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Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War
for The New York Times Sunday Book Review

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party of his erstwhile tormentors have described him as a role model.
Condoleezza Rice is the most recent example. Thirty years after his death, Acheson has achieved icon status.

This is all the more remarkable in view of Acheson's out of scale personality, so at odds with a period in which eminence seems to be tolerable only in the garb of the ordinary, if not the banal. The debonair conduct, the bristling mustache, the Bond Street tailoring, the biting wit, the extraordinary analytical skill, the refusal to turn the other cheek bespoke an insistence on the individual rather than the conventional. He was a man of high principle and sense of honor, shaped by the nineteenth century, whose hero was Oliver Wendell Homes, a Boston Brahmin, and whose personal friend was Felix Frankfurter, the brilliant son of Jewish immigrants. Though Acheson served during the transition when America emerged as a world power and still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, the scale of government was as yet relatively [small], and Washington was still a comparatively
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The position of Secretary of State is potentially the most fulfilling in the government short of the presidency. Its scope is global; it addresses an ultimate philosophical inquiry into the nature of world order and the relationship of order to progress and national interest.

Lacking such a conceptual framework, the daily task of dealing with the thousands of e-mails from nearly 200 diplomatic posts and a constant flow of communication from the Executive Department compiled with the need for congressional liaison that daily demand attention, by which America's relationship to the world is constantly redefined, runs the risk of turning incoherent.

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In this maelstrom, Acheson dealt with the five principal tasks of any Secretary of State: the identification of the challenge; the development of a strategy to deal with it; organizing and motivating
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No Secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill—though Acheson came closer than any other of the modern period. He was the first to face the need to define a conceptual framework on which to base America's involvement in global affairs. He turned George Kennan's seminal article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" into an
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The tension between the two schools of thought – the one that treats

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In my period in office, I had the auditorium in the State Department named after Dean Acheson – one of the few honors it is in the power of the incumbent Secretary to bestow: [those] who have not pronounced themselves on the subject hold very positive views.

The same is true of Acheson’s Democratic successors.

How did Acheson achieve this status? The admiration for him surely owed something to Acheson’s extraordinary personality and style, with a period in which American became the world’s largest bête noire.

The debonair conduct, the bristling mustache, the biting wit, the extraordinary analytical skill. He was a man of high principle, whose hero was Oliver Wendell Holmes and whose personal friendship was Felix Frankfurter. Though Acheson served during the transition when American emerged as a world power and still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, the scale of government was [as yet] relatively small. Its conflicts were between actual human beings rather than contrived symbols sent into battle by public relations advisors who, in the final analysis, the other side always understood an insistence on the rational rather than the unreasoned.
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This is a special problem for an American Secretary of State. He [or she] is the representative of a society that, until the post-World War II period, never has had to conduct a foreign policy as most other nations do. Americans had known no direct permanent threat to their security since the early days of the republic. Such challenges as arose could be overcome rapidly by the mobilization of America's growing strength, soon to become paramount. Acheson served as Undersecretary of State and then as Secretary during the period when his people had to be brought along to the recognition that history had set them the task of peacemaker, if peace was to be achieved, and as guarantor of security, and that they would have to do so on a
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No Secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill—though Acheson came closer than any other with whose tenure I am familiar.

He was the first to face the need to define a theory on which to base America's involvement in global affairs, striving to turn George Kennan's seminal article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" into an operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to mean that the task of American foreign policy was to create military situations around the Soviet periphery to resist any temptation for Soviet aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be
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Acheson was probably right in the conditions of his time. The
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How did Acheson achieve this exalted status? The admiration for him surely owed something to Acheson’s extraordinary personality: the debonair conduct, the bristling mustache, the English suits, the biting wit, the extraordinary analytical skill. He was a man of high principle, whose hero was Oliver Wendell Homes and whose personal friend was Felix Frankfurter. Though Acheson served during the final stages of America’s emergence [transition when American emerged] as a world power, and when it still enjoyed a commanding lead in nuclear weapons, {Note: Acheson served as secretary from 1949 to 1953. The first Soviet nuclear test was in August 1949, and the second in September 1951. So the Soviets had achieved nuclear status during most of the period that Acheson was Secretary.} [still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly,] the scale of its government was [as yet] relatively small. Its political conflicts were highly personal and not shaped not shaped [between actual human beings rather than contrived symbols sent into battle] by public relations advisors and tested [who, in turn, test their advice] on focus groups. This explains the scene, unimaginable today, described by Mr. Beisner. [when] Acheson was confronted by Senator Kenneth Wherry at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee and told the Senator not to shake his dirty finger in his face. When Wherry persisted, Acheson rose and launched a roundhouse swing at his senatorial gadfly, which was stopped at the last moment because the legal advisor of the State Department wrapped his arms around Acheson and pulled him down into his seat. Acheson, in short, was an original, whose personality matched the challenges he faced.

The position of Secretary of State is potentially the most fulfilling in the government short of the presidency. Its scope is global; its responsibilities require [addresses an ultimate] philosophical inquiries
or perhaps “reflections on”]. [y] into the nature of order and its relationship to progress and national interest. Without such a conceptual framework [concept], the [daily] task of dealing with the thousands of cables that daily demand attention, which is the mechanism by which America’s relationship to the world is defined, runs the risk of turning incoherent.

This is a special problem for an American Secretary of State. He [or she] is the representative of a society that, until the post-World War II period, never has had to conduct a foreign policy as most other nations do. Americans had known no direct permanent threat to their security since the early days of the republic. Such challenges as arose. America grew up with the conviction that such challenges as arose could be overcome rapidly by the mobilization of America’s growing strength, soon to become paramount. Acheson served as Under Secretary of State, the number two position, and then as Secretary during the period when the American people [his people] had to [be] brought [along] to the recognition that history had set them the task of peacemaker, if peace was to be achieved, and as guarantor of security, if conflict could not be avoided. [and that] They would have to play this role [do so] on a permanent basis by measures major in magnitude yet not capable of final solutions.

Inevitably this realization was slow in coming, if indeed it has been fully achieved to this day. This is why Acheson was assailed from both wings: by those consumed by [of the national] nostalgia for an end to involvement as soon as the immediate threat had been defeated; [from those who sought a final victory over the threat followed by withdrawal] and, on the other wing, by those who thought there was no threat to begin with, or at least none that required Acheson’s response.

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Acheson was probably right in the conditions of his time. The overriding priority in the years immediately after World War II was to restore Western Europe and create a political community to resist what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. Acheson created the structure which sustained the free countries during the Cold War; without it, the ultimate outcome of the Cold War would never have been reached – aside from the fact that Acheson envisioned not so much the collapse of the Soviet Union as its transformation. In time, the issues implicit in Kennan’s challenge had to be addressed: how to gain Soviet acquiescence in the US position of strength [implied the question[s] of how the situation was to be conveyed to the other side] and what a negotiation based on it would involve. [But] Acheson was less clear about the diplomacy that needed to follow the culmination of his architectural phase.

Kennan, on the other hand, represented the other strand of American thinking. If Acheson implicitly believed [implied] that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, thus lessening the importance of diplomatic engagement with the adversary, Kennan saw intrinsic value in [conveyed that] diplomacy [had its own beginning?] almost independent from the strategic environment. The danger of the one is that it risks conflict through miscalculation; the danger of the other is that it seeks stability through appeasement. The role of diplomacy in grand strategy [How to establish the relationship between strategy and diplomacy] is still not [yet] completely resolved, reflecting the tension [the] between the school of thought [that] consider[s] diplomacy as an aspect of a strategic situation, as a means to an end, and those who see it as an end in itself. [In it an essentially autonomous means of solving dispute.] How to merge the two strands so that military force and [supports] diplomacy are mutually supportive so that national strategy becomes a seamless web [without being identified with it and diplomacy can build national strategy as a seamless web] is the essence of a continuing national controversy. The failure to do so [neglect of doing so] with respect to the Korean war was the cause of the single greatest mistake of Acheson’s policy: the inability to correlate [discipline] military operations, after the crossing of the 38th parallel, to the achievement of [into some relationship with] feasible diplomatic objectives. {Note: it also illustrates that Acheson was more comfortable dealing with Europe than with
Asia. I read somewhere that Acheson made seven trips to Europe while he was Secretary but only one to Asia, even though we were in active combat with communism in Asia. I haven’t checked these statistics, but they roughly illustrate that Acheson’s greatest impact was in Europe, while MacArthur was a more dominant factor in East Asia until he was removed from his position in 1951.}

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The applicability of that lesson has not changed with the passage of time. {Note: this is an excellent ending.
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How to establish the relationship between strategy and diplomacy is still not yet completely resolved, between the school of thought [that] consider[s] diplomacy as an aspect of a strategic situation and those who see in it an essentially autonomous means of solving disputes.
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was to be conveyed to the other side and what a negotiation based on
it would involve. Acheson created the structure which sustained the
free countries during the Cold War; without it, the ultimate outcome of
the Cold War would never have been reached – aside from the fact
that Acheson envisioned not so much the collapse of the Soviet Union
as its transformation. But Acheson was less clear about the diplomacy
to follow the culmination of his architectural phase.
Kennan, on the other hand, represented the other strand of American thinking. If Acheson implied that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, Kennan conveyed that diplomacy had its own beginning almost independent from the strategic environment. How to establish the relationship between strategy and diplomacy is still not yet completely resolved, between the school of thought that consider diplomacy as an aspect of a strategic situation and those who see in it an essentially autonomous means of solving dispute. How to merge the two strands so that military force supports diplomacy without being identified with it and diplomacy can build national strategy as a seamless web is the essence of a continuing national controversy. The neglect of doing so with respect to the Korean war was the cause of the single greatest mistake of Acheson’s policy: the inability to discipline military operations, after the crossing
of the 38th parallel, into some relationship with feasible diplomatic objectives.

That error aside, Acheson stands [as] the greatest Secretary of State of the postwar period in the sweep of his design, his ability to implement it, the extraordinary associates with [whom] he surrounded himself, and the honor of his personal conduct. Mr. Beisner emphasizes these qualities and provides detailed examples of both design and execution.

For someone who knew Acheson, the portrait does not always quite catch the vividness of his personality, which emerges more as a list of eccentricities than as the elemental character it was. Especially his assistance to the Nixon White House, and [to] the President himself, is too easily dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's vanity. I considered [it] an example of Acheson's generosity of spirit. Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his
1952 campaign for Senate. But when Nixon reached out to Acheson, it was from genuine respect, and it was received with the consideration Acheson felt he owed to any President. I was present at those meetings during which Acheson conducted himself with respect but as a form of service to the country. His value to the administration was not, as the author claims, to "repel uprisings by former internationalist Democrats." I recall only [one] such occasion when, at the very end of his life, Acheson chaired a group opposing the Mansfield Amendment seeking to remove American troops from Europe. At other meetings, Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at flattery, in pursuit of his conception of national service. The same was true of his more frequent meetings when I sought his advice or had [my then assistant] Larry Eagleburger brief him.
A speech at the War College in August 1951 is quoted by Beisner as follows: "There was not 'one more river to cross' but countless problems stretching into the future: Americans must reconcile themselves to limited objectives and work in congress with others for an essential part of American power was the 'ability to evoke support from others — an ability quite as important as the capacity to compel.'"

The applicability of that lesson has not changed with the passage of time.
Dean Nelson in office was one of the most influential Secretaries of State of the 19th century. His influence was profound. Nelson's comprehensive and thoughtful work paved the way for a better understanding of our nation's history. During his tenure, Nelson served as Secretary of State and Republicans made 1268 antagonistic statements on the Senate floor and only seven that were favorable. History has treated Nelson more favorably than his contemporaries. Republicans, including Senator Ewing, Senate Majority Leader, have spoken highly of Nelson's service. In my period in office, I had the administration in the State Department named after Dean Nelson—-one of the few persons it is in the power of the incumbent Secretary to bestow.
who have not pronounced themselves on the subject

held very practice views. The same is true of

Democrat

Adams' successors.

How could Adams advocate this view

states?

the administration for their nearly annual

return's

something to the extraordinary personality. The Adams

conduct, the bustling manner, the English exits,

the bustling with. the extraordinary analytical skill.

though he was a man of high principle whose

Abraham Lincoln modest a leader to control the progress

interest in his wars Oliver Wendell Holmes and his

in the age of 24 years. Lincoln's

whose personal friend was Felix Frankfurter. Though

Lincoln served during the colonization at

beast to inspire

period when America emerged as a world power

and still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly the

scale of its government was still relatively small.

actual

Its conflicts were between genuine human beings
rather than continue symbols sent into battle by public relations advisors or to turn for their advice on focus groups. This explains the scene described by Mr. Weiss/unnecessary to say later. Helen was confronted by Senator Kenneth Wherry at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee and told

hence the Senator met to take his daily finger in the face.

When P. Wherry precipitated Bacon immediately a sound

louder swung at his senatorial гаранти, which was_for stopped at the last moment. Because the legal

advice of the State Department protected his arm

smashed Bacon and pulled him down into his seat.

Bacon in short was an original

personality matched with. The challenger he dealt

most
The position of Secretary of State is the most fulfilling in the government. Its scope is global:
it addresses the role of America in its world and the ultimate philosophical implications with its nature of order and its relationship to progress. It is a concept of incorporating the daily task of managing daily with billions of thousands of cables which daily demand attention, which is the overwhelming artist.

America's relationship to the world is different from the rest of humanity. This is a special problem for an American Secretary of State. He is the representative of a society that until the post World War II period, much less (most), had to conduct its foreign policy as others were permnent. Mr. Americans had known no direct permanent plans to their security since the early days of the Republic. Such
challenger as arose. America grew up with the
conviction that such challenger as arose would be overcome
rapidly by the mobilization of America's growing
strength soon to become paramount. Kellogg served
as Undersecretary of State and then as Secretary during the
period when the people had to be brought along to the proper
realization that electricity had not been the task of peacemakers
if peace was to be achieved as a guarantee of
security. By measures major in magnitude yet incapable
of final solution, and that they would have to be in an a permanent
basis without recourse to
was clear in
unrest if indeed it has been fully achieved to this
day. This is Kellogg
knowing American was noisily passed for an end to
imperative. Both wings of the national mustalgia from these
rule now it sought a final victory over the threat
followed by withdrawal and on the other way those who thought this was one threat to begin with or at least none that required Feulner's response.

In this madhouse Feulner dealt with the five principal tasks any Secretary of State confront. The identification of the challenger, the development of a strategy to deal with it, to organize and convince the bureaucracy to hold in the State Department and in other agencies, to persuade the American public and to understand the diplomacy towards other countries. All this require the closest collaboration with the President. Secretaries of State who seek to have their influence on thepurging of his office invariably become marginalized. Presidents cannot be constrained by administrative floor charts will seek advice from their chiefs.
they will seek out for a Secretary of State to be effective in his last year with the President’s lead not to speak. This is why Atlee made it a point to see Truman almost every day they were in Czar together and meticulously kept him informed.

A secretary can fulfill all these tasks, with equal skill. Though Atlee came close to any other, with whom I am familiar. He was the first to face the need to define a theory on what is America’s civilisation. He had experience in what he gave one global affairs.

The sources of Soviet conduct were an operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to mean that the task of American foreign policy was to create mutually satisfying
around the Soviet purges and to resist any lengthy
for Soviet aggression. Negotiations with the Soviet
Union was to be deferred until the situation of
strength existed; any attempt to launch diplomacy
prematurely would undermine the primary task.
Khrushchev was later to regret the volatile and reckless
militarization of his policy, launching a debate
that has not ended to this day.
Dulles rose probably reflects the condition
of his time. The overriding priority was to restore West
Europe and create a political community to resist
what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. In times
of great Kennan’s challenge implied the question of
how the situation was to be conveyed to the other sides
and what negotiations based on it would involve.
Kissinger created the machinery which sustained the.

free currencies during the Cold War. Consequently, the outcome of the Cold War.

the ultimate goal of victory would never have been

reached. Kissinger, from the fact that Kissinger convinced

not remained the collapse of the Soviet Union and

But Kissinger was not clear

Transformation. Even despite its ambiguity,

Kissinger on the other hand, almost

the diplomacy to follow the conclusions of his architecture.

place. In the process he laid himself open to the idea

Kissinger on the other hand represented the other

strand of American thinking. If Kissinger implied

that situations of strength would be self-enforcing.

Kissinger insisted that diplomacy lost its meta-

independent

almost separate from its strategic environment.

How to establish the relationship between strategy

+ diplomacy is still not yet completely worked
The debate between those who consider diplomacy an aspect of the armaments or special services as a special case of the art of war and those who see it essentially autonomous. There are two views. In the view of those who see it as a means of solving disputes, how to merge the two shades of military force so that strategy supports diplomacy without having identified with it and diplomacy can strongly influence strategy as a seamless Web of the essence of and containing national strategy. The neglect to do with respect to the Korean war and the failure of the United Nations to make any mistake was the cause of the single greatest factor of America's policy: the inability to discipline military operations after the North reached the 38th parallel with some relationship with feasible diplomatic efforts.

That occurred because it was the greatest Secretary of State of the post-war period in the
sweep of his design, his ability to implement it, and the extraordinary staff with which he surrounded himself and the course of his personal conduct. Mr. Helen's omnipresent qualities and provides detailed examples of both design and execution.

For someone who knew Helen, the portrait does not quite catch the mood of his personality emerging more as a list of eccentricities than as the elemental character it was. Especially his cooperation with the Union White House and that president's variety is too easily dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's vanity. I considered an example of Helen's patriotism of spirit. Helen had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Helen.
During his 1952 campaign for Senate. But when
Nixon reached out to Reclus, it was from genuine
respect and it was received with the considerate
Reclus felt he owed to any President.
I was present at these meetings. Nixon policy
Reclus conducted himself with respect, but
as a form of service to his country. His value
to his administration was met as the author claims
to repel uprisings by former internationalist
Democrats. I knew of only such occasion very
rare. At the end of his life
near Reclus' death, Reclus claimed a
group opposing the Mansfield amendment calling
seeking to remove American troops from Europe.
At the meeting Reclus dealt with the issues arising
just before his tragically, privately, without any
conceiving attempt at flattery in pursuance of his belief in the pu of national service. The same spirit of his more frequent meetings when denying his advice or had Larry Kirkhanger brief line.

for a letter speech at the War College in August 1951 quoted by Biren as follows:

"There was not one more actor to cross but countless problems stretching into the future. America must reconcile themselves to limited objectives and work in concert with others for an essential part of American power was the ability to evoke support from others - an ability quite as important as the capacity to compel."

The applicability of this lesson has not changed with the passage of time.
DATE: 8/9/06  CORR. FILE: New York Times Book Review

ACTION: Alan Stape Dennis

Jessee Theresa Rose

John Maggie Suzanne

SUBJ. FILE: ____________

CROSS REF: ____________

STAFF MEMO: ____________

COMMENTS:

8/11 Per HAK, find out what they are paying. T. left msg for Ruska un. Editorial Contracts dept. (212/556-5988) to call back. (Specific msg. not left on v.m.)

INFO COPY TO: Barry Gwun - will have quote by Thurs. or Fri.

8/15 Barry Gwun (556-4393) advised that the fee will be determined upon receipt.

8/16 Jessee faxed contract & W-9 signed by HAK to NYT.

ROUTE CC COPY TO: ____________

TO BE FILED: ______
-----Original Message-----
From: NYT-PACT [mailto:nyt-pact@nytimes.com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2006 4:32 PM
To: tamantea@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Writer Contract received

Aug 16, 2006

Thank you.

'The New York Times
**KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC.**

350 PARK AVENUE, 26TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, NY 10022

TELEPHONE: 212-739-7919
FACSIMILE: 212-739-0042

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**FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECIPIENT: Ruska Halinci</th>
<th>SENDER: Jessica LePorin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMPANY: NYT Editorial Contracts</td>
<td>DATE: August 16, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAX NUMBER: (212) 556-4401</td>
<td>TOTAL PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET: 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To the Editorial Contracts Office:

Following please find the signed contract and W-9 form in connection with Dr. Kissinger's agreement to contribute a review of Robert B. Altman's *Dean Acheson: A Life In the Cold War* for The New York Times Book Review.

Jessica LePorin
Office of Henry Kissinger
To the Editorial Contracts Office:

Following please find the signed contract and W-9 form in connection with Dr. Kissinger’s agreement to contribute a review of Robert Beisner’s *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War* for *The New York Times Book Review*.

Jessica LePorin
Office of Henry Kissinger
This letter will constitute our agreement with respect to the articles and other materials (collectively, the "Articles") you write or contribute to, on a freelance basis, for The New York Times newspaper or nytimes.com (or any successor thereto) (collectively, "The Times").

1. (a) Upon publication of the Articles(s), you will be paid the amount agreed upon between you and The Times.

    (b) The Times will reimburse you for reasonable and necessary expenses provided that such expenses have been pre-approved and you submit documentation acceptable to The Times within sixty (60) days of incurring said expenses.

2. (a) The Times owns all right, title and interest, including copyright, in and to the Article(s), throughout the world (such material being commissioned by The Times as a contribution to a collective work and therefore a "work made for hire" under the Copyright Act or, alternatively, if not a "work made for hire," then you hereby assign all such right, title, interest and copyright in and to the Article(s) to The Times). Notwithstanding such ownership, except as set forth in paragraph 6 below, The Times agrees to pay the by-lined writer of the Article(s) fifty percent (50%) of its net receipts (that is, receipts after deduction of syndication expenses) from syndication of the Article(s) ("Syndication Fee"). Articles are "syndicated" when they are sold individually, and not as part of The Times or other articles published in The Times, to a third party for republication in any form. Thus, for example, the inclusion of the Article(s) in The New York Times News Service is not a "syndication" for which additional compensation would be paid.

    (b) In addition to the foregoing, you hereby grant to The Times a perpetual, worldwide, royalty-free, paid-up non-exclusive transferable license under copyright to reproduce, distribute, display, perform, translate or otherwise publish your Prior Contributions in any form or media, whether or not such prior contribution may be individually accessed, perceived or retrieved from such form or media, and to authorize third parties to exercise such rights, provided that this license shall be limited to the use of Prior Contributions in forms or media that contain other articles from The Times. As used in this Section 2 (b), "Prior Contributions" shall mean articles, columns or any other materials written by you and published in The New York Times newspaper or on nytimes.com prior to the date of this agreement, other than such materials as are already covered by a written agreement between you and The Times.

3. The Article(s) will cover subjects, and be submitted on a schedule to be agreed upon between you and the editors. You agree to cooperate in the normal editing process of The Times, including such rewrites as may be requested. In the event the Article(s) is (are) not published, you will be paid a kill fee in an amount to be agreed upon by you and the assigning editor. The payment of a kill fee shall be in the sole discretion of the assigning editor.

4. The Times shall have the right to use your name, likeness and by-line in connection with the advertising and/or promotion of The New York Times newspaper and nytimes.com and the Article(s).

5. You warrant that the Article(s) will be original and that it (they) will not plagiarize another's work, infringe another's copyright or trademark, violate any person's rights, including the right of privacy, or contain libelous or otherwise unlawful or misleading material. You also warrant that the Article(s) will not have appeared in any other publication, in whole or in part. You hereby agree to cooperate fully with The Times in responding to and defending against any third-party claims relating to the Article(s).

6. You agree that with regard to the Article(s) written under this agreement, you will take care to avoid conflicts of interest or the appearance of conflict, and you will otherwise comply with the applicable provisions of the policies on Ethical Journalism set forth at http://www.nytimes.com/company-properties-times-coe.html. For example, but without limitation, in connection with the Article(s), you will not accept free transportation, gifts, junkets, or commissions/assignments from current or potential news sources, and you agree to disclose to The Times any financial interest you may have in the subject matter of the Article(s). To the extent the Article is syndicated for use in an advertisement or promotion, there will be a maximum Syndication Fee. You will not use your association with The Times to advertise or otherwise promote or identify yourself in any speaking engagements or public appearances you may have without the prior permission of The Times.

7. For a period of 14 days from publication of the Article(s), you will not permit any article by you on a subject matter similar to that of the Article(s) to appear in any publication which is competitive with The Times, without prior approval of The Times. (Competitive publications include any newspaper, magazine or other publication, without regard to the form or media of publication, whose editorial focus is either New York City or general interest news and information.) Thereafter, you may write on the same subject matter for any publication. Other than the foregoing, your ability to write for other publications is not restricted.
8. You acknowledge that your relationship to The Times is that of an independent contractor. As such, you will not be an employee of The Times, nor will you be entitled to any employee benefits, such as medical benefits, life insurance, retirement benefits, etc. Since you are an independent contractor, The Times will not withhold moneys, including but not limited to taxes and FICA on amounts paid to you under this agreement. At the end of the year, The Times will send you IRS Form 1099 which will reflect all amounts paid to you during the year.

9. This agreement sets forth the complete understanding and agreement of the parties, shall supersede any prior agreements between the parties on the subject matter hereof, and may not be amended or modified except in writing and signed by both parties. The terms of paragraphs 2 and 5 shall survive any termination of this agreement.

10. This agreement has been made in and shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of New York applicable to agreements executed and wholly to be performed therein. Any action to enforce this agreement shall be brought exclusively in the federal or state courts located in the County of New York.

If this letter accurately reflects the terms of our agreement, please fax a signed copy to the Editorial Contracts Office at (212) 556-4401.

Sincerely,

THE NEW YORK TIMES NEWSPAPER
DIVISION OF THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY

By: William E. Schmidt
Assistant Managing Editor

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name:</th>
<th>Henry A. Kissinger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Byline (if different):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address:</td>
<td>350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York, NY 10022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Social Security (or EID): |                     |
| Phone Number (primary):   | 212/759-7919        |
| Phone Number (secondary): |                     |
| Fax Number:               | 212/759-0042        |
| Email Address:            | tamantea@kmglobal.com |
| Other Contact Information:| Office contact is Theresa Amantea - 212/759-7919 office 201/697-2431 cellular |

---

Accepted and Agreed to:

By: [Signature]  Date: 8/16/06

---

#26529 v.17
Sir:

Attached are the IRS Form W-9 (prepared by Dennis Gish) and the contract from the *New York Times* for your signature, in advance of your writing the review of Robert Beisner's *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War* for *The New York Times* Sunday Book Review.

The fee will be determined upon receipt of your review. It is set by the editor who will work on the piece and based on "a number of things, such as the book being reviewed, content of your review, number of words, etc."

Theresa
Hi,

I just wanted to make sure that you received and were able to open the NYT Freelance Writer's Contract I recently sent to you, as I have yet to receive a signed copy back from you. If you were unable to open the attachment, please contact me and I will resend it via another method (e.g., fax or overnight mail). If you have the contract, please sign it and fax a copy to me at 212-556-4401 as soon as possible.

Sincerely,
Michaela Williams
Director, Editorial Contracts
212-556-1918
E-Mail: mickey@nytimes.com
From: NYT-PACT [nyt-pact@nytimes.com]  
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 5:55 PM  
To: jleporin@kmaglobal.com  
Subject: Freelance writer's contract

Dear Henry Kissinger,

I have been asked to forward to you the attached copy of The New York Times freelance writer's contract. Please note that in addition to the standard contract, I have attached a copy of the W-9 form, which the Internal Revenue Service requires as confirmation of your Social Security Number. Please be sure to return this form, completed, along with your signed contract.

If you are unable to open the attachment*, please contact me (Rusha Haljuci) in the Editorial Contracts Office at (212) 556-5988 or via email at newscontracts@nytimes.com and I will fax it to you instead. If you do not have a Social Security number and live and work outside of the United States, please contact me and I will forward a W-8 form to you.

*Please note, in order to print the contract, you may need to download the Adobe Acrobat Reader for your computer. The download is free and is tremendously useful to have as it will enable you to download similar attachments in the future. ALSO NOTE THAT THE DOCUMENT ITSELF IS PROTECTED AND CANNOT BE ALTERED OR TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER FORMAT FOR ALTERATION. To download the Reader, just click on the following URL:

http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep2.html

Once you have successfully opened the attachment, please:

1) print the attachments  
2) review, complete, and sign both the contract and the W-9 form  
3) keep the hard copy for your files  
4) fax a copy of the signed contract and completed W-9 to the Editorial Contracts Office at fax#: 212-556-4401  

PLEASE DO NOT USE MAIL UNLESS UNAVOIDABLE

Sincerely,

Rusha Haljuci  
Editorial Contracts  
212-556-5988
Jessee LePorin

From: Jessee LePorin [jleporin@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 08, 2006 4:55 PM
To: 'gewen@nytimes.com'
Subject: Book Review by Henry Kissinger

Dear Mr. Gewen:

Many thanks for your e-mail in which you invite Dr. Kissinger to review Mr. Beisner's book for the NYT Sunday Book Review. Dr. Kissinger, who is currently out of town, has received the book you recently sent and will be able to get a review it by the end of next week. Would you kindly e-mail me the contract that you refer to in your e-mail? Also, would you provide us with your telephone number, in the event we need to reach you by phone?

Thank you,
Jessee LePorin

Jessica P. LePorin
Office of Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022
TF (212) 759-7919
Fax (212) 759-0042

8/8/2006
Dear Dr. Kissinger--

We were wondering if you would be interested in reviewing "Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War," by Robert L. Beisner for The New York Times Sunday Book Review. We would want 1700 words (though we could go higher if you wish) and we would need the review by August 21 (though, again, we could be flexible about the deadline if necessary). However, if you decide to take on the assignment, we will have to ask you to sign a contract, required of all nonemployees of The Times, that explicitly grants us the right to reproduce your material electronically. So let me know about all this. Thanks,

Barry Gewen

Sir:

The NY Times Sunday Book Review asks if you would write a review of Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War. Length: 1700 words (at the least); deadline: Mon., Aug. 21 (but it is flexible). They mention that you would have to sign a contract granting them explicit rights to reproduce your piece electronically.

Any interest?

Regret and explain

Prefer: Let me see copy

Theresa

7/29/06

Do you want to write a review?

Yes

No