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[4]

DATE 8/10/06 CORR. FILE die welt

ACTION: Alan Stape Dennis

Joshua Jessee Maggie

John B. Suzanne Theresa

SUBJ. FILE _____

CROSS REF. _____

STAFF MEMO _____

DC OFFICE:
Christie / Jody / Ann / Rose

COMMENTS:
a/o JL sent HK's article
(he called Seibel directly
to explain they would have
to use an already published
piece)
a/o unpublished version (in German)
attached.

INFO COPY TO:

ROUTE CC COPY TO:

TO BE FILED ✓ _____

DIE WELT

INTERNATIONALE SICHERHEIT

Ordnung kontra Chaos

Die größte Herausforderung der nächsten Jahre besteht in der Verbindung transnationaler Terrorgruppen wie Hisbollah mit Staaten wie dem Iran. Gefährlich ist deren Bestreben, das als ungerecht empfundene internationale Staatensystem zu untergraben.

Von Henry Kissinger

Zwei Missverständnisse dominieren die Diskussion über den Libanon. Erstens, dass die Hisbollah eine herkömmliche Terrororganisation wäre. Zweitens, dass die Waffenruhe das Ende des Krieges bedeutete. Beide Ansichten sind falsch.

Tatsächlich ist die Hisbollah eine Metastase des Al-Qaida-Musters. Sie agiert offen als Staat im Staate. Zwei UN-Resolutionen zum Trotz befehligt sie auf libanesischem Boden eine Armee, die stärker und besser ausgerüstet ist als die libanesische. Finanziert und ausgebildet vom Iran, können ihre gut organisierten Einheiten Krieg gegen einen mächtigen Gegner führen. Als Schiiten-Partei hat die Hisbollah zwei Minister in der libanesischen Regierung, die sich aber nicht an Regierungsbeschlüsse gebunden fühlen. Ein nichtstaatliches Gebilde auf dem Boden eines Staates mit allen Attributen eines Staates, gestützt von der größten Macht in der Region, ist ein neues Phänomen.

Seit ihrer Gründung hat die Hisbollah permanent Krieg geführt. 1983 tötete sie beim Angriff auf eine US-Kaserne 241 Marines und brachte Amerika dazu, seine Friedenstruppen aus Beirut abzuziehen. Ihr Zermürbungskrieg gegen israelische Truppen im Südlibanon endete im Jahre 2000 mit Israels Rückzug. Jetzt provozierte die Entführung zweier israelischer Soldaten auf israelischem Boden einen israelischen Vergeltungsangriff.

Wir erleben keine isolierten Terroranschläge, sondern einen sorgfältig vorbereiteten Angriff auf das internationale System von Souveränität und territorialer Integrität. Die Gründung von Organisationen wie Hisbollah und al-Qaida signalisiert die Ersetzung nationaler durch transnationale Loyalitäten. Die treibende Kraft hinter dieser Kampfansage ist die dschihadistische Überzeugung, dass die geltende Ordnung illegitim sei, nicht die Hisbollah und ihr Dschihad. Für die Anhänger des Dschihad lässt sich das Schlachtfeld nicht mit Grenzen definieren, die auf einer von ihnen abgelehnten Weltordnung gründen; was wir Terror nennen, ist für die Dschihadisten eine Kriegshandlung mit dem Ziel, unrechtmäßige Regierungen zu stürzen.

Eine Waffenruhe beendet diesen Krieg nicht; mit ihr tritt er vielmehr in eine neue Phase ein. Dieser Angriff auf die Weltordnung durch das Bündnis radikaler Staaten mit transnationalen, nicht-staatlichen Gruppen ist zwar vor allem ein Problem des Nahen Ostens, wo Grenzen selten nationale Traditionen nachzeichnen und nicht einmal ein Jahrhundert alt sind. Wo immer es militante, radikalislamische Gruppen gibt, könnte sich dieses Phänomen jedoch ebenfalls ausbreiten.

In diesem Muster ist die Libanon-Krise ein klassischer Fall. Die wahren Ziele der Hisbollah waren transnational. Es ging nicht um den Libanon, sondern darum, die tausend Jahre alte Spaltung zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten auf der Grundlage des gemeinsamen Hasses gegen Israel und Amerika zu überwinden; den Druck auf den Iran wegen seines Atomprogramms zu vermindern; zu zeigen, dass Israel unter Druck handlungsunfähig gemacht werden konnte; Iran als zentrale Größe bei allen Verhandlungen zu etablieren; den Friedensprozess in Palästina zu sabotieren; zu zeigen, dass Syrien - der zweite große Sponsor der Hisbollah - nach wie vor in der Lage ist, seine Ziele im Libanon zu verfolgen.

Kein Zweifel, der Krieg hat der Hisbollah schwere Verluste zugefügt. Die psychologische Realität jedoch ist, dass die Hisbollah intakt geblieben ist und dass Israel sich als nicht fähig (oder nicht willens) erwiesen hat, die Raketenangriffe auf sein Territorium zu unterbinden und sich militärisch eine politisch bessere Verhandlungsposition zu erkämpfen.

Die Diskussion über die Kontrolle der Waffenruhe überträgt überkommene Sichtweisen auf eine nie da gewesene Situation. Eine der Kriegsparteien hat der Waffenruhe nicht zugestimmt und verweigert sowohl seine eigene Entwaffnung als auch die Freilassung der beiden entführten israelischen Soldaten, wie es die UN-Resolution fordert. Die Länder, die das erzwingen sollen, sind zwiegespalten aufgrund der Bedeutung, die sie ihren Beziehungen zum Iran beimessen, ihrer Angst vor Terroranschlägen im eigenen Land und - wenn

auch im geringeren Maße - ihres Interesses, ihre Beziehungen zu Syrien zu verbessern.

Das Mandat der UN-Truppe spiegelt diese Ambivalenzen. UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan hat erklärt, die UN-Mission diene nicht der Entwaffnung der Hisbollah, sondern solle einen politischen Prozess in Gang setzen, der "über einen inneren Konsens im Libanon erreicht werden muss". Syrien hat erklärt, dass es die Stationierung von UNIFIL-Truppen entlang seiner Grenzen als feindseligen Akt begreifen würde, und die UN haben sich gefügt. Wie soll der politische Prozess funktionieren, wenn die UN-Truppe sich den entscheidenden Herausforderungen gar nicht stellen darf? Die libanesische Armee - großteils Schiiten und mit veralteten Waffen ausgerüstet - kann weder die Hisbollah entwaffnen noch die Grenze zu Syrien kontrollieren. Verschärfend wirkt, dass die Hisbollah im libanesischen Parlament vertreten ist und in der Regierung sitzt. Beide Institutionen entscheiden in der Regel einvernehmlich. Die Hisbollah kann also die Kooperation der Beiruter Regierung mit der UN zur Durchsetzung der Waffenruhe blockieren.

Als Nächstes dürfte die Hisbollah versuchen, die Beiruter Regierung einzuschüchtern und das im Krieg erreichte Ansehen nutzen, um die demokratischen Prozesse zu ihren Gunsten zu manipulieren. In einer solchen Situation werden Iran und Syrien die Bedingungen der Waffenruhe eher bestimmen als die UN-Kräfte, die - wie die Erfahrung lehrt - mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit abgezogen werden, sobald Terroranschläge Opfer unter ihnen fordern. Die Herausforderung für Amerika und alle, die sich um die Weltordnung sorgen, besteht darin, die Notwendigkeit zielgerichteter Gestaltung des Waffenstillstands zu erkennen. Hauptziel muss sein, die Hisbollah daran zu hindern, sich erneut zu bewaffnen und den politischen Prozess im Libanon zu dominieren. Andernfalls werden die UN-Truppen zum Schutzschild, hinter dem die Voraussetzungen für eine noch größere Gefahr geschaffen werden.

Der Libanon-Krieg hat die Lage Israels dramatisch verschärft. Vordem ging es bei der Palästina-Frage, all ihrer Heftigkeit zum Trotz, um herkömmliche Prinzipien des Staatenwesens: die Legitimität Israels; die Schaffung eines palästinensischen Staates; die Grenzziehung zwischen diesen beiden Gebilden; die Sicherheitsfrage und die Regeln friedlicher Koexistenz. Die Hisbollah, die den Südlibanon übernommen hatte, die Hamas und verschiedene dschihadistische Gruppen, die die palästinensische Autonomiebehörde beiseite geschoben haben, wollen eben diese Entwicklung verhindern. Sie verachten die Programme gemäßigter arabischer und israelischer Führer. Sie lehnen die bloße Existenz Israels ab, nicht die eine oder andere Grenzziehung.

Infolgedessen liegt der Friedensprozess in Trümmern. Nachdem nichtstaatliche Dschihadisten Israel von Gaza und dem Libanon aus mit Raketen beschossen haben, dürfte es Israel schwer fallen, einseitige Rückzüge noch länger als Weg zum Frieden anzusehen. Ebenso schwierig dürfte es sein, unter den jetzigen Bedingungen einen Verhandlungspartner zu finden, der die Sicherheit des Landes garantieren würde. Und schließlich fehlt es Israels Regierung nach dem Libanon-Krieg an Autorität und öffentlicher Zustimmung, um auch nur die 80 000 Siedler aus der Westbank abzuziehen, wie Sharons Plan das vorsah.

Zugleich ist der derzeitige Status quo auf Dauer nicht tragbar. Es bedarf einer neuen"Road Map" für jene umfassende Nahostpolitik, die auf den Libanon-Krieg folgen muss. Um die von der Verbindung von nichtstaatlichem Fanatismus mit staatlicher Machtpolitik ausgelöste Krise in den Griff zu bekommen, müssen Amerika, Europa und die gemäßigten arabischen Staaten einen gemeinsamen Ansatz erarbeiten. Nur so kann sich in den besetzten Gebieten eine Führung herausbilden, die der friedlichen Koexistenz zustimmt.

Alles läuft immer wieder auf die Herausforderung durch den Iran hinaus. Der Iran bildet die Hisbollah aus, den Staat im Staate Libanon, finanziert sie und rüstet sie aus. Er finanziert und unterstützt die Sadr-Miliz, den Staat im Staate Irak. Er arbeitet an einem Atomwaffenprogramm, das zu unkontrollierter nuklearer Proliferation führen und dem Land als Schirm für die systematische Zerstörung der Ordnung zumindest in der Region dienen würde.

Es geht um eine neue Weltordnung, nicht um Veränderungen im herkömmlichen Rahmen.

Eine gemeinsame atlantische Politik, unterstützt von den gemäßigten arabischen Staaten, muss jetzt oberste Priorität haben, ganz gleich wie pessimistisch einen die Erfahrung mit früheren derartigen Versuchen stimmt.

In der Libanon-Krise lassen sich immerhin die Anfänge eines solchen Prozesses erkennen. Europa hat die amerikanische Sichtweise in ausreichendem Maße geteilt, und Amerika hat den europäischen Bedenken in ausreichendem Maße Rechnung getragen, um die Vorgehensweise im Sicherheitsrat abzustimmen und eine bedeutende Friedenstruppe in den Libanon zu entsenden.

Es bleibt abzuwarten, ob diese Zusammenarbeit aufrechterhalten werden kann; insbesondere, ob das UN-Engagement im Libanon sich als geeignetes Mittel im Umgang mit den hier umrissenen Gefahren erweist oder

nur dazu dient, nötigen Entscheidungen auszuweichen. Das gilt noch mehr für die bevorstehenden Verhandlungen mit dem Iran. Wir stehen vor der Notwendigkeit, eine neue Weltordnung zu errichten oder andernfalls eine globale Katastrophe zu riskieren. Weder Europa noch Amerika sind der Aufgabe allein gewachsen. Reicht diese Erkenntnis aus, das Bewusstsein gemeinsamer Ziele zu erneuern?

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Theresa Cimino

From: Jessee LePorin [jleporin@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 4:07 PM
To: andrea.seibel@welt.de
Cc: tamantea@kmaglobal.com; 'Christie Neumann'
Subject: Article by Henry Kissinger

Dear Ms. Seibel:

As per your conversation with Dr. Kissinger this morning, he asked that I forward you the attached article which is going to be distributed by his syndicate.

Best,
Jessee LePorin

Jessica P. LePorin
Office of Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
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Fax (212) 759-0042

[LC]

HENRY KISSINGER

For immediate release

(ATTENTION EDITORS: This column ends with the words "Is that realization sufficient to regenerate a sense of common purpose?." If the column you see below concludes any other way, you have received an incomplete version. Please contact TMS customer service at 800-346-8798 for a retransmission.)

AFTER LEBANON

By Henry A. Kissinger

Two misconceptions dominate public discussion on the crisis in Lebanon. The first is that Hezbollah is a traditional terrorist organization operating covertly outside the law. The second is that the ceasefire marks an end to the war in Lebanon. Neither of these views is valid.

Hezbollah is, in fact, a metastasization of the al-Qaida pattern. It acts as an overt state within a state. It commands an army much stronger and far better equipped than Lebanon's on Lebanese soil, in defiance of two UN resolutions. Financed and trained by Iran, it fights wars with organized units against a major adversary. As a Shia party, it has ministers in the government of Lebanon who do not consider themselves bound by its decisions. A non-state entity on the soil of a state with all the attributes of a state and backed by the major regional power is a new phenomenon in international relations.

Since its creation, Hezbollah has been almost permanently at war. The first of three Hezbollah wars occurred when, in 1983, its attack on US barracks killed 241 Marines and convinced America to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from Beirut. The second was a campaign of harassment that induced Israeli forces to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000. The third was inaugurated this year with the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers inside Israel that led to the Israeli retaliatory attack.

We are witnessing a carefully conceived assault, not isolated terrorist attacks, on the international system of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The creation of organizations like Hezbollah and al-Qaida symbolizes that transnational loyalties are replacing national ones. The driving force behind this challenge is the jihadist conviction that it is the existing order that is illegitimate, not the Hezbollah and jihad method of fighting it. For the jihad's adherents, the battlefield cannot be defined by frontiers based on principles of world order they reject; what we call terror is, to the jihadists, an act of war to undermine illegitimate regimes.

A ceasefire does not end this war; it inaugurates a new phase in it. This twin assault on the global order, by the combination of radical states with transnational non-state groups sometimes organized as militias, is a particular challenge in the Middle East, where frontiers denote few national traditions and are not yet a century old. But it could spread to wherever militant, radical Islamic groups exist. Leaders therefore are torn between

following the principles of the existing international order on which their economy may depend, or yielding (if not joining) the transnational movement on which their political survival may depend.

The crisis in Lebanon is a classic case of that pattern. By the rules of the old international order, the war technically took place between two states — Lebanon and Israel — which, in fact, have very few conflicting interests. Their sole territorial dispute concerns a small strip of territory, Shebaa Farms, occupied by Israel from Syria in 1967 and indirectly certified as not being part of Lebanon by the UN in 2000. The UN ceasefire resolution affirms that the crisis was provoked by Hezbollah, which had kept the Lebanese armed forces out of the southern part of Lebanon facing Israel for thirty years. Yet by the existing international rules, the secretary of state was obliged to negotiate on the ceasefire with the Lebanese government, which controlled no forces in a position to implement it while the only forces capable of doing so have never formally accepted it.

The real goals of the Lebanese war were transnational and not Lebanese: to overcome the millennia-old split between Sunnis and Shia on the basis of hatred for Israel and America; to relieve diplomatic pressure on Iran's nuclear program; to demonstrate that Israel would be held hostage if pressure became too acute; to establish Iran as a major factor in any negotiation; to scuttle the Palestinian peace process; to show that Syria — the second major sponsor of Hezbollah — remained in a position to pursue its ambitions in Lebanon.

This is why the balance sheet of the war in Lebanon must be assessed in large part in psychological and political terms. No doubt the war inflicted heavy casualties on Hezbollah. The overriding psychological reality, however, is that Hezbollah remained intact and that Israel proved unable (or unwilling) either to suppress the rocket attacks on its territory or to gear its military power to political objectives capable of providing bargaining positions after the cessation of hostilities.

Much of the discussion over observance of the ceasefire applies traditional verities to an unprecedented situation. One of the principals in the war is not a party to the ceasefire and has refused either to disarm or to release the two Israeli prisoners it kidnapped, as called for in the UN resolution. The countries needed to enforce the agreement have been ambivalent because of the importance they attach to relations with Iran, their fear of terrorist attacks on their own territory, and, to a lesser extent, their interest in improving relations with Syria.

The mandate for the UN force in southern Lebanon reflects these hesitations. The secretary general of the UN, Kofi Annan, has declared that the mission of the UN force is not to disarm Hezbollah but to encourage a political process that, in his words, "must be achieved through an internal Lebanese consensus, a political process for which the new UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) is not and cannot be a substitute." Syria has declared that it would consider the deployment of UNIFIL forces along its borders as a hostile act, and the UN has acquiesced. How is the political process going to work when the UN force is precluded from dealing with the most probable challenges?

The Lebanese army — composed largely of Shia and armed with obsolescent weapons — is in no position to disarm Hezbollah or to control the Syrian border.

To compound these complexities, Hezbollah, as a political party, participates in the Lebanese parliament and, on the ministerial level, in the central government. Both institutions generally make decisions by consensus. Hezbollah thus has at least a blocking veto on those issues on which the cooperation of the Beirut government is needed for enforcement.

Hezbollah's likely next move will be an attempt to dominate the Beirut government by intimidation and using the prestige gained in the war, manipulating democratic procedures. In such a situation, Iran and Syria will be in a stronger position to shape the rules of the ceasefire than the UN forces, which — as experience shows — are likely to be withdrawn when terrorist attacks inflict casualties. The challenge for American policy and all concerned with world order is to recognize that the ceasefire requires purposeful management. A principal objective must be to prevent the rearmament of Hezbollah or its domination of the Lebanese political process. Otherwise, the UN force will provide a shield for creating the conditions for another even more dangerous explosion.

The war in Lebanon has transformed the position of Israel dramatically. Heretofore the Palestinian issue has for all its intensity been about the traditional principles of the state system: the legitimacy of Israel; the creation of a Palestinian state; the drawing of borders between these entities; the security arrangement and rules for peaceful coexistence. From Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's "land for peace" formula, to Saudi Arabia's offer of peace and mutual recognition, to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's concept of unilateral withdrawal from occupied territories, the so-called peace process was conceived as culminating in an internationally accepted peace between internationally recognized states.

Hezbollah and other rejectionist groups are determined to prevent precisely this evolution. Hezbollah, which took over southern Lebanon, and Hamas and various jihadist groups, which marginalized the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, disdain the schemes of moderate Arab and Israeli leaders. They reject the very existence of Israel, not any particular set of borders.

One of the consequences is that the traditional peace process is now in shambles. After being attacked with missiles from both Gaza and Lebanon launched by non-state jihadists, Israel will find it difficult to view unilateral withdrawal as a road to peace, nor will it be able under current conditions to find a partner to guarantee security. Finally, in the aftermath of Lebanon, the current Israeli government lacks the authority or public support to withdraw even the 80,000 settlers from the West Bank envisaged in the Sharon plan.

At the same time, an indefinite continuation of the status quo is not sustainable. Some new road map must emerge to underpin the comprehensive Mideast policy that must follow the Lebanon war. To deal with the crisis produced by the combination of non-state

fanaticism and state power politics, a joint project among America, Europe, and the moderate Arab states is needed to work out a common approach. Only in this manner can a leadership accepting peaceful coexistence emerge in the occupied territories.

Everything returns to the challenge of Iran. It trains, finances, and equips Hezbollah, the state within a state in Lebanon. It finances and supports the Sadr militia, the state within a state in Iraq. It works on a nuclear weapons program, which would drive nuclear proliferation out of control and provide a safety net for the systematic destruction of at least the regional order. The challenge is now about world order more than about adjustments within an accepted framework.

A common Atlantic policy backed by moderate Arab states must become a top priority, no matter how pessimistic previous experience with such projects leaves one. The debate sparked by the Iraq war over American rashness versus European escapism is dwarfed by what the world now faces. Both sides of the Atlantic should put their best minds together on how to deal with the common danger of a wider war merging into a war of civilizations against the background of a nuclear armed Middle East. This cannot be done through ad hoc bargaining over Security Council resolutions; rather, the Security Council resolutions should emerge from an agreed strategy.

Many of the countries in such a grouping have a more optimistic view about the prospects of diplomacy than the American administration. We should be open to these concerns and be prepared to join a serious exploration of prospects for turning away from confrontation. But the European allies need to accept that this process should not be driven by domestic politics or media pressure. It has to include a bottom line beyond which diplomatic flexibility cannot go and a time limit to prevent negotiations from turning into a shield for developing new assaults.

In the Lebanon crisis, one can detect the beginning of such a process. Europe shared enough of the American perception, and America paid enough attention to European concerns, to produce a coordinated diplomacy in the Security Council and to supply a significant peacekeeping force for southern Lebanon.

It remains to be seen whether this cooperation can be sustained in the next phase, specifically, whether the UN effort in Lebanon can become a means to deal with the dangers outlined here or become a way to avoid the necessary decisions. This is even more true of the impending Iran negotiations. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, thoughtful observers have wondered whether the Atlantic ties can be maintained in the absence of a commonly perceived danger. We now know that we face the imperative of building a new world order or potential global catastrophe. It cannot be done alone by either side of the Atlantic. Is that realization sufficient to regenerate a sense of common purpose?

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Theresa Cimino

From: Jessee LePorin [jleporin@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 11:40 AM
To: tamantea@kmaglobal.com
Subject: FW: Dr. Kissinger's article

Rec'd today - again, it doesn't clarify what they want.

-----Original Message-----
From: gesine.leidicke@welt.de [mailto:gesine.leidicke@welt.de]
Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 10:16 AM
To: jleporin@kmaglobal.com
Cc: andrea.seibel@welt.de; armgard.neubert@welt.de
Subject: Dr. Kissinger's article

Dear Ms Leporin

Christie Neumann gave me your e-mail address.

I am writing on behalf of our deputy editor-in-chief Andrea Seibel.

Mrs Seibel is waiting eagerly for Dr. Kissinger's column for DIE WELT.

Christie said that he might be still writing it?

Would you please let us know when we could expect it?

You could send it to

Chefredaktion@welt.de

Or

Andrea.seibel@welt.de

With many thanks and kind regards

Gesine Leidicke

Sekretariat Chefredaktion

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Theresa Cimino

From: Jessee LePorin [jleporin@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2006 9:58 AM
To: tamantea@kmaglobal.com
Subject: FW: Dr. Kissingers Essay 9/11

Hi Theresa,

As you can see, she doesn't specify which piece. Do you think I should reply asking her to specify, or should we just said her what he already did?

Tx,
JL

-----Original Message-----
From: andrea.seibel@welt.de [mailto:andrea.seibel@welt.de]
Sent: Tuesday, September 05, 2006 3:12 AM
To: jleporin@kmaglobal.com
Subject: AW: Dr. Kissingers Essay 9/11

Dear Jessee,

great! Could you please sent the piece as soon as possible?

Yours, Andrea

Andrea Seibel

Stellv. Chefredakteurin
DIE WELT / Berliner Morgenpost
Ressortleiterin FORUM
Fon: ++49 (0) 30 / 25 91 - 7 17 53
Fax: ++49 (0) 30 / 25 91 - 7 19 29

> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> **Von:** Jessee LePorin [mailto:jleporin@kmaglobal.com]
> **Gesendet:** Freitag, 1. September 2006 20:56
> **An:** Seibel, Andrea
> **Betreff:** RE: Dr. Kissingers Essay 9/11
>
> Ms. Seibel:
>
> I wanted to keep you posted on the status of Dr. Kissinger's essay to commemorate the fifth anniversary of September 11. He is currently in the process of finishing a piece which his syndicate plans to distribute on Tuesday. Dr. Kissinger said you are welcome to use parts of that piece, which focuses more on the current situation but is relevant to your subject matter. Alternatively, he may be able to draft a much shorter piece for *Die Welt* mid-next week.
>
> For your information, Monday is a U.S. holiday, therefore we will be in the office again on Tuesday, September 5.
>
> Have a nice weekend,

Jessee

Jessica P. LePorin
Office of Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022
TF (212) 759-7919
Fax (212) 759-0042

-----Original Message-----
From: andrea.seibel@welt.de [mailto:andrea.seibel@welt.de]
Sent: Monday, August 28, 2006 8:26 AM
To: jleporin@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Dr. Kissingers Essay 9/11

Dear Jessica,

time is running out. When can we get a copy of Dr. Kissingers essay?

Yours

Andrea Seibel

Stellv. Chefredakteurin
DIE WELT / Berliner Morgenpost
Ressortleiterin FORUM
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Fax: ++49 (0) 30 / 25 91 - 7 19 29

Theresa Cimino

From: Jessee LePorin [jleporin@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Friday, September 01, 2006 2:56 PM
To: andrea.seibel@welt.de
Subject: RE: Dr. Kissingers Essay 9/11

Ms. Seibel:

I wanted to keep you posted on the status of Dr. Kissinger's essay to commemorate the fifth anniversary of September 11. He is currently in the process of finishing a piece which his syndicate plans to distribute on Tuesday. Dr. Kissinger said you are welcome to use parts of that piece, which focuses more on the current situation but is relevant to your subject matter. Alternatively, he may be able to draft a much shorter piece for *Die Welt* mid-next week.

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New York, NY 10022
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Fax (212) 759-0042

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Sent: Monday, August 28, 2006 8:26 AM
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Stellv. Chefredakteurin
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Fax: ++49 (0) 30 / 25 91 - 7 19 29

Jessee LePorin

From: Jessee LePorin [jleporin@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 10:13 AM
To: 'chefredaktion@welt.de'
Subject: Re Possible Essay by Henry Kissinger

To Andrea Seibel:

Many thanks for your fax dated August 10. Dr. Kissinger is currently out of town, but has indicated he will let us know next week (the week of August 21) if he is able to contribute an essay re the war on terrorism for *Die Welt*. I will contact you at that time, but wanted to make you aware of the status of your request.
Wishing you a nice weekend,
Jessee LePorin

Jessica P. LePorin
Office of Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022
TF (212) 759-7919
Fax (212) 759-0042

CD 8/10/06

Andrea Seibel, Die Welt, sends fax asking if you would like to write an essay (800-1200 wds) to be published in correlation with the fifth anniversary of 9/11.

Yes; let them know I will write something _____

Check with syndicate _____

Prefer _____

JL

I'll let her know
next week. Make
sure I do

[LC]

DIE WELT

AUG 10 2006

Telefax an:
The Hon. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
c/o Kissinger, McLarty Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Datum: August 10, 2006
Fax: 001 212 759 0042
Anzahl der Seiten (inkl.): 2

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re: Possible essay on the War on Terrorism for DIE WELT

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

as the fifth anniversary of September the 11th draws near, we deem it important to put into perspective the underlying psychological currents and respective historical as well as political predispositions that appear to be pushing Europe and the U.S. further apart from each other ever since. Although in the aftermath of that day, a superficial emotional unity seemed to bring the West up to speed with regard to identifying a common encompassing cause, it cannot possibly be denied any longer how after the fact, a deep rift is laying bare the differences that shape a fractured Western response by now. Europe and the U.S. are giving a starkly different wording to what transpired on 9/11 -- in that Europeans refer to it every so often as merely an "Anschlag" versus the firm U.S. notion of a full-fledged "Angriff" -- seems to hint at it. And words, to our mind, make quite a difference here. A war-torn Europe keeping herself aloof from an America that, contrary to European public opinion, has accumulated a great deal of war memories, too, albeit of a different nature.

As someone being intimately in the know about both the philosophical traditions and political conceptions that frame the world outlook of the entities on the near and the far shores of the Atlantic, it occurs to us that you may be in a unique position to shed light on the mutual cultural, historic and philosophical misperceptions and misunderstandings that at times seem to render the transatlantic relationship quaint when it comes to developing a decisive long-term strategy to deal with the root causes of terrorism.

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Steffen Naumann, Dr. Andreas Wiele

[LC]

Add to it the notion that quite a couple of Middle Eastern countries that currently harbor terrorist groups are nation states in name only, their policies and politics driven by religious and tribal forces and loyalties that transcend borders, and it may seem that in the end, classic diplomacy addressing nation states governments could well fail in dealing with them. As such, the Middle East somehow might resemble how Germany posed a challenge during the Thirty Years' War. While it would certainly not constitute an indisputable historic simile, there are some traits that do look familiar at any rate, or so it would appear to us, in that in 1648, it took a new concept of international law, and a new understanding of religious tolerance, to finally bring the war to a close. Likewise, today the U.S. Government as well as many European politicians are hinting at the War on Terrorism as being a possibly futile endeavor as long as there is no advancement in international law accompanying it, and no substantial effort to win a War of Ideas that is at the core of this conflict.

Pondering issues of this nature, we cannot help but think that a topic like this one might perfectly suit your mind that has brought about lucid studies on how war-time diplomacy entrenched in underlying traditions and forces has to be conducted, in order to be successful. Recalling that you once mentioned the European Union as a possible role model to mediate and to solve conflicts, it would obviously be of tremendous interest to our readership if you could expand on it, in case it relates to the present conflict in any meaningful way.

In case you feel inclined to do so, and your schedule allows for it, we would be truly honored to publish an essay of yours in the 800-1200 words range, the envisioned publication date being either Saturday September 9 or Monday September 11.

We would appreciate a hint of yours as to whether you would want to accept our invitation, at a point in time of your convenience. To facilitate an appropriate translation, we would be grateful if a text would eventually be made available to us by Thursday September 7.

Sincerely yours,

Andrea Seibel