Young because I had met him in New York when I was associated with Governor Rockefeller, and he was a member of the law firm that worked for the Rockefeller family. When I came to Washington, I was looking for a man of high moral standards, whom I knew personally, who could work as a personal assistant and appointments
early last week.*

I have called both Senator Fulbright and Senator Stennis and told them that I would be prepared to meet with their committees to answer any questions that they might have on this subject.

Q. One quick follow up, who interrogated Admiral Welander?

A. I believe he was interrogated by David Young, but from this one could not suppose that David Young was conducting an investigation.

Q. Did you know David Young had performed the interrogation?

A. I knew that David Young had performed the interrogation, but I had assumed that since we had sent Admiral Welander to Mr. Erlichman's office, Mr. Erlichman had designated one of his staff members to take whatever report Admiral Welander had to give.

I repeat again, we were not told about either the investigation preceding it or the investigation following it, and I had no contact whatever with David Young during that period....

*General Haig has himself assured me that he had no contact with David Young on the report or related matters.

Confirmation Hearings Statement

secretary. David Young worked in that capacity. He was very highly recommended. I also knew his family, and I thought extremely highly of him. And I must say that in my own experience I never had any reason to change my mind.

He worked in this capacity as my appointment secretary for a year, from roughly January 1970, to January 1971. That position is one of the more exhausting ones in the Government, for both practical and I suppose psychological reasons. David Young therefore asked to be transferred to more substantive work. We could not find any substantive work for him immediately because all of his experience had really been in domestic affairs. So David Young worked in the files; he didn't even have an office from January 1971, through June 1971. He accompanied me occasionally to meetings, but basically he was no longer working in my outer office; he was working with people located in the files.

In June 1971, David Young -- on his own initiative or Mr. Ehrlichman's, I don't know which -- transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff. David Young had met Mr. Ehrlichman because Mr. Ehrlichman and I sat across from each other on Air Force 1 and David Young sat next to me and Mr. Ehrlichman's assistant sat next to him. In fact, the transfer occurred while I was on my first secret trip to China.
Confirmation Hearings Statement

At that time I was told that David Young would work on a project for 3 months concerned with changing the declassification procedures of the Government, a project that was publicly announced and which published a public report [Executive Order 11652, March 8, 1972]. After this project ended, I was told by Mr. Ehrlichman that David Young would stay on his staff, and I had no contact with David Young either by telephone or in my office or in any other way after he left my staff, although I continued to have high regard for him.

In short, I did not know either from him or anyone else about the existence of the "Plumbers," as I said, by this or any other name, or about his activities in connection with internal security matters. I think it was a deplorable event...pages 51-2 of SFRC Report, Part I - September 7, 1973.

The Chairman. I have one last question growing out of your questioning the other day. I did not have an opportunity to ask you about this. You testified that Mr. David Young left your office and went to Mr. Ehrlichman's office in July, I believe, of 1971.

Mr. Kissinger. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman. Did he continue on your payroll, carried as an employee of your office during the period that he was in Mr. Ehrlichman's office.

Mr. Kissinger. As I was looking over the transcript, Mr. Chairman, I was tempted to add an explanation about that, and I am, therefore, glad that you give me the opportunity to add to this.

Mr. Young continued to be paid from National Security Council funds for the technical reason that employees in the various organizations in the White House are very often carried on payrolls of other organizations. The Domestic Council at that time did not have independent funds and, therefore, an administrative arrangement was made for him to continue to be paid out of those funds. Also, there was the expectation that eventually he would return to the staff.

I must say that I was not aware of this until after about 7 months, when a routine request for promotion came into my office, and I wrote on it, and asked what we were paying him for if he was working for Mr. Ehrlichman.

It was a technical, administrative arrangement. It had nothing to do with his obligations. And I must repeat what I said on Friday, that I was not aware even of the location of his office or his duties beyond the declassification exercise I mentioned yesterday, nor did I have any contact with him.
Confirmation Hearings Statement

The Chairman. It is very unusual procedure, though, to have a man engaged in setting up an organization which has come to be called the plumbers being on the payroll of the National Security Council, is it not?

Mr. Kissinger. Well, it would be a very unusual procedure if he had been hired for that purpose. It is not such an unusual procedure if he is being transferred to another section of the White House, particularly, Mr. Chairman, if you keep in mind my perception of what he was doing. My understanding was that he would work for Mr. Ehrlichman on the new declassification system, which is, of course, a matter in which the National Security Council has an interest. That was publicly announced, and indeed, Mr. Young held a press briefing together with Mr. Ehrlichman on that subject.

The matter to which you refer is something I knew nothing about, and he would not have been paid from funds controlled by the National Security Council if I knew that he was engaged in any such activities.

II. Knowledge of Existence of the Plumbers

...This incident arose out of the leakage of highly classified documents containing minutes of meetings of the Washington Special Action Group on the India-Pakistan crisis to a columnist. As a result of this leak, Mr. Erlichman, who was in charge of all internal security investigations in the White House, started an investigation of this particular leak.

Sometime after this, Admiral Welander, who was in charge of the JCS Liaison Office at the NSC, came to General Haig and told him that the internal evidence of at least one of the documents suggested to him that the leak to the columnist had occurred from his office.

I was out of town at the time. When General Haig informed me of this, I told him to turn that matter over to Mr. Erlichman.

Sometime later, I don't have the exact dates, several weeks later, Mr. Erlichman let me see -- or rather listen -- to the interrogation of Admiral Welander with respect to this particular incident. And, in the course of this interrogation, there was developed an allegation not only with respect to the source of the leak, but also about the unauthorized transfer of documents from my office to the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Kissinger.... After some months of this procedure, in the summer of 1970 it was decided that the internal security aspects of national security should be separated from the foreign policy aspects, in other words, that my office should no longer have anything to do with the internal security aspects of national security. From then on all these reports went to Mr. Haldeman's office and not to mine. Also, from that time on my office did not participate in any of the other internal security operations that have recently come to public attention.

Informal liaison was maintained, however, in the one area that had predated this decision, between General Haig and Mr. Sullivan of the FBI. If the wiretaps that continued developed information of sufficient gravity, Inspector Sullivan would call up General Haig and either inform him of that fact or call his attention to the fact that a report containing that information had been sent to Mr. Haldeman.

At this point I remember only one such event, but there may have been others.

This is the extent of the participation of my office in a program that we had reason to believe followed procedures of preceding administrations, and that was carried out by procedures believed to be legal at the time, and in which every individual action was individually authorized by both the Director of the FBI and the
Beyond this one interrogation, I was told nothing about the investigation, either preceding or following this interrogation.

...I must add that I was not aware of the fact that a report was being prepared by Mr. Erlichman, and I have never seen that report. Nor have I seen the report of the investigation that was conducted by Secretary Laird's office. And therefore what I am saying is based on my personal knowledge of the incident which is confined to this one interrogation of one individual who volunteered his information first to my office. These reports must have come to conclusions similar to the ones I have outlined here, because no disciplinary action was taken by the addressees of this report.

...I repeat again, we were not told about either the investigation preceding it [interrogation of Admiral Welander] or the investigation following it, and I had no contact whatever with David Young during that period.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify, you said you participated in the interrogation.

A. I did not participate in the interrogation.

Q. Could you clarify that you read or listened to a tape of the interrogation?

A. I listened to a portion of the tape of the interrogation.

Confirmation Hearings Statement

Attorney General, and in which the results of the investigation came to my office only for a while, only when they concerned national security matters, and after that not at all...pages 12-13, SFRC Report Part I, Sept. 7, 1973

Mr. Kissinger. Senator, I have no knowledge of any such activities that David Young may have engaged in. I did not know of the existence of the "Plumbers' Group," by that or any other name. Nor did I know that David Young was concerned with internal security matters....page 51, SFRC Report Part I, Sept. 7, 1973

Mr. Kissinger.... In short, I did not know either from him [David Young] or anyone else about the existence of the "Plumbers," as I said, by this or any other name, or about his activities in connection with internal security matters. I think it was a deplorable event....page 52, SFRC Report Part I, Sept. 7, 1973

The Chairman. It is very unusual procedure, though, to have a man engaged in setting up an organization which has come to be called the plumbers being on the payroll of the National Security Council, is it not?

Mr. Kissinger.... The matter to which you refer is something I knew nothing about, and he would not have been paid from funds controlled by the National Security Council if I knew that he was engaged in any such activities....page 69, SFRC Report Part I, Sept. 10, 1973.
Q. Mr. Secretary, why didn't you find out the total results of the investigation and the interrogation of Admiral Welander?

A. Because I was told that I was not to be informed of it.

Q. By whom were you told?

A. I have said all that I will say on this subject. All internal security matters in the White House after May 1970 were handled by Mr. Erlichman's Office, and therefore it was not unusual for this to be conducted in the established framework.
PROFILES OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE MEMBERS

STENNIS - Personally and genuinely concerned about the defense "spying" issue; generally supportive of the President but the extent of his activity on behalf of the war powers bill shows that he is deeply troubled by the executive-legislative balance.

SYMINGTON - Has evolved into one of the Pentagon's most pungent critics; tough, combative, and very well-informed.

JACKSON - Almost as critical of the military as Symington, but more in favor of big defense spending; very critical of our approach to the energy crisis, MFN, detente, and the wisdom of less than all-out support for Israel.

ERVIN - Has largely maintained traditional Southerner's support for the President on foreign and security issues; his Pacem in Terris speech showed his concern for unilateral presidential action in foreign affairs, especially executive agreements. One of the few Democrats to vote against the War Powers Bill.

CANNON - Thrust into recent and temporary prominence as Chairman of Rules Committee which heard Ford nomination; strong supporter of the military. A highly responsible moderate.

MCINTYRE - Influenced strongly by Symington and Kennedy.

BYRD - One of the Senate's strongest fiscal conservatives; support of military second only to that.

HUGHES - Has openly criticized Stennis for not holding open hearings on their "spying" issue; the Committee's most consistently liberal voice, and skeptical of military costs and extent of military influence on foreign policy.
NUNN - Freshman protege of Jackson, with whom he co-sponsored amendment on NATO offset which bears their names. A sensible, thoughtful individual striving to become known for his responsible, statesmanlike approach.

THURMOND - Perfervid supporter of the military establishment; leader of Senate opposition to any changes in the Panama Canal status quo.

TOWER - Strong supporter of the Administration and the military establishment; Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee with whom you will have lunch on February 19.

DOMINICK - Conservative who has been strongly pro-Administration; Watergate has visibly shaken that loyalty.

GOLDWATER - Another strong supporter of the military; even-handed on the Middle East, but fiercely his own man.

WILLIAM SCOTT - Makes the other Senator from Virginia look like a liberal; conservative to such a degree that his natural bent toward the military conflicts with fiscal tightfistedness, and he comes out against, for example, security assistance.

TAFT - Just named to this Committee to replace Saxbe; thoughtful, responsible, moderate.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, if you would permit me, before we get into the Middle East, I would like to say a few words to the Committee about a matter that was in the newspapers while I was gone and about which I made a press statement. I should like to make this statement since it concerns testimony I gave before this Committee, and because my relationships with this Committee mean a great deal to me. I wondered, therefore, whether you would let me make a short statement.

The Chairman. Certainly.

Secretary Kissinger. The subject is my relationship with David Young. If you remember, Mr. Chairman, at my confirmation hearings Senator Percy asked me the following question:

"Did you, with respect to David Young when he left your employment and was transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman, have any idea at that time or any subsequent time that he was to be requested to engage in illegal activities, burglary, conspiracy to burglarize or whatever that might be?"

I then gave a long answer explaining my relationship to David Young, the gist of which was that I did not know about the "Plumbers" by that or any other name; that my knowledge of David Young's assignment was that he was to work on the declassification of
documents. I also said, "I did not know from him or anybody else about the existence of the 'Plumbers' by this or any other name, or about his activities in connection with internal security matters."

My answer was in the context of the question that was asked. Let me now sum up my knowledge of the so-called spying activities on my staff and then you gentlemen can decide for yourselves whether my knowledge of David Young's activity constituted knowledge of internal security matters.

I repeat, I stand by every word I have said before the Committee. I did not know about the "Plumbers", I did not know that David Young's assignments included investigation of internal security matters. It was my belief that David Young was assigned to John Ehrlichman's staff to work on declassification and whatever other assignments John Ehrlichman might give him, but I did not know what these other assignments were.

I stated before the Committee, and I repeat again, that based on my recollection and on my logs, which is the only evidence I now have, I never saw David Young after he left my staff, I never telephoned David Young after he left my staff, and I never communicated by any other means with David Young after he left my staff.

I received from David Young three memoranda after he left my staff. They are dated May 11, 1972; June 15, 1972; and
August 11, 1972. Each of them dealt with declassification. I had no other communication with David Young.

It is, of course, not precluded -- because my logs would not show it -- that I ran into him in the halls of the White House on some occasion, or at a cocktail party. I have no such recollection, but I do want to leave some margin, since something of that sort could have occurred. But I have no recollection of any meetings with David Young until he had resigned in March of 1973 and asked me whether I could help him find another job.

He came to me because, as I have told this Committee, I had brought him to Washington to work for me originally.

The only other memorandum in my files dealing with David Young is a note to me from General Haig on December 13, 1971, which put through a routine promotion for Young. I wrote on that note "Why are we carrying him when he is working for Ehrlichman?" These are all the records that I have on David Young.

Now, let me turn to the matter of the alleged spying. You gentlemen are all familiar with the Anderson stories on the India-Pakistan War, stories in which there were very substantial leaks of National Security Council documents in early December, 1971.

Around December 12th or 13th -- I do not have the exact date -- John Ehrlichman called me and said that he was conducting an
investigation into these leaks, that I was not to be told about this investigation, and that I was not to do anything in connection with this investigation. He also told me that as part of that investigation he might have to investigate members of my staff and security procedures in my office. I told him, through General Haig, that if there was an investigation of security procedures in my office I would not object so long as I saw a copy of the report.

They then assigned a man called John Sither, from the Department of the Air Force, to study the security procedures in handling classified documents in my office. Sither wrote a report, a copy of which went to General Haig. I never read that report because Haig told me there was nothing in it that deserved attention.

As for the investigation of the leaks themselves, I had assumed -- although I cannot recall if I had any basis for so assuming -- that this would be conducted by the FBI and other investigative agencies reporting to John Ehrlichman.

The first knowledge I had of any substance in connection with this investigation was when I was away and General Haig called me and told me that Admiral Welander, who was in charge of the JCS Liaison Office on my staff, had reported to General Haig that, on the basis of internal evidence, one of the documents that had been leaked to
Anderson had to have come from Admiral Welander's office. General Haig asked me what he should do with that information. I told him to send Admiral Welander to John Ehrlichman because John Ehrlichman was in charge of the investigation. I heard no more for about a week. Then on December 24th John Ehrlichman asked me to come to his office where he played a portion of the tape in which Admiral Welander was interviewed by David Young about his knowledge of the allegedly stolen material. The part of the tape I heard was the new information that was developed as a result of this interview, according to which someone on the staff of the JCS liaison office was reportedly stealing documents from me and transmitting them in an unauthorized way to the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I listened to about 15 minutes of that tape.

You have to remember, gentlemen, that at that time I paid no particular attention to the fact that David Young was conducting the interview. I assumed that he was doing it in his capacity as an Ehrlichman staff member; that he was interviewing a man I had sent to Ehrlichman's office -- a man who had volunteered the information. I frankly attached no importance whatever to the fact that David Young was conducting the interview. I did not construe from that that David Young was conducting an investigation; the "Plumbers" were
beyond my imagination, and I was much more interested in the substance obtained from that interview than I was in who was conducting the interview of a man whom, I repeat, I had sent there, and whom I would have had interviewed by one of my staff members if I had not previously been told that Ehrlichman was in charge of the investigation, and that I was to stay out of it.

Except for that interview, I was given no other information about the investigation. I did not know that David Young had written a report until I read it in Seymour Hersh's article about two weeks ago. I have never seen the report, I have never had it described to me, nor have I seen the report that was made of this matter to Secretary Laird.

When I said that I did not know that David Young was engaged in internal security matters, what I meant to say was that I did not know that a part of his duties was to investigate internal security affairs. I could not exclude that in his capacity as a member of Ehrlichman's staff he might be given an assignment for a day that included interviewing an individual who had been sent to Ehrlichman's office. Therefore, I maintain what I have said to this Committee.

No member of this Committee has asked me -- and I appreciate your courtesy in this respect -- but because our relationship
depends not only on the formal but also on the intangible, I thought I
should tell you everything that I know about this investigation. This
is the totality of my knowledge of what David Young did.

I call your attention also to the fact that David Young gave
press conferences on March 8, 1972, and in September, 1972, in
which he publicly described his duties as having been declassification.
I repeat, this was what I understood his duty to be, plus whatever other
assignments John Ehrlichman might give him that I did not know about.

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman --

The Chairman. Senator Percy.

Senator Percy. I appreciate Dr. Kissinger starting right off
with this issue. I asked the question during the confirmation hearings
because I felt we should have on the record in sworn testimony an
opportunity for Dr. Kissinger to put on the public record statements
that he had already made to a number of press people about this. I
obviously have had a great many questions since then. I have refused
to comment in any way, have refused to even call Dr. Kissinger about
it, feeling that an answer should be provided in this forum because it
was in the official hearing forum that the question originally came up.

I am absolutely satisfied with his reply, and I should like
permission from the Committee to at least respond to questions now
rather than refusing to comment, having heard the reply that at least as one Senator I am totally and completely satisfied, that there is nothing inconsistent with what Dr. Kissinger told the Committee and our understanding of it at this time.
HAK: The Moore statement for tomorrow.

W
STATEMENT BY
ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER, USN
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WEDNESDAY, 6 FEBRUARY 1974

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Some two weeks ago in letters to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, I offered to provide "all of the information available to me" concerning the anonymous allegations of "military spying," the so-called unauthorized transfer of papers and the publication of documents in the media which could affect national security -- either through the Staff "or at a Formal Hearing as you deem it appropriate or desirable."

I stand ready to do so.

It is, personally, very, very distasteful and certainly out of character to find myself discussing the attacks and insinuations appearing in the media that I was "spying" on the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It is distasteful and out of character because I have served this Nation for 45 years as a member of a profession where honesty, integrity and devotion to country are the measure of the man. I have risen during this period from Midshipman to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have seen peace, and I have been a part of three wars. As an
experienced apolitical professional, I bow to no one in or out of uniform in terms of devotion to duty, to country, or to the Constitution of the United States.

Therefore, I hope you can understand why these insinuations and allegations sicken me as a man, concern me as a military officer and deeply disturb me as the nation's senior uniformed official.

The rationale advanced for this so-called "military spying" has been that since the Joint Chiefs of Staff were denied a free flow of National Security Council information which we were entitled to receive in order to fulfill our statutory responsibility, a "spy ring" was established to thwart or inhibit the development of policies with which they allegedly disagreed.

In the interest of placing this matter in proper context, I appeared on national TV and publicly denounced this allegation for what it is -- ludicrous and ridiculous. I stand by that statement. In the first place, there is and always has been a free and complete flow of information between Dr. Kissinger and me as required by Presidential directive. Secondly, with respect to foreign policy and military operations, there has been no one who has been more active in the support of our national policy. I respectfully call your attention to my many appearances before this and many other Congressional Committees, my speeches and press conferences. Furthermore,
I have frequently been requested by the President to brief individuals and groups from the Congressional Leadership, including the Distinguished Chairman of this Committee, the Speaker of the House and many others. I have also been the senior military spokesman charged with explaining United States national policy to our Allies. In short, I have continuously been engaged in steadfastly supporting initiatives which it is now alleged that I opposed. This allegation simply does not make sense.

At the outset, let me emphasize that I have never seen any of the reports of investigation supposedly submitted on the matters at hand. I have not had the privilege of listening to any tape of any interrogation relating to these subjects. I have only been briefly advised orally by Mr. Buzhardt, then General Counsel of the Department of Defense, as to the contents of an interview with Yeoman Radford and Rear Admiral Welander. Just yesterday, for the first time, I did receive for review some bits and pieces of the Defense Investigative Service investigation. As you know, this sheaf of unsigned narratives is far from an Investigative Report.

My letter of 30 January to you, Mr. Chairman, sets out in detail my recollections of the circumstances surrounding the various allegations. No useful purpose would be served by repeating at this time all that has been said. Yet, I would like to emphasize a few points.
First, I must speak about my relationship with Dr. Kissinger and the National Security Council Staff. The exchange of information, the coordination of effort, and the mutual feeling of confidence was and still is excellent. I am sure Dr. Kissinger will attest to this fact. I have always been privy to full information on all subjects with military implications and on the multitude of subjects where coordination between the NSC Staff and the JCS is necessary. Whatever contribution I have been able to make toward the development and implementation of national security policy in the past four years has been served well by the mutual exchange and confidence which exists between Dr. Kissinger and myself.

Subsequent to the initiation of this investigation, I have been informed that on two occasions, over two years ago, I was shown papers by one of my staff officers -- papers which, as it turned out, were acquired in an irregular way incident to clerical duties performed for Dr. Kissinger and General Haig while traveling with them. As I recall, they were treated as I treat any paper handed to me by my staff officers: I quickly scan the paper for subject matter; if the subject matter is one with which I am already fully informed, the papers are simply handed back or set aside. These particular papers, as I explained in my letter of 30 January 1974, were on subjects with which I was already
In my most recent letter of 30 January 1974 to you, I discussed the facts and circumstances concerning the leaks of highly classified material to the press and Yeoman Radford's suspected involvement. In fairness to Yeoman Radford, I want the Committee to understand that this is circumstantial evidence and does not, under military judicial standards, establish guilt. On two occasions I recommended orally that investigative procedures under the Uniform Code of Military Justice be invoked in order to establish the guilt or innocence of Yeoman Radford. I was advised that no disciplinary proceedings would be conducted and that Yeoman Radford would be transferred from Washington.

Obedience, integrity, and loyalty to country are the standards of our military services. The people of our great country deserve nothing less than absolute adherence to these standards from all of us who serve. The allegations and insinuations of "spying" subvert these standards and grossly distort the truth -- which I am confident this Committee will establish to the satisfaction of the American people. The trust and confidence of our people in their military forces must not be weakened. It is absolutely indispensable to the safety and well being of our country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
completely familiar; so they were, as is my custom, routinely returned. These papers were only momentarily scanned, and I did not focus on any irregularity. The irregularity simply did not register. Let me again emphasize, there is no substantive relationship between the leak of official documents which appeared in the media and these miscellaneous papers which were retained by Yeoman Radford in the course of his clerical duties during two trips several months before the leak to the press. Yet, for some reason unknown to me, it is these miscellaneous internal papers which are being spotlighted rather than the documents covering a different time frame which were leaked to the media, boldly displayed, with their Secret stamp clearly visible. These are the documents which, in my opinion, did have an adverse effect on national security.

Perhaps I should have been more alert in following up as to the precise origin and transmission of the "trip reports"; but these were busy times, and I was dealing rapidly with literally thousands of papers, dispatches, and documents -- in fact, a deluge of information.

It is important that I stress to you that I gave no orders, issued no instructions, gave no encouragement -- either direct or implied -- to anyone to collect or retain in any irregular or unauthorized manner any information, papers or documents from the National Security Council or any other agency or individual.
Spying in the White House
Said to Have Begun in '70

Operation by Military Allegedly Started
Shortly After Moorer Took Post,
 a Year Earlier Than Reported

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special To The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 2—Military spying inside the White House began in the fall of 1970, a few months after Adm. Thomas H. Moorer became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and more than a year earlier than has been previously reported, closely involved sources said.

The spying involved as many as five high-ranking officers who regularly received and delivered over the next 15 months classified documents pilfered by a Navy yeoman, these sources said.

A New York Times investigation shows that the spying began within weeks after Yeoman 1st Cl. Charles F. Radford was assigned in September, 1970, to the military liaison unit set up by the Defense Department inside the National Security Council.

The sources said that Petty Officer Radford confessed to Pentagon investigators in December, 1971, shortly after he was suspected of leaking White House documents on the India-Pakistan war to Jack Anderson, the columnist, that he had begun pilfering documents more than a year earlier at the express directions of Rear Adm. Rembrandt C. Robinson.

Admiral Robinson, who was replaced in March of 1971 by Rear Adm. Robert O. Welander in the military liaison position, was killed in a helicopter crash in Southeast Asia in 1972.

Petty Officer Radford has repeatedly denied leaking any material to Mr. Anderson and he has also denied knowing of any security leaks to Admiral Moorer's office.

Refuses to Comment
Admiral Moorer's spokesman, Navy Capt. J. C. Mackercher, issued the following statement today after being informed of the Times's account: "The chairman's office has no comment on these charges any more than it has had on the innumerable other charges that have been made by unidentified sources."

As chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Moorer is a statutory member of the National Security Council. The documents and materials in question, however, were explicitly denied to his office and to high officials in the State Department on the orders of Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon.

During the period of Yeoman

Con Ed Curbs Urged
The Public Service Commission yesterday proposed several energy-conservation measures in New York City and Westchester County, including a ban on new electric heating in buildings. Page 32.
Spying in White House by Military Is Said to Have

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

Radford's activities, the White House was involved in intensely secret negotiations with China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Former White House officials have acknowledged that details of those talks were restricted to very few officials in the White House.

Since the allegations of military spying first became public more than two weeks ago, high-ranking officers in the White House and the Pentagon have repeatedly referred to it as the work of two "overzealous" men—a reference to Admiral Welander and Yeoman Radford, who were taking documents in an effort to prove their superior, Admiral Moorer.

Admiral Moorer, after first denying any knowledge of the military spying, conceded on May 18 that he had received a "file" of unauthorized material that he publicly denied containing "just a collection of, you know, roughs and carbon copies, and a thing or two of that kind."

The "overzealous" men sources said that Petty Officer Radford had been urged to pilfer documents during his daily work, as a stenographer-clerk in the National Security Council and had also been encouraged to do what he could while serving as an aide on overseas missions undertaken by the head of the council, Henry A. Kissinger and his chief deputy, then Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr. of the Army. Mr. Kissinger is now Secretary of State and General Haig is White House chief of staff.

Among the documents taken by Yeoman Radford and supplied to Admiral Moorer's office, the knowledgeable sources said, were copies of "eyes only" messages intended solely for President Nixon or Admiral Moorer from such key diplomats as Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in South Vietnam and Ambassador Emory C. Swank in Cambodia.

One high-ranking White House official acknowledged in an interview this week that the military spying inside the National Security Council had begun under Admiral Robinson and not Admiral Moorer. But this official noted that he had been informed by a Pentagon investigator that "very little of importance was taken — just one or two papers."

This official also disputed a reporter's contention that the White House and Pentagon had been misleading in their public statements on the spying allegations.

L. Fred Buzhardt Jr., former Pentagon general counsel who is now a White House aide, has not been personally reviewed by Secretary Schlesinger.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has summoned Admiral Moorer and Mr. Kissinger to a closed hearing Wednesday on the spying allegations, but committee sources said, Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, the chairman, has not yet agreed to request to testify.

Still unclear, the well-placed sources said, was the exact role played by Admiral Moorer in the military spying ring.

He became chairman of the joint chiefs, America's highest military job, in 1969, replacing Army General Earle Wheeler, who had served as chairman for six years. Admiral Moorer was reappointed by President Nixon to a second two-year term in May, 1972, after the spying incident.

In a telephone interview yesterday, General Wheeler denied that he "certainly didn't do anything like this" when he was chairman.

The retired officer, who now lives in West Virginia, noted that Admiral Robinson was his liaison aide on the National Security Council in early 1970 and continued on that job with Admiral Moorer.

"I don't think that Robby [Admiral Robinson] would dream up anything like this," General Wheeler added.

The liaison office was set up, he said, early in the Kennedy Administration to facilitate the flow of high-level White House information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was shut down literally "overnight," the informed sources said.

After Mr. Kissinger learned of the military spying in December, 1971, the closely involved sources said that Yeoman Radford had told investigators that the pilfered documents were hand-carried in sealed envelopes either by himself, Admiral Robinson or Admiral Welander from the White House military liaison office to Admiral Moorer's office, where they were given to his senior aide and executive assistant at that time, Capt. Harry D. Train 2d.

Later deliveries, the sources said, were made to Navy Capt. Arthur K. Knoesen, Captain Train's replacement.

Some information was also separately delivered by Admiral Welander to an Air Force captain who was assigned to a

Kissinger, General Haig, and many aides on the National Security Council, the sources said. He has described his double agent's role inside the White House to investigators, these sources said, as a "perfect thing" because he had "everybody's confidence."

The taking of documents was depicted by Yeoman Radford as nearly an everyday occurrence, but he has told investigators, The Times's sources said, that the various overseas meetings and trips undertaken by Mr. Kissinger and General Haig were considered "special items."

During his 15 months with the military liaison office, the petty officer traveled to Southeast Asia and to Pakistan with Mr. Kissinger during the highly secret China trip in July, 1971. After returning from those trips, the sources said, the petty officer would recall documents that he had pilfered either to Admiral Robinson or Admiral Welander or directly to Mr. Kissinger's office.

Both Mr. Kissinger and General Haig were said to be furious upon learning of the pilfering.

A full statement by Yeoman Radford was given to a Pentagon investigator, W. Donald Stewart, in December, 1971, sources said. The sources added that Petty Officer Radford and Admiral Welander were repeatedly interrogated about their activities during tape recorded sessions in the Pentagon.

Admiral Robinson was recalled from duty in Southeast Asia for interrogation, the sources said.

A number of sources have said that Mr. Young and other Government investigators had also accumulated evidence indicating that Yeoman Radford had been responsible for providing Mr. Anderson with the India-Pakistan papers and other top-secret material.

No charges were filed in connection with that aspect of the investigation, apparently, but President Nixon took no action against Admiral Moorer for his role in receiving the documents.

Admiral Welander was immediately transferred out of the White House but given a much-sought-after sea command early in 1972. He is now serving in a key Pentagon post for the Navy. Yeoman Radford was transferred to a Navy Reserve center in Salem, Ore., and recently announced his intention to leave the service.

President Nixon has not spoken out on the issue since it arose, although White House officials have confirmed that the spying was one of the "national security" secrets cited by the President last spring, when he sought to curtail the Justice Department investigation into the four-man plumbers team.

The plumbers, headed by Mr. Young and Egil Krogh Jr., were also responsible for the burglary of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist in September of 1973.

The subject of military spying was first touched on during John D. Ehrlichman's testimony last July before the Senate Watergate committee. Although it was not dealt with in specific terms, Mr. Ehrlichman, President Nixon's former domestic adviser who was in overall charge of the plumbers team, refused to discuss the issue in public, but did arrange for a private White House briefing for some committee members.

The meeting, at this briefing, provided in part by Mr. Buzhardt, that the military spying was depicted as being of the utmost "national security" consideration.
an interview this week that the
camouflage spying inside the Na-

tional Security Council had be-
year under Admiral Robinson—
and not Admiral Welander. But
this official noted that he had
been informed by a Pentagon
investigator that "very little of
importance was taken — just
one or two papers."

This official also disputed a
reporter's contention that the
White House and Pentagon had
been misleading in their public
statements on the spying alle-


lation. "I don't think there's
been any injustice to the facts,
the official said.

In a news conference on Jan.
24, Secretary of Defense James
R. Schlesinger declared that his
review of the Pentagon investi-
gation of the allegations had
determined that "the material
in question consisted of two
collections of material." The
Defense Secretary then added,
"Admiral Moorer was not, in
my judgment, at all familiar
with the exuberant methods
that had been used to collect
this material."

The Times's sources said,
however, that a special report
on the military spying allega-
tions prepared by David R.
Young Jr., a former member of
the so-called "plumbers" inves-
tigations unit, concluded in
early 1972 that Admiral Moorer
was directly involved in the
operation.

The sources said that Mr.
Young's report, which has been
categorized as "ludicrous" by
stenographer and clerk by Mr.
The following item(s) have been removed from the collection because they contain security classified information:

Collection: Henry A. Kissinger papers

Box Number: 383

Folder Number: 4

Item(s) and Security Classification:

1. Telegram 5023, SecState to White House, 21 Sep 1970
2. Telegram 154666, SecState to White House, 21 Sep 1970
3. Telegram 5235, SecState to White House, 21 Sep 1970
4. Telegram 7681, SecState to White House, 21 Sep 1970
List of Meetings on the Jordanian Crisis

September 1970

NSC Meetings:
- September 21 (2 meetings)
- September 22
- September 23

WSAG Meetings:
- September 15
- September 17 (2 meetings)
- September 18
- September 19
- September 20 (2 meetings)
- September 21 (2 meetings)
- September 22
- September 23
- September 24

HAK books and minutes from these meetings -- where available -- are in HAK meeting files.
Meet in 1125